I.B. TAURIS

SONYA NEVIN

MILITARY LEADERS AND SACRED SPACE IN CLASSICAL GREEK WARFARE

TEMPLES, SANCTUARIES AND CONFLICT IN ANTIQUITY

SONYA NEVIN is Research Fellow and Visiting Lecturer in Classics at the University of Roehampton, London. She was awarded a doctorate by University College Dublin in 2009, and her classical research interests include ancient Greek warfare, religion and historiography. She is co-director of a project to create animations based on the characters and scenes depicted on ancient Greek vases (www.panoply.org.uk). This is her first book.

'Military Leaders and Sacred Space in Classical Greek Warfare explores the interaction between two central facets of ancient Greek life: war and religion. The author examines how generals and soldiers dealt with conflicts between their military needs and the deeply ingrained cultural imperatives that required all Greeks to respect the inviolability of shrines, sanctuaries and temples, as well as the rich dedications these often housed. Sonya Nevin's searching analyses of the discourse of war in the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plutarch and other writers reveal how negative reports of their treatment of sacred space could harm the reputations of even the most successful generals – such as Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, or the great Spartan king Agesilaus. In a culture that placed a high premium on respect for the gods, accusations of impiety could seriously undermine a general's authority. Conversely a leader who was conspicuous in honouring the gods could – as Nevin shows – enhance his own prestige and raise the morale of his followers. This is an innovative and penetrating work.'

PHILIP DE SOUZA, Senior Lecturer in Classics,
University College Dublin

'This is a well-written and very interesting book. It addresses a fundamental question of classical Greek history – religion and war – but it approaches the subject in an innovative way, by analysing Greek leaders, Greek writers, and their attitudes as shown through their actions towards sacred space and sacred objects. How, for instance, should a military leader conduct himself towards foreign shrines, how do military leaders actually conduct themselves, and what consequences do classical authors assign to their behaviour? Any reader interested in the history, religion, or war of the classical world will find this book indispensable.'

ALFRED S. BRADFORD, John Saxon Chair of Ancient History,
University of Oklahoma

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Temples, Sanctuaries and Conflict in Antiquity

Sonya Nevin

I.B. TAURIS
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To my loved ones

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Abbreviations

CID:	G. Rougemont, *Corpus inscriptions de Delphes* (Paris, 1977–).
FGE:	D.L. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge, 1981).
FGrHist:	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, 15 vols (Leiden, 1923–58).
GRBS:	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*.
IG:	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin, 1873–).
LGS I & II:	H.T.A. von Prott and L. Ziehen, *Leges Graecorum Sacrae e Titulis Collectae*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1896–1906).
LSA:	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1955).
LSC Supp.:	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des Cités grecques: Supplement* (Paris, 1962).
LSCG:	F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des Cités grecques* (Paris, 1969).
RE:	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie d. klasischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1893–).
Syll:	W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*, 4 vols (Leipzig, 1915–24).
TAPA:	*Transactions [and Proceedings] of the American Philological Association*.
Tod:	M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Vol. 2: *403BC–323BC* (Oxford, 1948).
ZPE:	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*.

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Introduction

War was a backdrop to ancient Greek life, while interaction with gods and heroes through sacred places, objects and actions was also part of the everyday. Inevitably, those engaged in warfare faced decisions about how they should respond to the sacred phenomena that they encountered on campaign. It is widely acknowledged that unwritten laws required military leaders to respect sacred places, but the definition of respect could be ambiguous, and the pressure of danger, the demand for success, and the desire for dominance all influenced how people behaved. Gods, who were at once one's own and another's, presided over these territories, taking in an interest in what choices were made and how military leaders and their armies conducted themselves. Mortals, too, took an interest in each other's military conduct and stories of how military leaders behaved towards sacred sites were a key part of the discourse of war, affecting how individuals, states, and conflicts were regarded and remembered. This book examines the discourse of war and sacred space in classical Greece, exploring its values and how it expressed ideas of character and morality, piety and sacrilege, and power and change.

Scholarship on the conduct of ancient warfare has tended to fall into two main camps: the historical and the historiographical. The more historical approach has tended to assess the rules of warfare regarding sanctuaries by collating examples of incidents in which military conflict impacted directly upon sacred space in the form of looting, fighting, or cases of conspicuous avoidance.[1] This has provided an extremely valuable impression of the type of things that

could happen in ancient conflicts. There is a risk, however, of the examples becoming de-contextualised, limiting our ability to see how those incidents have been understood and shaped and the values associated with them.

The historiographical approach has been more focused on context, exploring ancient military values by analysing how ancient historians presented their material. Since the early twentieth century, Greek historiography has been increasingly understood to have been profoundly shaped by the purposes of protreptic moralism, that is, by the intention to provide the reader with explicit or implicit moral guidance. Literary techniques such as motif, structuring, narrator intervention, intertextuality, and direct speech shape how events are presented and how the reader is led to interpret them. Some events are passed over at break-neck speed, while others are presented in real-time, drawing the reader into the detail. These techniques are used to guide readers to a moral interpretation of past events and historical causation. Even Thucydides, once considered the most clinical of writers, has been demonstrated to have balanced the demands of historical exposition with profoundly moral themes, particularly the nature of power and the effect of conflict on social values.[2] Herodotus is another author whose moral purpose is now more fully appreciated. Greater awareness of the moral themes that structure the *Histories,* especially its recurring exploration of the concept of boundaries and the nature of despotism, have ensured that it is no longer sufficient to study it solely in terms of its reliability according to anachronistic standards.[3] Similarly, scholarship on Xenophon's *Hellenica* has helped to dispel the formerly frequent depreciation of that history by demonstrating that it is a work of moral instruction as well as a historical record.[4]

Ancient authors demonstrate a pronounced interest in the personal, social, and political implications of acting 'rightly' or 'wrongly', in political and military situations. Characterisation, whether in ancient biography or historiography, was never entirely neutral. An individual (or state) was regarded as a moral-agent, that is, as one free to make their own choices. As such the manner in which they responded to external circumstances was a mark of their character, in a manner that could be judged according to an established set of standards, deserving of praise or blame.[5] Although ancient authors differ on matters such as divine agency, piety is

always preferable to impiety, just as right is to wrong, reason is to rage, or moderation to excess. As a consequence, there is always significance in ancient authors' representations of human interaction with the sacred; such interaction is not presented neutrally, but as part of an interpretive scheme that prefers piety. As such historiography offers a valuable guide to the values associated with different behaviours and what the consequences of each were perceived to be.

These welcome breakthroughs in historiographical scholarship have clarified the importance of the moral frameworks within ancient historical works. However, much of this research has remained focused upon historiographical matters, without applying the conclusions to a broader consideration of the conduct of ancient warfare. This work will present an integrated approach, combining historiographical analysis with a historical exploration of the actions and dynamics depicted. This combination will offer a sense of what a military leader and their army might do and why, and will explore the cultural values and ideas of historical causation that are expressed through the depictions of their actions.

This work will focus on a selection of illustrative episodes from the late archaic and classical periods, ending with Macedon's increased involvement in Greek affairs in the fourth century. Good and bad behaviours are explored, although the emphasis tends towards the bad, exploring the parameters and perceived consequences of improper behaviour. As such, the majority of episodes take place in enemy territory or during defensive conflicts in home territory, while the topic of military leaders' peacetime interactions with their own cults has largely been left to another work. The term 'military leader' is deliberately broad. Here it encompasses generals, *strategoi*, as well as those with other military commands and those military leaders who were kings or tyrants. On some occasions, the evidence obscures the role of the individual in favour of the collective, so at times the representation of a group's behaviour is analysed rather than that of an individual leader.

A well as drawing on the big three historians, this work will also feature Diodorus Siculus' *Bibliotheke*, with its pronounced interest in empire, and other forms of literature including a range of Plutarch's *Lives* and moral essays. These latter works stem from a later period, but with their intense focus on moral character and coming from an author steeped in classical writers and history, they are simply too

valuable to ignore.[6] There will also be insights from archaeology, epigraphy, and iconography, but the focus remains on the ancient historians.

Part I offers an overview of what sacred space is in an ancient Greek context, what forms it took, what was in it, and how it was regulated. This is followed by an overview of ancient Greek military leadership structures, and a discussion of some of the early Greek literature addressing the subject of military interaction with the sacred. Part II examines military conduct in various contexts: the use of sanctuaries as fortified positions, sacrifice on enemy *acropoleis*, sacred items as targets, the presence of sanctuaries beside battlefields, and sanctuaries as places of post-battle asylum. Part III looks at the issue of relationships. It considers how interactions with sacred space could influence reputation and diplomacy, and offers a chronological examination of struggles to control the Panhellenic sanctuaries. Translations are taken or adapted from the Loeb unless otherwise stated. All dates are BCE.

PART I

Boundaries of Culture and Space

WHAT IS SACRED SPACE? THE SACRED LANDSCAPE

> Godlike Nausithous took them and settled them in Scherie, far from ordinary hard-working people. There he laid out the walls of a new city, built cities, put up temples for the gods, and divided up the land for cultivation. (*Od*. 6.7–10, trans. Rieu)

As this Homeric passage demonstrates, ancient Greeks were conscious that sacred places could be defined by human demarcation. While attributing the foundation of very ancient sites to mythical heroes close to the gods, they continued to designate new sacred sites consciously as well as maintaining the old. Awareness of the human origin of the distinction between sacred (ἁγνός) and profane (βέβηλος) space did not make it less meaningful. These were places dedicated to the worship of supernatural powers, ranging from the major Olympian and chthonic gods through minor deities, nymphs and similar immortals, and heroes and heroines with localised powers.[1] The communities of the archaic and classical eras had inherited and newly established a wide variety of sacred sites. Landscape features such as groves might be held sacred, presided over by particular heroes or heroines.[2] These might contain structures, such as an altar or tomb, although this was not always the case. Other sacred spaces were demarcated by clearings, boundary-stones, or walls. Monumentalised hero-shrines (heroons) could be found in urban or rural locations. Some sat within larger sanctuaries, such as the tomb of Pelops at Olympia, others stood in isolation. They might or

might not contain relics.[3] Anonymous figures might also be the focus of cult at Bronze Age tombs.[4]

Sanctuaries of deities were clearly identifiable as sacred sites, whether they were located within a city, outside city walls, or in the countryside. There was huge variety to the forms that they took and the environments in which they stood, yet enough similarities remain to be able to form some general guidelines.[5] The extent of a sanctuary was marked by boundary indictors, such as a wall or boundary stones. The boundary perimeter, or *peribolos*, marked the division of sacred from profane land.[6] A gateway, or *propylon*, might mark the entrance in grand style. The land inside the boundary was the *temenos*, or sacred precinct. *Temenos* land was sacred, but the area closest to the most sacred features, especially the altar, might be regarded as more sacred, and might even be surrounded by a further wall. At the sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea, for example, distinct flooring indicted an inner-precinct surrounding the altar and temple, distinguishing that area from the rest of the space within the sanctuary.[7] *Temenos* and *hieron* are the most common terms for sanctuaries. Greek authors sometimes used them interchangeably, although the *hieron* is the special bit. Robert Parker notes an Athenian decree which illustrates this tidily, in which the *hieron* of a sanctuary is to be fenced off and the rest of the *temenos* leased to become an olive orchard. Both areas are part of the sanctuary, but the *hieron* is the most special area.[8]

The altars (one or more) were the primary sacred feature of a sanctuary, being the site of sacrifice, the central act of communication with the divine.[9] Temples, where they were present, typically stood in line with an altar. While some temples had a single main interior room, housing the cult statue, many had an additional inner-room of restricted access. These spaces could be the site of ritual, although their typical function was to serve as repositories of sanctuaries' most valued items and, often, state funds.[10]

Beyond the *hieron*, a sanctuary might have a grove (*alsos*), which could offer visitors shelter from wind, rain, and sun, or which might be used for cutting or gathering wood.[11] Some sanctuaries contained special individual trees, which were typically associated with myth.[12] Sanctuaries might also feature fields and meadows as well as further buildings associated with ritual, festival, and the accommodation of visitors, such as springs, wells, cisterns, and fountain-houses, dining

rooms for post-sacrifice meals, treasuries, theatres, stadiums and gymnasiums, stoas, and hostels.

THE CONTENT OF SANCTUARIES

Items dedicated to a Greek sanctuary garnered a sacred aspect by virtue of belonging to the deity that presided there. Most sanctuaries contained a main statue or statues, which represented a bond with the deity and acted as a focal point for some rituals. Old statues, typically *xoana*, made from carved wood, had a privileged sanctity, often derived from association with myth. Several were said to have fallen from the heavens, while others were said to have been dedicated by mythical founding figures. These ancient statues retained their status even when new ones joined them; much as Pheidias' Athena impressed the Athenians, the old, wooden Athena remained preeminent.[13] The strength of a religious experience was increased as the petitioner got closer to the phenomena they honoured, making the ability to see or even touch a statue or other particularly sacred item a potentially profound experience.[14]

Implements used in sacrifice, post-sacrifice dining, and other rituals were distinct from similar items used for profane acts. They would remain within the sanctuary or at least they could not be removed for profane use without diminishing their privileged status, a practice that seems to have been well-established by the Early Iron Age.[15] Skulls and other remains of sacrifices were sometimes retained and displayed at sanctuaries. Those items used in mystery cults and other restricted rituals such as those of the Thesmophoria held an exceptionally sacred status and access to them was frequently limited to a privileged group. Among the most prominent contents of sanctuaries were the votive offerings dedicated by individuals, groups, and states. These took all manner of forms, from the modest to the opulent, large and small, utensils, bowls, tripods, statuettes, statues, arms and armour, masks, crowns, furniture, clothing, and an almost limitless further range of items. Once dedicated, these items also accrued a sacred nature and were typically intended to stay permanently within the sanctuary. One of the tasks of sanctuary life was the management of the goods within the sanctuary, and inventories as well as excavation have provided insight into what these items were and what happened to them.[16]

Some objects would be held particularly sacred by the entire community. Items at the heart of community rituals, such as the altar and cult statue, were held in special regard. Dedications by the state or by individuals could be regarded as having particular value for the whole community, especially if, for instance, they were particularly old, beautiful, or valuable, or if they commemorated an important event. Taken together, the contents of a sanctuary constituted much of the financial wealth of a community, but also much of its cultural wealth and identity. Josephine Shaya highlights how a temple in antiquity acted not only as a treasure house, but also as a sort of museum:

> Within this domain, objects were invested with meanings that were very much dependent on their status as gifts and divine possessions, on the very place in which they were kept, on their relationship to other treasures, and on the narratives to which they were made to attest.[17]

These items were a manifestation of a city's relationship with its deities, of its past, and of its wealth. Their presence was a cause for pride, their loss a blow to wealth, prestige, and identity.

HOW TO BEHAVE IN A SANCTUARY

Sacred spaces required a set of heightened behavioural standards that recognised that sacredness. Herodotus regarded Egypt as the origin of this practice and considered it a sign of their early sophistication (Hdt. 2.64). The distinction between sacred and profane space was maintained by a variety of proscriptions which determined access to sacred space and regulated conduct within it; this maintained the purity of the site by excluding and preventing pollution (miasma). This creation of a purified space acted as its own offering to a deity (or deities) and created a particularly appropriate space in which to honour and communicate with the divine, even though both of those acts could also take place outside the boundaries of a sacred space.[18]

The citizens of Greek *poleis* determined these rules themselves without the existence of a separate priestly class. The organisation of sanctuary life, its calendar, festivals, and building projects, was an important part of what a *polis* government did. The allocation of priesthoods and determination of sanctuary rules was part of that organisation.[19] Sanctuary rules were increasingly formalised in the

classical period. As the epigraphic habit became more pronounced, regulations for sanctuary life were frequently inscribed for public viewing. These inscriptions belong to a class of epigraphy now referred to as sacred law.[20] The collation and study of this class of material has demonstrated the fundamental significance in ancient Greek culture of establishing and maintaining a distinction between sacred and profane space, and the manner in which that distinction was expressed by demanding a standard of behaviour within sacred space that exceeded what was permissible in profane space and everyday life.

Sacred laws fall into two related but distinct groups.[21] Some concerned fiscal matters. These were important because sanctuaries could be responsible for a great deal of wealth and income. Sanctuaries and the states that ran them 'codified the ways in which goods and resources which formed part of divine service could properly be used'; what constituted proper use was determined by a fluid interplay of ancestral practice and communal decision-making.[22] Entrance fees and prerequisites from sacrifices were regulated through these laws, so too was the management of income and land. Income might be generated through renting out sanctuary land, the proceeds of land (such as quarried material, crops, animals reared there, or their dung), or even from loans made to individuals from sanctuary funds. The potential for income from sacred land meant that arguments over ownership could be resource disputes not purely symbolic disagreements.[23] Lending generated income via interest; accounts from sites such as Rhamnous, Eleusis, Delos, and perhaps Calapodhi in Phocis, detail names, sums lent, and amounts paid back.[24] These deals were typically managed by the sacrifice overseers (*hieropoioi*) and publically proclaimed in a manner that demonstrated that they were approved by gods and mortals alike. Eleusinian decrees announce that the Athenians might dispose of certain wealth on the acropolis as they see fit.[25] Spending met sanctuary expenses such as animals, incense, and building projects.[26] The sacred wealth contained in dedications and sacred funds was distinct from state wealth obtained by other means but stored within a sanctuary. Sacred wealth might still be spent on civic endeavours in challenging circumstances, particularly military emergencies.[27] This practice seems to have increased in the fifth century, with the costs of navies and the increasing use of mercenaries putting pressure on finances.[28]

The laws for spending varied from sanctuary to sanctuary and reflected the nature of the sanctuary and the dynamic between its users. Each community exercised its own judgement on what was or was not available. At Delphi, a Panhellenic site, while income was spent on the sanctuary, wealth from dedications accumulated as a testament to piety and was not available for other uses, a structure that reflects the multitude of communities behind the dedications.[29] The legitimacy of spending decisions came from the legitimacy of the bodies that took the decisions. Most of the time, that was self-evident, but when conflict brought doubt over the ownership of territory, that included ambiguity over the administration of sanctuaries and their funds, something we will see more about below.

Theft from sanctuaries was punishable by severe methods. At Athens that meant exile or execution followed by denial of burial within Attica (Xen. *Hell*. 1.7.22; *Mem*. 1.2.62; Isoc. 22.6).[30] Prosecutions could be brought within individual *poleis* for further forms of religious misconduct committed outside as well as inside sanctuaries, such as offences concerning festivals, atheism, or impiety. In terms of form, these laws were not essentially different from other civic laws. They are often recorded with reference to legal penalties; where breaches of conduct were deemed punishable, some offences would be disciplined within the sanctuary, while those of a more serious nature would be referred to the courts.[31]

In theory, citizens, *metics* (resident foreigners), and *xenoi* (non-resident foreigners) could be tried for offences committed within sanctuary grounds, although in practice this may have been difficult to implement for *xenoi*.[32]

A second group of sacred laws reflect traditions intended to protect sanctuaries from mistakes in ritual. Specified punishments usually have a ritual rather than secular nature, such as an order to purify the sanctuary or denial of the right to sacrifice.[33] Robert Parker has described these laws as instructive guidelines, which 'explain, above all, how to sacrifice in a given sanctuary and what conditions of purity are required for access to it'.[34] Contact with birth, death, or sex for example, required designated periods of time to have elapsed before it was permissible to enter a sacred site. In some sanctuaries, although not all, prohibitions existed against certain people or further activities considered polluting. Some excluded on the basis of gender or status (such as excluding slaves), others excluded according

to ethnicity, refusing persons of a particular ethnic group or all *xenoi* altogether.[35] These restrictions might apply to the entire site or to the right to sacrifice or to enter specific buildings. Excretion and the disposal of waste within the sanctuary itself, copulation, parturiency, and non-sacrificial death or killing were considered polluting and were also outlawed from Greek sanctuaries, although not all these activities would be specifically legislated against as the custom of their exclusion was so widely practised.[36] Some sanctuaries had prohibitions against carrying weapons (e.g. *LSC Supp*. 60; *LGS* 2.117, 13; *LSA* 68). These laws were drawn up as a form of assistance, on the assumption that people would want to conform in order for their sacrifice or other dedication to be as pleasing and therefore as meaningful as possible. Various officials, including priests, priestesses (ἱερεῖς and ἱερείας), sacrifice overseers (ἱεροπόιοι), interpreters of sacred matters (ἐξηγηταί), and caretakers (νεωκόροι and ναοφύλακες) who monitored access and purification, were available in one combination or another to advise, assist, or, alternatively, exclude.[37]

Although most sanctuaries were geared towards the community that ran them, religious activity was possible beyond one's own *polis*. When Greeks visited a city they did not belong to, it was customary for them to liaise with a *proxenos*, the citizen who represented their city's interests in that state. The *proxenos* would usually be the person to facilitate arrangements for sacrifice, either to confirm that the visitor might sacrifice or to act as a mediator, conducting the sacrifice (or arranging for it to be conducted) on the visitor's behalf. This system smoothed relations, reduced the likelihood of religious offences occurring, and presented a likely mediator should problems arise.[38] The distinction about who could access a sanctuary was not always determined by citizenship alone. Ethnic affiliation was also an important identity category and territorial boundaries did not always conform to ethnic boundaries, meaning that people from both sides of a border might be able to use the same site. Indeed, it can be difficult to distinguish through archaeology sanctuaries which were for a particular *polis* and those for an *ethne*, as their physical form and offerings were essentially the same.[39]

The *proxenoi* system was in place at the Panhellenic sanctuaries, and it has even been suggested that the system arose to meet the emerging needs of Panhellenic Olympia.[40] While Greeks from all over the Greek world were welcome to visit the sanctuaries of Olympia,

Delphi, Isthmia, and Nemea, *proxenoi* would mediate between the visitors and the altar.[41] The states that administered these sanctuaries determined their regulations, although, from the late seventh century, Delphi was run by local Delphians under the governance of a 24-vote Amphictyonic Council.[42]

HOW TO BEHAVE IN AN ARMY

While individual *poleis* could punish their own citizens for infractions of sacred law, it was harder to enforce conduct between states. Cities all ran their armies their own way. Loosely speaking, *strategoi* reported to the city, various officers reported to the *strategoi*, and the troops to the officers, but the details of this varied. Military leaders played a major role in the religious life of their armies, instigating, overseeing, and sometimes carrying out essential rituals such as offering sacrifices, inspecting entrails and omens, seeing to the set-up of victory trophies (at least on the classical battlefield), and making dedications (especially of tithes of booty). As the authors of command and discipline they also determined questions such as where the army would encamp, when and whether a site would be sacked, and how sacred spaces were treated. Much military behaviour was guided by unwritten rules of custom shared by the Greeks as a whole, yet these offered opportunities for varied interpretations.[43] The practice of declaring war openly, respecting sacred spaces and suppliants, returning the dead, and the winners' rights to the losers' property, were widely recognised, but easily disputed, customs.

The accounts of controversies at sanctuaries examined below present a wide variety of avenues of complaint rather than modes of prosecution. Delphi's Amphictyonic Council resembled a court; they heard complaints and could impose fines and declare war, but this related only to matters affecting Delphi. Many communities belonged to a variety of leagues and alliances, which had complex terms of obligations and privileges, usually bound by oath.[44] Members of alliances complained to each other about the conduct of fellow members and non-members, indeed, part of the point of joining alliances was to have states who would share your grievances. Enemy cities complained to each other of their conduct, using heralds or meetings to raise and answer complaints, particularly at the outset of wars. Pre-battle speeches were another opportunity to

revisit one's own past glories and others' iniquities. This extended to the end of wars, when the treatment of sacred space might be brought up in requests for leniency or harsh measures. At home, in a less direct way, cities might express responses to current events through artwork, with drama, poetry, painting, pottery, and sculpture all acting as platforms for exploring moral themes. Abroad, Panhellenic festivals gave cities the opportunity to express inter-state standing; at the extreme end individual *poleis* might be barred and, even at the less extreme end, individuals would have been conscious of the sort of welcome they experienced, from the pleasure of being recognised for belonging to a city in high repute, to the awkwardness that must have afflicted visitors from states defying public opinion. Stories of enemy armies behaving badly seem to have been remembered primarily (but not exclusively) by the indignant communities that experienced those wrongs, passing traditions down orally and recording them in sacred histories and other records.[45]

Knowledge of states' mechanisms for responding to the campaign actions of their generals suffers from an evidence gap, with profound shortfalls even for Athens, the best evidenced *polis*. Yet there are insights that can be gleaned about procedures and attitudes. There are reports of trials of kings and other leaders accused of military misconduct at Sparta, while in democratic Athens, military leaders might undergo examination and trial following their campaigns. The juries in Athenian cases were made up of soldiers, including the soldiers who had until recently been under that leader's command. Trial, fines, exile, and execution were real enough possibilities to place pressure on leaders in the field. Suspicion of incompetence or accepting bribes could lead to prosecution. Religious matters might be raised in accusation or defence during these cases, but there are no known examples of people being prosecuted for religious offences committed abroad.[46]

There are few reported cases of armies becoming concerned at their leader's religious conduct. One example that does exist is interesting for its explicit connection between the leader's standing with the gods and the outcome of the war. Dionysius I of Syracuse had been busy plundering from temples at home and abroad; during campaigns against invading Carthaginians, the Syracusans began questioning the need for his leadership. This is expressed by a speech from 'Theodorus, a Syracusan, who was held in high esteem among

the cavalry' (Diod. Sic. 14.64.3–5). Among the many accusations thrown at Dionysius is this:

> Are we not ashamed that we should have as commander in our wars the man who has plundered the temples of our city and that we choose as representative in such important matters a person to whom no man of good sense would entrust the management of his private affairs? And though all other peoples in times of war, because of the great perils they face, observe with the greatest care their obligations to the gods, do we expect that a man of such notorious impiety will put an end to the war? … We should, therefore, seek out another leader, to avoid fighting under a general who has pillaged the shrines of the gods and so finding ourselves engaged in a war against the gods; for it is manifest that heaven opposes those who have selected the worst enemy of religion to be their commander. (Diod. Sic. 14.67.4–14.69.3)

In this instance we have an explicit connection between the leader's plundering of sanctuaries and the expectation of bad luck in war, yet even here the complaint concerns the city's own shrines.[47]

Good conduct from generals, including piety, was a form of moral support to an army. Xenophon advises in *The Cavalry Commander* that leaders can avoid the contempt of their men if they show that they have the necessary skills, 'and if besides, they are certain that he will never lead them against an enemy recklessly or without the gods' approval or in defiance of the sacrifices' (Xen. *Eq.Mag.* 6.4–6). Implicit here is the suggestion that the men will obey their commander more readily if they know he will not ask them to do anything likely to earn the gods' disapproval, with the corresponding implication that they will despise the leader who asks these things of them. In idealising passages from the *Agesilaus* encomium and the *Hellenica*, Xenophon presents men cheered by a leader doing the right thing:

> One would have been inspired by another sight too; first Agesilaus, then also the rest of the soldiers returning crowned from the gymnasium dedicating the crowns to Artemis. For where men worship the gods, train in war and practice obedience, how can such a place not be entirely full of good hopes? (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.18–19)[48]

Xenophon also examined the idea that military leaders might bring out the worst in their troops. The *Hellenica* expresses disappointment with Thibron's campaign in Asia Minor. Under Thibron's leadership, the former troops of the Ten Thousand plundered Greeks and made a

nuisance of themselves. When Thibron was replaced, a message from Sparta told the troops that they would be forgiven if they behaved themselves in future. 'Unjust', replies a former leader of the Ten Thousand (probably Xenophon himself), for troops behave as their leaders direct them: Thibron was responsible for the army's misconduct, not the troops (Xen. *Hell*. 3.2.6–7).[49] Yet it was no easy thing to control an army's behaviour. In theory, Athenian generals of the fifth century could execute soldiers or bring them to trial in Athens, but punishments seem to have been relatively rare, not least because unpopularity posed a danger to the general. Nicias complained by letter to the Athenians that the army on Sicily was hard to control (Thuc. 7.14.2) and Xenophon echoes this when he has the younger Pericles complain to Socrates that Athenian hoplites and cavalry are ill-disciplined (Xen. *Mem*. 3.5.19). Known cases of on-campaign punishment include disciplining for desertion, premature attack, and for dumping a chamber-pot over a fellow soldier's slaves, but none relates to unauthorised incursions into sacred space.[50]

When it came to city-taking, *strategoi* will typically have been instructed prior to departure on how far to push their victories. A city would not be annihilated without the prior approval of the general's government.[51] Plunder taken throughout campaigns appears to have become the property of the army as a whole, to be distributed later, either by the city or by the general should he need to spend some of it to maintain the army. There were also opportunities for private plunder (Xen. *Hell*. 1.2.5; Xen. *Ana*. 6.6.2).[52] It is unlikely that rogue theft from sanctuaries would be tolerated in this scenario when it might be perceived as having detrimental consequences for the campaign as a whole, but this is not an issue that receives notice from ancient authors.

As we have seen, the administration of cults was a matter for the states they belonged to. Allocating priesthoods, arranging pilgrimages, determining regulations, and carrying out building programmes, sacrifices and festivals in honour of the city's gods and heroes was a responsibility and perhaps sometimes a pleasure that was fundamental to that state's identity and purpose. And yet, inevitably, states sometimes lost control of their cities, lands, and cults, occasionally facing annihilation. When land changed hands, the sanctuaries within it changed hands; new people decided if the cults would continue and, if so, who would fill the priesthoods and perform the rites. All too little

of the detail of this is reflected in the epigraphic record, yet it can be seen that when Athens took Oropus from Thebes, for example, they filled the Amphiaraeum's priesthoods with Athenians. Likewise, when the Athenians depopulated Aegina, the sanctuaries of Aegina were run by Athenians, and so on, and so on, all over the Greek world.[53] But while we know that these were trends in long-term territory shifts, we have only a tantalising glimpse of how these issues worked in practice, how the various parties more or less involved regarded these transitions, and what happened in the many more episodes in which armies entered enemy territory without long-term conquest. As we have seen, much ritual and military practice operated by customary guidelines rather than clear or enforceable laws, a situation that was ripe for disputes and contested narratives.

EXAMPLES FROM TROY

The ancient Greek interest in the treatment of the sacred in warfare is apparent in even its earliest literature. Amongst the first lines of the *Iliad* is the declaration that Apollo started the feud between Agamemnon and Achilles and sent a plague upon the Greek army because Agamemnon mistreated Apollo's priest (*Il.* 1.7–10, with 1.21); the key poem of Greek culture has military treatment of the sacred within its opening premise. This programmatic episode demonstrates two crucial principles straightaway: that gods might regard rough treatment of their servants as an insult to themselves and that a leader's behaviour towards the sacred had consequences for the rest of the army.

Early post-Homeric poetry picked up the theme of military conduct. When Locrian Ajax raped Cassandra at the Trojan temple of Athena, the spatial aspect was the most problematic component of the episode, not the assault itself:

> Ajax the son of Ileus, when trying to drag Cassandra away by force, tears away with her the statue (*xoanon*) of Athena. At this the Greeks are so enraged that they determine to stone Ajax, who only escapes from the danger threatening him by taking refuge at the altar of Athena.
>
> (*Sack of Ilium*, 1)

Assaulting Cassandra is Ajax's primary goal, yet assaulting her during her supplication and toppling the statue are presented as the crucial aspects of the episode. Although violent sacrilege by a Greek is

presented as conceivable, the episode appears to have been shaped to establish the contrast between the offending individual and the rest of the army. Ajax is saved only by their respect for the protection of the altar and the goddess still plans to destroy them at sea (*Sack of Ilium*, 1). This offence against Athena is part of the story of Troy, but its message warns rather than normalises.

More remains of this theme as it was explored by the lyric poet, Alcaeus, in the sixth century. The 27 surviving lines of the poem have the statue toppled, Cassandra clutching it, Athena's enraged witnessing of the abduction, and the observation that the Greeks would have been better off killing Ajax for his sacrilege, rather than suffering Athena's vengeance: 'they'd have had gentler sea' (Alcaeus 298.7; *P.Oxy*. 2303). This poem revisits the idea that the Greeks condemned Ajax's offence, and that group punishment could be inflicted for an individual's actions. Alcaeus seems to be connecting this mythic episode with questions of contemporary punishment; fragmentary lines refer to how 'we ought to set / his neck in clamps and stone him' (Alcaeus, 298.2–3).[54]

Stories of sacrilege and consequences retained significance for their ancient Greek audiences. They were retold and reimagined in various ways, while the Greek leaders' misdemeanours remained key to the narrative.[55] Achilles' killing of Troilus accrued more explicit reference to the divine over time. In the *Iliad* and the *Cypria*, Troilus is simply said to have been killed (*Il*. 24.257; *Cypria*, 1). Classical vase painters often included details suggesting a sanctuary or altar as the site of the killing, with Apollodorus later recording that 'Achilles waylaid Troilus and slaughtered him in the sanctuary of Thymbraean Apollo' (Apollod. *Epit*. 3.32). With Achilles usually said to have been killed through Apollo's agency, this killing in Apollo's space is an appropriate feature that was either always there in traditions that are now unknown, or which developed as an appropriate invitation to divine vengeance.[56]

The traditions of Troy presented a fantasy environment in which conceivable (but not necessarily common) horrors of war could play out. While the Trojans would be destroyed for their wrong-doing, the Greeks suffered too, and their own wrong-doing was part of the cause. Those acting violently within sacred spaces or against sacred persons are not anonymous members of the mob, but named heroes; in this sense their transgressions indicate both their

greatness and their human limitations. They are so great that their actions matter enough to appear in song, but they err in thinking that they may do as they please in defiance of mortal limits. The expectation and delivery of divine vengeance acts as the main indicator of unwritten codes being broken, indicated by a variety of means from narrator-intervention to the judgement of the army or the gods themselves. This is a war in which the gods are intensely interested in how the mortals conduct themselves and slights against divine privilege do not go unnoticed. These stories were the bedrock of an ancient Greek upbringing and adult leisure-time. For the soldier, they offered discouragement from wrong-doing. For writers, they offered a mode of talking about war in which the sacrilegious actions of military leaders provide dramatic incident, insights into character, an opportunity to explore moral themes, and bridges to serious consequences.

PART II

Sanctuaries

CHAPTER 1

The Temple as Fortress

In good times, sanctuaries were places for sacrifice, festivals and dedications. Maintaining their purity was a ritual imperative that preserved them as special places. Yet there were times when sanctuaries were used for quite a different purpose, serving as positions in which to fight. This chapter will focus on contrasting contexts for this, defensive and offensive. As we will see, although both contexts involved polluting sacred spaces, they were viewed quite differently. We will also see contrasting examples of military leaders attempting to access the acropolis sanctuaries of cities they do not belong to.

THE ATHENIAN ACROPOLIS IN THE PERSIAN WARS

The *Iliad* presents the spectacle of gods choosing sides and particular mortals whom they will favour with protection (esp. *Il.* 20.60–75). Greek cities lived this experience, regarding themselves as having a strong bond with their major deity, and hoping for their protection in times of trouble. In a city with an acropolis, the acropolis would typically be the site of the main deity's cult, providing a focal point for the city and playing a double role as sanctuary and citadel. Athena Polias was the most common city guardian. Her sanctuaries are found on numerous citadels at sites as ethnically disparate as Argos, Sparta, Athens, Gortyn, Lindos, Larisa in Thessaly, and Troy. Her armed virgin inviolability as well as her famed wisdom made her an appropriate choice as a defender, her chastity offering a metaphor of the city's (intended) impregnability.[1]

At Athens, the acropolis seems to have played a dual role as cult centre and defensive citadel since the Bronze Age, if not earlier.[2] The Athenians told a story that Athena became their guardian after defeating Poseidon on the acropolis in competition for the privilege. Still in the age of myth, the battle was re-enacted, with Athena's descendent, Erechtheus, overseeing the repulse of Poseidon's son.[3] Command of the acropolis was at the heart of the Athenians' self-identity and their sense of the past. Their acropolis was covered in *temene* housing several cults. In the late archaic period, the cult of Athena Polias, with its sixth-century temple, was the most revered, while that of Athena Parthenos had a marble temple planned (the so-called Older Parthenon). Further smaller cults were situated on the top and slopes of the acropolis. A wall, including Mycenaean masonry, surrounded much of the crest of the rock, while a gateway channelled access via the west.[4]

Much as this ongoing relationship between deity and community offered hope of protection, there could be no certainties. The *Iliad* offers the disquieting prospect of deities deliberately rejecting the mortals who turn to them. Inside Troy, there is a pathos-filled scene in which the Trojan women appeal to Athena with prayers, offerings, and promises, all of which Athena hears and rejects (6.286–311). The audience already knows that the Trojans have invited punishment through injustice and that Athena hates this city though it treats her as its guardian (e.g. 4.21, with 8.449; 20.313; 24.25). Later poems expressed these anxieties in relation to current events. An anonymous poem written at Megara during the Persian invasion appeals to Apollo, reminding him of his relationship with the city:

> Lord Phoebus, you're the one that built the citadel
> on Pelops' son Alcathous' behalf:
> now keep the Medes' rampaging army off the town,
> so that the people with a cheerful heart
> when spring arrives can make fine hecatomb-parades,
> enjoying happy feasting and the lyre
> and dances round your altar with glad paean-cries.[5]

A short time later, a group of Corinthian women expressed their gratitude to Aphrodite with a dedication bearing an epigram thanking her for not 'betraying the acropolis of the Hellenes to the bow-carrying Medes' (*FGE* 14, G). Aphrodite could have deserted the

Greeks, but she did not and her decision is memorialised. In *Seven Against Thebes*, the tyrant, Eteocles, takes the chorus' prayers, 'Divine company, do not betray our fortifications!', as ill-omened words, fearful of seeing them realised (Aesch. *Seven*, 251–87).

A deity might protect a community, even apparently taking part in their defence. On the other hand, they might refuse support, either in indignation at wrongdoing or simply owing to the power of fate. Athena's acropolis represented a point of hope to the Athenians during the Persian invasion of 480, but it did not offer a very practical remedy for many of them; only a fraction of the population could have sheltered there, and the limited water supply meant that even a small garrison could not hold out very long.[6] Their response to the danger they faced demonstrates the values associated with defence of a sacred space, the experience of an acropolis sacked and used by enemies, and a third conception of divine response – Athena did not defend or abandon the acropolis, she joined her people in their flight then returned to reclaim her city.

The Persian Empire was conspicuously tolerant of other people's religions and its kings frequently conformed to the ritual requirements of subject communities. This was pragmatic in an empire spanning many faiths and ethnicities. Cyrus the Great was famously called 'Yahweh's anointed' for his commitment to rebuilding the temple in Jerusalem (Isaiah 44.28–45.1) and, in Babylon, records show Cyrus ensuring that the usual rituals were fulfilled.[7] Despite his wild reputation, Cyrus' son, Cambyses, also allowed traditional rituals to continue at Babylon and may have participated in their rites as well.[8] In Egypt, he had temples purified and he visited to make offerings, prostrating himself 'before her majesty [Neith], as every king has done'.[9] His successor, Darius, carried out an extensive temple building programme in Egypt and continued the Babylonian rituals, as did his son, Xerxes.[10] In the Greek world, things went differently and the reputation of the Persian kings there reflected this and worse. After the failure of the Ionian Revolt, Miletus was sacked and the oracle of Apollo at Didyma plundered and burnt, fulfilling the oracle:

> Then, Miletus, planner of evil deeds,
> You shall be a feast for many and a rich prize.
> Your wives shall wash the feet of many long-haired men,
> The shrine at Didyma shall be cared for by others. (Hdt. 6.19)[11]

Eretria, another participant in the Ionian Revolt, also saw its temples burnt, although worse destruction was wrought upon the city gates.[12] This contrast from the careful treatment of sacred spaces shown to conquered peoples seems to have been motivated by the desire to inflict a striking punishment for the uprising. The Athenians and Ionians had submitted to Persia. The Persians regarded submission as a permanent arrangement made with Ahura-Mazda and the Great King; revolt was a matter of cosmic disorder as well as political rebellion, deserving of harsh treatment.[13] The form of the destruction may also reflect retaliation for the burning of the temple of Cybebe in Sardis. Herodotus dismissed this as a pretext following a fire that accidentally spread through reed roofs (Hdt. 5.101–2); the extensively tiled roofs of Sardis suggest there was more to the story.[14] Either way, the battle of Marathon prevented further sacking after Eretria, but Xerxes' second invasion increased the extent of damage to cities and sanctuaries alike. This campaign was characterised as being of a different, escalated nature. Herodotus, in particular, presented Xerxes' campaign as being deeply unjust, motivated not only by revenge, but by a hubristic yen for world domination (Hdt. 7.8a–c). Natural and cultural boundaries are flouted along the way, all characterising the campaign as the epitome of tyrannical excess inviting divine retribution.[15] The Persian sack of Athens followed a trail of destruction through Greece.

Facing crisis, the Athenians sent to Delphi for guidance. The envoys were initially told to flee, 'leaving home and the heights of your city'. A second oracle was requested and received a response including: 'Yet shall a wooden-wall built by all-seeing Zeus be granted to the Triton-born [Athena] / a stronghold for you and your children.' Back in Athens, the people debated the oracle's meaning. Some (including the older citizens and the professional oracle interpreters, *chresmologues*) thought that the 'wooden-wall' meant that the acropolis would not fall. Others interpreted it as a reference to ships (Hdt. 7.139–43).

Herodotus frames the debate in positive terms, within an argument that the Athenians deserve the most credit for defending Greece at this time.[16] He admires the Athenians' bravery in persisting in their search for an effective way to fight.[17] Defending the acropolis is depicted as the traditional option. It is the elders and professionals who advocate it, the radical outsider who pushes an alternative.

The oracle reaffirmed the Athenians' relationship with Athena; she would intercede with Zeus on their behalf. If they decided to stay, it would be only a small step to imagine her taking a lenient view the pollution incurred in dire circumstances. Pollution could usually be purified away after all, if the population survived.[18] And besides, the blame ultimately fell on the invaders. In Herodotus' *Histories* in particular, people are responsible for their own actions even if someone tempts them. The gods themselves are depicted playing the game of entrapment, encouraging wrong-doing to hasten the destruction of the one who commits it.[19] The Athenians might invite pollution by standing siege on the acropolis, but if the invaders pursued that temptation, that would be their responsibility, and their invitation to divine vengeance.

Famously, Themistocles persuaded the people that the navy must be the correct interpretation of 'wooden-wall'. The decision against fighting on the acropolis, was not made to avoid polluting it, but because defence at sea was regarded as the best interpretation of the oracle, and therefore the most likely to succeed. The *chresmologues* who opposed Themistocles are said to be disinclined to offer any defence rather than reluctant to involve the sanctuaries. As long as the Athenians considered themselves to be acting on the oracle, either defence or flight was acceptable. This demonstrates clearly that fighting on the acropolis could have been interpreted as a virtuous – if desperate – act. As it was, the city was evacuated and the defence mounted at sea.

Athena's priestess secured the final departure of the population by announcing the disappearance of the great snake that guarded the acropolis. This convinced those remaining that the goddess had departed, which made them all the more keen to leave (Hdt. 8.41). The snake-announcement communicated Athena's acquiescence in the evacuation and the sense that she was still to some extent with them beyond their home. This ameliorated, though perhaps did not solve, the theological (and psychological) problem of the goddess allowing these events to unfold.

There is little more detail from Herodotus on how the Athenians managed their evacuation. The priestess and most other sanctuary personnel apparently left. The so-called Themistocles' Decree contradicts this, asserting that '[the treasurers] and priestesses are to remain on the acropolis'.[20] But Herodotus' version seems more likely,

given that no one mentions them in accounts of what happened during the sack. The existence of both traditions demonstrates that both were plausible. The portable wooden statue of Athena seems to have been taken with them. A statue of this sort played a role in city life after the war and this seems to have been the original rather than a fifth-century replacement.[21] An observation from Pausanias is relevant: he considers it unlikely that the Athenians really kept the Trojan Palladium at Brauron, as they would never have left it there to be looted if it had been the real thing (Paus. 3.7–8). An assumption of removing portable sacred items makes as much sense for an earlier period as for Pausanias'. Other particularly valued utensils may also have been taken. The Themistocles' Decree gives a further indication of this. The sacrifices ordered are appeasement offerings of the sort usually made for changes to cult property, perhaps on this occasion marking the removal of items from Athens and perhaps across Attica too.[22] The retention of some of these items would have helped the Athenians to maintain their sense of community in the face of an indefinite displacement.

A few people stayed on, 'temple stewards and needy people', those too poor to leave and those convinced that the acropolis had the wooden-wall. They rolled rocks onto the attackers, but beyond that they are not described as fighting there, but dying, either by jumping down the sheer edges or being killed in the temple where they had taken refuge in the inner room (Hdt. 8.51–3). They may have hoped that the invaders would consider killing in the temple more taboo than killing outside. The expectation was reasonable, not only because the Persians had similar distinctions within their own sacred spaces, but also because there were Greeks in the invading army.[23] They were killed nonetheless, and Herodotus' notice of their hiding place presents their deaths as a pathetic embodiment of the indiscriminate ferocity and sacrilege of the sack.

As is well known, the destruction on the acropolis was extensive. Herodotus reported the acropolis 'stripped of its treasures and burnt', with no one left alive (Hdt. 8.53). Excavation revealed the burn layer, the damage to the temple of Athena Polias, the smashed monuments. Statues were looted, or beheaded, some had their heads split open, throats cut, their hands, breasts, and genitals cut off.[24] A second wave of destruction followed during the withdrawal of 479 (Hdt. 9.13). This was, to use Rachel Kousser's phrase, 'far beyond what might be

considered militarily useful'.[25] As a show of power in their most sacred space, the focal point of their territory, the destruction challenged the Athenians' communal identity as well as punishing them materially.

Herodotus' representation of Xerxes' response to the widespread destruction of sacred spaces across Greece adds a fascinating strand to the whole scenario. Even in this narrative of the sacrilege in an outsider-led campaign, Herodotus depicts an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and an attempt to win the Greek gods' favour. Prompted by a dream, or repenting of what he had ordered, Xerxes sent the Peisistratids and other Greeks in his company to sacrifice on the acropolis according to Athenian rituals (Hdt. 8.54–5). It has been convincingly argued that the early Persian kings knew little of Greek religion and that we should be sceptical of the Herodotean stories of Persian reverence for the Greek gods, as they are shaped to 'reflect inadequate attempts by Persian kings and their representatives to avert the anger of the Greek gods for the fundamental hybris of invading Europe'.[26] Herodotus' speculations about Xerxes' motives reflect this tendency, anticipating his failure to placate the gods. Yet while the motives attributed to Xerxes seem designed for a moral, literary purpose, the scene of the collaborating Greeks sacrificing on the acropolis has a ring of literal truth to it. Their actions would embody a change in rights of access to the city and its goddess. An apparently accepted sacrifice could be asserted as proof of divine approval. The use of Athenians is important, as collaborators bridged the distance between outsider and insider, past and future. This consideration makes it all the more likely that we should follow Herodotus rather than the Themistocles' Decree over the priestesses' evacuation. Had they stayed, they might have been killed or coerced into overseeing the sacrifices. The possibility of either made it prudent to evacuate.

In the Herodotean narrative, the collaborators' sacrifice serves not to legitimise their actions but to make them the witnesses of a delegitimising miracle. Although Athena evacuated the acropolis, her ongoing power is evidenced in the miraculous rejuvenation of her sacred tree, re-grown in defiance of the previous day's fire (Hdt. 8.54–5). This is a miracle with a message.[27] Athens will rejuvenate. Gods may leave, but they can also return. The story surely had its origin in Athens itself, helping people come to terms with what had happened.

Athena was also reputed to bring more timely miracles. The epigraphic Chronicle of Lindos describes the siege of 490, when the city ran dry while encircled by Darius' army. Athena stood over a dreaming magistrate and promised to ask her father for water. The Lindians requested a five day armistice, saying they would surrender if no water appeared after that. The general, Datis, laughed at them. Rain fell on the acropolis the following day. Dismayed at this epiphany, Datis agreed friendship and made dedications to the sanctuary.[28] Stories of intervention and restoration strengthened communities' ability to deal with crisis.

Not every historian gave the sack of Athens the detailed, religiously themed treatment that Herodotus did. Diodorus, writing in the first century, refers to the temples at Athens being destroyed along with the city (11.14.5 and 11.28.6), but there is no slowing of the narrative to establish detail. Diodorus was more inclined to explore the collapse of the Greek alliance. How the treatment of allies affects the durability of empire is a fundamental theme in his *Bibliotheke*; the Persian Wars were interpreted within that framework, and the religious theme so central elsewhere was largely rejected.[29] The Diodoran coverage reminds us that not every response to the Persian Wars focused on sacrilege as Herodotus did. Yet other responses to the sack of the Athens demonstrate how impactful the event was at Athens. The damaged temple of Athena, like others across Greece, was left standing with its fire-blackened walls, and when the temple of Athena Parthenos was constructed, it revitalised the damaged temple by standing in harmony with it.[30] Broken columns and entablature were conspicuously reused in the acropolis walls, while damaged statues were buried as fill. Other artistic works, such as the Painted Stoa, the decoration of the Parthenon, and fifth-century vase-painting, also suggest responses to the trauma that the city experienced, with features celebrating success, asserting Greek righteousness, and presenting sympathetic depictions of suffering.[31]

Drama featured responses to the violation of the acropolis sanctuary. In Aeschylus' *Persians*, accusation is coupled with a form of denial. The ghost of Darius is made to cite impious actions as a cause of their defeat:

> Restrained by no religious awe, they ravaged the images of the gods and gave the temples to flames. Altars have been destroyed, statues of the gods have been overthrown from their bases in utter ruin and

> confusion. Therefore, since they wrought such evil, evil they suffer in no less measure; and other evils are still in store.
>
> (Aesch. *Pers*. 809–14)

At the same time, the destruction of Athens is obscured:

> Messenger: [. . .] it was some divine power that tipped the scale of fortune with unequal weight and thus destroyed our host. The gods preserve the city of the goddess Pallas.
> Atossa: Is then the city of Athens not yet despoiled?
> Messenger: No, while her men still live, her ramparts are impregnable.
>
> (Aesch. *Pers*. 345–50)

While the Persians suffer for the destruction of actual cities and sacred sites, Athens is protected through the use of metaphor, becoming a city that remained impregnable. It is easy to imagine the audience enjoying the sentiment as the restoration underway helped the worst of the events to recede.

In later years, Euripides' *Erechtheus* evoked the inviolability of the acropolis once again. After repelling an invading army, Athena announces how the Hyacinthids (Erechtheus' newly heroised daughters) are to be worshipped. The context and instructions forefront the connection between access to sacred space, military impregnability, and the threat presented by the enemy. As Gunnel Ekroth describes it:

> When war threatens, the Athenians are to perform a particular sacrifice (*protoma*) to the Hyakinthids and their sanctuary is to be a guarded *abaton*, which no enemy shall be allowed to enter and sacrifice to secure victory.[32]

Staged *c*.422, some 60 years after the Persian sack, in the midst of the territory invasions of the Peloponnesian War, the *Erechtheus* imagines the acropolis protected from invaders, with special rituals performed out of the reach of enemy hands guaranteeing Attica's protection from hostile invaders.[33] But while myths reworked in drama were an important aspect of exploring anxiety and building confidence, the Athenian acropolis would be subject to an enemy army again in less than 20 years' time.

MILITARY LEADERS ON THE ACROPOLIS

The Athenians chose for themselves whether to fight on their acropolis or to evacuate. But that does not mean that they could do

whatever they liked there without other members of the Greek world taking a critical interest. The problems that dogged the Athenian Alcmaeonid clan demonstrate the religious propriety expected of citizens even in challenging situations, and the long-standing importance of the acropolis in would-be take-overs. An Athenian Olympic victor of the seventh century, Cylon attempted to establish a tyranny by occupying the acropolis. The *demos* did not accept his bid, he and his followers were besieged and, when they were offered quarter, Cylon's followers (and perhaps he himself) were killed by some of the Alcmaeonids. In the late sixth century, at the instigation of Isagoras, the Spartans used this as a means of compelling the Athenians to exile hundreds of Alcmaeonid families.[34] Herodotus indicates that the charge was unjust, and it is possible that the Alcmaeonids left to deter the Spartans from intervening more directly, yet it is noticeable that the Athenians appear never to have said that they were entitled to do whatever they wanted on their acropolis and that it was no one else's concern.[35] The people might determine the sacred laws that governed their sanctuaries, but they were not at liberty to disregard religious norms whenever they chose without the criticism of their peers. Pollution incurred in a desperate military defence fell into a different conceptual bracket from defence of the political status quo, and accusations of religious offences had enduring mileage in inter-state disputes.

Cylon and Xerxes' Greeks were not the only ones who attempted to bring change in Athens via its acropolis. That Cleomenes features in Herodotus' account of the Cylon episode is no coincidence, for as soon as it has been related, Cleomenes appears in a similar situation. If Leonidas is now one of the most famous military figures of ancient Greece, Cleomenes, his elder brother and father-in-law, is one of the most infamous. The *Histories* details a range of Cleomenes' striking interactions with sacred sites. Although a legitimate king, he is one of Herodotus' tyrant-friendly figures; it is Cleomenes' desire to restore tyranny to Athens that prompts a virulent condemnation of tyranny that acts as a programmatic statement of Herodotean reservations about despotism (Hdt. 5.92). In keeping with this characterisation, Cleomenes frequently behaves inappropriately in sacred spaces.

The first Cleomenes-in-sacred-space narrative occurs during the political upheaval following the expulsion of the Peisistratids (Hdt. 5.70–3). Uncomfortable with the direction of the new democracy,

Cleomenes and a band of Lacedaemonians backed the oligarch, Isagoras, against the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes. He and Isagoras expelled the 'accursed' Alcmaeonids, and attempted to abolish the council and transfer power to Isagoras and 300 supporters. When they failed, they seized the acropolis. Like Cylon, they found themselves blockaded and after two days they accepted a truce and left the city. Herodotus slows the pace of the narrative right down to offer a detailed account of how Cleomenes occupied himself on the acropolis:

> When Cleomenes climbed the hill to seize the acropolis, he was just going into Athena's temple to ask a question when the priestess, before he could get through the door, rose from her chair and cried: 'Lacedaemonian stranger, go back. Do not enter the holy place. No Dorian is permitted to come in.' Answering, 'Oh lady, I am not Dorian but Achaean', Cleomenes paid no attention to the warning and made his attempt upon the acropolis, and, as I have said, he and his Lacedaemonians were flung out. (Hdt. 5.72)

The priestess' words are an unsolicited omen, anticipating the campaign's end. Cleomenes' quick-witted response is typical of the remarks that make him such a vibrant figure in the *Histories*, yet his aggressive entrance to the sanctuary marks this as a transgressive episode.

Boundaries of geography, social space, and custom all have huge thematic resonance in Herodotus' *Histories*, and those who cross them are strongly associated with wrong-doing, more specifically with a tyrannical leaning that prevents them from recognising the limits that are appropriate to them as a mortals and as members of particular communities.[36] Cleomenes' encounter takes place at the very door of the temple, emphasising the boundary motif, and the priestess re-enforces this by raising an ethnic boundary, which Cleomenes also flouts.[37] The characterisation of Cleomenes' motive for entering the temple also reveals a negative interpretation on Herodotus' part: he entered 'ἦιε ἐς τὸ ἄδυτον τῆς θεοῦ ὡς προσερέων'. Some render this as 'to say a prayer', but 'to question' is more precise. The difference is significant because 'ἐρωτάω', 'I question', is more presumptuous than the more usual 'εὔχομαι', 'I pray' (used at 2.65; 7.178; 8.64), and this is indicative of Cleomenes' hubristic attitude towards the gods. His manner here is reminiscent of Croesus' impudent testing the Greek oracles.[38] Croesus' test used a form of

'ἐρωτάω' (1.53) whereas in his appeal to Apollo to save him, he 'calls on' the god, 'ἐπικαλεόμενον' (1.87). Respectful questions, such as the Delphians to Apollo, take the form 'ἐχρηστηριάζοντο' (7.178). Cleomenes' manner towards the goddess was therefore presumptuous, which compounds the wrong-doing of entering a place where he had been told he does not belong. Had Herodotus wished to represent the coup positively, we might have a scene of Isagoras and Cleomenes sacrificing or dedicating on the acropolis before being turned out by a ruthless crowd. Instead, without explicit criticism, Herodotus builds a picture of despotic behaviour and Cleomenes' persistence in the face of just opposition from the people and the priestess signals what is inherently wrong with the coup.

It has been wondered why Cylon and Isagoras/Cleomenes took the acropolis. The suggestion has been made that the occupations were motivated by the presence of the old *prytaneion* rather than the symbolic nature of the acropolis; after all, claims to divine approval could be rejected and occupation characterised as impiety.[39] The *prytaneion* may well have been on the acropolis at this time, and that certainly would provide a practical motive, but we should be cautious before dismissing the importance of the symbolic and religious role of the acropolis, because the symbolic aspect comes through in several similar scenarios as we will see – and Xerxes did not send the collaborators up because of the *prytaneion*.

Another episode involving an enemy leader on a city's acropolis clarifies that this is an important literary trope in Greek history writing and not always a problematic action. Lisa Hau has demonstrated that Greek historiography employed scenes of the victor-after-the-victory as a motif which expresses moral themes about self-knowledge and moderation (or the lack of) by detailing how a leader responds to the good fortune and power of victory.[40] Robert Parker has noted that there is a series of stories in which *strategoi* sacrifice in the sanctuaries of defeated enemies.[41] These motifs can overlap and the *strategoi* sacrificing scenes vary in a similar way to other types of victor-after-the-victory stories; they are not always examples of bad behaviour, on the contrary, they can offer an example of good behaviour to be emulated. Xenophon includes fascinating examples of this form of story with a pair of victor sacrifices carried out in Asia Minor. When the Spartan *strategos* Dercylidas takes control of Scepsis and Gergitha, he marks both

occasions by sacrificing on the cities' *acropoleis* (Xen. *Hell*. 3.1.21–3). What is particularly informative about these occasions is that they are represented in such a positive light. The Lacedaemonians are not an entirely hostile force; they are there to depose the tyrant, Meidias, and to hand the cities over to their citizens. Xenophon has already established that we are to approve of Dercylidas' actions. He introduces Meidias in a hostile way, detailing how he took power by murdering his trusting mother-in-law and her handsome young son. Xenophon adds another leader's response (that he will not rest until the victim is avenged) to guide our interpretation (Xen. *Hell*. 3.1.14–15).[42] Dercylidas arrives in the aftermath of this episode, enjoys success in one swiftly narrated episode, then in another which contrasts Dercylidas' success following adherence to omens with another leader's disastrous decision to ignore them (Xen. *Hell*. 3.1.17–19).[43] Dercylidas' deposition of Meidias follows, with the build-up ensuring that we interpret it as a positive occasion with a leader acting appropriately. With the absence of outraged citizens and priests, a sacrifice on a strange acropolis can be a moral action.

The Spartan *strategos* Lysander dedicated a gold wreath on the Athenian acropolis following that city's submission after the Peloponnesian War.[44] Whether or not he sacrificed on that occasion is unknown. The episode would not be known at all had the treasury-record of it not survived. In extreme contrast to the Dercylidas sacrifices, Xenophon is silent on Lysander's dedication, saying instead:

> Lysander sailed into Piraeus, the exiles returned, and the Peloponnesians with great enthusiasm began to tear down the walls to the music of flute-girls, thinking that that day was the beginning of freedom for Greece. (Xen. *Hell*. 2.2.23)

Xenophon's emphasis directs the reader's attention away from the personal and pious aspects of Lysander's triumph and towards the Peloponnesians' response, that is, to their misplaced optimism.[45]

Another detail carefully included in the Gergitha episode reminds us of another aspect of sacrifice in politically complex situations. Dercylidas, maintaining a false impression of amiability, insists on Meidias joining him while he sacrifices. Feeling the sands shifting, Meidias attempts to escape by offering to go and prepare hospitality. Dercylidas' answer is given in direct speech:

> No, by God, for it would be shameful for me, who have just sacrificed, to be entertained by you instead of entertaining you. Stay with us, and while the dinner is preparing you and I will think out what is fair toward one another and act accordingly. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.24)

The sacrificial meal gives Dercylidas an opportunity to keep hold of Meidias and determine his fate. The meals following the sacrifices of incoming or still enemy generals must often have been highly charged affairs. Hospitality and sacrificial dining enabled groups to act out important dynamics about who is in the authoritative position of host, who is included within the group as a guest, and who is excluded altogether. Meidias is toppled; he may not play host in these cities anymore. If Xerxes' Greek allies ate together following their sacrifice on the Athenian acropolis, the atmosphere must have been a strange one given that the sacrifice had taken place amid still-burning ruins, with some of them perhaps confident of their homecoming and others more uncertain. But these scenes are not always painted for us. Each treatment of a post-conflict sacrifice is constructed of carefully selected elements chosen in order to express the key morals of the story. In narrative terms, Xerxes' Greeks are there to act as witnesses to Athena's miracle, Cleomenes is there to illustrate the hubris of despotism, and Dercylidas is there to demonstrate the canny manner of a good leader.

The use of one's own acropolis sanctuary as a fortified post was a permissible if desperate option in the Greek military repertoire. Once an enemy force had entered a city, sacrificing in its main sanctuary was a desirable action for its leader. This must frequently have been an unhappy experience for the defeated, but that does not seem to have been enough for that act to be broadly understood as problematic; that definition lay rather with the actions or manner of those carrying it out. Carried out peaceably, this was an example of a *strategos* behaving appropriately. Carried out through violence, having torched the sanctuary or insulted its staff, it cast doubt on the legitimacy of the leader and their conquest. For most of the many occasions on which cities fell, there is no account of what action the *strategos* took. These episodes only appear in Greek historiography when the author has a moral point to make about an individual or their campaign. Historians must frequently have been able to choose between very different accounts of how leaders behaved in these situations as put forward by the opposing parties, selecting and

shaping these narratives as a mode of talking about the conquests. Hindsight was powerful in this context. Herodotus knew that Cleomenes and Xerxes' Greeks were unsuccessful in their attempts to bring oligarchy to Athens, while Xenophon knew that Dercylidas' anti-tyrant liberation was successful; their stories reflect these factors accordingly.

SANCTUARIES AND BORDERS

Having looked at city-centre sanctuaries, we turn now to sanctuaries closer to the borders of territory. François de Polignac transformed research in this area with his thesis that the *polis* developed in part via the spatial relationships between urban and extra-urban sanctuaries, joined in an articulation of territory, distinguishing between civic, agricultural, and wild land.[46] De Polignac's theory was swiftly shown to be over-schematised, with many exceptions demonstrating greater complexity than his model permitted.[47] But while many sanctuaries predated the *polis* and occurred in a wide variety of locations, it is nonetheless apparent that some sanctuaries were located on the periphery of territory for the purpose of marking that border, for self-definition, communication, and potentially as a warning.

Sparta was ringed by a community-defining loop of sanctuaries, although the concept of territory proved more nebulous when Messenia and the borderlands of Arcadia and Argos were annexed.[48] Mantinea too was ringed by sanctuaries at or near boundaries with the various neighbouring city-states: Poseidon near the frontier with Tegea, Zeus on the way to Pallantion, Artemis on the way to Orchomenos, and at Anchisia, also towards Orchomenos, Aphrodite.[49] The seventh-century inhabitants of Mycenae marked their fraught north-western border with a new sanctuary of Enyalios in what appears to be an attempt to discourage Argive encroachment.[50] Several communities sited Artemis sanctuaries at their land borders and where one shore faced another, the goddess of the hunt apparently intended to turn back unwelcome visitors.[51] In peaceful situations, sanctuaries at borders offered a safe-zone for inter-community communication and exchange that benefited everyone.[52] When peace failed, however, the same deities that guaranteed safety to friendly visitors could be thought of as discouraging hostile ones.

For Athens, the sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis formed an important territorial marker. The important sanctuaries of Brauron (on the east coast) and Halimous (on the west) were also linked to the city by processions, but Eleusis offers a particularly striking example of sanctuary as border-marker by virtue of its proximity to the rival state of Megara.[53] Eleusis appears to have been part of Attica for as long as Attica was a recognisable concept.[54] From an early date, the sanctuary was known for its open disposition. Worshippers from anywhere in the Greek world were welcomed for initiation; exclusively Athenian worship took place elsewhere.[55] And yet despite this openness, the defensive potential of Eleusis was vigorously developed. The sanctuary was monumentalised in the time of the Peisistratids (*c*.550–510) during a period of conflict with Megara, and this included the construction of fortification walls of a significant scale.[56] As threats shifted, Eleusis became 'not just a very special sanctuary but a major garrison *deme* and a first line of defence against a Peloponnesian invasion'.[57] Fortifications did not prevent the sanctuary from being sacked during the Persian Wars, but the policy continued.[58] New walls were added under Cimon's direction (*c*.479–461), and extended under Pericles. The sanctuary seems to have escaped damage in the Peloponnesian War, although access was cut off at times. Fortification continued into the fourth century, with the so-called Lycurgan wall built for the south side and another for the west in *c*.360.[59]

These extensive fortifications at the sanctuary of Demeter extend the notion of the sanctuary as fortress. The walls added to the sanctuary's impact as a territorial marker and actively discouraged territorial incursions. No historian offers a scene of Athenians manning the walls of Eleusis, but there are references to its military function. A scholiast notes that after the initial expulsion of Cleomenes, Isagoras' supporters held Eleusis, which would have made an effective base for taking Attica. Unfortunately for Cleomenes, Athenian democrats had retaken Eleusis by the time he returned and he found them there ready for battle (Hdt. 5.74–5).[60] Under different circumstances, the Athenians and Spartans met at Eleusis before marching to face the Persians together at Plataea (Hdt. 9.19; see also Chapter 3, 'The Oracles and Prophecies of the Plataea Campaign'). The Athenians bitterly complained when Cleomenes ravaged the sacred groves of Eleusis (Hdt. 5.74; 6.75), but using the *deme* and sanctuary as a base of operations was uncontroversial.

THE SANCTUARY OF APOLLO AT DELIUM

We move now to quite a different use of a sanctuary as fortress: the use of the Boeotian sanctuary of Delian Apollo at Delium as an Athenian base in the Peloponnesian War. As an inter-Greek conflict, the Peloponnesian War fell into a different conceptual bracket from the Persian Wars; horrors committed could not be contained within the relatively safe space of outsider actions. We also move from a Herodotean perspective to a Thucydidean one. One well-known difference between these two historians is that Herodotus was more willing to refer to divine causation. Nonetheless, Thucydides' under-reporting of religious factors in some areas of the war is coupled with a profound interest in religion as a social signifier of cohesion and traditional moral values.[61] The extensive Delium narrative provides a significant contribution to Thucydides' moral discourse, with the events he describes indicating a severe breakdown in social conduct. The campaign is also contrasted with the more successful mission of the Spartan general, Brasidas (see Chapter 5, 'Brasidas' Moderation and the Sanctuary of Athena'), expressing a contrast between Brasidas' effective strategy of moderation and piety and the Athenians' disastrous policy in Boeotia. This comparison between the campaigns adds to the moral discourse of the work by favouring piety and mercy over impiety and violence. For us it demonstrates some fundamental yet ambiguous guidelines on how to treat other people's sanctuaries, including the sticking-point of this campaign, that while it may be acceptable to use your own sanctuary as a fortress, it is less acceptable to your enemy's that way.

The Delium campaign took place in 424. After years of maritime campaigns, the Athenians switched strategy and planned a land-campaign in Boeotia. This was a return to mid-century Athenian ambitions in this area (Thuc. 1.108, cf. Diod. Sic. 11.81.4–83.4). Thucydides outlines the intended outcomes of the Delium campaign (Thuc. 4.76.1–5). The generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, had arranged with democratic Boeotians that Siphae and Chaeronea would revolt simultaneously and be given up to the Athenians. This would divide the Boeotian forces, enabling the Athenians to occupy the sanctuary of Apollo at Delium, near the Boeotian coast around Aulis and Oropus.[62] The sanctuary would provide a temporary base from which to raid the countryside, supporting the pro-Athenian rebels and

eventually enabling them to assert authority over Boeotia. The elucidation of these intended outcomes makes it all the more obvious, when the time comes, just how entirely the plan failed. The narrative does not move straight on, but switches to continue the account of Brasidas' Thracian expedition (Thuc. 4.78–88), picking up an earlier thread (Thuc. 4.70–4). By switching back and forth, Thucydides creates the critical comparison. The implication that the Athenians would have been better off stopping Brasidas rather than invading Boeotia had personal implications for Thucydides; he was the Athenian in charge of Amphipolis, exiled after its loss (Thuc. 4.104).[63]

The plan went wrong quickly. Demosthenes arrived at Siphae too early, not co-ordinated with Hippocrates' arrival at Delium. The plot had also been leaked, meaning that Siphae and Chaeronea were defended and the conspirators did not revolt. Knowing the plan, the reader can anticipate the trouble facing the Athenians who would meet a far larger force than they expected. The Athenians were indeed defeated in a pitched battle at the border near Oropus, and a garrison of 300 cavalry plus returnees from the battle found themselves besieged by the Boeotian army. After a stand-off of almost two weeks, the Boeotians blew a hole in the wall and retook the sanctuary. Thucydides ends the narrative with an ominous note of the death of an important ally in the Thracian area (Thuc. 4.101.5), duly followed by a return to Brasidas, who was rapidly approaching Amphipolis.[64]

Thucydides was not present at Delium, yet he went to great lengths to gather material from which to write a detailed account of the campaign.[65] The Athenians' failure to establish a presence in Boeotia had a considerable impact on the strategic progression of the war. However, much of the narrative focus falls on events without strategic significance, indicating that the Delium narrative was not primarily composed to elucidate military developments, but to explore the social significance of the parties' actions. A range of motifs and other literary devices are employed to express moral criticism and to invite reflection.

One method that Thucydides uses to stimulate reflection and a negative interpretation of the campaign is to establish an affinity between the Delium campaign and the Pylos campaign that preceded it. It has long been argued that Thucydides emphasised the element of chance, *tyche*, in the Athenian success at Pylos.[66] The significant role which *tyche* plays at Pylos seems to rob the generals involved of

credit.[67] However, the speeches which follow Pylos demonstrate that the emphasis on *tyche* has a further function. The Spartan ambassadors stress that the Athenians should make peace now while fortune is going their way, pointing out how changeable it is, especially in times of war (Thuc. 4.17–20).[68] When the Athenians reject peace (Thuc. 4.23), the observant reader anticipates a reversal of fortune. This gives an ominous air to the Athenians' decision to persist with hostilities.

Like the occupation of Pylos, the Delium campaign represents a change from Periclean strategy (Thuc. 1.144 and 2.65); instead of consolidating, the Athenians expand. The attempt to defend a small oasis within hostile territory is common to both campaigns, but while lucky timing enabled the Athenians to take Pylos, unlucky timing in Boeotia doomed the campaign. While the Spartans became isolated on Sphacteria, at Delium it is the Athenians who become trapped in their temple-fortress, eventually killed or imprisoned as the Spartans had been. The term *tyche* and its cognates no longer appear and it is apparent that the good fortune so prevalent at Pylos is evaporating.[69] The reader sees that the Athenians had failed to heed the warnings regarding fortune, and that they had been greedy in pursuing hostilities in the hope of further gain.[70] These factors imply that the Delium campaign was a bad idea from the start and the details that unfold reinforce the impression of a bad plan badly executed.

Thucydides describes the fortification of the sanctuary in detail, ensuring recognition that the Athenians' activities encompassed the sacred area:

> A ditch was dug around the sanctuary and the temple: the earth thrown up from the trench was heaped up into a wall and stakes were driven in, vines had been cut from around the sanctuary and thrown in along with stones and bricks from the buildings nearby which had been demolished, and they did everything to change the height of the fortifications.
>
> Wooden towers were erected wherever they could be profitable and where there was no sanctuary-structure available, for the stoa that once existed had fallen down. (Thuc. 4.90.2)[71]

Thucydides' emphasis on the site's sacred nature is illustrated by reference to Diodorus' account. Where Thucydides refers to the 'temple of Apollo' (Thuc. 4.89.4) and offers details of the sanctuary,

Diodorus calls it simply 'Delium' (Diod. Sic. 12.69.1). Where Thucydides details the use of sanctuary features in the fortification, Diodorus states briefly that they 'fortified it' (Diod. Sic. 12.69.2).[72] Thucydides' comparatively conspicuous use of religious terminology indicates that the sacred nature of the site is intended to be prominent in the reader's conception of the situation and in the meaning of the subsequent narrative.

Reference to the cutting of vine-wood in the sanctuary also indicates a negative assessment of the Athenians' actions. Sacred laws from a number of sites indicate that this could be a problematic action in and of itself.[73] Perhaps more troublingly, the vine-wood serves a thematic function by linking Delium to the *stasis* on Corcyra, where a prosecution for cutting vine-wood on sacred land brought the feuding groups into conflict (Thuc. 3.70). This escalated into a massacre, in which the participants were bound 'not by the gods' law' (οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ), 'but by shared lawbreaking' (Thuc. 3.82.6). The traditional relation between words and deeds changed (Thuc. 3.82.4) and while neither party had piety, 'those who would do dreadful things under cover of specious terms were more listened to' (Thuc. 3.82.8).[74] No passages of Thucydides express quite as much horror as those describing the Corcyran *stasis*. The allusion to the cutting of vine-wood at Delium recalls these horrors, casting a grim sense of foreboding upon the developing situation. Jonathan Price suggests that Thucydides envisaged the Peloponnesian War as sort of *stasis* between Greeks, with states acting as destructively to one another as factions of a *polis* in *stasis*.[75] The evocation of the Corcyran *stasis* alerts the reader to the socially destructive nature of the events at Delium, linking that episode into the interpretive scheme that runs throughout the *History*.

Most of the campaign-narrative describes not the battle, but the dispute that arose afterwards between the Athenians in the sanctuary and the Boeotians besieging them (Thuc. 4.97–100). Thucydides presents a dramatic scene in which heralds from either side meet. Heralds are a recurring motif within the *History*, appearing at pivotal moments and serving 'as indicators of societal values and as a kind of punctuation or structuring device'.[76] Their recurrence throughout the *History* provides a link between the extreme events that both identifies their extremity and provides a critical judgement. The manner in which they frame the debate at the sanctuary draws the reader's

attention to the social significance of the events.[77] The Athenian herald's request for the battle-dead is rebuffed. The Boeotians' callousness on this issue has attracted scholars' criticism, although the Athenians' position is also presented as problematic.[78] The pair of speeches that follows also signals the events' importance as such pairs only appear at critical moments of shifting attitudes.[79] This speech is one of only three occasions in the *History* on which the speakers are referred to collectively as the 'Athenians'. The individuality of the leaders is subsumed within a representation of the values of the *polis* as a whole. The first occasion of this usage was the Athenian envoys' speech at Sparta (Thuc. 1.72–8).[80] The second occasion is at Delium, the third will be the Melian dialogue.[81] Together these three speeches by 'the Athenians' represent the development of an Athenian rhetoric of compulsion and the progression of the Athenians' self-serving re-interpretation of Greek norms.

The speeches offer fascinating insights into ideas about sacred space in conflicts. The Boeotian herald tells his counterpart not to request the bodies again until the Athenians have replied to the following complaints:

> That their seizure was not just and violated Hellenic law. For it was established among all of them to abstain from the temples in each other's lands, yet the Athenians had fortified Delium to live in it. Also, they were doing all the things there that people do in profane space; the water which is not to be touched except to wash hands before sacrifice they were drawing and using. Therefore it was on behalf of the god as well as the Boeotians themselves that in the name of the divinities of the place and Apollo they warned them to leave the temple and then take back what was their own. (Thuc. 4.97.2–4)[82]

The Athenians respond with a series of justifications:

- That they have not and will not mistreat the sanctuary.
- That they are acting under duress against Boeotian aggression.
- That according to Greek law (νόμον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν), whoever possesses land possesses that land's sanctuaries, and that occupiers are required to maintain the rites of those sanctuaries as much as possible.
- That the god will forgive their use of the water as it is being used out of necessity.
- That altars provide protection for people [like them, they imply]

who have erred involuntarily; that it is not right to say they have transgressed the law, as that applies to people who have done wrong without compulsion, not those [like them] who have simply been driven to daring by misfortune.

- That the Boeotians are committing a far worse sacrilege by retaining the corpses.
- That as the sanctuary is conquered ground, the demand for the Athenians to vacate should be dropped and the corpses returned.

(Thuc. 4.98.1–8)

Both parties are shown to assert the concept of rules of war: the Boeotians talk of the 'norms of the Greeks' ('τὰ νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων', Thuc. 4.97.2), while the Athenians talk of 'Greek law' ('τὸν δὲ νόμον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν' Thuc. 4.98.1) and 'ancestral custom' ('τὰ πάτρια' Thuc. 4.98.8). Reference to these concepts demonstrates their prevalence, but their inclusion in the debate explores the idea that, while desirable, unwritten, customary laws are essentially vague and unenforceable.

The Boeotians' first complaint is that while Hellenic law requires armies to avoid their enemies' sanctuaries, the Athenians have fortified and are living in this one, doing in the sanctuary all the things that men do in un-consecrated ground, and using 'the water which is not to be touched except to wash hands before sacrifice' as if it were normal water (Thuc. 4.98.5). This complaint was not petty. It was a matter of ritual purity that was typical of Greek cult practice, especially in sanctuaries of Artemis, Demeter, and, particularly in Boeotia, Apollo.[83] The Athenians' claim that Apollo would forgive the pollution as they are acting under duress recalls the similar reasoning inferred to be behind the Athenians' use of their own sanctuary as a fortress. Yet it is apparent to anyone that this is, as Clifford Orwin puts it, 'duress in a highly diluted sense'.[84] The pollution that they claim as accidental is caused by their very deliberate and obstinate occupation of the sanctuary.[85] The Boeotians were urging them to leave, not compelling them to stay. The claim to a god's forbearance is more convincing the more secure the hold on the territory is. Athena might well be thought to support the city she had presided over for so long; it is less clear why Apollo should switch his favour to the Athenians. It was a particular issue of inter-Greek conflict that their shared pantheon exposed them to

disputes of this sort. The reading of omens was too subjective to help in this regard as there was no certainty of a reading both sides would agree on. Pagondas had assured his Boeotian army that Apollo would support them in anger at the Athenians' desecration of his sanctuary (Thuc. 4.92). The Athenians could not say the same, but perhaps believed they had done enough to please him. Thucydides signals the weakness of their argument further by depicting them moving with great fluidity between postulations of having acted under duress, to claims based upon the right of conquest.[86]

What did the Boeotians mean by 'avoiding' enemy sanctuaries? Even the relatively simple matter of whether or not armies might encamp in sanctuaries outside their own territory can still appear uncertain. Hugh Bowden observes that it 'was not necessarily a sacrilegious action', while Price has argued the opposite.[87] Such encampments do not appear to have been controversial when they occurred in friendly territory. Sanctuaries expected visitors, who might stay in large numbers during festivals. Those visitors frequently stayed within sanctuary grounds, as the epigraphic record of behavioural guidelines attests. So, in practical terms at least, it was possible for armies to stay in many sanctuaries without causing unprecedented inconvenience. As far as their welcome is concerned, other Thucydidean episodes feature sanctuary encampments which ruffle no feathers. When the Athenian army camped in the sanctuary of Artemis at Rhegium, the Rhegians took a market there so the army could restock and no complaint was made about the camp. That the Athenians were attempting to win over the Rhegians suggests that they did not expect their use of the sanctuary to be provocative (Thuc. 6.44). Relations between the two groups were friendly. It seems likely that the Athenians sought approval, although this is not specified. Amongst other authors, Herodotus treats the Athenian encampments in two *temene* of Heracles in Attica as a positive sign (Hdt. 6.116, see Chapter 3, 'The Battle of Marathon'). Xenophon explicitly praises Agesilaus for staying in sanctuaries on campaign (Xen. *Ages*. 5.7) i.e. within non-Lacedaemonian, probably allied territory, although this does not mention his army. On another occasion, Xenophon does describe an army camping in an ally's sanctuary, and the camping itself is not controversial (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.1). The sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi could act as a place of muster (Thuc. 3.101), much as Eleusis was for the Plataea campaign (Hdt. 9.19, see Chapter 3, 'Plataea: Sanctuaries of

Demeter and Hera'). These examples of armies camping in their own sanctuaries in home territory, or in allied or friendly territory all seem uncontroversial. Using a sanctuary in a hostile territory, however, seems to be a different story, and there are few clear references to people even trying. The act of camping itself is not the problem, but permission and welcome is all-important, even amongst friends, and especially between communities with ambiguous relations.

Members of even welcome armies were probably required to keep to outer areas such as the groves and pasture lands, and as Greeks themselves, they would know the general forms of behaviour that were prohibited, particularly regarding theft and sex. Armies from friendly territories could be expected to request access and follow guidelines; the lack of control over a hostile force would be another reason to develop a general practice of non-admittance. The duration of the stay must also have been a key factor. Even festival-goers were often subject to 'short-term parking' policies, in which they were welcome to stay during a limited time-period, but subject to fines from patrolling officials if they over-stayed.[88] Non-hostile armies might stay, but it would be cause for complaint if they did not move on.

These normalised examples of encampments within sanctuaries may explain how the Delium plan gained approval in the Athenian assembly and with the atticising Boeotians. The Boeotian complaint confirms that the Athenians went beyond the norm with the fortifications they constructed, but while those alterations were clearly intended as a form of defence, it seems likely that it was the unexpected intensity of the siege which led the Athenians to use the sanctuary as if it were profane space. The Boeotian army was supposed to be busy dealing with insurgency, and if most of Boeotia had atticised, the Athenians would not have been unwelcome intruders. The failure of the revolt made their presence problematic, and they could no longer leave and re-enter the sanctuary as freely as more typical visitors might.[89]

The Athenians do not deny the Boeotians' assertion that it is normal to avoid enemy sanctuaries. Their response is to say that it is usual for conquerors to claim any sanctuaries and maintain rites within the territories they had conquered. The Athenians' pollution of the sanctuary compromised their claim to normality, but, as Robert Parker observes, the Athenians well knew this principle to be true, having taken a great many people's land and sanctuaries.

When they depopulated Aegina, Athenians began running Aegina's sanctuaries, leaving their trace in Attic-style records.[90] The sanctuary of Amphiaraus at Oropus changed from Oropean to Theban to Athenian possession when there were shifts of border; its personnel shifted accordingly, with Athenians from nearby Parnes replacing Oropeans in the priesthood inscriptions.[91] Delium itself seems to have changed hands before, from Thebes to Tanagra, perhaps even Tanagra to Thebes and back again.[92] Sacrifice, the main ritual of the Greek world, was similar in its essentials from place to place, meaning that it could go ahead under new people without confusion. Other specifics might be laid out in written form and could be followed accordingly. But in conquest situations, the new occupiers became the new religious authority. While they seem mostly to have followed the general pattern of pre-existing rituals, it was up to them what specifics they kept or changed. The fact that most priesthoods were civic appointments made the people in those roles very replaceable. At Oropus there is no evidence of an extreme change in ritual practice, but minor changes are evident.[93] Many Greek wars did not involve permanent changes in territory. No one can have regarded short-term raids as a legitimate opportunity for a change in rites and priests. The Athenians' application of the right of conquest to Delium was a controversial and wild over-reach as the sanctuary was not *in* territory they had conquered, it *was* the territory.[94]

Their extraordinary claim begs the question of why they hung on so doggedly. The rhetoric does not suggest that it was simply fear, and an imperialistic sense of entitlement alone does not explain their persistence in the face of failure. In his effort to make the Delium campaign look like a futile enterprise, Thucydides may have left out one of its key purposes, namely the increased influence it offered regarding Delian Apollo. The sanctuary of Delian Apollo on Delos had become increasingly important to the Athenians since the war had strained their influence with Pythian Apollo at Delphi.[95] A year or so before the Delium campaign, the Athenians had purified the island and revived the Delian Games (Thuc. 3.104). This placed them at the heart of a religious and ethnic network of Ionians and other islanders, a position of significant moral authority in keeping with their imperial ambition. The Athenians went further a short time later, expelling the population (in another example of conquerors co-opting sanctuaries) (Thuc. 5.1).[96] The sanctuary of Delian Apollo at

Delium was just a short sail from Delos.[97] The connection is explicit in a Herodotean story in which Datis the Persian has a dream realisation about a statue looted from Delium, which he finds and leaves at Delos for collection (Hdt. 6.118, with Paus. 10.28.6). Through their Aegean empire, the Athenians already had influence over the 20 or so sanctuaries of Delian Apollo beyond Delos.[98] Possession of Delium would increase Athenian prestige within that network and draw Boeotia towards Delos and the Aegean. This would be an important counter-balance to the Athenians' loss of influence at Delphi in a war bound up in religious and ethnic affiliations. It seems probable that the campaign was planned with this in mind. It also explains why the Athenians in the sanctuary hung on so long; the sanctuary was not only a short-term stepping stone to military goals in Boeotia, it was a target in its own right.

While the Delium narrative reveals the ambiguity of unwritten rules of military conduct, Thucydides' detailed presentation of the episode guides the interpretation and demonstrates that he at least considered it clear that both sides had done wrong: the Athenians in their use of the sacred space and their brazen attempts to justify it and the Boeotians in their treatment of the dead and in their violent resolution of the siege. The Boeotians' explosive entrance into the sanctuary is arrestingly unusual and Thucydides is specific that there were killings as well as captures. Ownership is not everything; this killing spree in the sanctuary also appears to be offered as evidence of moral failure, and it is another echo of the Corcyran *stasis*.[99] Another historian describing this episode might have offered an omen that helped to express divine disapproval these events. Thucydides provides no such sign, but the details he provides create an appalling prospect, and there are practical consequences in terms of the damage done to the Athenians' reputation.[100]

From an alternative perspective, the events at the sanctuary of Apollo were a far cry from the conspicuous destruction carried out on the Athenian acropolis and elsewhere during the Persian Wars. There is no suggestion that the sanctuary was robbed and the Athenians' pollution, shocking though it appears, is collateral damage, not the purpose of the mission. The Boeotians were understandably indignant at the Athenians' presence, but apparently even they did not accuse them of sacking the site. By dramatising the Athenians' flawed arguments, Thucydides demonstrates that their use of the

sanctuary as a fort violated custom, but the question at issue was primarily the definition of ownership and necessity. What they did was not fundamentally different from what they did on their own acropolis during invasion or at Eleusis as a precaution; what made it problematic was the lack of necessity for doing it and the illegitimacy of their presence. But while Thucydides meant us to understand the Delium campaign as a low in military conduct, the use of this sanctuary was not primarily war by sacrilege.

THE TEMPLE AS FORTRESS

Camping in sanctuaries seems to have been uncontroversial for armies in non-hostile territory, but unorthodox in enemy lands. Even amongst friends, there were probably limits on where members of those armies were allowed to go, preventing camping around the temple and altar, and concentrating people in the outer areas. Military leaders had their own reasons for desiring some restrictions of movement and behaviour anyway, as success on campaign depended on maintaining a degree of discipline as well as divine goodwill. This desire to maintain divine support (and the moral high-ground) must often have limited the disruption to sacred spaces. Armies in hostile territory may have made use of sanctuaries for encampments from time to time, but this does not seem to have been usual practice and all states had a vested interest in discouraging the practice generally. Although the Athenians took things to an extreme at Delium, their case represents the more likely ambiguity of armies welcomed by some locals but not by others. Their offence was in staying once it was clear that those rejecting them outnumbered the welcomers.

Whether or not it was acceptable to fight in a sacred space was determined primarily by the ownership of the site. While the pollution it entailed was undesirable, there was a greater claim to the indulgence of the deity in cases where the besieged could claim defence rather than aggression. Withdrawal to a citadel sanctuary was a defensive instinct and necessity might excuse the pollution. The use of a strange sanctuary as a base from which to conquer a territory could make no such appeal to necessity. Athenians in Athens were suppliants within their own city; Athenians in Boeotia were not. Yet these unwritten rules were open to alternative interpretations. While

there were bitter divisions between Greek communities, there was enough shared religious culture for claims to divine approval to carry weight, particularly at home and amongst allies, even if not in an enemy city. It is for this reason that both sides bothered to accuse the other of wrong-doing, and for this reason that the Athenians defended their actions rather than telling the Boeotians that they would do worse than pollute the water. Thucydides' disgust at the Athenians' behaviour suggests their actions in Boeotia were unusually brazen, but the campaign plan won approval and in later years it could be mentioned in Athens without embarrassment.[101] Had the Boeotian collaborators succeeded in wresting control of the cities, Delium might have passed to Athens without raising many eyebrows. Timing was crucial in this regard and only hindsight could really prove the gods' opinion.

CHAPTER 2

Talismans

Sanctuaries housed communities' most sacred items and were focal points of community ritual and identity. While we have seen that there were incentives to show respect towards an enemy's sacred spaces, we will turn now to narratives in which *strategoi* deliberately target enemy sacred sites in order to access special items within them, touching, damaging, or removing them in an unwelcome way.

MILTIADES: HERO AND DESPOT

The Athenian *strategos* Miltiades is known to history as the victor of Marathon. Through Herodotus, he is also known for an attempted violation of the sanctuary of Demeter on Paros in a campaign following the Persian retreat (Hdt. 6.132–6). The narrative runs as follows:

> So far I have told this story the way all the Greeks tell it; but the rest of it is only told by the Parians. While Miltiades was frustrated by the siege, a prisoner – a Parian woman named Timo, who was an under-priestess of the chthonic deities – sought an interview with him. This woman, coming before Miltiades, suggested to him that if he really wanted to capture Paros, he should follow her advice. Afterwards, following her advice, Miltiades went to the hill in front of the *polis* and, as he was unable to open the gate, leapt over the fence of the sanctuary of Demeter Thesmophorus. Having leapt over he went to the shrine, perhaps intending to move some of the things in there which are not to be moved or to do something else. But as he got to the doors of the shrine a fit of trembling seized him. He returned the way he had come,

> and in jumping down from the wall he broke his thigh – or, others say, struck his knee.
>
> So, being ill, Miltiades sailed back, bringing no money to the Athenians and without having annexed Paros. (Hdt. 6.134–5)[1]

We are told that when the Parians discovered what Timo had done they asked Delphi if she should be executed for treachery and for 'revealing to Miltiades the sacred rites which are secret from those born male'. Delphi ordered that Timo be spared, as 'Miltiades was destined not to end well' (Hdt. 6.135).

There are several indications that make it clear straightaway that what is described is transgressive. Firstly, Herodotus outlines Miltiades' intentions in a way that would make it clear to any ancient Greek that Miltiades is attempting something wrong. Secrecy, selective and gendered access rites, and ritual purity were fundamental to Demeter's rites.[2] For a male and an outsider to see and touch the items associated with those rites would be polluting and an offence against the goddess. The mysterious trembling and injury express divine resistance, another indication of wrongdoing. Delphi's complacency about Timo adds further evidence that Miltiades deserved what he got.

Even if we are not convinced of the literal truth of the Parian account of Miltiades' actions, we should be reluctant to invent new versions. It has, for example, been suggested that Miltiades 'really' went to the temple to plunder its valuable votives to recoup the costs of the expedition. This supposition is backed by the suggested that this was the Parians' plan: that Timo would tempt Miltiades into stealing the votives and leaving the island satisfied with a stolen horde.[3] The raid is still assumed to have been executed in secrecy. Simply on a practical level, one might wonder just how many votives one man could carry. Could he really steal enough to meet the huge cost of an expedition? If nothing else gives us reservations, we should recall that no ancient source suggests that Miltiades was attempting to steal from the sanctuary. The claim that this is what he was 'most likely' doing relies too much on modern presuppositions about how people 'really' behave around fiscally valuable objects and distracts from the meaning that has been carefully created in the existing account.

Another suggestion put forward is that Timo advised Miltiades 'that he could enter the city through the sanctuary'.[4] This is an interpretation of Timo's words: that if Miltiades wanted to take the

island he should do what she said. Although the scholar suggesting this still describes Miltiades' actions as sacrilege, by suggesting that he was seeking a secret route into the city, violence is done to the subtlety of the Timo narrative and its suggestion of ritual intent. And if we are to employ this pragmatic approach to the situation, we might wonder why Miltiades went alone. It seems unlikely that the leader of the entire campaign would pursue a reconnaissance mission at all, never mind alone, and if it was intended as more than that, then an advance by an individual would be ludicrous. Miltiades' appearance in the sanctuary is not a story that can easily be rationalised into a tactical advance.

One further suggestion is that Miltiades was attempting to win Demeter's loyalty away from the Parians.[5] This has some plausibility as we have seen that military leaders did offer sacrifice to the gods and heroes of lands they were invading. To Xerxes ordering sacrifice at Athens and the Athenians maintaining rites at Delium, we could add stories such as Solon sailing secretly to Salamis to sacrifice to local heroes before the Athenian invasion.[6] While the scenarios seem similar, the comparison is flawed. In these examples and in similar cases, the invading leaders make attractive offerings. By contrast, Herodotus reports Miltiades' intention to touch things that should not be touched. As such, there is no context in which this could be pleasing to the deity. Consequently, there is no incentive to believe that the Herodotean Miltiades was inducing Demeter to abandon her community. It is entirely likely that the historical Athenians sacrificed to her and other deities in the hope of winning favour, but that should not be conflated with the sanctuary-invasion narrative. There is no 'what really happened' story of Miltiades' lone venture into the sanctuary; ideas about the historical Athenians' ritual activities should be separated from it.

Herodotus did not communicate the idea that Miltiades was intending theft, locating a secret entrance, or attempting to win over Demeter. His actions are represented as an attempt to harm the community by ritual means, by compromising the ritual purity (and therefore efficacy) of sacred objects intended to ensure the community's strength.[7]

Demeter is famous as an agricultural deity, but her role as an agent of fertility went far beyond crops. The introduction of agriculture was perceived as the origin of civilised society; consequently her role as an

agent of renewal extended beyond the reproduction of crops to include the replication of the body politic.[8] The enactment of cult rituals, with the appropriate sacred objects, promoted the health and longevity of the community. Her concern for the land and the renewal of the *polis* find a joint expression in her role as a defender of territory, that is, as a defender of community sovereignty.[9] Greek religion was intensely bound up with the notion of *polis* identity and this achieved one of its most extreme enactments in the rites of Demeter Thesmophorus. Pollution of the sacred objects involved would therefore be a strike against community well-being. But the goddess seems to be responsible for preventing this from happening, and the Delphic response provides an authoritative interpretation to the end of the *logos*. When Delphi declares that Miltiades was destined for a bad end, the reader is invited to think back on the rest of Miltiades' life to consider why that might be. As the following analysis will show, pursuing this suggestion and understanding the narrative on its own terms is the most effective way to appreciate what the account communicates and how it was shaped to express not only condemnation of Miltiades' actions, but also powerful criticism of the character traits and the political system associated with them.

Herodotus says that while all the Greeks agree on why Miltiades went to Paros, the account of Timo and the temple comes only from the Parians (Hdt. 6.134). It might be said that in making this proviso, Herodotus distances himself from the Parian account, but by omitting other versions he bestows considerable privilege upon it. Herodotus had access to both positive and hostile traditions and he was at liberty to employ them as he chose.[10] The decision to privilege elements of a hostile tradition lies in the two faces of Miltiades that Herodotus seems to provide. The story of Miltiades on Paros belongs not with Miltiades-of-Marathon, but with Miltiades-the-Tyrant. As we will see, Herodotus went to great lengths to associate Miltiades with tyranny; it is this characterisation as tyrant that provides the clearest indications of how to read the episode on Paros.

The negative consequences of despotism are a key theme of the *Histories*. Herodotus uses a variety of motifs to characterise his despots, forming connections between them which express an anti-tyranny ideology.[11] In particular, despotic leaders throughout the *Histories* are driven to excess through a loss of perspective, a belief

that the boundaries that apply to others have no bearing on themselves, leading to an insatiable desire to do more or have more than their natural due. They violate cultural boundaries, and often fail to observe the spatial boundaries established by the gods, crossing natural borders such as seas and rivers, persisting with expansion heedless of the risk it presents to their current fortune.[12] The drive to do so is consistent with the insatiability that is represented as characteristic of despotism. The unsustainability of unrestrained expansion is a recurring theme within the *Histories* – an expression of the principle that fortune does not favour the same person or people indefinitely, as Herodotus observes explicitly in his introduction (Hdt. 1.4).[13] Despite these trends, Herodotus' depictions of tyrants, despots and other solo leaders are nuanced and varied.[14] Accordingly, Miltiades differs from other Herodotean despots, as well as sharing some of their characteristics. His birth is not predicted by oracles (as Cypselus and Cyrus' are), and unlike them, no one attempts infanticide against him. He is not murderous (like Cypselus or Periander), or sexually deviant (like Cambyses, Periander, and Xerxes). As despots in the *Histories* go, Miltiades is certainly one of the milder ones. But while there is variation, Herodotean *logoi* are consistently shaped to demonstrate the negative aspects of despotism, communicating a judgement against the institution of despotism and those who exhibit despotic tendencies.

From his first appearance in the *Histories*, Miltiades is identified as a medising tyrant. He is 'Miltiades the Athenian, *strategos* and tyrant of the Chersonese in the Hellespont' (Hdt. 4.137), commander in the army of Darius. Herodotean Greek tyrants of the late sixth century are frequently portrayed in connection with the Persian King in exploration of the threat posed to Greece by the favours they owe him.[15] Miltiades' appearance in Darius' service and in the company of other tyrants is a negative introduction, even though this is mitigated by his actions. At this stage in the narrative Darius has crossed the Danube, leaving the Greek tyrants to keep the bridge safe for his return. The Scythians encourage the tyrants to destroy the bridge and Miltiades supports them. The other tyrants initially agree, but are persuaded against rebellion by Histaeus, tyrant of Miletus, who argues that without Darius they will lose their power (Hdt. 4.137). The bridge is left standing and Herodotus registers disapproval through the Scythians' derision of the Ionians.[16] Scholars have long

questioned the historicity of this incident, not doubting that Miltiades campaigned for Darius, but that he ever suggested rebelling.[17] The tradition may well be the apologetic one promoted by his family.[18] Nonetheless, Herodotus has used it in an ambiguous manner – the positivity of the story is undermined by its inclusion. A more positive account would have omitted Miltiades' presence altogether rather than making him the best of a bad bunch.[19] This ambiguity is typical of Herodotus' treatment of Miltiades.[20]

The background to Miltiades' tyranny plays an important part in his characterisation. Our Miltiades is Miltiades IV, son of Cimon, and a member of the Philaid-Cimonid family.[21] Tyranny was in the family, as his grandfather had married the widow of an Athenian, Cypselus, who had been named after his grandfather, Cypselus tyrant of Corinth, best known for his appearance in Herodotus (Hdt. 1.23; 5.92). The widow had one son, Miltiades III, by her first husband, and a second, Cimon, by the next.[22] Herodotus provides a history of how, in *c*.556, Miltiades III became tyrant of Chersonese. Things started out amicably, as the Dolonci Thracians of the Chersonese invited him to rule them (Hdt.6.34–6).[23] One of his first actions was to repel raiders by building a wall to cut off the peninsula; this was a cunning ruse, but troublingly reminiscent of the Cnidians' attempt to turn their peninsula into an island, which was sternly rebuked by Delphi (Hdt. 1.174).[24] Like other Herodotean despots, he then proved unable to be content with what he had, launching an unsuccessful campaign against Lampsacus and ending up their prisoner (Hdt. 6.37). There was no need to attack Lampsacus. The campaign is presented as the unprovoked expansionism characteristic of hubris. It is noticeable that Lampsacus sits on the eastern side of the Hellespont, with the Chersonese on the west. Miltiades III was attempting, figuratively, to bridge the Hellespont, joining East to West in one domain in defiance of divine design. This prefigures the infamous behaviour of Xerxes.[25] Miltiades III was released from captivity only through the intervention of Croesus, an instance of the maxim (Hdt. 8.142), a tyrant works with a tyrant. Miltiades IV's brother succeeded to the tyranny. He also pursued an aggressive war across the Hellespont, which is cited as the cause of his early heirless death (Hdt.6.38).[26]

Miltiades IV received the tyranny, not from his brother, or the Dolonci he was to rule, but from the Peisistratids. When the tyrant, Peisistratus, died, Cimon was murdered in the unrest that followed

and the sons of Peisistratus were implicated in his murder. Miltiades, however, prospered:

> The Pisistratidae had done well by Miltiades while he was in Athens, just as if they had not been guilty of the death of his father, Cimon, – that story however, I will treat later on. (Hdt. 6.39)[27]

Herodotus' observation (which is made, as Wade-Gery puts it, 'rather sourly') draws attention to the incongruity of Miltiades' friendliness with his father's probable murderers, alerting the reader that this is not admirable reconciliation, but a perversion of the Greek principle to help friends and harm enemies.[28] Miltiades' flouting of this custom seems to be motivated by ambition. Epigraphic evidence shows that Miltiades became archon at this time, and Herodotus brings out the connection between Miltiades' disregard for family loyalty and his receipt of the valuable tyranny.[29] The perversity of the situation prompts Herodotus' narratorial intervention promising to discuss it in more detail later on, which he does not fail to do (6.103). Unnatural familial relationships are characteristic of Herodotean tyrants.[30] Miltiades' friendship with his father's killers should be considered part of his characterisation as one whose desire for power corrupts normal familial bonds.

On arrival in the Chersonese, Miltiades uses his brother's wake to arrest his opponents (Hdt. 6.39). His stratagem is an effective way of expressing dominance, yet the use of trickery connects him with other despots, such as Deioces, Peisistratus and Darius, who all gain power through deceit.[31] He then adopts a 500-man bodyguard and marries a non-Greek princess, further characteristics typical of Herodotean tyrants.[32] Miltiades' succession differed significantly from that of his predecessors. Unlike them (invited and ruling by consent), Miltiades imposed himself by force.[33] The Cimonids in the Chersonese started as manageable cubs and quickly became uncontrollable lions, just like other tyrants throughout the *Histories*.[34] Once established, Miltiades participated in the incriminating campaign against Thrace leading Darius' Chersonese contingent.[35] He also turned his expansionist aims against the non-Greek people of Lemnos continuing the Cimonid's dynastic behaviour with a conquest of the island.[36] He later turned it over to Athens, before returning to that city a few years after the Ionian Revolt of 499.[37] Once back in newly democratic Athens, Miltiades

was put on trial for his life on a charge of tyranny. Following an acquittal, he was elected as one of ten *strategoi* and led the Athenians to victory against the Persians at Marathon.

Herodotus does not paint an exclusively negative portrait of Miltiades. As Marathon approaches, Miltiades' reputation is re-established on more positive terms. When Miltiades is announced as *strategos* (Hdt. 6.103–4), Herodotus relates the Cimonids' Olympic victories in a way that reflects positively on Miltiades.[38] The account of the battle of Marathon seems favourable towards Miltiades. Miltiades is granted a far more prominent and dynamic role than the actual *polemarch*, Callimachus.[39] It is Miltiades who convinces the *strategoi* to fight (Hdt. 6.109), Miltiades who is entrusted with extra responsibility (Hdt. 6.110), and Miltiades whose reputation is enhanced by the victory (Hdt. 6.132), a victory which saves Athens from the double threat of Persian and Peisistratid despotism.

Despite this positivity, there are ominous undertones to much of this narrative, and Herodotus is not ready to dispense with Miltiades-the-Tyrant. One of the most striking aspects of Miltiades' despotic character is his ability to encourage those same tendencies amongst the Athenian people. As Peter Derow has argued, an imperialistic instinct exists within the Athenian population throughout the *Histories*, even before Miltiades' time, and yet Miltiades has a particular knack for bringing that instinct into action.[40] His despotic tendencies do not disappear, they are channelled through the city. When urging the Athenians to fight the Persians, he bid them do so not only to keep out Hippias, but so that Athens might dominate others.[41] Following this promotion of the despotic principle, Miltiades himself achieves pre-eminence over the other *strategoi*. They submit voluntarily, but one is left to wonder how often Miltiades will be able to become first among supposed equals. Sure enough, this act of harmless domination is followed by an unorthodox request to command the fleet on an undisclosed mission:

> After the defeat at Marathon, the fame of Miltiades, which had earlier been considerable in Athens, was greatly increased. He persuaded the Athenians to give him 70 ships and an army and money, not saying which country it was that he would campaign against, but telling them that he would enrich those who followed him; for he would lead them to a country from which they would easily carry away gold. This is what

> he said when he asked for the ships; which the Athenians, being reassured, gave him.
>
> Taking the army, Miltiades sailed for Paros, on the pretext that the Parians had brought this on themselves by earlier sending triremes to Marathon with the Persians. This was the pretext he voiced; however he had a grudge against the Parians because Lysagoras son of Tisias, a man of Parian descent, had slandered him to Hydarnes the Persian.
>
> (Hdt. 6.132–3)

Miltiades' expedition to Paros came during a transitional period, the end of the age in which individual aristocrats might go raiding for booty and the beginning of the period in which acquisitive raids were public activities; the expedition as described by Herodotus falls awkwardly between these two camps.[42] On the one hand, Miltiades is the instigator and leader, but on the other, the expedition is equipped by Athenian citizens. By conducting an 'Athenian' rather than personal enterprise, Miltiades seems to be playing by the rules of the nascent democracy, but the Herodotean narrative makes Miltiades' motivate personal, indicating that, for Herodotus, Miltiades is still very much an individualist. Scholars with very different views of Miltiades' intentions in the Cyclades agree that he demonstrated a tyrannical bent when he initiated his secretive mission.[43] Many have doubted the historicity of the motive Herodotus ascribes to Miltiades for undertaking the campaign, seeing it as too petty and suggesting alternatives.[44] While consideration of what 'really' happened is warranted, understanding the chain of events as depicted by Herodotus is the best route to understanding the meaning he ascribed to them. Miltiades' pretext has interpretative significance. He might claim to be punishing Paros for medising, but *really* he goes 'because Lysagoras son of Tisias, a man of Parian descent, had slandered him to Hydarnes the Persian' (Hdt. 6.133).[45] This clearly refers to Miltiades' time in the Chersonese.[46] The Herodotean Miltiades leads the expedition because he is angry that a Parian damaged his relations with the Persians. This is drawn from a deeply hostile tradition, and by including it at this point, Miltiades-of-Marathon is eclipsed in favour of Miltiades-the-Medising-Tyrant. As a consequence of this literary pointer from Herodotus, the reader should view the Parian expedition as a progression of the story of Cimonid tyranny, with all the negative connotations of despotism.

The most despotic feature of the campaign is its injustice. Miltiades wishes to punish a whole island for the actions of one man – an act of hubris. Neither he nor the other Athenians can be satisfied with defending their own land. Like other despots before them, Miltiades and the Athenians follow success with reaching for more, the Athenians hungry for gold.[47] This aggression indicates how Miltiades' despotic nature has encouraged that of the Athenians as a whole.[48] The despotism that saw the Cimonids push their dominance on others has built to Miltiades' unjustly campaigning for vengeance and prestige and the Athenians accepting his lead for their own hubristic reasons. This demonstration of despotic hubris is all distilled and re-played in Miltiades' attempt upon the sanctuary of Demeter.

THE SANCTUARY OF DEMETER AND A DESPOT'S CRIME

> As he was unable to open the gate, he leapt over the fence of the sanctuary of Demeter Thesmophorus. Having leapt over he went to the shrine, perhaps intending to move some of the things in there which are not to be moved or to do something else. But as he got to the doors of the shrine a fit of trembling seized him. He returned the way he had come, and in jumping down from the wall he broke his thigh – or, others say, struck his knee. (Hdt. 6.134)

We have seen the importance of boundary motifs in depictions of despotism, and this account of Miltiades' attempt on the sanctuary emphasises this transgressive aspect with repeated references to gates, doors, and walls. This provides resonance with other spatial transgressions and is escalated by Miltiades' transition from profane to sacred space. Nonetheless, the crossing of the wall is merely the warning sign. The real offence appears in Herodotus' explanation of what Miltiades was intending to do in the sanctuary. Herodotus privileges the idea that he was there 'to move some of the things which are not to be moved', while retaining an authentic sounding uncertainty through the possibility of some other (unspecified) intent.

The reader is also told that Timo was accused of revealing to Miltiades 'the sacred rites that are secret from those born male' (Hdt. 6.135). By seeing the mysteries forbidden to men, Miltiades violates a gender boundary and sacred law of considerable importance, ignoring the respect due to Demeter as a goddess.[49] The Athenians sentenced Alcibiades to death for offending Eleusinian Demeter

(Thuc. 6.60–1), and other stories have men torn apart for invading the mysteries of Demeter Thesmophorus.[50] Between them, Herodotean despots violate *nomoi* of all sorts, but religious violations, although fairly rare, are among the most extreme. Miltiades' offence against Demeter puts him in company with Cambyses at his most mad and Xerxes at his most arrogant.[51] Although Herodotus never explicitly condemns what Miltiades does, the impropriety of his actions would have been clear to any ancient Greek and through the employment of thematic correlations with other religious offences Herodotus signals the scale of the offence and anticipates Miltiades' punishment.

Even the word 'ἀκινήτος', meaning something that is unmovable or not to be moved, has significant verbal resonance. This term is used on only two other occasions in the *Histories*: of Nitocris' tomb, opened by Darius (Hdt. 1.187), and of the island of Delos (Hdt. 6.98).[52] Donald Lateiner suggests that, like words indicating fortune, ἀκινήτος is used by Herodotus to indicate a false sense of stability in something that must inevitably move or be moved. He rightly identified how carefully Herodotus verbally demarcated these three items, however it must be noted that Miltiades is not successful. Unlike the fortune words, which really do suggest that change is inevitable, these unmovable items are so labelled in order to emphasise just how shocking it is that someone should attempt (Miltiades) or succeed (Darius) in moving them, or how remarkable an omen it is if the matter (Delos) should move of its own accord. The use of 'ἀκινήτος' signalled the extent of Darius' hubris. Similarly, Demeter's cult items are not wrongly considered unmovable, rather 'ἀκινήτος' indicates the extent of Miltiades' hubris in attempting to move them.

The verbal connection between Miltiades' attempt on the temple and Darius' on the tomb of Nitocris, invites an assessment of the thematic connection between them. It has already been suggested that both individuals demonstrate hubris by attempting to move that which they have no right to. In the case of Darius, his attempt was scorned for the greed that his act demonstrated. Darius had responded to an inscription on the queen's tomb:

> If any king of Babylon in time to come is in need of money, let him open the tomb and take as much as he wants. However, he is not to open it if he is not in need, for this will not work out well.
>
> (Hdt.1.187)

The tomb remained 'ἀκινήτος' until the time of Darius, who opened it despite his wealth. The tomb contained not riches, but Nitocris' note: 'If you were not insatiable towards wealth, and covetous, you would not have opened the coffin of the dead.' Herodotus' readers are aware that Darius is rich, but Nitocris was not to know that the person to open her tomb would not be in difficulties. The meaning of her indiscriminate note is therefore that one is never so short of money that it is permisable to open a tomb and that anybody who does so is excessively covetous. That Herodotus himself probably developed the inscription/tomb-robbing aspect of the Darius-Babylon *logos* out of an indigenous tradition indicates how thematically important this invented aspect was to the *Histories* as a whole.[53] As Herodotus provides a link between this incident and that of Miltiades, the same message seems applicable. Miltiades made his attempt on the sanctuary because he was frustrated in his desire to capture Paros. Although there is no explicit statement to the effect, the resonance with the Nitocris *logos* suggests the same moral, namely that one can never desire another people's land so much that it is permissible to commit sacrilege.

It is telling that Miltiades' involvement at the temple starts when he listens to 'a female captive, a Parian named Timo, who was an under-priestess of the chthonic deities'. (Hdt. 6.134). Not all translations express Timo's position as an αἰχμαλωτίς: she is a prisoner-of-war.[54] It is fitting for the rest of the story that Miltiades' downfall starts with this rough treatment of a priestess, when the mistreatment of women is another negative characteristic of Herodotean tyranny.[55] Timo told Miltiades to do what she said if he really wanted to take the island (Hdt. 6.134). Her words are not merely the 'friendly treason' they have commonly been taken for.[56] Their ambiguity is reminiscent of Delphi's famous response to Croesus about the fall of a great empire (Hdt. 1.53). On that programmatic occasion, Croesus wrongly interpreted the Pythia's words as a promise of success for himself, a misunderstanding caused by his excessive pride and greed for domination.[57] The Pythia's words left room for Croesus' nature to undo itself, much as Darius' nature was revealed by his response to the oracular words of the Nitocris inscription.[58] Miltiades' unreflective response to Timo's words shows a similar myopia. He is so determined to succeed that he does not consider the possibility that he has misinterpreted Timo's words – that doing what she said might lead to disaster.

Other figures in the *Histories* reflect on advice before acting on it.[59] The previous chapter discussed Herodotus' hostile representation of Isagoras' coup (see Chapter 1, 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'). Later we hear that Cleomenes used that opportunity to steal a collection of oracles predicting Spartan misfortune at Athens' hands (Hdt. 5.90). Tempted to act on these stolen oracles, the Spartans almost brought upon themselves the ignominy of backing Hippias in what would become the Persian Wars (5.90). Moved by appeals against tyranny, they resisted temptation and avoided this fate (5.92–4).[60] Cleomenes' theft reflected his transgressive nature, while the oracles tested Sparta's justice. Timo gave the advice, but Miltiades is to blame for acting on it contrary to religious law.[61] Furthermore, Croesus received his ambiguous message after he had impudently tested the oracle, while Miltiades received his after the imprisonment of a priestess during an unjust invasion. Both deserve the ambiguous guidance they receive, just as both misunderstand it because of their characters.[62] Delphi will not condemn Timo (Hdt. 6.135) because she played the same role that Delphi played with Croesus.[63] There is always tension between free choice and fate.[64] Miltiades acted from his own free will, but his choice was determined by his despotic character and the pattern of behaviour that has developed in his family ever since their adoption of absolute power.

Miltiades' fatal injury occurs on one of the boundaries he transgresses.[65] Herodotus cites two accounts of the nature of the injury, a broken thigh and a struck knee (Hdt. 6.134).[66] He then favours one over the other: Miltiades could not defend himself in court because of the infection in his thigh, and gangrene of the thigh killed him (Hdt. 6.136). Fehling suggests that this remarkable 'triviality' was presented 'to demonstrate the author's own painstaking accuracy'.[67] Far from trivial, the competing versions are offered in order to emphasise a preference for the thigh-wound, an injury with great thematic significance. The thigh injury is another hallmark of despotism, creating a connection between Miltiades' injury and several other thigh wounds sustained by despots as a result of their offences. Cambyses transgresses a religious boundary when he stabs the sacred Apis bull in the thigh (Hdt. 3.29). He later stabs his own thigh in exactly the same place (Hdt. 3.64), and dies, like Miltiades, from gangrene of the thigh (Hdt. 3.66).[68] The next thigh wound afflicts a Persian noble, stabbed during the deposition of the

Magi (Hdt. 3.78). Although not personally a despot, he features in the Constitutional Debate, voting for monarchy (Hdt. 3.83).[69] A further thigh wound is inflicted upon Histaeus of Miletus, wounded while trying to reclaim his tyranny (Hdt. 6.5).[70] The final thigh wound occurs in the strange self-mutilation of the Spartan king Cleomenes, who kills himself in prison after over-tyrannising the Spartans (Hdt. 6.75, with 6.84). These are all of the thigh wounds that are recorded in Herodotus (and all but two of the references to thighs in any context), and they all contain a connection between the injury and despotism. This is the explanation for Herodotus' emphasis on Miltiades' injury. The thigh wound forms a motif that connects the figures who suffer them.[71] The wound Miltiades sustains expresses the nature of the offence. Back in Athens, Miltiades is successfully prosecuted for defrauding the people by returning empty-handed. He is not charged with sacrilege, but Herodotus attributes Miltiades' premature return to his injury (Hdt. 6.134–5). Debra Hamel observes that 'The reason for Miltiades' departure from Paros is obscured in some translations.' She argues convincingly that 'φλαύρως ἔχων' should be given its due prominence in order to clarify the sense in Herodotus that 'Miltiades returned to Athens *because he was ill*'.[72] The significance of this causal connection is that by making Miltiades' injury the cause of his premature departure, Herodotus makes Miltiades' actions in the sanctuary the cause of both his death and his prosecution. Divine vengeance finishes him off very thoroughly.

Having learnt nothing from the failure on Paros, Herodotus' Athenians act just as rapaciously in attacking Greek islands after Salamis (Hdt. 8.111.ff).[73] Kurt Raaflaub notes the similarity between their attack on impoverished Andros and the Persian attacks on other poverty-stricken lands – the desire for material gain changed to expansion for its own sake.[74] Accounts of Miltiades' and Themistocles' campaigns had resonance for Herodotus' contemporaries who were living through the consequences of Athenian imperialism.[75] Miltiades' personal ambitions came to an end, but the despotic urges he encouraged in the Athenians continued after his death. According to the pattern of the *Histories*, their good fortune would not continue indefinitely.[76] The contemporary reader was being asked to consider when, not if, the Athenians' time to fall would come.

There are then a multitude of factors at work in the Herodotean narrative which express the nature and extent of Miltiades'

wrongdoing. It is associated with despotism through the term used for Miltiades' intention and through the injury he sustains. His mistreatment of a priestess and failure to recognise the ambiguity of her words are also evidence of association with despotism. Most crucially, the episode sits within a long chain of related events. The Cimonids' aims may be more modest than those of Cyrus, Croesus, or Xerxes, but they are of the same nature. Their actions, as represented in the *Histories*, provide a pattern of increasing transgression that leads them towards destruction. Initially they are hubristic merely towards their fellow humans, then towards geographical boundaries, and finally towards a goddess, encompassing a rejection of political, geographical, cultural and religious boundaries. These increasing transgressions express the same principle – the apparently inevitable increase in hubris of unchecked authority. To start with they are fortunate, but that fortune is finite, their desire becomes excessive, they overreach, and the rule of the dynasty comes to an end.[77] The episode at the sanctuary sits in a Janus position: it reflects back upon the actions of the earlier Cimonid-Philaids, it marks the end of the current Miltiades, and it tentatively anticipates the expansion and fall of the Athenians as a whole. Herodotus appears to have taken a hostile tradition and reproduced it in a motif-laden form that connects it with the anti-despotic theme that runs through the *Histories*, providing a huge degree of implicit condemnation with which the reader is invited to concur. At the temple on Paros, Cimonid despotism manifests more strongly than at any other time.[78] This demonstrates that Miltiades' reported attempt to interfere with the ritual purity of the Parians' cult items is not only wrong, but the truly egregious act of a despotic figure from a despotic dynasty.

In the largely oral society of the early classical period, different interest groups remembered and promulgated the traditions that were valuable to them and, as Rosalind Thomas notes, 'Different types of tradition may compliment, reinforce, or contradict each other.'[79] The tradition that Herodotus relates he describes as the Parian account (6.134–5).[80] Relieved by the Athenians' departure, a story combining a practical explanation (injury of the general in charge) with a supernatural one (the goddess' protective actions), underpinned by an account of the invaders' iniquity, would have offered a satisfying explanation. It is entirely likely that the Parians

did tell a story of the sort that Herodotus relates. They may not have been the only ones with hostile traditions about Miltiades. Community or family prestige was the primary motive for passing-on traditions, yet occasionally a group might retain harmful traditions about rivals in order to malign them when opportunity arose.[81] The Philaid-Cimonids had such enemies in the Alcmaeonids. It was they who brought the case against Miltiades (Hdt. 6.136). Court-cases increased the urgency of competition between different versions of events, and it has been suggested that much of the account in Herodotus, 'with its unfavourable view of Miltiades' motives and conduct, is probably Alcmaeonid, derived perhaps from the speech made by Xanthippus in prosecuting Miltiades'.[82] The trial was an opportunity for competing narratives to be aired, feeding competing the traditions.[83]

Alternative traditions make the decision to abandon the campaign following an injury an act of piety. These accounts are preserved in scholia on Aelius Aristides' *On the Four*, which defends Miltiades and those others who stand accused in Plato's *Gorgias* of failing to improve the morality of the *demos*. Though plagued by manuscript complications, the scholia derive from sources dating back to the fifth century and as such represent valuable traditions that were current in antiquity.[84] Three of these accounts make reference to a temple: two naming Demeter, one leaving the deity unidentified.[85] In the two naming Demeter, Miltiades does nothing to offend her beyond attacking the island. A missile strikes his thigh and, because he is near a temple of Demeter, he fears it is a sign that he should leave, which he does.[86] In these accounts, Miltiades' departure, while linked to his wound, is an act of piety. He abandons his campaign because he *might* have offended the goddess. Although the accounts are similar, Miltiades' attitude towards Demeter signals whether he is accused or excused of the responsibility for abandoning the siege. If he incurred the wound by attacking her shrine, the failure of the campaign is his fault. If the goddess inflicted it while he was pursuing normal military activities, he was right to return to Athens. The latter case would have been easy to rationalise into the Ephoran version now found in Nepos (*Milt.* 7.3–6), in which Miltiades rightly heeded a non-religious warning and was wrongly accused of treason.[87]

Despite enemies and hostile traditions, with Cimon's encouragement, Miltiades' reputation was nurtured and revered. We hear of

statues of him at Marathon and Delphi (Paus. 1.32.3; 10.10.1), while at Athens he appeared in glory in the Painted Stoa at the heart of the city (Paus. 1.18.3) (see Chapter 3, 'The Battle of Marathon'). Herodotus was prepared to undermine Miltiades' reputation for the sake of moral edification, but it was not in everyone's interest to do so. While the Persian Wars were fundamental to Greek identity generally, the battle of Marathon was particularly important at Athens for providing a focus upon an Athenian (and non-Peloponnesian) victory, which fostered claims of superiority that corresponded with the rhetoric of empire.[88] With Marathon overwhelmingly admired, complaints about Miltiades' behaviour on Paros were an effective way to promote different perspectives about him and his family. These traditions depended on authors' confidence that the dynamics and values involved would be easily recognisable. To this extent, they clarify the great power of sacred sites as tools of characterisation and polemic.

While hostile traditions assert Miltiades' entrance into the sanctuary, apparently friendly traditions assert his avoidance of it. No traditions take the position that Miltiades entered the sanctuary to do ritual harm and was right to do so. This seems likely to stem from the specifics of what Miltiades was accused of: not of sacrificing while unwelcome, or appropriating votives, but of ritual offences that could not be interpreted positively. The account demonstrates why few military leaders would be likely to carry out these acts, even if they believed in their efficacy. Herodotus represents them as plausible, but also as so extreme that only someone almost unhinged by avarice would consider them. The attempt is of course also represented as a failure vigorously punished, and belief in deities' inclination and capacity to respond directly to events in their sanctuaries must have genuinely cautioned most people. Not every military leader is a natural-born despot.

MOVING BONES

Special objects relating to the myth or worship of gods and heroes could be regarded as having protective, talismanic properties.[89] Heroes' power was considered to be more bound to a specific location than gods' and their status put them closer to mortal affairs, both factors which made them likely to be on-hand in times of trouble.[90] In tragedy, Oedipus (Soph. *OC*. 1518–38) and Eurystheus (Eur. *Heracl*.

1030ff) offer to protect Attica after their internments there. Heroons could receive cult without containing bones, but the relics were a valuable indicator of the hero's presence and support.[91] Barbara McCauley has described a classical 'renaissance of interest' in hero cult, one manifestation of which was the transfer of heroes' bones.[92] The context that prompts or enables these transfers is usually a hostile occupation, yet they are typically presented as a cause for celebration. This section will analyse stories of heroes' bones and the dynamics surrounding their appropriation.

Miltiades' son, Cimon, led Delian League offensives against Persia and continued earlier imperial activity in the Greek islands. While Herodotus expressed a negative interpretation of violence against fellow Greeks through, in part, his account of Miltiades' attempted sacrilege on Paros, the story of Cimon's encounter with sacred relics on the enemy island of Scyros was positively celebrated. Cimon's actions, as reported by Plutarch in the *Life of Cimon* and the *Life of Theseus*, boosted his popularity at home (Plut. *Cim*. 8.3–6; *Thes*. 36). According to these accounts, Scyros was betrayed to Cimon by the Dolopian pirates who lived there, who were in turn betrayed by Cimon who seized the island and made it an Athenian colony. He searched for the bones of Theseus, who had been murdered there long ago.[93] The bones were found and removed with honours to Athens. This episode, more than any other, says Plutarch, endeared Cimon to the Athenians. Cimon was also popular with Plutarch, who characterised him as a successful military leader who nonetheless was 'gentle' in politics, bringing rare respite from civil strife (Plut. *Cim*. 3.1).

It has been demonstrated that this story probably belongs to the fourth century rather than the fifth.[94] That it was clearly developed as propaganda not slander compounds the question of how it was that such a tradition was developed, in which Cimon's seizure of the bones was not just tolerable but celebrated. Authorisation is a major factor. The Herodotean Miltiades was prompted by an imprisoned under-priestess, while Cimon was prompted by an actual oracle. But even oracles can be misleading, so there must be more to it.

In the *Cimon*, Plutarch reports that an oracle instructed the Athenians to obtain the bones, but that their location was unknown. The islanders declined to confirm the story or allow a search; Cimon was reminded of this during the campaign and his possession of the island made the search possible (*Cim*. 8). In the *Theseus* (written after

the *Cimon*), the Athenians are commanded by Delphi to retrieve, honour, and guard the bones following Theseus' appearance at Marathon (*Thes*. 35–6).[95] The *Cimon* also reports that the Delphic Amphictyony wanted the Dolopians punished for attacking pilgrims. The oracle's unambiguous instruction legitimises the seizure, while the request to punish the Dolopians makes Cimon's attack a holy retribution. A second legitimising factor is that Theseus is undoubtedly Athenian. There is no suggestion that the bones held any significance for the people of Scyros. The *Theseus* explicitly says that the bones' location was unknown to all. It is by 'divine inspiration' that Cimon correctly interprets the sight of an eagle scratching at the ground as an indication of the grave's location (Plut. *Thes*. 36). The act is therefore reclamation, not theft. The combination of authorisation, ownership, and intent, make the seizure as Plutarch describes it a very different affair from Miltiades' unauthorised attempt to pollute.

Matteo Zaccarini suggests that the story of Theseus' bones developed when Athens was disputing ownership of Scyros with Sparta and Persia.[96] The revival of stories about the conquest of the island, elaborated with details of the oracle-induced bone-hunt, re-asserted Athenian claims to the island that pre-dated those of their competitors. Thucydides had presented the Athenian seizure of the island as a matter of strength rather than justice (Thuc. 1.98). The story of the bones provides a distraction from the question of force and, more importantly, provided a justification for the conquest by offering evidence of the Scyrians' ancestral guilt. The account of the Scyrians' earlier refusal of permission to search expresses their recognition that the Athenians' request was an accusation of wrong-doing. Athenian claims to own formerly neglected mythic objects made myth and history tangible, apparently demonstrating Athens' historical transfer of authority from Scyros to Athens.[97] This public proclamation of possession appears more important than any magical power in the relics.[98] The Theseum at Athens was decorated at great expense with scenes of centaurs, amazons, and Theseus with Minos. These paintings cast the medising Dolopians in the role of barbarian embodiments of disorder and hubris (Paus. 1.17.2–3).[99] Their crimes and their ignorance of the bones provided a retrospective legitimisation of the seizures of the relics and the island. These factors, and Theseus' clearly Athenian identity, made this a

story that could be told with pride by Athenians and, for Plutarch, as a positive presentation of Cimon.

It was already noted in antiquity that the search for Theseus' bones was similar to Sparta's quest for the bones of Orestes (Paus. 3.3.7), and indeed, the story was probably based on the famous Orestes equivalent.[100] In Herodotus, Orestes' bones are located in response to a cryptic oracle from Delphi following an enquiry about conquering Tegea (Hdt. 1.67–8). A Spartan elder solved the riddle, located the grave in Tegea and, with fellow Spartans, concocted a ruse through which the land the grave was on was purchased and the bones secretly removed. Victory followed, with Tegea remaining semi-independent but ceding control of foreign policy. The Orestes-transfer occurred in the context of Sparta's domination of the Peloponnese, much as the Theseus story re-asserted Athenian claims in the Aegean. Sparta's possession of Orestes' bones was a claim to Tegean territory made via an asserted link to the old kings of the Peloponnese and the suggestion that the hero Orestes now dwelled at Sparta.[101] The tradition of the elaborate acquisition of the bones emphasises the oracle's role and the Tegeans' ignorance of the bones. The Tegeans did not give permission, but the Spartans could hardly be accused of sacrilege in taking neglected bones to offer them honours. The Tegeans, according to this logic, were not the true heirs to the kingship of the Peloponnese; that authority belonged to Sparta. The Spartans' subsequent success seemed to bear out the truth of their claim. A hero's presence should provide their community with protection. If the bones are removed and success follows for the removers, the oracle, the removal, and the conquest are all validated.

A further intriguing case involves Olympia, although the evidence is unfortunately slight. Pausanias describes a Hippodameum at Olympia, containing Hippodamia's bones, removed (so the Eleans told him) from Midea, where she had gone to avoid her husband, Pelops (Paus. 6.20.7). Like the story of Theseus, this tradition expresses the idea of repatriation; Olympia was Hippodamia's marital home despite her flight. McCauley convincingly argues that the bones' arrival was announced in order to contradict Sparta's Orestes-based claim to Peloponnesian hegemony by asserting a connection to older rulers of the Peloponnese.[102] The transfer, probably declared at the Olympics of 420, was most likely facilitated by Elis' new alliance with Argos. This makes it a willingly bestowed gift ordered by an

oracle; nothing could be more respectable. But a sinister back-story emerges from the question of how Argos came to be able to provide this gift. The answer lies in the Argives' destruction of their neighbours in the 460s, a campaign that saw Mycenae, Tiryns, and Midea conquered, their populations removed or enslaved.[103] The Argives' gift to Elis was taken from neighbouring Midea, from a people who could no longer approve or resist the removal of their property, cultic or otherwise. It is frustrating to hear nothing of the Mideans' perception of all this. The Tegeans and Scyrians were explicitly said to be ignorant of the relics they harboured; whether these were Midean cult items, or whether they were 'discovered' in much the same way as Theseus' bones is unknown. Either way, Olympia clearly promoted this as a positive story. With Elis the beneficiary, Midea abandoned, and Sparta banned from the games of 420, no state was likely to challenge the propriety of removing the relics, especially when an oracle had apparently ordered it. This made it an easy gift for Argos to bestow and their gesture pleased their new allies, confirmed control of territory seized some years before, and challenged their rival's claim to hegemony.

A final example continues the association between relics and territory, but from the alternative perspective of two failed removal attempts. Plutarch's *On the Genius of Socrates* combines an account of the Theban revolt from Sparta with an exploration of the nature of divinity and the parameters of piety. In it, the Spartans have removed relics from Alcmene's tomb in Boeotian Haliartus (although not her bones, which have disintegrated). Their actions are implicitly criticised through the reported misgivings of a near participant (*De Gen*. 5; *Mor*. 577E) and by their connection to natural disasters in Haliartus and impending disaster for Sparta (*De Gen*. 5; *Mor*. 578A). By removing grave-goods without an oracle's permission, they have acted unjustly, and this acts as a metaphor for their unjust occupation of Boeotia, which is about to end. So far so clear: it is not acceptable, and there are negative consequences, to emptying a tomb without appropriate permission.[104] A second tomb-emptying is also proposed; a visiting Pythagorean asks to remove the bones of Lysis to Italy. His polite request provides a contrast to the Spartan actions. He asks if he may have them and offers compensation, and he awaits signs of divine discouragement in case he should stop. His request is withdrawn when the Thebans

reject payment for the bones and demonstrate that the transfer is unnecessary; Lysis has taught Pythagoreanism to the Thebans, so he has enjoyed the proper rites (*De Gen*. 8–16; *Mor*. 579A–586A). The narrative's contrast between despotic Spartan occupiers, polite Pythagoreans, and plucky philosophical Thebans is acted out through these contrasting attitudes towards tombs, while Boeotia is shown to be a site of superior philosophy and the proper home of Heracles' mother.

To look at this case from another angle, we might compare two Plutarchan stories about Spartan kings, the descendants of Heracles, interacting with sacred spaces in Boeotia. This gives us Leonidas, travelling to give his life to Greek independence, asking for permission to sleep in Heracles' temple (Plut. *De Herod*. 31; *Mor*. 865e), and Agesilaus, occupying a Greek city improperly, digging up Heracles' mother. With this starker contrast before us, we can see how these stories function as expressions of the kings' relationships with the land they were visiting, the one friendly, the other hostile. In a further twist, the tomb contains a message which Agesilaus sends to Egypt for translation. It comes back telling the living to make art, not war. Like Nitocris, Alcmene speaks to her tomb-robbers and knows their weakness.

MOVING STATUES

While relics could be an object of veneration, cases of transfer typically involve those initially buried without honours. The same cannot be said for transfers involving statues taken from sanctuaries, which, by their nature, were already part of a community's cult. Their protective aspect is evident in Xenophon's observation that no Athenians would conduct serious business during the Plynteria festival, when the statue of Athena was veiled for removal and cleaning rites (Xen. *Hell*. 1.4.12). Despite, or perhaps because, of the close connection between a community and its main statue, there are rare examples of statues being appropriated by enemy hands during conflicts. The dynamics of these episodes reflect those of the heroes' bones in that communities seem to seize them with the intention of honouring them in a new place, rather than destroying them. Given the care with which Herodotus structured the Miltiades *logos* in order to express a negative view of despotism, it is revealing to see how he

addressed an instance of statue theft, in an example from just before the Persian Wars.

Herodotus sets up the chain of events with an example of a harmless transportation of statues. He reports that statues of the Tyndaridae traditionally went on campaign with Spartan kings, but that after a falling-out between Cleomenes and Demaratus it became customary for one to remain behind (Hdt. 5.75).[105] The theft narrative opens with Thebes seeking help from Aegina against Athens. In a supportive gesture, the Aeginetans sent what appear to have been statue(s) of the Aeacids to the Thebans (Hdt. 5.80–1).[106] The statues seem to have been intended to provide literal as well as symbolic assistance. When the Thebans were subsequently defeated, they returned them and asked for some soldiers. The islanders provided this follow-up support due to bad feeling towards Athens on account of a rather less consensual statue transfer in the recent past. With the movement of statues thus established as something of a norm, Herodotus now tells that story. When Epidaurus experienced sustained crop failures, Delphi advised them to set up statues of Damia and Auxesia (fertility goddesses). The Epidaurians requested permission to cut olive wood in Attica, believing this to be the most sacred wood available. The Athenians agreed, with the Epidaurians consenting to send an annual sacrifice to Erechtheus and Athena Polias (Hdt. 5.82). When Aegina later separated from Epidaurus, they demonstrated their independence through raiding and, during one of the raids, stole the statues of Damia and Auxesia and set them up with rites similar to those once offered at Epidaurus. When the Aeginetans rejected the Athenians' demand for payment, a trireme was sent to bring the statues to Athens by force. The Athenian crew attempted to tear the statues from their pedestals, first by hand, then with ropes. Thunder and earthquake interrupted them. They went mad and killed one another until only one man remained. The Argives had been summoned to aid Aegina. They concurred that the thunder and earthquake occurred as the statues were man-handled; however they claimed to have killed the Athenians, denying that the Athenians did it themselves. The sole survivor was murdered by the widows of the other Athenians (Hdt. 5.83–7).

The thunder and earthquake testify to divine intervention, as does the Athenian story of the crew's sudden madness. Further evidence of divine response was offered in a story Herodotus

disbelieved, that the formerly standing statues remained kneeling ever after.[107] Several aspects of the traditions around this episode are revealing. Firstly, it is clearly implied that the deities involved were capable of defending their statues, expressing their displeasure through extraordinary natural events and a possible unnatural one. Secondly, the Athenians are represented as preferring the infamy of their crew having murdered each other through divinely induced madness, to the idea of them having been defeated by the Argives. This suggests a limit to the degree of shame a community might feel in relation to acts of sacrilege, perhaps because sacrilege could be resolved by atonement (and, here, the immediate perpetrators were all dead), while the worldly risk of being thought weak was harder to resolve. Herodotus represents both the Aeginetans and the Athenians as being at fault in their actions, yet the consequences for the Athenians (who did not, after all, remove the statues, and who perceived their claim as legitimate) appear to end with the death of the last crew member, while the consequences for the Aeginetans are altogether graver. Superficially, the Aeginetans appear not to suffer repercussions, yet the narrative-chain follows through to a series of further sacrilege-themed reprisals and a terrible end.

While unpunished for their obstinate statue-theft, the resentful Aeginetans ambushed and captured Athens' state ship en route to a festival at Sunium (Hdt. 6.87). Afterwards they cut the hands off an individual involved in a pro-Athenian coup as he clutched Demeter's temple door-frame in supplication. Herodotus reports darkly that no absolution was forthcoming for this last sacrilege in the chain, and 'Before they could regain the favour of the outraged goddess, they were driven from the island' (Hdt. 6.91). These days, one must turn to Thucydides to learn that the Athenians expelled these Aeginetans from the island in 431 (Thuc. 4.27), and attacked them in their new home a short time later (Thuc. 4.57). This would have been far more familiar to Herodotus' contemporaries, for whom the Athenians' ruthless ending of this cycle was a recent event. While the Aeginetans' initial statue-theft appeared innocuous enough, particularly as Herodotus offered no explicit criticism of it, the ultimate consequence is represented as the total destruction of the population, albeit with the original offence compounded by further incidents. The Aeginetans honoured the stolen statues and made them offerings, yet the initial theft is problematised by the related

outcomes. Within the wider narrative, the story also reads as a criticism of inter-Greek conflict, for as the quarrel between Athens and Aegina escalates, Persia matures its plans and Darius 'remember [s] the Athenians' (Hdt. 6.94). Much as Thucydides represented the Athenians' sacrilege at Delium as a distraction from the threat posed by Brasidas, so Herodotus encourages his readers to regard the Greeks' mistreatment of each other as a failure to perceive the 'real' threat posed by Persia.[108] The initial theft was a conceivable feature of Greek warfare for Herodotus, with two cities competing in this particular affront to the deities. Yet for all that this creates a commonplace, Herodotus presents the theft within a framework of serious consequences and self-destruction.

The account of the Athenians' attempt on the statues may reflect a historical attempt to establish a claim to Aegina via their cults. The Athenians set up their own shrine to Aeacus around this time (Hdt. 5.89), attempting to appropriate his authority through this act much as they established a shrine to Salaminian Eurysaces as part of their claim to Salamis.[109] Similarly, the traditions surrounding the Aeginetans' theft may well have circulated at Athens within justifications for annihilating a people that had performed so well in the Persian Wars (especially at Salamis, Hdt. 8.83–93). Some decades had elapsed between the initial events and their outcome, yet hindsight made the link appear clear and gave the Athenians' actions a touch of righteousness.

When the Argives conquered the Argolid in the 460s, Tiryns was abandoned, its inhabitants removed (Strabo 8.6.11 has them remove to Epidaurus; Pausanias 2.25.7 to Argos). Tiryns had previously been a decidedly separate city. In the early fifth century it had asserted its independence from Argos by participating in the Persian Wars when Argos remained neutral (Hdt. 6.83). Like Mycenae, the Tirynthians enjoyed their own mythical traditions. These would be subsumed within those of Argos following the conquest, and this 'cultural imperialism' was epitomised in the Argives' seizure of the ancient statue of Hera from Tiryns.[110] The statue was re-deposited in the Heraeum of the Argive Plain, where it was seen by Pausanias centuries later:

> The very oldest is made of pear-wood; it was dedicated at Tiryns by Peirasus son of Argos; but when the Argives took Tiryns they brought it to the Heraion. I saw it myself, a seated image, not large.
>
> (Paus. 2.17.5).

This will have been an important statue for the Tirynthians. The temple of Hera from which it was taken is commonly identified as the temple on the citadel of Tiryns that follows the outline of the Mycenaean *megaron*.[111] The statue's pear-wood construct indicates its antiquity and suggests an association with the 'festival of the "pear-throwers" celebrated amongst 'Argive children', likely children of the Argive plain.[112] The statue would have featured in numerous festivals. It was also connected to myth; for mocking it, the daughters of the first king of Tiryns were dreadfully punished in a manner that suggests a connection between the myth and local initiation rites.[113] As a feature of cult and myth, this statue would have held a prominent place in the Tirynthians' communal activities and identity. The statue was not destroyed by the Argives but, by its removal from Tiryns, it was, like the Tirynthians themselves, subsumed within an Argive identity.[114] In this respect, the removal of the statue of Hera was an act of war, designed to contribute to the destruction of the defeated community and to their acquiescence in that defeat.

The Argive conquests had consequences for other cults within the Argive plain. Previously, the main Heraeum on the plain seems to have been used by a variety of local communities. Afterwards, the Heraeum became more explicitly 'Argive' as part of a wider restructure. As Jonathan Hall has concluded:

> The expansion of Argos and the destructions of Mycenae, Tiryns, and Midea in the 460s BC had a far-reaching effect. They were almost certainly the trigger for wide-scale institutional changes and a re-organization of the phratry system, and they should also be viewed as prompting the re-modelling of the Heraion and its festivals.[115]

Hall also notes that the road from Mycenae to the Heraeum fell out of use at this time, replaced by one connecting Argos to the sanctuary.[116] The extent to which former residents of Tiryns visited the Heraeum on the plain will have depended on where they settled. Visiting Tirynthians would still have been able to see their city's former statue, but it was now one of several, having joined the sanctuary's pre-existing statue, and soon joined by a chryselephantine one that was most likely paid for with the booty from the recent conquests. The subsequent building programme at the sanctuary was probably also financed by the conquest.[117] The statue and the Heraeum were now essentially Argive.

There are indications that cult transfer and assimilation had precedent at Argos in the event of a neighbours' destruction. Following their conquest of Asine in the eighth century, Asine was abandoned and its population dispersed, yet cult action persisted at the city's sanctuary, an Argive hero cult was established there, and Apollo – so marginalised in the Hera-focused Argolid – began to be worshipped across Argive territory. Asine's cult of Apollo Pythias seems to have been incorporated into Argive cult, with the Argives re-adjusting and adopting the Asineans' cults and cult-sites for their own use, a 'symbol of Argive dominance'.[118] At Tiryns too, while the Tirynthians departed, there is archaeological evidence that the sanctuary of Hera at Tiryns remained in use for another 100 years.[119]

There was an assumption that the possessions of the defeated belonged to the victors (e.g. Xen. *Cyr*. 7.5.73; *Mem*. 4.2.15). Nonetheless, it was surely the scale of these defeats that made acts such as the removal of statues possible. It does not seem likely that the pear-wood Hera would have being taken if Tiryns had simply been looted, but the razing of the city and the removal of the population signalled a drastic change. As the Athenians would argue at Delium, it was normal for conquerors to take over the sanctuaries of the conquered (Thuc. 4.98, see Chapter 1, 'The Temple of Apollo at Delium'). The Argives' continued activity in the sacred spaces of Asine and Tiryns suggest a desire to appease the deities of those places as well as a demonstration of authority. But as the sites were not re-inhabited and a good deal of time passed without divine objection making itself apparent, the burden of cult maintenance at an otherwise empty site may have come to seem unnecessary. No wonder that in time the activity stopped. This may well have been the point at which the statue was transferred. The Tirynthians may have resented it, but with the sanctuary abandoned, the option of depositing it in the major Heraeum meant that it remained a cult item and its history was remembered, as Pausanias' description testifies. This inclusion of the statue within an alternative but flourishing cult presumably added legitimacy to the Argives' actions. An oracle would perhaps have been consulted about the change, and it seems likely that it would have been made with pomp. It is frustrating, yet telling, to have so little detail. The events apparently did not receive wide coverage and to many in the wider Greek community they were perhaps just a natural development from such a comprehensive conquest. While it is

easy to sympathise with the Tirynthians, they lost their diplomatic voice and no allies came forward to help them reclaim it. The transfer of the statue was perhaps generally considered to be the best outcome from a gruesome situation. The episode could easily have been understood as one in which the conquerors should be praised for preserving the ancient statue and for having maintained the cult at Tiryns for so long.

There are also traditions of statues actively responding to attempts to move them. Perhaps the most famous case of this is set at the Heraeum on the Argive plain, where the statue of Hera sent out a flame that was interpreted as a warning against attacking Argos (Hdt. 6.82, with Chapter 4, 'Cleomenes and the Grove of Argos'). A further example also concerns Hera, at another of her major sanctuaries, the Heraeum of Samos. This story, set in the mythical past, sees Tyrrhenian pirates stealing the statue from the temple. The pirates found that they were miraculously unable to row away with the statue on board. Fearing further divine reprisal, they left it on the beach with offerings of food and fled. The islanders (still Carians at that time), found the statue and, assuming that it had tried to leave, bound it to a willow bush. A Greek priestess recognised what had happened, untied the statue, purified it, and returned it to the temple.[120] The story hinges on the assumption that deities are aware of circumstances affecting their statues and can act through them in their defence. Two further details of the story stand out. Firstly, that the pirates did not act spontaneously, they were bribed to steal the statue. In that respect, the seizure acts as the catalyst of a miracle without suggesting that such a theft is normal even for raiders. Secondly, the bribe came from Argos. The priestess is Admete, wife of the Eurystheus of Argos who tormented Heracles with the labours. Having left her husband, she made a new life at the temple on Samos. In retaliation, the Argives plotted to steal the statue to get her into trouble; it was not desired for its miraculous powers, or to weaken Samos, it is simply presented as the item most likely to induce a negative reaction against the priestess. The main thrust of the story is an aetiology for the Tonaia festival.[121] Nonetheless, the circulation of stories that rely on the assumption that a deity could defend their statue demonstrates a framework within which drastic sanctuary changes could be legitimised. If a statue could respond but did not, that looks at lot like compliance.

The Argives' readiness to co-opt their enemies' statues makes still more sense when we recall that Argos was amongst the cities that claimed ownership of the Trojan Palladium. According to Callimachus' *Hymn to Athena* (5.1–2; 33–4), the women of Larisa (the Argive acropolis) would enact the rite, taking the statuette of Athena in a wagon, along with Diomedes' shield, 4 km from the city to the river Inachos, where they would bathe it.[122] The Palladium was a mythical guardian-statue of Athena (sometimes of Pallas) said to have fallen from the heavens during the time of Troy's construction. Troy would not fall while the statue was inside. Odysseus (or Diomedes and Odysseus) stole it, fulfilling one of the conditions necessary for Troy's capture. There is no Homeric tradition for the Palladium, which receives its fullest surviving treatment from Apollodorus, however it did feature in the *Little Iliad*, and surviving iconography demonstrates that its story circulated widely in the fifth century. Athens, Sparta and, in Italy, Heraclea, Luceria, Siris, Lavinium, and Rome also claimed possession.[123] A fifth-century vase by the Tyszkiewicz Painter shows Athena accompanying Odysseus and Diomedes during the theft, looking on without anger, only eyeing the statuette of herself with curiosity.[124] While everyday humans may not always do what heroes do, the perpetuation of the Palladium myth normalised the removal of sacred items from enemy cities even before their capture. Troy also raises the matter of delayed vengeance. Locrian Ajax seemed to get-away with violating Athena's sanctuary only for the goddess to wreak revenge later; her non-intervention was not acceptance. But the artists depicting the Palladium-theft were working in a long tradition in which Athena was Odysseus' champion, she wanted Troy to fall, and fall it did; her approval of the theft was well-established. There is a further distinguishing factor in the treatment of the statue. Odysseus and Diomedes took the statue, but they did not murder or rape anyone within the sanctuary, and like the Athenians on Aegina and the Argives at Tiryns, they continued to honour the deity. With life more ambiguous than myth, only time could tell what was truly acceptable in ambiguous circumstances. This may well explain the 100-year delay before the abandonment of the sanctuary in ruined Tiryns. Sparta eventually restored the Aeginetans to Aegina. Delphi told Athens to restore the Delians to Delos and they obeyed. Athens was wrecked in the Persian Wars, but Athenians returned and rebuilt. The people of Tiryns were

not able to do that, and after a considerable delay, it must have looked safe to their conquerors to leave with the statue.

This chapter has presented nightmare scenarios for Greek states, of enemies laying their hands on secret items, relics and statues being removed, enemies taking over the running of sanctuaries, and the total abandonment of those once vital sacred spaces. Defeat in war did not always mean the destruction of a city, but when destruction came, removing sacred items to the victorious state seems to have been more normal than damaging them. Relocation demonstrated a new power structure without necessarily constituting an offence against the deity. That the management of this form of ritual rearrangement was handled carefully is indicated by the ongoing cult practice in otherwise abandoned sites. The dynamics of the successful relic-moving stories are rather similar, suggesting the factors that made this activity acceptable. The most important legitimising factor is that they were initiated by oracular command. Two of three of them are presented as homecomings. The original bone-owners are presented as having forfeited their rights to them, either through ignorance of their presence, departure from the territory, or both. The items move from a place of neglect to a place of honour. While the concept of hero-relic or statue transfer was clearly very meaningful in this period, these stories do not offer evidence of a general free-for-all in seizing sacred property. The transfers are territorial appropriation by appropriation of the right to honour, not to disrespect. There is even something dubious about the literal truth of the relic transfers, and it seems that it was rarely actual cult items being moved at all. This factor supports the theory that proclaiming their presence was more important than their magical value, whether to announce the success of taking them legitimately or of seeing off an unscrupulous attempt.

The nature of the stories correlate to the ends of the conflicts described. The stories of unsuccessful and sacrilegious attempts come from injured parties who successfully defended themselves, Paros, Thebes, and, conceptually, Samos. The stories of successful moves come from the movers or enemies of the victims, with the defeated party destroyed (Midea, Scyros, Aegina, and, to a lesser extent, Tiryns) or disincentivised (Tegea) from offering an alternative. Accounts of aggressors being seen off tend to be colourful and characterful; those reporting change can be too, although some are more perfunctory.

The Athenians' stories of Cimon's adventures on Scyros were vibrant enough to compete in the imagination with other claims to the island. The Tirynthians disappeared as a people and there were no other claimants to Tiryns. Pausanias mentioned the seizure of the Tirynthian Hera in order to differentiate between statues and satisfy antiquarian interest. No heavily characterised account of the sack of Tiryns has survived; stories of it must have competed, but ultimately they were not remembered. The Palladium signalled different things in different places: in Greek cities, the Greeks' triumph, in non-Greek cities, the Trojans' survival. While an ancient Greek might shudder at the thought of their own sanctuaries being emptied or reoccupied, that does not mean that they necessarily thought these actions were sacrilegious rather than one of life's harsh realities.

CHAPTER 3

On the Battlefield

Battle was fraught with hopes and anxieties associated with the divine. Gods were thought to take to the field only rarely in classical warfare, but they might help in other ways. It is a commonplace to read that victories will be had or lost with the help of the gods: 'We shall try with the help of the gods to retaliate', says Clearchus in a speech to his men (Xen. *Ana*. 2.3.23). Gods had a finite amount of favour to bestow; as it was important to be the recipient of that favour, it was the Spartan kings' practice to get up early on campaign in order to sacrifice first (Xen. *Lac.Pol*. 13.3). Heroes were more likely to take a direct role, especially if they had shrines nearby.[1] 'One of the half-gods came against you and wrought your undoing', proclaims an Athenian memorial to Athenians killed beyond Attica.[2] That this inscription was erected on a public monument is a reminder that belief in divine participation was not restricted to isolated superstitious types, but was a mainstream way of understanding the forces at work in the world. It complicates the understanding of the role of sacred spaces in battlefield dynamics that they were conspicuous landmarks, making it challenging to distinguish between references to sanctuaries as topographical markers and as implications of divine involvement. The frequent references to sanctuaries do at least indicate how significant sacred spaces were to the Greek conception of landscape.[3] This chapter will examine the significance of proximity in the perception of divine involvement in battles and will consider the parameters of respect and sacrilege with regard to the practical use of sanctuary structures. Examples come from the Persian Wars and from more exclusively Greek against Greek conflicts.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON

Greeks regarded the battle of Marathon in 490 as a turning point in Greek history from the moment it took place. Herodotus provides the most thorough (though still brief) account, and it is resplendent in sacred details. Archaeology has offered further insights into the sacred landscape around the battlefield. A boundary marker naming Athena indicates a *temenos*, while the remains of a seventh-century temple and female statuettes found close by re-enforce the likelihood that the battle took place near a sanctuary of Athena.[4] A sanctuary of Heracles was also on site and, while its exact location has not been identified, this *temenos* plays the more dominant role in the Herodotean narrative.[5]

According to Herodotus, the Persians landed at Marathon because it was accessible from Eretria and good for cavalry. Hippias directed them there (Hdt. 6.102). Further practical motivations have been suggested: that provisions could arrive by sea and land (via Boeotia, passing Delium), that the beach was good for landing and defence, that the Tricorynthus area offered water and a defensible position, and the accessibility of the rest of Attica.[6] Some have suggested that the Peisistratids' association with Marathon was part of what prompted Hippias to suggest this landing-point.[7] Herodotus does not stress this, although readers may have been expected to recall that Peisistratus had arrived there to establish his tyranny some 50 years before, with Hippias urging him on (Hdt. 1.61–4). The Peisistratids are thought to have cultivated an association with Heracles.[8] Similarly, Athena had played a role in the establishing of the tyranny, in the wonderful Phye episode (Hdt. 1.60) and in the battle for Athens taking place beside the temple of Athena at Pallene (Hdt. 1.62). But if these associations had significance for the choice of Marathon, Herodotus does not explore it. We learn that the Athenians camped in the *temenos* of Heracles (Hdt. 6.108), which suggests that it was no priority for the Persians or Hippias' entourage to control that space. Did Hippias sacrifice in this or Athena's sanctuary before the Athenians arrived? Did the Persian leaders join him there? The silence on this issue either way demonstrates that it was not a priority for Herodotus, reminding us that when references to military leaders entering or avoiding sanctuaries are included, they are there for a particular narratorial purpose, not simply as a record of what happened.

The battle-narrative features the divine in other ways. In the build-up: Hippias receives and correctly interprets an omen of defeat (Hdt. 6.103); Pan appears to a messenger in a detailed epiphany-narrative, with the god offering help and requesting recognition (Hdt. 6.105); the Athenians camp in Heracles' *temenos* (Hdt. 6.108);[9] Miltiades declares that 'If God gives us fair play, we can not only fight but win' (Hdt. 6.109); and the pre-battle sacrifices prove encouraging (Hdt. 6.112). The battle itself prompts a wondrous event; an Athenian, Epizelus, went blind without receiving a blow after seeing a *daimon* kill the man at his side (Hdt. 6.117). Once the battle is over, a striking correlation is noted: 'Just as at Marathon the Athenian camp had been a precinct of Heracles, so now they fixed their camp [outside Athens] on one sacred to Heracles at Cynosarges' (Hdt. 6.116). There is no more explicit reference to Heracles participating in the campaign, but the correlation communicates a sense of something more than mortal at work, and there is space for the reader to recognise this as evidence of Heracles' intervention if they choose.[10]

There is no suggestion that Athena played any part in the battle, despite her having a temple at Marathon. The Pan narrative is rather exceptional and expresses the special nature of the campaign, but the general situation rather than anything on the battlefield prompts the epiphany. The selectivity of Herodotus' depiction of the divine participation at Marathon is clarified by comparison with alternative representations of the battle. The iconography of the Painted Stoa is particularly revealing. Erected by 460, it 'already shows a developed mythology of superhuman intervention':[11]

> Here is also a portrait of the hero Marathon, after whom the plain is named, of Theseus represented as coming up from the underworld, of Athena and of Heracles. The Marathonians, according to their own account, were the first to regard Heracles as a god. Of the fighters the most conspicuous figures in the painting are Callimachus, who had been elected commander-in-chief by the Athenians, Miltiades, one of the generals, and a hero called Echetlus, of whom I shall make mention later.
>
> (Paus. 1.15.3)

This public painting gives a far more prominent role to divine figures than Herodotus' narrative, although it is not clear if their presence is figurative or indicating more direct involvement.[12] Athena and Heracles were local to the battlefield, but also had a general interest in the Athenians' well-being. Theseus appears although his connection

was with Attica rather than Marathon specifically. By Plutarch's day, if not before, there were stories of him actually fighting.[13] Marathon's presence emphasises location, being the eponymous hero of the battlefield, and Echetlus too seems to be a local hero, either before or after the battle.[14] Hera, Demeter and Kore, and Pan were also depicted in the stoa.[15] Hera's presence is interesting as there is no other indication of her involvement in the battle. Demeter and Kore do not seem to have had a sanctuary at the site, although they do appear in a local calendar, so they had some cult function nearby. Nonetheless, their participation may reflect their role as guardians of Attica generally rather than a specifically local presence. If Evelyn Harrison's interpretation is correct, another local defender was depicted within a Marathon narrative on the shield of Athena Parthenos at Athens – Cecrops, fighting with a rock, 'an object connected to the earth, symbolizing the mobilization of all the forces of the homeland to repel the invader'.[16]

An array of other monuments and cult foundations testify to the perceived role of deities. The Marathon monument at Delphi placed Miltiades in the midst of Athena and Apollo, the eponymous heroes of Athens, and heroes Codrus, Theseus, and Neleus (Paus. 10.10.1–2).[17] Artemis Agrotera featured prominently in commemorations, as huntress and moon deity. She was prominent in the festival at Agrae at which Marathon was celebrated with a sacrifice made in accordance with the vow taken shortly before the Persian landing.[18] And, with Apollo, she was named in a commemorative inscription at Delphi.[19] The Great Panathenaea featured prayers recalling Marathon, which must have reinforced the idea of Athena's role in the victory (Hdt. 6.111), while the giant statue of Athena Promachus on the acropolis also proclaimed her part (Paus. 1.28.2). Pan got the shrines and festival he requested (Hdt. 6.105), and Heracles received new games.[20] Vases from this period depict heroes emerging to assist in the battle.[21]

Even this brief survey of the divine figures and spaces associated with the battle of Marathon demonstrates the considerable role that the divine played in the way that it was remembered. It is not evident, however, that the various sacred spaces around the battlefield were regarded as particularly pertinent, still less the interaction of the various military leaders with those spaces. Heracles, who was venerated locally, was regarded as taking an active role of some

sort, but so was Artemis, who had no such direct connection. Athena did have a sacred space on the site and was regarded as playing a role in the outcome, but Herodotus' account shows that it was possible to drop her from the battle-narrative. The heroes regarded as participating had local relevance, yet those whose connection was Attica rather than Marathon could participate equally. Herodotus could have been far more overt about divine involvement if he had chosen to. That he did not adds support to J.A.S Evans' theory that Herodotus was not as excited about Marathon as he was about the battle of Plataea.[22] As we will see, the Herodotean account of Plataea includes more explicit examples of direct divine involvement. The narrative sense of a build-up to Plataea would have been somewhat undermined if Marathon had been equally wonderful. As for the physical role of the sanctuaries, one provided a camping site for the Greeks, but beyond that the various temple buildings do not seem to have affected how the armies were deployed or manoeuvred.

ARTEMISIUM AND SALAMIS: GODS OF WIND AND WATER

While vengeance for the destruction of the sanctuary in Sardis was offered (and to some extent received) as an explanation for Darius' invasion of Greece, the invasion under Xerxes was regarded as an extreme escalation, with the destruction more widespread and the aims regarded as more hubristic (see Hdt. 7.8a–c, with Chapter 1, 'The Athenian Acropolis', n.15). In the Herodotean narrative, the gods' role appears more pronounced in relation to this increase in hubris and other religious offences. Numerous stories from the Artemisium and Salamis campaigns indicate the particular importance of divine figures with sacred spaces close to the scene of the battles.

The outcome of the naval battle of Artemisium is represented as hinging on a combination of political dexterity, courage and skill, and a wrangling for the affections of divine powers near the battle.[23] At the outset of the campaign, Delphi contacts the defending Greeks, advising them to 'Pray to the winds'. They respond gratefully with prayers and an altar (Hdt. 7.178).[24] 'There is a story', Herodotus follows up, that another oracle prompted the Athenians to sacrifice to Boreas (the north wind) and Oreithyia, his mortal Athenian wife, the daughter of Erechtheus, begging them 'to come to their aid and

repeat the former disaster at Athos by destroying the Persian fleet' (Hdt. 7.189). While Boreas is too elemental to be local, the connection with Erechtheus and Oreithyia makes this a place-based story in which Boreas is a sort of son-in-law to the Athenians. In a compelling battle of rituals, the Persian magi are said to have been busy casting spells upon the winds and sacrificing to Thetis and the Nereids, halting the storm that the Athenians summoned. 'The reason', Herodotus explains, 'that the Magi sacrificed to Thetis was that they had learnt from the Ionians that she was supposed to have been carried off from here by Peleus, and that all the headland of Sepias belonged to her and the other daughters of Nereus' (Hdt. 7.191). Sepias is the south-east corner of Magnesia, across the water from Artemisium. The Persians were drawing on the relatively local knowledge of Ionian collaborators (perhaps from Ionian Magnesia, a Magnesian foundation), whose insight enabled them to respond to their location to call on a local deity.[25]

In these precursors to conflict, Herodotus is clear about the importance of identifying the most appropriate local deity to sacrifice to. He had been reluctant to say whether Boreas really caused the storm, but this should not be taken as disbelief, so much as an example of his reticence to offer definite opinions on divine causation. Furthermore, he reports the Athenians' insistence that Boreas did intervene and cites the temple that they built in appreciation (Hdt. 7.189). Herodotus is more non-committal regarding the magi's rituals, describing them as halting the storm, but qualifying that 'it may be that the wind died down of its own accord' (Hdt. 7.191). Poseidon took sides in this naval clash and received 'prayers of thanksgiving and libations of wine to Poseidon the Saviour' (Hdt. 7.192). Across the waters from Thetis' shore, was a sanctuary of Artemis on the cape of Euboea (Hdt. 7.176). Her sanctuaries seem often to serve an apotropaic function.[26] Accordingly, although she plays no conspicuous part in the Herodotean narrative, she received elegiac verses of thanks inscribed and dedicated at the sanctuary (Plut. *Them*. 8.3).

Deities with sacred spaces near or connected to the conflict zone played a role in the follow-up battle of Salamis. Artemis had a sanctuary there (Paus. 1.36.1), although her role in the battle seems only to have been as an advisor (Plut. *Them*. 22.1–2). An earthquake affecting land and sea started the day's proceedings which, Herodotus

tells us, the Greeks responded to with sacrifices and the decision to invoke Telamon and Ajax, the son and grandson of Aeacus, who had been based on Salamis since Telamon settled it (Apollod. 3.12), and where he had hero-cult (*LIMC* 7.1, 1994, 852–4). As we saw (Chapter 2, 'Moving Statues'), the Aeacids, so recently featured in intra-Greek hostilities, were fetched from Aegina to join this (almost) Panhellenic struggle (Hdt. 8.64; 8.83).[27] The sacrifices were place-based, inspired by a perception of the heroes' special interest in and influence over things happening in their vicinity, as well as their support for the Greeks more broadly. That their statues were sought at so much risk also indicates that their efficacy was thought to be increased by their proximity to the battle.

Proximity plays a role in a further divine-intervention. Herodotus reports three versions of how the battle began. The third, the 'popular belief' has the fleet backing up before 'the phantom shape of a woman appeared and, in a voice which could be heard by every man in the fleet, contemptuously cried out: "Wretched men, for how long will you back water?"', prompting the fleet to fight (Hdt. 8.84).[28] The phantom was understood to be Demeter, whose major sanctuary was at nearby Eleusis. Her involvement was foreshadowed by a sighting of a huge dust-cloud, as if made by 30,000 men, and the sound of the Eleusinian Iacchus song. Only one witness, an Athenian exile, recognised these as omens of divine help arriving from Eleusis. His companion, the exiled Demaratus, foresaw that it meant the destruction of the invader (Hdt. 8.65).[29]

In later years, another local would be recognised for contributing. Coins minted in the Imperial period depict the hero, Cychreus, as a snake aboard Themistocles' ship. Cychreus had a joint association with Salamis and Eleusis – an ideal figure to participate in a local action. The Herodotean Themistocles declared that the gods, not mortals, won Salamis (Hdt. 8.109). The apparently late addition of Cychreus to the narrative is a fine demonstration of how the Persian War narratives continued to accrue divine associations, with local heroes remaining attractive options.[30]

PLATAEA: SANCTUARIES OF DEMETER AND HERA

The Plataea campaign followed hard upon Salamis. In terms of interpreting ancient representations of the events, it is helpful that

one of the chief protagonists was so respected for his virtue that he was known as Aristides the Just and that Herodotus described the battle explicitly as 'the most wonderful victory ever known to us' (Hdt. 9.64).[31] This section will focus on the presentation of the Plataea campaign in Herodotus' *Histories* and Plutarch's *Lives*. Both authors made the location of and treatment of sacred space a key interpretive feature of their accounts.

Following the defeat at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia while his general, Mardonius, stayed on to carry out the conquest of Greece (Hdt. 8.100–20). The section of the *Histories* between the start of Xerxes' retreat and the start of the Plataea campaign (indicated by the Persian re-occupation of Athens, Hdt. 9.3) sees an increased density of incidents involving the divine, a device which prepares the reader for the climactic defeat of the invaders and signals the relevance these events had in the divine sphere. These incidents include Delphi advising the Lacedaemonians to demand reparation for the killing of Leonidas (8.114);[32] Xerxes' loss of the sacred chariot (8.115); the discovery that the bridges joining Asia to Europe have been swept away (8.117); Greek victory dedications at Isthmia, Sunium, Salamis, and Delphi (8.121); the destruction of the Persians besieging Potidaea (attributed by Herodotus to Poseidon's vengeance, 8.129);[33] and Mardonius' consultation of Greek oracles (8.134–5).

Following these religious references, Herodotus has Mardonius sending Alexander of Macedon to Athens to urge surrender. The striking Athenian response continues the religious and moral agenda:

> We understand that the power of the Mede is many times that of our own, so there is no need to reproach us with that. But we are so fond of freedom that we will defend ourselves as much as we are able. Regarding agreement with the barbarian – you make no good attempt to persuade us that way, and nor will we be persuaded. Now, take a message to Mardonius of what the Athenians say – that as long as the sun carries on the path it now takes, we will never come to an agreement with Xerxes. We will attack him and defend ourselves, trusting in the gods and heroes as our allies – those he had no respect for, whose homes and statues he burnt. (Hdt. 8.143)[34]

The Athenians proffer their love of freedom as their chief motivation and present the 'gods and heroes', whose sanctuaries and statues have been damaged as their allies. Plutarch names Aristides as the speaker of an equivalent response. The gods are not explicitly cited as

allies in Plutarch's version, and indeed, they play a less active role in the subsequent battle-narrative, but the desecration of sacred spaces is escalated to a primary motive for resistance (Plut. *Arist.* 10.5–6). The unprecedented degree of damage to their sanctuaries was clearly understood as having a galvanising effect on the Greeks, either as a motivating guarantee of divine aid or as a motive for justified revenge.

THE ORACLES AND PROPHECIES OF THE PLATAEA CAMPAIGN

Sacred spaces play a role from an early stage in the Plataea narrative. Herodotus has the Peloponnesian forces join the Athenians at Eleusis (Ht. 9.19), a tradition that also seems to feature in Simonides' Plataea elegy.[35] The geographical position of Eleusis made it a practical muster point, although proceedings must have been complicated by the destruction wrought by the Persian army. When he describes the allies' meeting, Herodotus makes no mention of the damage, referring only to good omens from the sacrifices. After the battle, however, he does refer to the destruction, commenting: 'they had burnt the temple, the *anaktoron* at Eleusis', 'ἐμπρήσαντας τὸ ἱρὸν τὸ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι ἀνάκτορον' (Hdt. 9.65). This has been borne out by excavation.[36] Herodotus' reluctance to evoke such a striking scene at this point seems to be motivated by concern for tone. The meeting at Eleusis is the beginning of the new campaign and has an atmosphere of modest optimism that suits an army setting off for victory. This tone may have been confused by introducing blackened wreckage into the scene, a difficulty that is avoided by delaying the revelation until a timely moment later on in the narrative.

Determining where to confront the Persian army was a drawn out process. The Athenians had initially been keen to fight the Persians near Eleusis on the Thriasian plain (Hdt. 9.7). This plan is not characterised as matter of divine aid, but as concern for suitable terrain in a (relatively) secure area. But just when Attica was proposed, the Persians withdrew, having heard of the Peloponnesians' approach and wishing to avoid being cornered. The Persians moved northwards, settling near the Asopus River and Mt. Cithaeron, at the southern boundary of Boeotia, only a short distance from medising Thebes. The Persians' movement drew the Greeks north after them. Herodotus has the allied Greeks move on from Eleusis, over Mt. Cithaeron, to occupy the lower slopes of its northern side (Hdt. 9.19).

Here the Greeks repelled the Persian cavalry (9.20–3). They then changed position, moving to a lower point near the Gargaphia spring and the *temenos* of the hero Androcrates (Hdt. 9.25), closer to the Asopus River where the Persians were arrayed. Herodotus explains this as a move to be nearer fresh water.[37] By the Asopus, the Greeks' *mantis*, Tisamenus, announced that 'the sacrifices indicated benefit to the Greeks if they defended themselves, but not if they crossed the Asopus and began the battle' (Hdt. 9.36). The Persians, we learn, had used 'Greek ritual' to secure omens via an Elean diviner; they have received the same warning (Hdt. 9.37). On the acropolis at Athens, in the storms at Artemisium, and here at Plataea, collaborators represent a ritual weakness to the defenders, sharing their religious insights. The Greeks made one more move (Hdt. 9.51), and the battle was eventually fought, for the most part, near a sanctuary of Eleusinian Demeter (Hdt. 9.57–70).

At times Plutarch follows Herodotus' Persian War narrative closely, but for Plataea he alters the structure of the Herodotean narrative to accommodate a non-Herodotean tradition. The most significant aspect of this rearrangement is the treatment of Tisamenus' prophecy. Although the Greek forces surely convened at Eleusis, Plutarch has them muster at Plataea (*Arist.* 11.1), and has the prophecy delivered on Cithaeron, rather than beside the river. There:

> To Pausanias and all the other Greeks Tisamenus the Elean prophesised and foretold victory if they stayed defensive not if they advanced to attack. But Aristides sent to Delphi and received from the god response that the Athenians would be superior to the enemy if they honoured Zeus, and Hera of Cithaeron, and Pan, and the Sphragitic nymphs, and sacrificed to the heroes Androcrates, Leukon, Pisandrus, Democrates, Hypsion, Actaeon, Polyidus, and if they were facing the danger on their own land, in the plain of Eleusinian Demeter and Kore.
>
> (Plut. *Arist.* 11.3)[38]

Plutarch's version moves the delivery of the prophecy from its suitable position beside the river and Aristides' consultation of Delphi follows it directly. Most translators emphasise Plutarch's 'μὲν … δὲ' construction with 'But Aristides … ', clarifying the sense that Aristides' prophecy rivals that of Tisamenus.[39]

Plutarch's Aristides is perplexed by this oracle, as the reference to Eleusinian Demeter seems to call them back, untenably, to fight in Attica. The problem is solved overnight:

> Arimnestus, the *strategos* of the Plataeans, thought that in his sleep he was questioned by Zeus the Saviour, who asked what the Greeks had decided to do. He said, 'Tomorrow we are going to take the army to Eleusis, Lord, to fight there against the barbarians in accordance with the Pythian oracle.' And so the god said that they were mistaken, for the places in the Pythian oracle were all on the spot around Plataea and – searching for them – they would discover them. This appeared so vividly to Arimnestus that, on awakening, he quickly summoned the most experienced and eldest of the citizens. After talking with them and investigating, he found that there was an ancient temple called by the names of Eleusinian Demeter and Kore, near Hysiae at the bottom of Cithaeron. And so immediately, bringing along Aristides, he led the way there to the place which was very well suited to the actions of the phalanxes on foot against powerful cavalry, as the foot of Mt. Cithaeron was unfit for riding, as the cavalry could be encountered and kept back where the plain met the temple. There too, nearby, was the shrine of Androcrates, surrounded by a thick and shady grove of trees.
>
> (Plut. *Arist.* 11.5–8)

Zeus' appearance in the Plataean *strategos*' dream solves Delphi's riddle, while the discovery of the *temenos* moves the Greeks into a physically strong position. This tradition is likely an amalgamation of oracles adjusted to fit this important context.[40] Herodotus and Plutarch had both stressed the importance of obeying oracles (in this case, acting defensively). Greeks and Persians receive the same advice from diviners (Hdt. 9.36–7; Plut. *Arist.* 15.1), and in both cases the Greeks obey and the Persians do not, anticipating their destruction and reaffirming the moral framework (Plut. *Arist.* 15.1, then 17.4).[41] However, Herodotus placed far more emphasis on the issue of crossing the river, which echoes the boundary motif that runs throughout the *Histories*. Plutarch omits the Herodotean link between the prophecy and the boundary-river (Plut. *Arist.* 11.2, 15.1 15.3), eschewing the centrality of Tisamenus' prophecy and privileging the dubious tradition of the Delphic prophecy and the dream.[42] His motives for this choice can be inferred, in part, from the rest of the *Aristides*. It places Aristides centre-stage, which is appropriate for a biography, and, more significantly, the Delphic prophecy and dream-narrative illustrate the benefits of one of the key themes of this *Life*, cooperation.[43] Cooperation is represented as a desirable virtue throughout Plutarch's *Lives* and its importance to the smooth running of a state is a major Plutarchan theme.[44] Plutarch makes cooperation one of Aristides' chief virtues,

enlarging upon the tradition of his cooperativeness that had already appeared in Herodotus (9.79).[45] The Delphic prophecy and dream-narrative reinforce this theme by emphasising the Athenians' cooperation with Plataea. The oracle alone is not sufficient; the prophecy delivered to the Athenian *strategos* can only work when combined with the dream of the Plataean *strategos*. This is the first element of cooperation. Then, when Arimnestus awakes, he immediately consults 'the most experienced and the eldest of the citizens' (Plut. *Arist*. 11.6), a second act of cooperation.[46] Thirdly, Arimnestus and Aristides go together to the new site. Finally, the discovery of the new site prompts the Plataeans to renounce the land to the Athenians, an act of munificence that Alexander the Great honoured many years later (Plut. *Arist*. 11.9). The selection of the new site is treated as a great success, validating the collaborative process that led to the fulfilment of the Delphic prophecy. These cooperative elements make the story a valuable contribution to the theme that is so central to the *Aristides-Cato* in its entirety. Aristides may have challenged Tisamenus to achieve this end, but the cooperation advantageously displayed in all other aspects of this episode more than justifies that challenge. Pro-active cooperation with Plataea is privileged over a submissive cooperation with Sparta.[47]

Ultimately, both Herodotus and Plutarch employ traditions of the pre-Plataea oracles in the manner that most compliments their work, although both pivot around the assumed virtue of obedience to divine guidance and responding appropriately to the aspects of the sacred that are reflected in the landscape, whether that means respecting a natural barrier or identifying the ideal local deities to honour. Both use this virtue to validate the party that the reader is encouraged to sympathise with and emulate, be it the Greeks collectively or an individual.

The Plutarchan oracle asserts the fundamental importance of the deities local to the conflict. Zeus is exempt from a more specific form, as, quite typically is Pan, but vows made to Hera are to Hera of Cithaeron, an epithet of Plataean Hera. Nymphs are by their nature local, associated with particular points on the landscape, usually with bodies of water or caves, in this case a cave on 'one of the peaks of Cithaeron facing the summer sunset', probably overlooking the battlefield (Plut. *Arist*. 11.4). Plutarch adds the detail that 'The heroes to whom [Aristides] was ordered to sacrifice were founders (ἀρχηγέτης)

of Plataea', clarifying their local relevance too. Although Androcrates was important enough to have a *temenos* mentioned in the oracle, he plays no further role in the narrative.

THE SANCTUARY AS SHIELD

The sanctuaries of Demeter and Hera offered conspicuous landmarks at Plataea, useful for leaders issuing orders and for writers describing the battle.[48] The temple of Hera has been excavated.[49] Demeter's has proved untraceable, despite numerous attempts. The discovery of two inscriptions relating to a sanctuary of Demeter have confirmed its presence in the vicinity, but although several suggestions have been made, no precise spot is confirmed.[50] The night before the battle took place, the Greeks attempted a movement, with some stopping at the temple of Hera while the Spartans and Tegeans were separated from the main group and ended up beside the temple of Demeter.

Neither group used their temple as a fort. Practical reasons may have dissuaded them as much as anything else. Their archers proved effective when mobile (Hdt. 9.22; Plut. *Arist.* 14.3); this potential would have been limited by a static position. Moreover, the army was looking to engage the enemy, not to defend a critical site. They had lost their supplies, making further delays unwelcome (Hdt. 9.39 and 51). By discouraging attack, the temple-as-fort would have compromised designs to tempt the Persians into battle. This does not mean that they made no use of the sanctuaries at all. According to Plutarch, part of the advantage of the prophecy/dream-inspired position was that the temple of Demeter's position created a good defence against cavalry (Plut. *Arist.* 11.7). Unfortunately, Plutarch's account is more useful for telling us what Plutarch found conceivable than what happened on the battlefield. His remarks on the advantages of the position are led more by the desire to make the match with the prophecy felicitous, than by any serious assessment of the military situation, and his topography of the site is fairly suspect.[51] Despite this drawback, the fact that Plutarch represented Delphi and Zeus Soter endorsing the military use of the temple as a barrier provides a clear value judgement that this was an acceptable tactic.

Herodotus' account of the troop movements is to be preferred. He describes the Spartans and Tegeans stopping at the temple to regroup while heading elsewhere (Hdt. 9.51–7). This was not the

divinely endorsed position presented by Plutarch, but it seems likely that Pausanias chose to wait there because of its defensive potential, with the temple (or its grove, Hdt. 9.65), offering shielding. Pausanias' unusually positive characterisation in the *Histories* suggests that this was not any more morally problematic for Herodotus than for Plutarch.[52]

Much thought has been given to whether the Greek centre really fled to Plataea as Herodotus claimed, or whether they followed orders to retreat.[53] Certainly Herodotus is scathing when he says that 'fleeing they came to the temple of Hera', 'φεύγοντες δὲ ἀπικνέονται ἐπί τὸ Ἥραιον' (Hdt. 9.52). Some have wondered if Pausanias ordered them to use this point to receive attacks, as they are described as bearing arms in front of the temple (ἀπικόμενοι δὲ ἔθεντο πρὸ του ἱρου τὰ ὅπλα).[54] Excavators described the 'moderately high and steep slope of the temple-terrace' as 'enough to check' their flight, which could also mean checking advancing forces.[55] Plutarch is ambiguous on their purpose. While he railed at Herodotus for claiming that these troops fled (Plut. *Mal. Hdt.* 872C–873E), even he is critical of their movement there:

> Then night came on, and the generals were leading them to the determined spot, but most of the army were not entirely enthusiastic to fall-in and keep together, but having left the first defences, the majority of them carried themselves to the city of Plataea, and with confusion they scattered about and encamped without order. (Plut. *Arist.* 17.1)

He does not say that the troops were 'fleeing' as Herodotus does.[56] But although Plataea does not seem to be the ordered destination, Plutarch's focus is on their disorder (mentioned twice), not the military plan. Accusations regarding laxity in formation contribute to the theme of *Aristides*; these Greeks will not co-operate properly, even though they desire the same result, and this unnecessary disunity makes them vulnerable and less useful to the common good. It is because of their disunity (and Pausanias' failure to call them, Plut. *Arist.* 17.5) that they only join the fighting in 'small and sporadic groups, once the battle was in hand' (Plut. *Arist.* 17.5). Paul Wallace developed a theory that the Greeks planned a trap, in which disunity would lure a Persian attack only for pre-planned re-unification to catch them on all sides. But W.K. Pritchett has demonstrated how dangerously impractical this would have been on such difficult ground, unlikely to have been attempted.[57]

Overall it is hard to know if the Greek leaders intended to use the city and temple as a shield, but ultimately they do not appear to have done so in expediency either, as Herodotus suggests that these troops did not contribute to the battle at all, while Plutarch has them leaving the area around Plataea to join the fight (Plut. *Arist*. 17.5). While they ultimately had no need to use the Heraeum as a shield, as with the temple of Demeter, no author suggests that it would have been irreligious to do so. There is no suggestion in Herodotus, and scarcely in modern scholarship, that the troops moved to the temple of Hera at Plataea because they sought her divine protection.[58] It is plausible that they might have appreciated this aspect, but whether they were camping or planning to fight, this would seem to be a bonus rather than a primary concern.

PRE-BATTLE SACRIFICES AT PLATAEA

As the last stragglers caught up with the Spartans at the temple of Demeter, the Persians attacked. Herodotus and Plutarch both report that despite a barrage of missiles the Spartans continued to wait because the omens warned against attack. Eventually:

> Pausanias lifted up his eyes to the Plataean Heraeum to call on the goddess, praying that they might not be disappointed in their hope.
>
> While he was still praying, the Tegeans leapt ahead and charged the barbarians; and immediately after Pausanias' prayer the signs from the victim of the Lacedaemonians' sacrifices became favourable. Now this had happened at last, they too charged the Persians, and the Persians met them, throwing away their bows. (Hdt. 9.61–2)[59]

Plutarch relates this with even more colour, detailing the Spartan casualties, giving more detail to Pausanias' prayer, and even adding that as he turned to the temple his eyes were filled with tears (Plut. *Arist*. 17.6–18.2). It is noticeable that Pausanias prayed not to Demeter, whose temple he was beside, but to Hera, on a distant rise. Wallace, arguing for the trap theory, suggests that when Pausanias lifted his eyes to Hera, 'he was hoping for more than divine aid', expecting the Corinthians to come and assist him. Lazenby also wonders if the regent might have been looking 'not so much for Hera's help as for that of his centre and left'.[60]

The suggestion that Pausanias sought human support is not incompatible with him requesting divine aid, especially in this

instance when both forces were in the same place. Herodotus and Plutarch prefer to interpret his act as a call to Hera, but practical and pious desires are not mutually exclusive. However, if there was hope of a human response it must have been more desperate than expectant for, as Pritchett observed when dismissing the trap theory, those at Plataea would have had some two miles to cover before they could help.[61] This makes the choice of Hera to pray to intriguing. Demeter could be called on in defence of territory and her shrine was right on hand. Nonetheless, she was not a highly favoured deity amongst the Lacedaemonians.[62] Hera was not their *most* favoured deity either, but who could forget Hera's words to Zeus, 'The three towns dearest to me are Argos, Sparta and Mycenae with its broad streets' (*Il.* 4.51–2). Zeus' consort, the friend of Sparta, was perhaps still a more appropriate source of aid for Pausanias than Demeter, the Athenians' favoured deity. Choice of deity, and the slim prospect of reinforcements, proved more significant than proximity.

Herodotus and Plutarch say that the omens seemed good directly after Pausanias prayed to Hera, yet scholars have debated the extent to which these authors advocate divine agency in the overall victory. It has been suggested that the prayer story is an elaboration to give credit for the victory to Plataean Hera: 'local piety has crept into the story … Both the difficulty and the eventual success were later said to be religious in origin, and credit was given to the local goddess, Hera.'[63] Elsewhere it has been claimed that while Pausanias prays to Hera, Herodotus never credits her with the victory.[64] Thomas Harrison proffers an effective compromise; the goddesses may not be given explicit credit for the victory, but the victory is 'implicitly at least, associated with Hera'.[65] The workings of the goddess need not be visible for them to occur in some form. Even if Hera's agency is only implied rather than explicitly stated, it is prominent enough in the narrative to suggest her intangible yet real contribution to the victory. Demeter's agency, meanwhile, is stated in one of Herodotus' most explicit examples of divine intervention (Hdt. 9.65). While the concept of divine agency does not seem to have greatly affected how the army related to the battlefield, with hindsight, the proximity of both temples was seen as having a positive role in the outcome of the battle.

While Plutarch went out of his way to eclipse Tisamenus' river-prophecy in favour of Aristides and Arimnestus' inspiration about the

sanctuary of Demeter, her sanctuary plays no further part in the Plutarchan narrative following its discovery. Plutarch's relative disinterest in Demeter indicates that he selected the Delphic prophecy not in order to prefigure Demeter's later part in the narrative, but to eclipse Tisamenus, for the reasons discussed above. In contrast, Demeter is vital to the Herodotean interpretation of Plataea. She has a direct impact on the battle, providing divine endorsement of the Greek victory and giving it moral meaning through an established pattern of transgression and retribution.

After the battle, Herodotus says that:

> It seems amazing to me that though the fighting was by the grove of Demeter there was no sign that any of the Persians had been killed in the *temenos*, or entered into it; most of them fell round the temple in unconsecrated ground. It seems to me, if it is possible to have views on the divine, that the goddess herself denied them entry, because they had burnt her temple, the shrine at Eleusis. (Hdt. 9.65)[66]

Herodotus recorded the probably genuine circumstance that no dead Persians were found in the sanctuary. No matter which of the several suggested locations for the sanctuary is accepted, it would still be up a slope, while apparent safety for the Persians would lie back down the slope, towards their camp and their fortified position near Thebes. If the sanctuary lay in any of the suggested positions, the Persians were unlikely to have attempted to enter it.[67]

This reference to the exclusion of the Persians from the *temenos* is the first time Herodotus has referred to the damage at Eleusis. By linking crime with punishment in this explicit way, the slaughter of the Persians takes on the sense of just retribution in which the goddess not only acquiesced but assisted. This is another 'moral miracle'.[68] Herodotus does not explain the 'mechanics' of Demeter's intervention, but his pronoun use (at 'ἡ θεὸς αὐτή' 'the goddess *herself*') conveys the goddess' active involvement.[69] There is no reference to her temple at Plataea having been destroyed. As an extra-mural sanctuary, it may have escaped harm. This suggests a careful sleight-of-hand. When Herodotus says that vengeance was visited upon the Persians at Plataea because of what they had done at Eleusis, Herodotus introduces the spectre of a destroyed temple of Demeter onto the field where there was no actual destroyed temple. This makes the vengeance more apt, and by introducing Eleusis into

Plataea Herodotus also presents the victory as moral retribution for *all* the crimes of the Persian occupation.

Herodotus reiterates Demeter's role, reinforcing the notion of divine intervention in the Persian defeat, in his account of the subsequent battle at Mycale (Hdt. 9.96–101). The first sign is a rumour amongst the Greeks that a herald's wand has been seen on the beach and that the Greeks had won at Plataea. The implication is that Hermes has delivered the good news miraculously fast. Herodotus continues:

> There are many clear proofs of the divine nature of things, and at that time, when the disaster at Plataea fell upon them on the same day as that which was to happen at Mycale, a rumour reached the Greeks there, which very much encouraged the army and made them keen to face danger.
>
> Also, a coincidence occurred, in that there were precincts of Eleusinian Demeter beside both battles. For at Plataea the fight happened by a temple of Demeter, as I said earlier, and at Mycale it was to be the same. (Hdt. 9.100–1)[70]

These apparently miraculous occurrences confirm the goddess' continued interest in Greek success and the punishment of Persian crimes. Herodotus' phrasing indicates that he accepts the reality of this epiphany, and he does not question its likelihood as he does in similar circumstances.[71] His statement that 'there are many clear proofs of the divine nature of things', is a strong one.[72] Coming as it does so close to the end of the work, it encourages the reader to consider the role that divine justice has played throughout.

Plutarch made room for one further story which reaffirms the impiety of the Persian army:

> Some say that as Pausanias was sacrificing and praying, a little to the side of his line of battle, some Lydians suddenly fell upon him, snatching and scattering the sacrifice; and that Pausanias and those with him, not having weapons, struck them with rods and whips. And even now this onslaught is imitated in Sparta where rites are completed in which the *ephebes* are struck around the altar, followed by the procession of the Lydians. (Plut. *Arist.* 17.8)

This anecdote is told as aetiology for the rites of Artemis Ortheia, held just outside Sparta. This tradition does not exist elsewhere. Ida Calabi-Limentani suggests that its origins lie in Sparta's oral traditions.[73] But wherever the explanation came from, it must be

wrong. Plutarch had witnessed the rite (*Lyc.* 18.2 & *Mor.* 239C–D), but he does not endorse the tradition about it (Plut. *Arist.* 17.8), and David Sansone says of this reticence:

> he is right to do so as the aetiology is certainly false. In the first place, the Spartan ritual in honour of Ortheia surely antedates the Persian Wars. In the second place, the ritual requires the *ephebes* … to steal cheeses from the altar, which have no place in the sacrifices preliminary to a battle.[74]

So Plutarch includes a story that is certainly unreliable, and which he himself quite probably doubted. The reason for this lies in the nature of the story, with its reiteration of Greek piety and its characterisation of the Greeks' enemies as sacrilegious, shamelessly scattering the gods' goods. This useful contribution to the religious dichotomy that informs Plutarch's narrative was more important than the reliability of the tradition from which it came. The theme of sacrilege is a powerful characterisation tool, and here Plutarch put it to effective use, denigrating the Lydians in the Persian army and presenting Pausanias and his Spartans as courageous defenders of the sacred, a dynamic that enacts in miniature the religious interpretation that was applied to the whole of the Persian Wars.

In a poem written only shortly after the battle, Pindar rejoiced that 'One of the gods has turned aside for us the stone of Tantalus above our heads, an unbearable hardship for Greece' (Pind. *Isth.* 8.10).[75] Simonides' Plataea elegy was more definite, naming Demeter and apparently referring to her taking vengeance.[76] Herodotus would echo this tradition, citing Hera's role and particularly that of Eleusinian Demeter. Celebration of the latter seems to have been particularly encouraged by hegemonically minded Athenians looking to promote a local deity with broad appeal.[77] Plutarch's mention of sacrifices to Zeus echoes evidence that he was thanked for his contribution with a statue at Olympia (Hdt. 9.81) and an altar and festival of Zeus Eleutherius (Plut. *Arist.* 20.4–21.1). Athena was also recognised, provided with a new temple of Athena Areia (Warlike) at Plataea (Plut. *Arist.* 20.1–3), in a dedication made by the Plataeans but suspected of being backed by the Athenians. Its luxurious interior decoration was resplendent with mythical scenes expressing moral condemnation of the impious medisers who fought with the Persians at Plataea and Marathon (Paus. 9.4.1–2).[78]

The Persian War narratives indicate that having a sacred space by a battle site made it likely that its deity would be regarded as contributing, although authors would differ about their role and other deities might also be considered to have participated. In that sense, proximity is not everything. Herodotus' picture of Pausanias at Plataea epitomises a military leader acting in harmony with the gods to overcome an impious enemy: obeying omens before battle, praying on the battlefield between two sanctuaries, and treating suppliants and the dead with moderation after the battle before sending dedications to the Panhellenic sanctuaries. His relationship with sacred space is part of that image, although it is only one aspect of a larger picture. There is no doubt that the Greeks continued to think of the gods as having participated in their defence. Herodotus states his belief in it boldly (Hdt. 7.139), and it is perpetuated in military contexts, with Xenophon, for example, encouraging his troops by reminding them of how the gods helped their ancestors in the Persian Wars (*Ana*. 3.2.11; 3.2.15).[79] Not all wars were as religiously charged as the Persian Wars, so it is rare to get as many references to the divine in accounts of other wars. Yet sacred spaces were part of the landscape and the conduct of war, and as such they appear in numerous narratives of inter-Greek conflicts. The following section explores this type of episode.

THE SANCTUARY OF PLATAEAN HERA IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Plataea's importance to the survival of Greek independence makes it all the more shocking that this same city would be razed come the Peloponnesian War. Only *c*.50 years after Pausanias prayed towards the sanctuary of Hera, that sanctuary was centre-stage in Plataea's tragedy. Thucydides included a pair of speeches to indicate the social significance of the events (Thuc. 3.52–67). The Plataeans' speech emphasises their city's noble past and the disgrace it would be to Sparta to destroy a people that had done such good service to Greece in the Persian Wars in alliance with their own ancestors whose tombs the Plataeans tend.[80] Their appeals were unsuccessful. The remaining male Plataeans and Athenians were executed, the women enslaved, the city was initially used as housing for refugee Megarians and laconising Plataeans and then destroyed.

> And they built onto the precinct of Hera an inn 200 feet square, with rooms all round above and below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of the Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and the iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they also built a stone temple of 100 feet square (Thuc. 3.68.3)

The excavators suggested that the temple was rebuilt at this point, having been damaged during the Persian Wars, or possibly during this conflict.[81] Albert Schachter notes:

> It may seem odd that the Thebans should, after razing the city of their enemies, set about furnishing a hostel and temple for its major cult. However, there are at least two reasons why they might have done this: first, because of the festival [The Daidala], which drew participants from many parts, who had to be housed; second, it might be regarded as a political act, to counterbalance the temple of Athena Areia built by the Athenians.[82]

The important Daidala festival continued to be held (and attended) despite the plight of the Plataeans. Laconising Plataeans presumably occupied the priestess positions, although it is possible that Thebans replaced them. The statues and other cult items apparently stayed at the Heraeum for use in the Daidala and other rites. Religious unease may also have added to the decision to retain the sanctuary of Hera. Her shrine perhaps acted as a symbol of ongoing respect for this major deity, although several other city-sanctuaries must have been destroyed along with the city. The destruction or take-over of cult was a real risk in the fall of a city, but this level of destruction should not be regarded as commonplace. Thucydides' treatment suggests that only an unusual degree of moral bankruptcy allowed it, and his Plataean speakers were right when they said that it would haunt Sparta and Thebes' reputation. The Plataeans retained a clear sense of their identity, although they took Athenian citizenship.[83] They returned home when Sparta re-founded Plataea in 386, but experienced a second destruction from Thebes in 377/6. Isocrates' *Plataicus*, set a few years after the second destruction, depicts the Plataeans continuing to stress reverence for the gods and heroes who haunt that place and the respect due to the Athenian war-dead as reasons for Athenian intervention (Isoc. 14. 57–62). These speakers consider the city's deities to have remained after the fall. Although they had to wait until 338, the city was again restored and the cults

re-founded. The dynamics of local rivalries and the political importance of the festival kept Plataean revival viable. For Tiryns (Chapter 2, 'Moving Statues'), this was not the case which explains why, after 100 years or so, their Hera cult closed forever.

NICIAS AND THE SANCTUARY OF ZEUS AT SYRACUSE

Amongst Greek against Greek wars, the Athenian expedition to Sicily has remained famous, largely owing to Thucydides' account, with its exploration of greed and imperial over-reach. So strong are these narrative undercurrents that it has been possible to demonstrate that Thucydides echoed aspects of the Herodotean account of the Persian invasion to articulate the injustice and poor execution of the Sicilian expedition.[84]

The wisdom of the campaign was hotly debated, favoured by the ambitious Alcibiades, rejected by the more cautious Nicias, and ultimately approved by a conquest-hungry *demos*.[85] It was a disaster, starting promisingly before ending in massive loss of life, goods, and prestige. The focus here will be on the narratives of Thucydides, Diodorus, and Plutarch's *Nicias* and their representations of interactions with sacred space. That Nicias ended up leading this campaign is in itself telling. If ever one doubted the significance of religion on civic decisions and military careers, the recall of Alcibiades confirms it. A dynamic general with enthusiasm for the campaign, Alcibiades was recalled nonetheless (leaving Nicias in charge) after being linked to the smashing of *herms* across Athens and imitation of the Eleusinian Mysteries, all of which constituted sacrilege and suggested an imminent push for tyranny (Thuc. 6.27–9, 6.60–1; Andocides I; Plut. *Nic*. 13–14; Plut. *Alc*. 18–21).[86] Thucydides' Nicias appears as a man of good character, a judgement made explicit on report of his death: '… he was killed, a man who, of all the Greeks in my time, least deserved to come to such misfortune, since the whole of his life had been devoted to the study and practice of virtue' (ἀρτὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν) (Thuc. 7.86). '*Arete*' denotes here 'the uprightness shown by Nikias as a religious and moral leader in the state'.[87] However he is also represented as an ineffective military leader. The Sicilian campaign presents the paradox of an essentially good man leading a campaign he does not believe in.

The most significant encounter with sacred space concerned the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus outside Syracuse. Accounts differ subtly over what happened. In Thucydides, the Athenians misdirected the Syracusans and then landed 'opposite the Olympieium to occupy the ground for their camp' (Thuc. 6.65). We might assume that this gave the Athenians a degree of control over the sanctuary, but they do not appear to camp within its grounds, its wealth goes unmentioned, and if Nicias entered to sacrifice there, neither Thucydides nor anyone else reports it. Preparations for battle do not appear to include the sanctuary. Walls, houses, trees, marsh, and cliffs provide cover, while forts are put up to protect the ships and a vulnerable position; the necessary trees and stones come from 'the neighbourhood' but apparently not from the sanctuary (Thuc. 6.66). This is a far cry from the operations at Delium.

A battle unfolded the next day between the Athenians and their allies and the Syracusans and theirs. The account includes a rare mention of ritual: 'Soothsayers brought forward the usual victims for sacrifice and trumpeters sounded the charge to the hoplites' (Thuc. 6.69). This is the only occasion on which Thucydides uses the term *sphagia*. Both sides are depicted sacrificing and this even-handed treatment reinforces Thucydides' account of both sides' desperation to win. Thunder, lightning, and heavy rain frightened the inexperienced Athenians, but the veterans among them were unmoved, recognising it as seasonal weather (Thuc. 6.70).[88] Lightning in particular is associated with Zeus, so its occurrence before a battle by his sanctuary might easily be regarded as divinely orchestrated. Thucydides is not explicit about the possibility of this being an omen, but he endorses the veterans' calm by explaining its basis. Nonetheless, the account of the varied reactions indicates that the presence of a sanctuary beside a battlefield did not hold universal significance, but differed between participants.

The Athenian army routed their opponents, but the Syracusan cavalry curtailed the advantage:

> The Syracusans rallied together again at the road to Helorus, formed up as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieium, since they were afraid that the Athenians might plunder some of the treasure (χρημάτων) there. The rest of the men went back to the city. The Athenians did not go to

> the temple; they collected their dead, put them on a pyre, and camped there for the night. (Thuc. 6.70–1)

References to military looting of sanctuaries are so infrequent that it is striking to hear of the Syracusans' fear that the invaders would loot the temple. The valuables in the sanctuary must have represented a large percentage of the Syracusans' wealth, which could have been used against them by the Athenians. The sanctuary might well look vulnerable when the Syracusans knew that the Athenians meant ultimately to seize everything else. Significantly, however, the Athenians had not plundered the sanctuary. Had the campaign proved successful, Athenians or perhaps atticising Syracusans would have taken up the priesthoods at the Olympieum. They would have become owners of its wealth, able, although not certain, to spend it. But these were not moves for the early stage of a campaign, especially as Nicias was receiving help from pro-Athenian Syracusans (Thuc. 7.48.2) whose enthusiasm would surely have waned in the face of such seizures. Pausanias would later cite this restraint as an example of the piety of men of old, and yet the context in which he does so nonetheless indicates that it would have been sacrilege to take from what was still another city's sanctuary (Paus. 10.28.6).[89]

Thucydides is characteristically enigmatic about Nicias' reticence to seize the sanctuary and its contents. Lisa Kallet-Marx has demonstrated the importance of finance within the Sicilian narrative, and argues that Thucydides implies it is 'a great opportunity mistakenly passed up', comparing it to Herodotus' implied criticism of the Ionians' 'fail[ure] to take the advice of Hekataios to raid the temple at nearby Branchidai' (Hdt. 5.36).[90] Given what we have seen of Herodotus' tough stance on disrespectful treatment of the sacred, including the moral of the Nitocris story (Hdt. 1.187, see Chapter 2, 'The Sanctuary of Demeter and a Despot's Crime'), it seems implausible that Herodotus was criticising the Ionians for their pious decision. Similarly, Thucydides' treatment of the events at Delium (Chapter 1, 'The Sanctuary of Apollo at Delium') also makes it implausible that he would endorse the immediate stripping of a sanctuary. Nonetheless, it is true enough that Thucydides emphasises both sides' financial hardship and draws our attention to this opportunity. Securing the sanctuary also offered the Athenians an opportunity to separate the Syracusans from their finances, but this is not the aspect Thucydides draws attention to.[91]

The issue he raises is the Athenians' opportunity to plunder. But rather than advocating or condemning seizure, Thucydides is perhaps asking his readers to consider a difficult question: if a state (or a person) has undertaken to do something unjust, to what extent should they continue to commit injustices in order to see that goal through? This was an issue that exercised thinkers of the period. Xenophon's Hiero, for example, complains that tyrants must steal from temples from the necessity to maintain mercenaries or be deposed (Xen. *Hiero*, 4.11). The invasion of Sicily was unjust; what further injustices should be committed to make it successful? Strategically, Nicias made a mistake; morally he made the right decision. Thucydides confronts us with the hard choice of what to make of that.

In his final speech, before he and his army are destroyed, Nicias consoles his soldiers by noting that he too suffers despite living justly and honouring the gods, adding, 'If we have roused any god's jealousy by our expedition, we have been punished sufficiently … we are now more deserving of their pity' (Thuc. 7.77). But by this time, the Athenians' confidence is shaken; thunder, earlier dismissed as seasonal weather, is now regarded as an omen of destruction (Thuc. 7.79).[92] Destruction does follow. As Tim Rood observes, 'the way Thucydides casts Nikias' personal story points up bitter paradoxes and human frailty: an upright man … died because of a fear that he might use his wealth dishonestly; offerings to the gods no more help Nikias than they did the Homeric Hektor.'[93] Thucydides' gods are indifferent to Nicias' offerings and his circumspect treatment of sacred space. That does not mean that Thucydides endorsed plundering the sanctuary, but it does suggest that piety is not enough to balance out poor leadership and an unjust enterprise.

Diodorus frequently focuses on alternative features to those emphasised in Thucydides. Of Sicily, he asserts that the Athenians did take the sanctuary, although he appears to concur that they did not loot it. They 'became masters of the Olympieum, but also, after seizing the entire area around it, constructed a camp' (Diod. Sic. 13.6.4).[94] Later, 'they not only enclosed the temple of Zeus but were besieging Syracuse from both sides' (Diod. Sic. 13.7.5). But despite the enclosure, the sanctuary remains essentially irrelevant to the narrative. This stands in marked contrast to a Diodoran account of a similar episode. Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, defeated the Syracusans in 491 and camped beside the Olympieum. There:

> He seized the person of the priest of the temple and certain Syracusans who were in the act of taking down the golden dedications and removing in particular the robe of the statue of Zeus in the making of which a large amount of gold had been used. And after sternly rebuking them as despoilers of the temple, he ordered them to return to the city, but he himself did not touch the dedications, since he was intent upon gaining a good name and he thought not only that one who had commenced a war of such magnitude should commit no sin against the deity, but also that he would set the commons at variance with the administrators of the affairs of Syracuse, because men would think the latter were ruling the state to their own advantage and not to that of all the people nor on the principle of equality. (Diod. Sic. 10.28.1–2)

Tyrannical excess is indicated by the seizure of the priest and the indecently early intervention in sanctuary affairs, yet even so, a combination of god-fearing caution and regard for reputation and civic stability prevent plundering. This is a far more character-based examination of proceedings than that offered for Nicias and the Athenian campaign. For that, Diodorus privileges the conduct of the victor-after-the-victory with the debate at Syracuse. The Athenians' wrong-doing is explored in speeches arguing for and against leniency. No one cites treatment of the Olympieum as a cause for complaint, despite it being enclosed by the Athenians' siege-wall. Gylippus, arguing for firm punishment, does argue that the Athenians have harmed sacred space, but this is in the tenuous sense of the whole island of Sicily being sacred to Demeter (13.31.1). This is meaningful to some extent, but has more than a touch of hyperbole to it.[95] The argument for leniency focuses on the injustice of the war; it is this that has led to the campaign's failure, the gods have enabled the victims of the injustice to right it (Diod. Sic. 13.19.6–27.6).

Plutarch paired his biography of Nicias with one of Crassus. Both were fabulously wealthy politicians who died leading catastrophic military defeats. Plutarch expected readers to be familiar with Thucydides and able to spot variations between accounts.[96] It is evident that he is more hostile to Nicias than Thucydides or Diodorus, seeming 'to depart from the main classical tradition in painting Nikias in a rather unfavourable light. He is, for Plutarch, the man of fear, superstition, and hesitation.'[97] While Thucydides had represented Nicias' pre-campaign acts of piety and generosity as

politically astute, Plutarch presents them as a cover for weakness, contrasted with Pericles' leadership by ability (*Nic.* 3.1–2).[98]

Piety appears to be at the fore when Nicias assesses the scene at the Olympieum:

> Not far from the camp there stood a temple of Olympian Zeus. The Athenians advanced to occupy it, since it contained a rich collection of gold and silver offerings, but Nicias deliberately held back and allowed a Syracusan garrison to move in. He felt that it would be of no advantage to the Athenian cause if his troops plundered these treasures and that he himself would bear responsibility for the sacrilege. (Plut. *Nic.* 16.6)

As with the other accounts, the Athenians do not plunder the sanctuary. Yet here, uniquely, loss of control of the sanctuary is explicitly Nicias' decision, and the other Athenians are drawn to the sanctuary specifically by its wealth. Nicias' decision to prevent them appears to be an act of piety, yet the reasons given imply a critical appraisal. Plutarch refers to the potential plundering as 'sacrilege' (ἀσεβήματος), a clear value-judgement. Like Hippocrates, Nicias is concerned about the negative impact of sacrilegious plunder on diplomatic relations. But he also fears that he will bear personal responsibility. His apparent piety is therefore characterised as a selfish act of fear. Control of the sanctuary did not necessitate plunder. Plutarch's Nicias fears looting because he doubts his ability to control his men and is afraid of the consequences. The army is then said to be furious at his lethargic failure to capitalise on victory. This is a continuation of the over-caution at the sanctuary and reflects the pattern of the *Life*. Plutarch would not expect it to be 'good for the Athenians' to plunder the sanctuary, but a more competent leader would secure the sanctuary *and* prevent it from being plundered. Plutarch implies that the Athenians were intent on theft, but the narrative seems to be guided by the thematic aim of indicating Nicias' flaw and should not be read as evidence that Athenian soldiers would assume temple-plunder was a typical spoil of war.

To return to Thucydides, the campaign-narrative offers further insights into the sanctuary-as-fort. While the Athenians appear not to have used the Olympieum as a fort, the Syracusans do use their sanctuaries in that way. Thucydides describes the Syracusans building a wall around the city, including the sanctuary of Apollo, and one at the Olympieum (Thuc. 6.75). Later, the Syracusans retreated behind

the wall via the sanctuary, beating back their over-zealous pursuers (Thuc. 6.100). The Olympieum subsequently provided the facility for a pincer movement by land and sea, in which Syracusan troops poured out of the sanctuary to attack the Athenians (Thuc. 7.37). The sanctuary continued as a base for Syracusan attacks, used to launch cavalry and javelin raids (Thuc. 7.42). While the attacking Athenians appear to have been reluctant to use the sanctuary in this way, it proves popular and effective for the home side.

Plutarch adds reference to the sanctuary of Heracles. The Athenian presence cut off the Syracusans from worshipping at the sanctuary, which stood near the Olympieum. The Athenians seem to have been using the temple (or sanctuary) wall for protection. There is no reference to the prospect of looting, and Nicias is not depicted venturing inside, even to sacrifice, even though this is the period in which he is over-absorbed in divination (Plut. *Nic.* 23–4). The emphasis falls not on Nicias' interaction (or non-interaction) with the sanctuary, but on the boost to the Syracusans when they regain access:

> He then abandoned his main camp and the walls which connected it to the temple of Heracles and drew up the remainder of his troops along the shore. In consequence the Syracusans, who for many months had been prevented from offering their usual sacrifice to Heracles, now went up with their priests and generals to sacrifice while their ships were being manned. (Plut. *Nic.* 24)

This account of the Syracusan sacrifice represents the return to the sanctuary as a revitalising part of the war effort. Heracles is then included in the Syracusans' pre-battle divination and is the recipient of festival and sacrifices after their victory (Plut. *Nic.* 25–6). Although nothing explicit is said about Heracles' involvement in the victory, there is room for those so inclined to read this into the account and he is certainly represented as important to the Syracusans. The Athenians experienced a similar euphoria when Alcibiades restored their processional access to Eleusis (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20–1; Plut. *Alc.* 34). Having departed Athens under a cloud at the start of this campaign, he furthered the restoration of his popularity through this active piety.

From beginning to end, the Sicilian expedition is surrounded by misunderstood omens and oracles. These misunderstandings appear to explain the scale of the Athenians' disaster, misunderstandings

caused, in part, by their despotic, imperialist greed.[99] Nicias was implicated in some of these misunderstandings, but with respect to sacred space, he acted circumspectly. Thucydides may well have been arguing against someone in saying that the Athenians did not plunder the sanctuary, but offences against sacred space were not an essential part of the narrative.[100] This perhaps stems from Nicias' reputation for leaning towards superstition rather than sacrilege, and from the sense that it was the *demos* at home acting tyrannically, not the general in the field.

ARCHIDAMUS AND THE SANCTUARY OF HERACLES

Thucydides did not establish any role for Zeus when the Athenians and Syracusans fought beside the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, even apparently endorsing the Athenians' interpretation of lightning as nothing more than seasonal weather (Thuc. 6.70). That does not, however, mean that the proximity of sanctuaries to conflict-zones had ceased to have significance for everyone. Xenophon provides a clear example of its ongoing significance in an episode from the 360s. In Arcadia, Archidamus, son of Agesilaus II, encountered a hostile force whilst returning his army to Sparta. He gave a brief speech, urging his men to restore Sparta's reputation, and then:

> When these words had been spoken, it is said that from a clear sky there came lightnings and thunderings of favourable omen for him; and it chanced also that on the right wing was a sanctuary and a statue of Heracles. As a result, therefore, of all these things, it is reported that the soldiers were inspired with so much strength and courage that it was a task for their leaders to restrain them as they pushed forward to the front. (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.31)

Xenophon includes a cautious 'it is said', but repeats the miracle of lightning from a clear sky, an indicator of divine encouragement. The chance presence of the sanctuary and statue of the divine founder of Archidamus' house is not the reason the ground is chosen, and Heracles is not seen on the battlefield, but the combination of omens encourages the soldiers to what is presented as an almost miraculous degree. For them it is deeply significant that Heracles' site is there, and we are left with the option of thinking that he actively inspired the troops. Either way, the proximity of the sanctuary is presented as

deeply significant, and the results are born out in the miraculous imbalance of their victory.

The presence of sacred sites near battlefields could still have significance for some participants and authors, but this is not a consistent feature of battle historiography. Thucydides depicts the Boeotian general at the battle of Delium encouraging his troops with the prospect of nearby Apollo's aid (Thuc. 4.92). But at the first battle of Mantinea, when Thucydides notes that the Spartans camped near a sanctuary of Heracles this serves only as a landmark and, in the battle-narrative, he goes out of his way to deny religious motives for apparently religious behaviour (Thuc. 5.65; 5.70).[101] Xenophon makes a feature of it for Archidamus' battle, but his account of the second battle of Mantinea makes no mention of significant sanctuaries (Xen. *Hell*. 7.5.7–25). Likewise, there is no divine involvement at the battle of Coronea, and the sanctuary of Athena is only significant in relation to the supplicants (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.15–21, with Chapter 4, 'The Battle of Coronea'). The account of the battle of Nemea makes nothing of the proximity of the sanctuary of Zeus (Xen. *Hell*. 4.2.9–23). The Oxyrhynchus historian describes several serious clashes, but sanctuaries play no part in their narrative (e.g. Florence 1.1, Spartans and Megarians against Athenians, and London 11.3–6, the battle of Sardis). Where there was a narrative cause, a nearby sanctuary could be represented as significant, but they were not a staple feature of battle-narratives, even when they were present.

With regard to the subject of the previous chapter, W.K. Pritchett's observation may be noted: 'There is no suggestion in the account of any Greek battle that physical symbols of the gods were captured by a victorious enemy or indeed that they were protected in any special way.'[102] Pritchett concludes from this that Greek armies did not routinely carry 'physical symbols of the gods' with them and with the acknowledgement of specific mentions of statues sought for special occasions, this appears to be a safe conclusion.

This selection of examples demonstrates a variety of behaviours and perceptions of sacred spaces beside battlefields. The use of sanctuary structures to provide shielding seems to have been entirely acceptable. If it was done only rarely, this was a matter of practical dynamics rather than moral objection. We saw, on Sicily, a community using its own sanctuary to deliver troops safely to attack positions. Like the use of sanctuaries as forts, this seems more

acceptable for a defending side than an aggressor, as the home side could legitimise an unusual action in a way that aggressors could not. While we have seen that sacrificing in a defeated city was important to victorious *strategoi*, sacrificing in the sanctuaries near battlefields is never presented as a priority. When battle looms, a *sphagia* remains the pre-eminent ritual; that is not renounced because a temple is nearby, and nor is a temple sacrifice recognisable as a bonus of any importance. Post-battle sacrifices in these sanctuaries are also absent from battle-narratives, unlike references to tithes and monuments. Honouring the deities near the battlefield was a normal practice nonetheless (and this signified good judgement and humility on the leader's part), but this could mean simply prayers or offerings made post-battle. Military leaders do not seek out sites with sanctuaries nearby to fight at. The gods of those places might be regarded as helping, but equally they might not, and other gods could be credited with involvement without any regular presence in the area. The Persian Wars, in which a clear-cut moral agenda was perceived, enjoyed a reputation for a conspicuously large number of divine interventions, but the number of epiphanies and other miracles reported in later years indicates that it was not only something for 'long ago'. The possibility of looting enemy sanctuaries beside battlefields must have been tempting at times, but the taboo against it seems largely to have been observed. As the Herodotean Croesus reminded Cyrus, if a site was to change hands, it would become the aggressor's possession (Hdt. 1.88); as such, its take-over would be handled officially, not in the heat of post-battle marauding. Before battle, the presence of a sanctuary seems to have been encouraging to many troops, particularly (though not exclusively, as Archidamus' battle shows) in a battle on home territory. The degree to which this was morale-boosting differed from person to person, just as the degree to which it was capitalised on must have differed from general to general. Generals might also hope that their troops were not encouraged only by the presence of a potential asylum site, a topic to be explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

Taking Asylum

> Heracles: Remember, in the hour of victory, reverence to the gods.
> This is the thing our Father holds most precious.
>
> (Soph. *Phil.* 1439–41)

> No man has ever cheated guest or suppliant,
> Cyrnus, without the immortals taking note.
>
> (Theognis, 143–4)

Once a battle was over and the defeated army routed, sanctuaries could serve as potential safe-harbours for fleeing troops who might look to become suppliants (ἱκέται) of the sanctuary's presiding deity. Those who took refuge in this manner might also be referred to as 'those who had fled', 'καταπεφευγότες'. This term has a more secular leaning than the more explicitly religious 'ἱκέτης', however, Frederick Naiden's extensive collection of supplications in Greek literature has demonstrated that καταπεφευγότες and kin-words are frequently employed to refer to legitimate acts of supplication.[1] Καταπεφευγότες in sanctuaries *were* supplicants. Supplication of the person was already recognised in the age of the Homeric epics (e.g. *Il.* 11.125).[2] By the late archaic and early classical period, a formal rite of ἱκετεία existed through which people could have their supplicant status recognised, while those making their initial arrival in a sanctuary could still claim asylum in a less formal way under the more general category of the protection offered to all things in a sanctuary, particularly at its altar, according to the principles of ἀσυλία ἱερά.[3] Worthy suppliants became the protected property of the god whose

space they were in and, as such, to kill or forcibly remove them constituted a serious religious offence. Herodotus provides a wonderful array of awful stories in which those who violate a supplicant's asylum meet terrible reprisals; one of the most remarkable is that of Aristodicus, who was taken to task for even asking if he might expel a suppliant (Hdt. 1.158–9). Thucydides relates that the Spartans attributed the earthquake and helot revolt of the 460s to a past incident in which suppliants at an altar of Poseidon were removed and killed (Thuc. 1.128). The Athenians threw this in the Spartans' faces when the Spartans troubled the Athenians about their own supplicant incident – the Cylon affair (Chapter 1, 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'). Xenophon cites the respectful treatment of sanctuaries and supplicants as a virtue when he picks it out as a source of praise in his encomium of Agesilaus, in which he wrote that:

> Agesilaus was a scrupulous observer of sacred places even when they lay in enemy territory, because he thought it just as important to win over gods over to his side on enemy ground as well as it was in friendly territory. He never did violence to anyone, even an enemy, who had taken refuge in the sanctuary of a god, because he considered it irrational to describe people who steal from temples as sacrilegious, and then to think that there is nothing irreligious about pulling a suppliant away from an altar where he has taken refuge. (Xen. *Ages*. 11.1)

As we will see, Agesilaus did not always conform to this ideal, but the fact that Xenophon identified it in this context demonstrates the positive values associated with it.

Most supplication requests seem to have been recognised, however Naiden has cautioned against the prevailing assumption of the 'automatic efficacy' of supplication.[4] The supplicated party had to judge whether or not to accept the supplicant's appeal.[5] Occasionally it might be legitimate to reject a supplicant's application and expel them from their place of supplication. The acceptability of rejection was based on the details of the supplicant's wrong-doing; Naiden refers to a 'tacit approval of supplicandi who expel a tyrant or criminal, criticism of supplicandi who expel worthy supplicants'.[6] Being on the losing side of a battle was not enough to disqualify someone from claiming supplicant rights, but it was a vulnerable position and the situation presented a dilemma to the victorious leader. How military leaders dealt with that dilemma presented historians with an important trope for characterisation and exploring moral themes.

DEMETER AT PLATAEA

We have already seen the moral miracle at the battle of Plataea, in which Demeter refused members of the Persian army access to her sanctuary (Chapter 3, 'Pre-Battle Sacrifices at Plataea'). Their bodies piled up outside the *temenos* as the allied Greeks killed them off. A miracle, Herodotus tells us, revenge for what had been done to her sanctuaries elsewhere (Hdt. 9.62–5), with collective rather than case-by-case punishment. As we have seen, the topography meant that it was unlikely any members of the Persian army attempted to enter the sanctuary. It is still possible that some were killed in there and dragged outside, or dragged out and then killed.[7] But the story of their exclusion relies on the plausibility that they would have been spared had they been allowed to enter. In this sense the story normalises and reinforces the idea that this is how a victorious army should behave.

CLEOMENES AND THE GROVE OF ARGOS

We have already encountered Cleomenes, pushing his way into a temple of Athena past a protesting priestess (Chapter 1, 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'). The Herodotean account of his gruesome treatment of post-battle suppliants in Argos is infamous as an example of cruelty. Although Herodotus does not offer an explicit verdict on this episode, it is clear that it is represented as immoral, but beyond this it is meshed into a wider narrative, and the interaction between that narrative's features provides much greater insight into the whole. As such, they will be considered here together, although aspects of it initially appear only tangentially connected to asylum.

The wider narrative relates competing causes for Cleomenes' madness and suicide. Herodotus describes how, while Cleomenes worked for Greece on Aegina, his co-king, Demaratus, spread malicious stories about him, prompting Cleomenes to remove Demaratus from office by bribing Delphic officials (Hdt. 6.61–71). Most Greeks, Herodotus tells us, put the madness down to this bribery and deposition. The Athenians, however, attribute it to the burning of sacred land at Eleusis, while the Argives cite the killing of suppliants and burning of a sacred grove (Hdt. 6.75–84). Herodotus goes on to explain the Argive tradition in detail.

The account relates the events of the Sepeia campaign. After receiving a Delphic oracle that he would take Argos, Cleomenes

invaded Argive territory, but received bad omens when he sacrificed to the Erasinus River on his way. Herodotus gives us a vivid response scene, Cleomenes saying, 'I admire the god of the river for refusing to betray his countrymen. But the Argives will not get away that easily.' Rather uncharacteristically, we might think, Cleomenes obeyed the signs and left. He sacrificed a bull to the sea to access Argive territory by a different route (Hdt. 6.76). The Spartans then won the battle of Sepeia, after first winning a battle of signs. The nervous Argives copied every move the Spartans made in an attempt to be ready for them. Recognising this pattern, Cleomenes altered the meaning of one of the signals, so that when the Argives tried to mimic it, they found themselves sitting down to rest as the Spartans charged and destroyed them (Hdt. 6.77–8). The survivors fled for asylum 'into the grove of Argos, where the Lacedaemonians surrounded them and watched them closely' (Hdt. 6.78). Cleomenes then tricked the suppliants in the grove, making use of deserters to call the Argives by name, telling them that they had been ransomed. They were killed once they left the safety of the grove. About 50 are said to have been killed in this way before someone climbed a tree and saw what was happening. When the Argives then stopped leaving the sanctuary:

> Cleomenes bade the helots pile wood about the grove; they obeyed, and he burnt the grove. When the fire was now burning, he asked one of the deserters to what god the grove was sacred. 'To Argos,' said the man. When Cleomenes heard that he cried loudly and lamentably, 'Apollo, god of oracles, you have deceived me by saying that I would take Argos. This I suppose is the fulfilment of that prophecy.' After this, Cleomenes sent the majority of his army back to Sparta, and taking 1000 of his best warriors went to the sanctuary of Hera to sacrifice. But when he wished to sacrifice on the altar, the priest forbade him, saying that it was not proper for a stranger to sacrifice there. Cleomenes had the helots take the priest away from the altar and whip him, and then offered sacrifice himself. This being done, he returned to Sparta. (Hdt. 6.80–1)

When Cleomenes arrived in Sparta, he was prosecuted for failing to take the city of Argos when he had the opportunity. In defence:

> Cleomenes alleged (whether falsely or truly I cannot say) that he had supposed the god's oracle to be fulfilled by his taking of the shrine of Argos; so he had thought it not right to assault the city before he had inquired by sacrifice and learned whether the god would give it to him or resist him; and while he was taking omens in the temple of Hera a

> flame had shone from the breast of her statue, by which he learned that he would not take Argos. For if the flame had come from the head of the statue he would have taken the city completely, but as it came from the breast what had already happened was as much as the god wished to happen. The Spartans accepted what he had said as credible and reasonable. (Hdt. 6.82)[8]

This episode shows several of the characteristic features of post-battle asylum narratives. We can well understand the position of the Argives; fleeing for their lives, the shelter of a grove must have been appealing, for both its physical protection and the protection potentially offered by its sacred status. Cleomenes as victor is faced with the choice of how to respond to the suppliants. Then there is the gamesmanship used to persuade the suppliants to leave their position of relative safety.

According to this account, about 50 people fell for the name-trick. That so many of them were duped expresses the normality of their expectation of a ransom and release outcome. Herodotus adds to this sense of normality with a house-keeping note on the usual rate of ransoms. It is the killing of the suppliants that is unusual. Some have considered the whole account to be made up, a slander created as a hostile characterisation of Cleomenes.

There is no doubt that it is a hostile tradition. Plenty of precedent shows that such a gruesome destruction was sacrilege. We have seen the response given to the Herodotean Aristodicus (Hdt. 1.158–9), and Thucydides reports Delphi's verdict on similar tricks: that it was not acceptable to starve a suppliant out of their place of safety, even if they actually died elsewhere (Thuc. 1.134).[9] The Athenians had condemned Cleomenes for burning sacred land even when it did not contain suppliants. Cleomenes' response to learning the truth of the oracle also indicates the hostility of the tradition. His complaint against Apollo is unfounded and absurd; it was his choice to destroy the grove, not Apollo's. The complaint reveals the lack of self-awareness that is evident in other Herodotean despots. But while the subject and details of the story are clearly hostile, that does not mean that the basic content is fabricated. Alastar Jackson notes just how tense things were for Sparta at that time, and concludes:

> No wonder then that Cleomenes seized the chance that the Argive hoplites gave him at Sepeia, by taking refuge in the sacred grove, to burn them to death in their thousands, not the act of a madman but what today might be called a strategic necessity.[10]

Did it occur? It is impossible to know, but it is certainly possible even if it would surely have been unusual.

What of the visit to the sanctuary? Several scholars have commented on the similarities this narrative has with Cleomenes in Athens, and with Miltiades on Paros.[11] These similarities, and the differences, are instructive. Whereas Miltiades' attempted sacrilege could only ever have offended Demeter, and while Cleomenes' approach to Athena at Athens was impudent, on this occasion Cleomenes wished to sacrifice, that is, to honour Hera. He disregards the legitimacy of the priest, not the goddess. Although Herodotus later claims to be unsure about Cleomenes' account of events, at the point at which he describes the decision to go to the sanctuary, he confidently asserts that Cleomenes went 'to offer sacrifice', and did so. The king later claimed that he sacrificed in order to learn whether the god would grant him the city of Argos. He was trying to gain knowledge and favour at the Argives' expense.[12] But, without being explicit, Herodotus includes several factors which indicate a negative assessment the way Cleomenes went about his enquiry. The whipping of the priest is the clearest indication that something is wrong as whipping in the *Histories* has a strong negative association with despotism, even when the victims are not priests.[13] And then, of course, there is the reason for the whipping, Cleomenes' defiance of a clear instruction about the impropriety of him sacrificing. This is another transgression of a boundary, this time a cultural and religious one. His response to the priest develops his characterisation as one who will not manage his impulse to put his interests first, indicative of his despotic character. The statue's response tells Cleomenes what he wished to know, but it is Argos which benefits most by avoiding attack, a fitting result for a sacrilege-themed campaign.

The political aspect of this episode is more ambiguous. It has been suggested that in sacrificing in the most important sanctuary in the area, Cleomenes was asserting his dominance over the Argives.[14] This would explain why he took '1000 of his best warriors', in contrast to Miltiades' furtive sneaking; it was a public display. This theory makes sense, and reflects what we have seen of *strategoi* sacrificing on the *acropoleis* of capture cities (Chapter 2, 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'). But this idea is undermined in both narrative terms and by the uncertainty surrounding who actually used this sanctuary in the early fifth century. The narrative does not read as a triumph over

Argos. As Jonathan Hall notes, 'In strictly narrative terms, the decision to go to the Heraion is intimately connected with Kleomenes' failure to take Argos.' And regarding access, even de Polignac, for whom the Argive relationship with the Heraeum was a critical case-study in his *polis*-formation theory, has conceded that various inhabitants of the plain used the sanctuary in their own right, until the Argive conquests of the 460s. In this context, Hall notes that it was 'not surprising', that Cleomenes would wish to go there for a sign if he was in the area, and that he got one.[15] If this was a regional rather than Argive sanctuary, his visit was not particularly humiliating to Argos. Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood has argued that while 'it is unclear [from Hdt.81] whether *xenoi* were totally forbidden to sacrifice, or had to sacrifice elsewhere in the precinct, or through a *proxenos*', the Spartan response to Cleomenes indicates that they saw no problem in his use of this site.[16] This seems a little extreme. It seems likely that most inhabitants of the plain would have resented a Spartan king entering the Heraeum. But the cited intention is omen-seeking rather than display, and the sticking-point of the narrative is not so much his attempt to sacrifice as his over-reaction to being rebuffed.

As with the grove, the entire historicity of the visit has been called into question. The suspicion is more compelling in this case, however, as there is such a close reflection of the Athenian acropolis story. Hall also notes that Herodotus mentions a priest when priestesses are otherwise attested for the Heraeum, a factor he attributes to the 'dubious nature of Herodotus' sources for this episode'. He also notes that the story runs contrary to a version known by Plutarch (using Socrates of Argos) and Pausanias, in which Cleomenes *did* attack Argos after Sepeia, but was beaten back by a defence led by the poet Telesilla.[17]

None of these stories needs to be literally true in order to be revealing. We have seen that the grove and Heraeum narratives help to contribute to the negative characterisation of Cleomenes, but Herodotus is doing something more sophisticated than simply implying that Cleomenes was despotic. With each stage of the campaign taken together, we can see that Herodotus establishes a scheme of signs understood or mistaken, which communicate a hierarchy of offence and the elusive power of symbols. Herodotus displays a keen interest throughout the *Histories* in the ability to interpret signs. It is an ambiguous skill; positive in its own right, yet often associated with tyrants. Cleomenes displays this skill when he

responds appropriately to the bad omens at the river. His circumspection leads to an outstanding result. The build-up to battle is a battle of signs. Cleomenes wins through his greater ability to control the meaning and interpretation of those signs; the result is another outstanding result. The grove features another battle of understanding, but while Cleomenes tricks the Argives, through his impiety he tricks himself out of the greater prize by misunderstanding Apollo's signs. Herodotus hones in on this issue by giving us Cleomenes' spoken word, as he realises that in taking the grove by force he has pre-emptively fulfilled the oracle. Spartans and Argives both benefit from the sign given in the sanctuary and the war comes to a close. Herodotus conveys criticism of Cleomenes' actions at the grove by representing them as the result of a failure of insight as well as an impiety. In this sense, impiety is shown to have practical drawbacks as well as moral ones. Yet none of this is what Herodotus considers the cause of Cleomenes' madness: 'It seems to me that Cleomenes was punished for what he did to Demaratus' (Hdt. 6.84). Herodotus does not cite the bribery of the Delphians here, only the outcome, the deposition of a legal king. No matter how badly Cleomenes treated his military enemies, Herodotus' unusually explicit blame falls on Cleomenes' corruption of his own state's political system. He is despotic, but perhaps not impious in the sanctuary of Hera, he is despotic, impious, and mistaken at the grove of Argos, but most egregious is the despotic act of deposing a legitimate ruler for his own advantage. *This* is why divine vengeance strikes.

AGESILAUS AT THE SANCTUARY OF ATHENA ITONIA

The next episode under examination involves the Spartan king, Agesilaus II, arguably the most famous man of his generation. His reign lasted from 400, when he took the throne as a mature man, until his death in 360, shortly after the second battle of Mantinea. The length of his reign combined with his forceful personality and military ability ensured that his influence on late classical Greece was immense. We have already encountered Agesilaus disturbing the tomb of Heracles' mother (Chapter 2, 'Moving Bones') and as he will appear in these pages in relation to further controversial encounters with sacred spaces, it will be worth establishing more about who he was and what the major sources for his life are.

Agesilaus came to the throne controversially, after disputing the legitimacy of the dead king's son (Plut. *Ages*. 3). Shortly afterwards, he campaigned in Asia Minor attempting to liberate the Greek cities from Persian rule. Resistance to the Spartan empire that had followed the Peloponnesian War led to conflicts that forced his return. The rest of Agesilaus' career was dominated by inter-state hostilities. This seemed settled by the King's Peace in 387; an agreement that all cities would be independent. However, Sparta went on to install several oligarchies and seized Thebes. When Thebes regained its independence and defeated Sparta at the battle of Leuctra, this signalled the end of Spartan supremacy. Agesilaus campaigned in Egypt to recuperate Sparta's finances and it was there that he died of natural causes. Agesilaus was internationally renowned and written about by many authors. This section will examine two incidents that took place following his return from Asia, focusing particularly on the accounts of his friend, Xenophon, and Plutarch's *Lives of Agesilaus and Pompey*.

Xenophon wrote in several genres. His first work on Agesilaus was an encomium, written to commemorate a man he had known well and who had been his benefactor. As a contrast between history and encomium will form part of the analysis of the way certain episodes were viewed, it will be useful to consider the conventions of encomium. Aristotle described encomium as a branch of rhetoric in which the objective was to praise an individual and glorify them for their accomplishments (Arist. *Rhet*. 1367B–3242). As in other literature dealing with character, character was not assessed neutrally, yet in contrast to other genres, encomium addressed the character and deeds of its subject solely in terms of praise. This bestowal of praise without blame made encomium different from both history and the various forms of biography, in which praise and blame were intermingled.[18]

Noreen Humble has demonstrated just how typical of encomiastic writing the *Agesilaus* is. Humble compares the *Agesilaus* with other surviving encomia, Isocrates' *Evagoras* and Agathon's encomium of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*, and with descriptions of encomium by Aristotle. This examination reveals that the subjects of encomia were credited with certain core virtues: justice, moderation, courage, wisdom, while others, such as piety, patriotism, philhellenism and urbanity might be included according to their relevance to the

subject. Examples would be given as evidence of these virtues and evidence to the contrary omitted. Xenophon's encomium reflects this, including a separate treatment of virtues and deeds, attributing key virtues to the subject, and excluding any factors which would compromise the depiction of virtue.[19] This clarification of the nature of the *Agesilaus* should confirm its distinction from historiography and discourage the still-frequent employment of the encomium as evidence of Xenophon's 'hero-worship' of Agesilaus.[20]

Justice, moderation, courage, wisdom, and piety are all attributed to Agesilaus in the encomium. Religion is to the fore in all of Xenophon's works,[21] but it is particularly dominant in the *Agesilaus*. The opening passage refers to the king's 'complete goodness' (τελέως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς, Xen. *Ages*. 1.1), and references to specifically religious goodness also appear throughout the work. The section providing examples of his virtues starts by stating that he was so pious that even his enemies trusted his oaths (ἐσέβετο, Xen. *Ages*. 3.2–5). The summary of his virtues also begins with his religious propriety: how he always revered sacred places, even those of his enemies (*Ages*. 11.1), how he never harmed supplicants (*Ages*. 11.1), how he believed the gods enjoyed righteous actions as much as temples (ὁσίοις ἔργοις, *Ages*. 11.2), and how he sacrificed even more in good fortune than in bad (*Ages*. 11.2). Xenophon's insistence on Agesilaus' piety is entirely in keeping with the encomium's specified intention to praise Agesilaus and with the expectations of the genre. However, it does not mean that this insistence reflects Xenophon's 'real' opinion on the matter, as encomia commonly claim attributes that the subject did not possess, or at least did not possess in the degree that the encomium suggests.[22]

Agesilaus also features heavily in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, a work of history that combines dramatic scenes and narrator-interventions exploring character and morality with a narrative of late fifth and early fourth-century events.[23] Several episodes that appear in the *Hellenica* are absent or truncated in the *Agesilaus*. Xenophon's intimacy with Sparta means that the absences were not caused by initial ignorance; they are missing because Xenophon made value judgements about them and deemed them unsuitable for a work of praise. The ability to analyse this adaptation for the requirements of genre reveals what aspects of Agesilaus' campaigns Xenophon had reservations about.

The sources for Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompey* were many and varied, but ultimately Plutarch selected and adapted material in his usual manner to achieve emphasis on the themes he considered most pertinent to the pair, hence accounts of the same incident can be represented differently in different *Lives* depending on the desired effect.[24] Plutarch's assessment of Agesilaus has been interpreted in a range of ways owing to its mixture of good and bad qualities.[25] But while there certainly are positive elements to the *Agesilaus*, there are many early warning signs and subtle criticisms throughout it which build in its latter stages. Plutarch's *Agesilaus* differs from Xenophon's encomium and *Hellenica* in the inclusion of telling observations about Agesilaus' childhood. The following description has significance for the biography as a whole:

> [Agesilaus was] the most victory-loving and high-spirited of the young men, wishing to be first in everything, and having a vehemence and fury which was unconquerable and hard to force down.
>
> (Plut. *Ages*. 2.1)[26]

This vehemence is muted only by his 'mildness' (πραότης) and 'readiness to obey' (εὐπειθής) (Plut. *Ages*. 2.1), the latter a product of a rigorous Spartan education. In Plutarch's *Lives*, character traits exhibited in childhood tend to manifest themselves fully in the subject's maturity.[27] This trend is particularly apparent in this *Life*, where Agesilaus' love of victory and desire to be first occur again and again. The destructive impact that these character traits have upon the states in which the protagonists live can be regarded as the main theme of the *Agesilaus-Pompey* pair.[28] At the end of his life, Agesilaus has the self-discipline to put his love of victory (φιλονικία) aside enough to save Sparta from destruction (Plut. *Ages*. 31–4), but its presence throughout his political career causes frequent avoidable difficulties.[29]

THE BATTLE OF CORONEA

The first episode we will look at in exploring Agesilaus' response to asylum claims took place after the battle of Coronea. Coronea was fought in 390s as the Lacedaemonians and their allies travelled back from Asia along the land route used by Xerxes (as Xenophon notes ominously, *Hell*. 4.2.8). They marched south through Greece until they encountered a hostile allied army at Coronea, in between Mt. Helicon

and Lake Copais. In the encomium and the *Hellenica*, Xenophon praises Agesilaus for his interaction with the sanctuary of Athena Itonia after the battle. This was the major pan-Boeotian sanctuary, where Athena was worshipped in her aspect of goddess of warriors, and where those belonging to the Boeotian *ethne* gathered for shared sacrifice and festivals.[30] The variations between these two accounts and between those of other authors illustrate the effects that genre could have on the representation of incidents involving sacred space and some of the values associated with responses to post-battle asylum.

The Lacedaemonians erected a trophy, but even in Xenophon it is apparent that the battle was a close run thing.[31] Agesilaus was badly wounded. As he was being carried to the phalanx, horsemen rode up to tell him that about 80 of the enemy, with their weapons, were in the nearby temple, and to ask him what it was right to do.

> And he, although he had many wounds, nevertheless did not forget the deity, but ordered them to allow these men to go away wherever they wished, and permitted no injustice. (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.20)[32]

A similar version had appeared in the encomium:

> When the victory had gone to Agesilaus, and he himself had been carried wounded to the phalanx, some of the horsemen rode up and told him that that 80 of the enemy, with their weapons, were in the temple, and they asked him what it was right to do. And he, although wounded all over with all sorts of weapons, did not forget the deity, but ordered them to allow these men to go away to whatever place they wished, and permitted no injustice, and sent his own cavalry escort to bring them to a safe place. (Xen. *Ages.* 2.13)[33]

The general sense and even some of the phrasing of these passages is very similar. In both, Xenophon stresses the restraint and piety that Agesilaus demonstrated. Those in the temple are not called 'suppliants'. As we have seen, this does not mean that they had no claim to suppliants' protection, but does suggest that Xenophon wished to express that their status was ambiguous. Certainly Agesilaus is asked how the troops should behave; there is no assumption that the enemy would be left alone. Nonetheless, that does not mean that it would have been acceptable to kill, enslave, or ransom them; they were enemies, but they had committed no crime that would automatically disqualify them from the protection of a sacred space.[34] They had entered the temple in a state of pollution,

covered in post-fight gore, but this would have been true of anyone fleeing a battle, including Agesilaus' troops had they followed them in. The main factor perpetuating the ambiguity is the retention of weapons. This is mentioned in both versions suggesting that it is crucial to how the episode is interpreted; had the Lacedaemonians acted against them, the Spartan account would presumably have stressed this hostility by way of exoneration. By remaining armed, they maintained a state of conflict. They had not placed themselves entirely at the mercy of the deity, but were rather combining potential ritual protection with a practical defence of their own. This is the temple as fortress again.

Those in the sanctuary clearly did not have confidence that they would automatically be safe in there and were unwilling to allow the Lacedaemonians the option of dragging them out unarmed or killing them there without a fight. But the arms were not enough to have made it really acceptable for the Lacedaemonians to attack these men in a Boeotian sanctuary, and without the use of violence, enslavement or imprisonment would have required starving them out. Unfortunately it is not entirely clear if these were Boeotians using their own sanctuary in this way or, perhaps more likely, their Athenian allies, cut off from the rest of the army.[35] Either way, they were in friendly territory, the Lacedaemonians were not. Agesilaus' order was magnanimous, but it would have been an extremely hostile act towards both deity and the norms of war to have acted otherwise. For the encomium, the grounds for praise are raised; not only did Agesilaus spare them, he provided an escort to accompany them home. This ensured that they were not killed or seized as soon as they left the sanctuary, always a risky transition for a suppliant. In the *Hellenica*, it is commendable that they are left alone, but in the ideal world of the encomium, it is not quite enough to do what you are supposed to do; Agesilaus must go above and beyond to earn praise.

Agesilaus' condition contributes to the impression of his restraint: 'He did not forget the deity', despite being wounded. His wounds are mentioned twice in both accounts, and the encomium goes further with 'wounded all over with all sorts of weapons'. The implication of this is that it was particularly magnanimous of Agesilaus to 'permit no injustice' (ἀδικεῖν οὐκ εἴα, *Ages*. 2.13; *Hell*. 4.3.20) when he had been wounded. The wider implication is that it would be

understandable for a leader to act more aggressively when he had suffered personal harm, although it would still have been 'unjust'. Xenophon's 'did not forget the deity' provides a pious motivation, clarifying the issue as a choice between piety and revenge.[36] It would be easy, it seems, for the latter to take precedence; Agesilaus, with grounds for revenge, is to be praised for restraint. The combination of wounding and mercy is a point of emphasis in other authors' accounts too. Pausanias' brief life of Agesilaus finds space for it:

> When the Boeotians were routed, some of the men took refuge in the sanctuary of Athena surnamed Itonia. Agesilaus, although having been wounded in the battle, did not act wrongly against the suppliants.
> (Paus. 3.9.13).[37]

Although he does mention Agesilaus' wounds, Plutarch's account has a different emphasis. Unlike Xenophon, Plutarch had mentioned Agesilaus being wounded during the battle narrative, making the outcome even more uncertain (Plut. *Ages*. 18.6).[38] In the aftermath:

> Agesilaus, although he was suffering in his body from many wounds, would not retire to his tent until he had been carried to the phalanx and seen that the dead were gathered together within the camp. Moreover, he ordered the dismissal of all the enemy who had taken refuge in the sanctuary. For nearby is the temple of Athena Itonia, and a trophy stood in front of it, the Boeotians set it up long ago when - with Sparto commanding - they had defeated the Athenians there, killing Tolmides.
> (Plut. *Ages*. 19.1–2)[39]

Plutarch credits Agesilaus with caring for his troops before himself, providing a positive example of the king's pastoral care and characteristic ability to exert physical self-control. However, there is a conspicuous lack of attention on what Xenophon depicts as a triumph of piety over wound-fuelled revenge. The release is mentioned, but in passing; instead of being the central point, it becomes a bridge to the description of an old trophy. Moreover, Plutarch's local knowledge is not used to provide details of the current battle but to explain the trophy, so that, in effect, the symbol of a former Boeotian victory detracts from the recent ambiguities.[40] Agesilaus' piety and toleration of his enemies is played down. To have emphasised their release would have compromised the *Life*'s thematic focus on excessive rivalry. Plutarch avoids this dilution of the central theme and Coronea (where Agesilaus carried out a risky

manoeuvre precisely because of his competitiveness) remains an example of the potential dangers of this character trait.

All these accounts have biographical emphasis; they are interested in Agesilaus' moral character and his actions are explored in that context. To appreciate the impact of this criteria, it is fruitful to compare these accounts with that of an author with a very different aim. Polyaenus produced his *Strategemata* with an 'underlying theme [that] is didactic, to expound the methods of protecting an army and overcoming the enemy'.[41] Although this is in part carried out through a 'life' of Agesilaus, the work concentrates on his strategic rather than moral decisions, or to put it another way, he looks at the strategic motivations for his decisions rather than the moral. As such, his account of the events at Coronea takes on a different emphasis.

> Agesilaus conquered the [Thebans] at Coronea.[42] Someone reported, 'the enemies are fleeing into the temple.' He gave orders to let them go wherever they wished, as it would be dangerous to engage men resuming the fight out of despair. (Polyaenus, 2.1.5, trans. Krentz)

In this version, Agesilaus is motivated to spare the enemy by the consideration that desperate men would fight all the more fiercely, causing any possible advantage from confronting them to be outweighed by the likely danger. This seems plausible. The Lacedaemonian victory had been precarious. In this delicate situation Agesilaus might very well have been reluctant to risk more troops against a remnant force that was still armed, and nor did he have the time or security to wait out the fugitives.[43] The king's mercy made practical sense. That does not of course mean that he *did* 'forget the deity', but it is a good indicator of the way that some of the accounts focus on the religious aspect of the situation to the exclusion of all others. It was suggested earlier that the focus on Agesilaus' wounds implied that other *strategoi* in that condition might not have acted with such restraint; but perhaps the tactical need for caution would have been enough to induce any *strategos* to act that way. Agesilaus has been marked out as particularly pious for an action that may have had a primarily practical motive. To have stressed the tactical necessity might have forced Xenophon to acknowledge more clearly how uncertain the result was. By marking the incident down to piety, he distracts the reader's attention from the precarious military situation and reinforces the theme of Agesilaus' respect for sanctuaries, achieving two goals in one.

If Xenophon established the religious motivation behind Agesilaus' actions and Polyaenus the tactical, a third type of motivator should also be considered, politics. Agesilaus had departed Greece under a cloud as a result of his intervention in a sanctuary in Boeotian Aulis (on which see Chapter 5, 'Agesilaus and the Sanctuary of Artemis'). The battle of Coronea marked Agesilaus' return to Greece. Good omens would help keep his allies galvanised. This need to maintain a positive atmosphere was the reason that just before the battle he deceived his troops about the Spartan naval defeat at Cnidus (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.10–14).[44] It was also important to present a positive front to the rest of Greece.[45] This impression would have been ruined by a massacre (or mass-enslavement) in a well-known sanctuary. So while there were religious reasons to 'remember the deity' and avoid ill omens for the return, there were public-relations reasons too. It must also be significant that, other than revenge, Agesilaus lacked any significant motivation to gain access to the sanctuary. The battle had primarily been fought to supress the anti-Spartan alliance; he probably intended to ravage Boeotia, but this was not an opportunity to conquer it. Demonstrating an ability to enter the pan-Boeotian sanctuary would not have won Sparta influence. After the battle, Agesilaus went on to Delphi and celebrated the Pythian Games as a hero (see Chapter 6, 'Isthmia in the Corinthian War'); this would have been seriously undermined by talk of 80 dead suppliants. In abstaining from conflict in the sanctuary, Agesilaus protected his troops and avoided controversy. In many cases, it was probably more trouble than it was worth to pursue suppliants and altogether preferable to conform to the expectation to leave them be.

AGESILAUS AT THE SANCTUARY OF HERA AKRAIA (PEIRAEUM)

As the Corinthian War rumbled on, pitting Sparta against the quadruple alliance of Athens, Argos, Boeotia, and the anti-Spartan element of Corinth, the Spartans realised that the alliance were moving goods across the Corinthian Gulf.[46] Agesilaus attacked Peiraeum, the peninsula north-west of the Isthmus and south of Megara. His success was a considerable boost to the Spartan war effort, so much so that it even appears in the encomium, despite its Greek against Greek theme (Xen. *Ages*. 2.18). Yet the encomium is coy about the details, stating vaguely that Agesilaus 'took everything in the area'. Looking at the *Hellenica* or Plutarch, this becomes

understandable. The *Hellenica* offers much more information, saying that the inhabitants of the peninsula had 'fled for refuge to the sanctuary of Hera, men, women, slaves and freemen, and the greater part of their cattle'. Measures had been taken to provide the sanctuary with water, equipping it to deal with large numbers of visitors, but with the Spartans on the cliff above them those hiding in the sanctuary were cut off from the drinking-water and trapped:[47]

> Those who had taken refuge (καταπεφευγότες) in the Heraeum came out, entrusting Agesilaus to decide what he wished to do with them. He decided that those responsible for the massacre would be handed over to the exiles, but that all the others should be sold. (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.5)

That Xenophon knew so much about the campaign, but avoided reference to the sanctuary and enslavements in the encomium, indicates his unease with the events there, or at least his judgement that this was not appropriate for a work of praise. Nonetheless, the episode has been variously interpreted and as such merits revisiting.

The suppliants' exit to appeal to Agesilaus would have been welcome to the waiting Spartans. The closer a supplicant's proximity to the altar, the greater the degree of sanctity to which they were entitled, a circumstance that seems frequently to have led to the sort of tricks and rule-bending that we saw at the grove of Argos.[48] The results have been called a 'fine haul', and Naiden has called Agesilaus a 'model supplicandus' during this episode.[49] Other scholars have suggested that the accounts of the episode contain implied criticism of Agesilaus and that his actions are not endorsed by the ancient writers who related them.

Naiden endorses Agesilaus' actions for two main reasons: firstly, the supplicants are not betrayed by Agesilaus, because he never gave them a pledge of protection. Secondly, they are unworthy of protection because they have been guilty of impiety during a massacre in Corinth. Their supplication is therefore hypocrisy, and Agesilaus is entitled to judge against them.[50] This reading follows Xenophon's encomiastic description of Agesilaus as a man who 'never harmed an enemy who was a supplicant of the gods' (Xen. *Ages*. 11.1). However, this would be absolutely the most positive interpretation of the situation; less indulgent interpretations would also be possible. Although the people left the sanctuary, they had been covered by ἀσυλία ἱερά and left only to appeal to Agesilaus because they were trapped. We have seen that

Delphi disapproved of cornering suppliants until they were desperate, and Naiden himself argues that while it could be legitimate to expel a rejected supplicant from their position of safety, the enslavement of those same persons was far more problematic.[51] Taking this line of thinking, Agesilaus was entitled to expel those supplicants who were from the peninsular and send them away, but his enslavement of them was excessively severe and open to criticism. Their enslavement may have been excusable according to the most callous interpretation of the ambiguous practice of supplication, but it challenges the idealising claim that Agesilaus 'treated sacred places with reverence, even when they were in enemy territory' (Xen. *Ages*. 11.1). This was a value Xenophon considered important, he places it at the top of the encomium's list of virtues, and it is attested elsewhere as a value admired by the Spartans (Plut. *Mor*. 227A–B). At the sanctuary of Hera, Agesilaus did not practise this virtue to the full.

The suggestion that the suppliants were legitimately rejected on the basis of their own wrong-doing seems like a misapplication of this principle.[52] Although there had been a sacrilege-heavy massacre in Corinth, the majority of those in the sanctuary had not massacred anybody.[53] Xenophon mentions the massacre in his account of the enslavements, but specifies that while those responsible were given up to the pro-Spartan Corinthians, most of the people taken were not even from the city of Corinth, but free and enslaved men and women from the Peiraeum peninsula (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.5). The punishment of most of the actual culprits had already been achieved in Corinth (Xen. *Hell*. 4.4.9–13), when the extensive destruction (in a military context) of those responsible was a 'gift from the gods' (Xen. *Hell*. 4.4.12).[54] The capture of those at the Heraeum has no such endorsement from Xenophon, precisely because it involved a different group of people. Peiraeum and the sanctuary had been Corinthian for a very long time.[55] Those from the peninsular could be accused of assisting Corinth, but not of participating in its internal violence; they had done nothing to negate their supplication.

The king's religious scruples at Peiraeum were certainly questionable, but what makes his actions worse for both Xenophon and Plutarch is the hostile arrogance that he exhibited during the seizure. While the people and goods were removed from the sanctuary, Agesilaus watched from the cliffs above, 'sitting in the attitude of one who was exulting in what had been accomplished' (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.7).

This already has ominous overtones of Xerxes at Salamis, and gets worse when Agesilaus conspicuously ignores some Boeotian ambassadors who had come to discuss 'peace': 'in a very lofty way (μάλα μεγαλοφρόνως) he seemed not to see them' (Xen. *Hell*. 5.4.6). As ambassadors rather than heralds they were vulnerable, and by approaching with their *proxenos*, the Spartan Pharax, they were acting properly in the established way.[56] Nothing that the ambassadors did was wrong, and in a society where 'it was a serious affront to turn away an envoy abruptly',[57] Agesilaus' behaviour towards them could be seen as even more unambiguously problematic than that towards the supplicants in the temple. Xenophon, and Plutarch even more so, certainly seem to judge events in that way.

The king's questionable treatment of the sanctuary, his thoughtless exaltation, and his hubristic treatment of the ambassadors all receive swift rebuke. News of the destruction of a Spartan unit arrives even as he sits relishing the spectacle of the plunder. Both authors continue their detailed treatments of the episode rather than moving to a summary account, indicating that a moral message is being communicated. Although only 250 troops are reported killed, the tone of the passage describing their loss presents it as a terrible disaster.[58] On learning of the setback, the Boeotian ambassadors 'no longer mentioned the peace', compelling Sparta to continue its costly war (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.9).[59] Although there is no explicit judgement, Xenophon's arrangement of the narrative links Agesilaus' treatment of the sanctuary and ambassadors with the subsequent reversal. At best, this suggests Agesilaus' foolish pride, at worst there is an implication of divine punishment. Those arguing that Xenophon is critical of Agesilaus' behaviour suggest that while the reader is left to judge for themselves, the narrative is constructed to ensure that the sanctuary events and military setback are weighed together.[60] Ever generous, Xenophon redeems Agesilaus' image by presenting him reacting to the bad situation with commendable equanimity, but his moderation had come too late.[61]

If it was only the arrogance Agesilaus showed towards the ambassadors that Xenophon deemed problematic, that aspect of the incident might have been erased from the encomium while retaining the enslavements as an indication of his good result. That he chose to avoid mentioning both aspects of the incident, while still referring to the success of the campaign, indicates that both aspects of Agesilaus'

behaviour were problematic. The enslavements at the sanctuary and the arrogance to the ambassadors were left unmentioned, indicating that both these things were considered unworthy of praise. One might say that this is stating the obvious, that of course it would never be appropriate to mention enslavement in an encomium, yet elsewhere in the encomium enslavement is presented as cause for praise.[62] That this does not occur in this instance indicates that other factors problematised the events at the Heraeum: the Greekness of the victims and the sacred nature of the site they were taken from.

Plutarch's account of this period of the Corinthian War combines Agesilaus' military successes with a moral failure.[63] Around Corinth, at the Heraeum, and in Acarnania, Agesilaus achieves military progress, but his characteristic moral lapse undermines his success. Plutarch deals with the supplicants briefly and, in contrast to the *Hellenica*, there is no pathetic reference to their exposure for sale. The emphasis of Plutarch's narrative falls instead upon Agesilaus' treatment of the Boeotian ambassadors, which is explicitly linked to the subsequent setbacks. The Boeotians are there 'about friendship', 'περὶ φιλίας' (a change from Xenophon's 'about peace'), but they are not well received:

> He had always hated that city, and thinking that this moment was good for insulting it (συμφέρειν ἐνυβρίσαι), he pretended not to see or hear its ambassadors when they presented themselves. But his actions soon suffered punishment (ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητόν). For the Thebans had not yet departed when messengers came to him announcing that the unit had been cut to pieces by Iphicrates. This was the greatest disaster that had befallen them in a long time. (Plut. *Ages*. 22.1–2)

Donald Shipley notes 'the oxymoron in the juxtaposition "συμφέρειν ἐνυβρίσαι" "to be well to insult"',[64] and certainly there is a sense that for Plutarch this is the significant aspect of the incident. An opportunity for peace and friendship has arisen, but Agesilaus rejects it because of his contentious attitude towards Thebes. Agesilaus is behaving in a manner that is consistent with the character Plutarch has already established. This problematic behaviour is directly followed by a setback for the state as a whole: the loss of troops and the ambassadors' retraction of their offer (Plut. *Ages*. 22.3). The king's tactical reaction to the setback is the same as it is in the *Hellenica*; he ravages land around Corinth while returning to Sparta (Plut. *Ages*. 22.3–4; Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.9–10). However, there is a

difference in the representation of Agesilaus' personal reaction. Xenophon's Agesilaus reacted to the Boeotian ambassadors' change of position with good humour, demonstrating the resilience of a steady commander.[65] Plutarch's Agesilaus is driven to anger 'ἡ ὀργή'. There is no good-natured chuckle, no self-control or moderation.

The way a leader's love of pre-eminence has a detrimental effect on his state has primary thematic importance in the *Agesilaus-Pompey*. The events at the sanctuary of Hera contribute directly to the illustration of that theme. Agesilaus' pride and antagonistic attitude towards Thebes are punished with losses and continued war. The enslavement of the civilians may be problematic, but the treatment of the ambassadors is more thematically important and therefore this is the subject that receives the focus of Plutarch's account. Xenophon also made the treatment of the ambassadors problematic, but he combined this with greater attention to the mistreatment of the supplicants. These elements are both chastised by the subsequent setbacks. While the treatment of sacred space and suppliants is important to both authors, this issue is more or less prominent in the narrative according to each author's narrative priorities.

As a military victor over the peninsular, Agesilaus was entitled to act as he saw fit. He faced a difficult decision; he was tasked with preventing the use of the harbour and the harbour was at the sanctuary. Nonetheless, his harshness towards the people at the sanctuary is represented as a demonstration of flawed character. Unusually, the *Hellenica* has no depiction of Agesilaus sacrificing during this mission, either in or outside the sanctuary. We have seen that sacrifices by *strategoi* in foreign sanctuaries had the potential to be controversial, yet the absence here is striking and adds to the sense of Agesilaus neglecting religious requirements. What should he have done in this situation? As the unquestionable victor over the site, he could have let the innocent suppliants leave the sanctuary without being enslaved, while ravaging the peninsular further if he chose. As for sacrifice, for Agesilaus to have sacrificed in the temple himself might have seemed arrogant; Sparta was not claiming the territory as its own, though it was intended that it would pass back to pro-Spartan Corinthians. Nor would it have been respectful to the goddess to coerce sanctuary-staff into sacrificing on his behalf, although that is a possibility. An accompanying pro-Spartan Corinthian would seem to be the most appropriate choice to conduct a sacrifice, as they had

traditional right of access to the sanctuary and would have been willing. According to the accounts, no thank-offering was made at all; that Agesilaus appears to give the goddess nothing despite taking so much is a sign that there is nothing edifying about this encounter. Of course a sacrifice may well have been made, but Xenophon avoids confusing his moral message by depicting one. Both Xenophon and Plutarch show this immoderate self-satisfaction to be futile by interpreting the subsequent setbacks as being consequent upon it. Attitude as well as actions influences the interpretation of the treatment of sacred space.

On balance, it appears that a Greek soldier could take refuge in a sanctuary following a battle with a fair (but not absolute) degree of confidence that it would save their life. The killing of suppliants following battles is used in Greek literature as an extreme signifier of a leader's negative characteristics. The characteristic associated with such episodes is a lack of self-awareness, expressed through an arrogance that prevents the aggressor from recognising the mutability of fortune and the mercy that this should prompt. This arrogance also causes the failure to acknowledge the respect due to the deity involved. There is a strong correlation between these qualities and those associated with tyranny and despotism. When suppliant-slaying is set before us, it invites us to look for correlative acts of immoderation and to anticipate where the perpetrator's character flaws will lead them. Enslaving civilians in similar circumstance suggests the same sorts of qualities, although enslavement is less egregious than killing. By contrast, episodes involving the release of suppliants post-battle provide a positive signifier of self-control and piety. We have seen that in some circumstances, it was simply practical to let suppliants go, however literary representations typically stress moral over pragmatic factors, and appear to be included in order to express this moral aspect. Personal injury and desire for revenge were recognised as playing a role in leaders' responses, although the individual's response to these factors is also an expression of character. The incidence of accounts either way is low, while the situation must have occurred fairly frequently. These episodes only make it into histories when there is call to express a moral point about the parties involved. Although the killing of suppliant troops evidently happened from time to time, it was rare enough that it remained genuinely appalling.

PART III

Relationships

CHAPTER 5

Reputation and Diplomacy

Ancient Greek history writers agree in the picture they present of states taking an acute interest in each other's behaviour. Allies and enemies alike are said to observe how individual states treat others, and the behaviour of individual *strategoi* could have an influence on relations. Herodotus, for example, presents resentment at the destruction of Greek sanctuaries as a key factor in the resistance to Persia (Hdt. 8.143–4).[1] Thucydides frequently illustrates how perception influences the responses and decisions of individuals and whole states.[2] He shows that perception affects how Athens and Sparta react to each other, and he draws attention to the vital role that image and perception have in determining how the less powerful states respond to the major powers. A fine example of this occurs in book three. The Spartan, Alcidas, having been unable to relieve Mytilene, sailed along the Ionian coast and slaughtered (ἀπέσφαξε) a number of the captives he had picked up en route. At Ephesus he was visited by Samian envoys.

> [The envoys] said that it was not a good way to free Greece, destroying men who were not lifting their hands against him and were not enemies, but were merely allies of the Athenians from necessity; and that if he did not stop he would bring few enemies over into friendship and would turn many more friends into enemies.
>
> (Thuc. 3.32.2)

This passage is explicit about the causal link between behaviour, reputation, and response, with particular reference to the ability to solicit support.[3] The importance of perception is also cited at the end

of the Pylos campaign. In a rare narrator-intervention, Thucydides says of the Spartan surrender:

> This was the greatest surprise to the Greeks of all the things that happened in the war. The general impression was that the Lacedaemonians would never be compelled to surrender their arms by hunger or anything else. (Thuc. 4.40.1)

This passage conveys the way that news travels throughout the Greek world, with the potential to reinforce or destabilise prestige. Image and reputation are fundamentally important in a war between ambiguously tied allied groups. The treatment of sacred space by military figures on campaign was one of the factors that had a major impact on how states perceived each other. This chapter will examine contrasting examples from Thucydides and Xenophon, in which military leaders' interactions with the sacred play an important role in securing or alienating allies. The Spartan general, Brasidas, experienced enormous success, while the Spartan king, Agesilaus II, oversaw significant setbacks. As we will see, episodes involving sacred spaces are part of the means through which their success and failures were understood.

BRASIDAS' MODERATION AND THE SANCTUARY OF ATHENA

For an example of the treatment of sacred space influencing campaign outcomes it is informative to turn to Brasidas' campaign in the north as described by Thucydides. This campaign took place at the same time that the Athenians were campaigning in Boeotia and losing at Delium. Thucydides went out of his way to draw attention to this correspondence, drawing out the contrasting results.

Thucydides' Brasidas has a supreme understanding of, and control over, the manner in which others perceive him. He appears suddenly in Thucydides' narrative, arriving just in time to save Methone, and becoming the first Spartan to receive official congratulation during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.25). This first appearance is 'very characteristic' of Brasidas' representation throughout the rest of the work, particularly regarding his swiftness of thought and action, qualities considered atypical of Spartans (see e.g. Thuc. 1.70; 1.80–5).[4] A.W. Gomme argues that Thucydides acts here as both historian and artist, recording genuine events but in a manner that prepares the reader for later developments.[5] Brasidas remains full of energy and ability:

arriving suddenly, fighting effectively, and urging his side to make the most of its opportunities (Thuc. 4.81.1; 2.93; 4.11–12, this last instance is cited by Plutarch as an example of Thucydides' mastery of vivid representation, Plut. *Mor. De.glor.Ath.* 347A–C). The manner in which Brasidas dominates the narrative has led to the suggestion that Thucydides' representation is akin to a Homeric *aristeia*.[6]

Brasidas' career influenced Thucydides', as the Spartan capture of Amphipolis, which Thucydides was in charge of defending, led to the historian's 20-year exile from Athens (Thuc. 4.104). Exile gave Thucydides the opportunity to interview Peloponnesians as well as other participants in the war, and it has been suspected that Thucydides' reliance on Brasidas himself (or more likely, his friends) explains the preferential treatment shown to Brasidas at the expense of his fellow officers.[7] Thucydides' use of Brasidas' associates as sources seems likely, however Thucydides had the independence to adopt and adapt material as he saw fit. His economy of expression is rightly famous, therefore where he discourses at unusual length about an individual or an event, it should not be assumed that this is simply how Thucydides heard it; what it contributes to the work as a whole is always the primary factor. This is how the extraordinary representation of Brasidas' religious activity should be approached.

It has repeatedly been argued that two of the campaigns in which Brasidas features, Pylos and Thrace, represent a deliberate coupling, and that this structural arrangement adds meaning to the *History* as a whole.[8] This is not to suggest that Thucydides falsified the order of events to fit them into a pattern, but rather that he emphasises certain aspects of the events in order to express their correlation.[9] We might recall H.P. Stahl's notion of a Thucydidean 'symbolism of the facts'.[10] The neatness of this binary can lead to the neglect of the campaign that falls between Pylos and Thrace, namely the Athenians' Boeotian campaign, encompassing the battle of Delium and the siege in the nearby sanctuary of Apollo. As we have seen, Thucydides' narrative of these events is structured so that the Boeotian and Thracian campaigns intersect, oscillating between one and the other (Chapter 1, 'The Sanctuary of Apollo at Delium'). It has been argued that this arrangement is simply an awkward consequence of 'Thucydides' unfortunate chronological method'.[11] But it is more realistic to regard the arrangement as a deliberate device used by Thucydides to demonstrate the factors which connect the

campaigns, inviting consideration of how the contrasting behaviours exhibited during them impacted upon reputation and alliances. This contributes to the exploration of the benefits of traditional Greek values and the harm war could do to them.

Brasidas' understanding of perception makes him powerful as he is able to manipulate it to elicit the responses he requires. Thucydides first made this apparent at Megara, focusing the narrative on the issue of perception and emphasising Brasidas' control.[12] The Peloponnesians show their readiness to fight, while the Athenians avoid confrontation. As Tim Rood puts it, 'The Athenians lose a battle that never takes place; they are not even presented as aware that they have lost one. Brasidas' vision, by contrast, is all-encompassing.'[13] Brasidas realises the propaganda value of the Athenians' hesitance. He will later distort this non-confrontation, winning support by convincing others that the Athenians are afraid to fight him (Thuc. 4.85.7 and 4.108.5).

In the north, Brasidas continued to draw the Athenians' allies to the Peloponnesian cause. Before the campaign narrative proper has even begun, Thucydides uses prolepsis to inform the reader of Brasidas' ultimate success and the means through which he achieved it.[14] This ensures that throughout the subsequent narrative, the reader is conscious of the importance of image and reputation:

> Straightaway he showed himself just and moderate (δίκαιον καὶ μέτριον) to the cities, which caused most of them to revolt, while others were betrayed to him, so that when the Lacedaemonians began to desire terms, as they did, they had places to give in exchange for what they hoped to recover and could lighten the pressure of the war on the Peloponnese. At a later time in the war, after the events in Sicily, the excellence and ability of Brasidas – of which some had experience and others knew of by report – was the main thing to encourage the Athenian allies to join the Lacedaemonians. For he was the first Lacedaemonian to come out to them and his reputation for all-round goodness (πάντα ἀγαθὸς) left behind a firm hope that all the others were like him. (Thuc. 4.81.2–3)

The factor most responsible for the cities' positive response to Brasidas is his demonstration of moderation. Thucydides often establishes a contrast between word and deed, but Brasidas is shown to put his talk of moderation into practice. Directly after this narratorial interlude, Brasidas jeopardises his relationship with the Macedonian

king Perdiccas by preferring negotiation with Arrhabaeus over conflict (Thuc. 4.82–3). This is moderate behaviour and it has a beneficial practical outcome: it enables Brasidas to get on with his urgent mission to the Greek cities.[15]

Brasidas then has another speech, before the assembly of Acanthus, where he speaks the language of moderation. He states:

- That Sparta is fighting to liberate the Greeks from Athens.
- That he apologises for not having come to liberate them earlier, but had hoped to win the war without needing to endanger them.
- That he is amazed that they have shut out his army, when they should have been welcomed.
- That other cities might suspect that their refusal means that Brasidas will not be able to protect the cities from reactionary attacks by Athens, although the Athenians had been afraid to fight Brasidas' force (near Megara). [A lie, according to Thuc. 4.73 and 4.108].
- That the Spartan authorities have sworn oaths not to subject the cities they release from bondage to Athens. [A point reiterated at length].
- That if they will not join Sparta willingly, 'I shall call on the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came here to help you and could not make you understand it. I shall lay waste to your land and try to bring you over by force.'
- That two compelling reasons (δύο ἀνάγκας) will force him to use violence if they will not co-operate willingly: he must stop Sparta from suffering from the money Acanthus sends Athens and he cannot let them hinder the mission to free Greece.
- That if they join him against Athens, they will win a fine reputation and everlasting glory.

(Thuc. 4.85–7)

The Acanthians vote to revolt from Athens, 'partly because they were swayed by what Brasidas said, and partly because they were frightened about their harvest' (Thuc. 4.88.1) (just ripened: Thuc. 4.84.1). The narrative moves from Brasidas' effective diplomacy to the Athenians' Delium campaign, then returns once more to Brasidas. After a sudden appearance outside Amphipolis, Brasidas puts forward moderate terms, in order to secure the city before Thucydides can arrive to relieve it (Thuc. 4.105.2–4.106.3). Once again he is

successful, and Thucydides has demonstrated Brasidas' manipulation of the people in offering generous terms to secure rapid surrender.[16] The importance of Brasidas' policy of moderation is reiterated in Thucydides' account of the response to the capture of Amphipolis:

> And [the Athenians] were fearing that their allies would revolt. For Brasidas showed himself to be so generally moderate and everywhere he went he made clear in his speech that he had been sent out to free Greece. And the cities of the Athenians, when they learned of the capture of Amphipolis and the allowance he made there, and of the mildness of Brasidas himself, they were especially keen for a new arrangement, and sent secret messengers to him, asking him to come on to them and wishing to be the first to revolt. For it seemed to them that this was safe, as they underestimated the power of the Athenians, a mistake which later became apparent.

Thucydides observes that the allies' decision was based more on hope than reason, then continues:

> Plus there was the fact that the Athenians had recently taken a trouncing in Boeotia and there was the seductive but untrue statement of Brasidas, that at Nisaea [outside Megara] the Athenians had not dared to engage the army that he had there. (Thuc. 4.108.2–5)

The northern cities are swept away by Brasidas' rhetoric of liberty and moderate behaviour. His ability to say and do the right thing has a devastating impact on the Athenians' alliances. In stark contrast to the Athenians' interstate relations, Brasidas is able to use promises as well as threats. Peter Krentz remarks wryly that 'after Brasidas threatened to destroy their grapes the Acanthians opted to believe his sweet talk about liberation from the Athenians'.[17] This does express the Acanthians' predicament, but it is worth observing that Brasidas did at least offer them some sweet talk, though he certainly did not have to. Like other Thucydidean speechmakers, Brasidas cites the pull of violent necessity (Thuc. 4.87.3). But unlike so many others, he couples necessity with a more attractive alternative. Brasidas avoids backing potential allies into a corner, offering a way to assist him without losing face. He presents a striking contrast to other Spartan commanders in his diplomatic skill and ability to inspire confidence.[18] So effective was his diplomacy that after his death, the people of Melos would use 'allies Brasidas has not got to', as an expression meaning 'allies that have not revolted from Athens'

(Thuc. 5.110.2), while at Athens, kinship or common understanding with Brasidas could be used as a humorous synonym for laconising (Ar. *Peace* 282–4; 640; *Wasps* 475).

In this section, Thucydides uses a wealth of positive value terms in relation to Brasidas: 'Just and moderate' (δίκαιος καὶ μέτριος) are unambiguously positive, as are 'excellence and tact' (ἀρετή καὶ ξύνεσις) and 'all-round goodness' (πάντα ἀγαθὸς) (Thuc. 4.81.2–3).[19] There are repeat references to Brasidas' 'moderate' (μέτριος) behaviour, and even to his 'mildness' (πραότης). Jacqueline de Romilly has demonstrated the thematic importance which 'reasonableness' (ἐπιείκεια) has throughout the *History* as a vital component of constructive interstate relations. Brasidas is the only figure whose demonstration of ἐπιείκεια is such that he is called 'mild', a demonstration which, as de Romilly puts it, 'proved wise and profitable'.[20] These references to moderate behaviour have so far referred to factors such as avoiding massacres and offering potential allies equal rights. These factors are combined with conspicuous acts of religious practice. Thucydides associates Brasidas with religion to an extent that is unusual in his work, and Brasidas' demonstrations of religiosity should also be regarded as part of what made him appear so trustworthy to the citizens of the northern cities.

THE RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY OF BRASIDAS

Brasidas' first association with religion came in the speech we saw in the Acanthian assembly. In narrative terms, this places it after the Delium campaign has been outlined but before its execution. Brasidas alludes twice to oaths binding the Spartans to respect the autonomy of the cities they separate from Athens. Coming at this stage in the war, when the Corcyran *stasis* has demonstrated the corruption the war has wrought upon language, this open allusion to the power of the oath seems curiously old-fashioned. Thucydides gives us a Brasidas who presents himself as a man who expects traditional religious practice to be recognised and valued. This is an attractive archaism in a world of decaying standards.[21]

In the same speech, Brasidas confronts the Acanthians with what will happen if they reject his proposals:

> I shall call upon the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came here to do good to you and could not convince you of it. I shall

> then ravage your land to persuade you; and will not consider this to be anything unjust. (Thuc. 4.87.2–3)[22]

Brasidas boldly claims the moral high-ground, asserting divine agreement with his point of view. His reference to the local aspect of these deities is striking in its direct attack upon any hope that the Acanthians may have had of divine protection particular to them. In his allusion to the gods' legitimisation of his aggression, Brasidas almost prefigures the Athenians' stance at Delium, but not so, for Brasidas does not speak from inside a sanctuary he has polluted, but from within an assembly room and without pollution. This crucial difference reduces the element of hypocrisy that so undermines the Athenians' rhetoric. Mention of 'the gods and heroes' also extends the extent to which religion permeates his frame of reference, a factor which makes Brasidas an unusual figure amongst Thucydidean characters. His religion-infused rhetoric provides an interesting demonstration of Brasidas' ability to combine a degree of energy that is atypical in a Spartan, with more traditional Greek values.[23] The Acanthians are won over. However sincere Brasidas was or was not, Thucydides demonstrates that Brasidas' references to oaths and divine approval are part of what makes him a convincing speaker and an effective *strategos*.

After Acanthus comes Torone, a campaign-narrative book-ended by religious references. The account begins with Brasidas halting his army at 'a sanctuary of the Dioscouri, rather more than a quarter of a mile from the city' (Thuc. 4.110). Plenty of practical reasons may have induced Brasidas to stop here, such as water and an enclosed space for camping; and Thucydides had a practical reason for mentioning it as it provides a prominent landmark. Nonetheless, the detail that the sanctuary was dedicated to the Dioscouri suggests that more is going on here. The Dioscouri had a pronounced association with Sparta. It is possible that Brasidas chose the site in order to capitalise on the connection, offering his troops, far from home, an encounter with friendly deities. More significantly, we learn that Brasidas met pro-Spartan Toronians at the sanctuary. A site of shared cult interest would have been an appropriate place to meet before beginning a risky joint venture, especially as the Dioscouri 'acted as the protectors of vows of friendship, of hospitality and of oath-taking'.[24] This was an ideal site for a joint sacrifice to seal the deal.[25] By providing details about the meeting-point, Thucydides implies

that Brasidas and the collaborators were drawing on the symbolic significance of the site to reassure each other of their reliability.

The city was taken just before dawn, with most of the citizens in a state of confusion. Of some 50 Athenian hoplites:

> A few of them were killed in fighting, the rest of them escaped, some by land, some by ship, two of which were patrolling there, and took refuge in a fort called Lecythus, a fortified post which they had taken over and held. It is at the extremity of the city, sticking out into the sea on a narrow isthmus. And the people of Torone who were friendly with the Athenians also took refuge there. (Thuc. 4.113.2–3)

Brasidas offers characteristically moderate terms:

> He sent a herald to the Athenians asking them to evacuate Lecythus – under a truce and with their possessions – since it was Chalcidian territory. They refused to leave the place, but asked for a truce of one day to collect their dead. (Thuc. 4.114)

Brasidas acts with full regard for Greek custom in granting a truce of twice the length requested for the collection of the dead.[26] These references to heralds and corpses connect the episode to the contrasting events at Delium. Brasidas then offers civic rights without reprisals to the Toronians and the rest are offered attractive inducements to revolt from Athens voluntarily. Religion then comes to the fore as the narrative reaches its climax.

The Delium campaign echoes again with reference to a primitive siege-engine that is available for breaching the walls of Lecythus (Thuc. 4.115). The Boeotians had just used a similar one to blast their way into the sanctuary, here the engine goes unused.[27] The house the Athenians are defending from collapses, causing them to panic and flee to their ships. When Brasidas perceives this, he leads an assault and kills those remaining. Thucydides dislocates the narrative order to add:

> Brasidas (as there is a temple of Athena in Lecythus, and as he had chanced to proclaim – when he was about to attack – that he would give 30 *minae* in silver to the one who first scaled the wall), thinking that the capture was due to other than human means, gave the 30 *minae* to the goddess for her temple and as well as dismantling Lecythus and clearing the ground, he gave it all over to be a *temenos*. (Thuc. 4.116)[28]

This is not how Thucydidean battle narratives normally end. As Simon Hornblower puts it, 'Brasidas prompts Th. to make some (for him)

uncharacteristically full remarks of a religious sort.'[29] Brasidas' interpretation of the events essentially amounts to an epiphany, a thing unique in Thucydides.[30] It was not so very uncommon that after succeeding in a difficult task, people should believe they had received divine assistance; but it is certainly unique for Thucydides to report such a belief. Almost as unusual is the detailed account of Brasidas' response: his redirection of the reward and the dedication of land to the sanctuary. The dedications are remarkable, but Thucydides' notice of them is even more so.

The dedication, 30 *minae*, half a talent, was considerable.[31] The announcement that the goddess had earned it declared her participation in the change of affiliation and had the potential to enhance support amongst the locals.[32] Thucydides is not explicit about the response to the dedications, but we may easily imagine how they would please the Toronian collaborators and at least reassure those who were nervously waiting to see if he would keep his word about reprisals. Brasidas was obliged to control the city as soon as possible to enable him to continue dominating the area. His method of gaining control was not intimidating violence but a pious gesture enriching the goddess and the community. His dedications demonstrated that he could act as he promised he would, as a friend to the city (Thuc. 4.114); this was timely use of religion in a city that had been won over partly by persuasion, but mostly by force.

While dedicating Lecythus to Athena was a religious act, as the land was only 'a bare 100 yards away' from Torone, turning it over to the sanctuary was a practical way to limit risk.[33] Brasidas had the houses and fortifications demolished and cleared away, making the peninsula much more exposed. Should the Athenians attempt to re-take the city from the sea (which they did, at 5.2–3), there would be no buildings to use as a base. By clearing the land, Brasidas removed a strategic weakness, even as its dedication offered a demonstration of piety. But propaganda and strategic advantage are not incompatible with genuine religious feeling.[34] The most remarkable aspect of the Torone narrative is not that Brasidas combined religious and strategic advantages, but that Thucydides reports his actions from a religious perspective. Cautioning against cynicism, J.G. Howie comments:

> A modern reader might be forgiven for at first thinking that both the interpretation and the dedication were opportunistic propaganda,

> but our author presents the interpretation as Brasidas' real opinion (νομίσας).[35]

A feigned claim to an epiphany would be incompatible with sincere religiosity, and as such, Howie's notice of the term νομίσας is particularly insightful. It does indeed suggest that belief in the epiphany was Brasidas' 'real opinion', not just a stated opinion. Quite typically, Thucydides' own opinion of the 'more than human' aid is 'inscrutable',[36] but Brasidas' subsequent actions are explained in terms of his internal interpretation of the events. After examining Thucydides' use of participles to express motivation, Mabel Lang remarks that he had 'neither a historian's intimate knowledge of individual's mind-sets and motives nor a closely reasoned interpretation of actions but rather a narrative technique which links actions and actors chainwise'.[37] This is a cautionary reminder that Thucydides required links to move his narrative along cohesively, and yet, in this instance, narrative causation does not sufficiently explain Thucydides' choice of word. It was a particular choice to render this in the direct form: 'Brasidas, thinking that …', 'Brasidas *said* that he thought …' or 'Brasidas, having said that …' would still have provided a causal chain of events leading to the dedications without citing (and therefore validating) Brasidas' belief in his religious experience.[38] It is not as if Thucydides would never represent Brasidas being misleading, as his 'seductive but untrue' claims about Nisaea demonstrate (Thuc. 4.108, with 4.73 and 4.85).

And so, unusually, the Torone campaign opens and closes with reference to religious practice: beginning at a philolaconian shrine and ending with Brasidas' epiphany and dedications. The campaign is certainly associated with religion to an extent that is unusual in the *History*. Nonetheless, the Thucydidean Brasidas is not said or shown to be successful *because* he is pious and the gods reward him, but because he is a charismatic leader who can elicit the responses he requires by combining limited violence with promises of political liberty and demonstrations of respectful piety. He uses interaction with sacred space as an effective tool with which to demonstrate goodwill and emphasise shared religious and cultural values. This is expert people management: moderate, reassuring and re-enforcing the bonds of traditional Greek culture. Thucydides refers to religion repeatedly in his depiction of Brasidas, revealing the impact his religiosity had. Earlier (Chapter 1, 'Military Leaders

on the Acropolis'), we saw that Lysander made dedication after capturing Athens that was similar to Brasidas' at Torone, and that Xenophon declined to mention it. Here we have a reversal of expectation, with Thucydides the one to describe a religious action. Xenophon apparently wished to down-play the suggestion of Lysander's piety; here Thucydides foregrounds Brasidas', and we understand it as part of his success in securing the region.

In a follow-up account of the cession of Scione, there are quasi-religious connotations to the treatment Brasidas receives. The city crowns him as a liberator, and 'in addition, many people showed their personal admiration by putting ribbons round his head and going up to greet him as if he were an athlete', 'ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐταινίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ' (Thuc. 4.121).[39] The Spartan's reputation preceded him and the Scionians are more than happy to put their trust in him and the prospect of freedom from Athens. With this quasi-religious depiction, Thucydides seems to be preparing for Brasidas' eventual heroisation at Amphipolis.

Brasidas' association with religion continues. At the second battle for Amphipolis the notion of religion as demonstration arises once again:

> News was brought to Cleon that he [Brasidas] had come down from Cerdylium into the city. From outside they could see him, sacrificing at the temple of Athena and carrying out these matters. It was reported (for [Cleon] had gone forward for reconnaissance) that the whole of the enemy army could be seen inside the city and that the feet of many horses and people were visible under the gate, as if they were about to come out. (Thuc. 5.10.2–3)

This passage has been translated quite literally in order to bring out the manner in which Thucydides moves between Brasidas and Cleon. This reinforces the comparison of the two men that Thucydides had already established through the thoughts of the Athenian soldiers. Cleon had undertaken this reconnaissance mission to quieten his disgruntled troops, who were comparing their leaders, 'contrasting the skill and daring of the enemy's leader with the incompetence and cowardliness of their own, whom, they remembered, they had been unwilling to follow from the beginning' (Thuc. 5.7.1–2).[40] Throughout the whole encounter there is a great deal of focus on visibility: seeing, being seen, and the interpretation of what is seen are all crucial.[41] Brasidas' conspicuous sacrifice at the temple of Athena

should be interpreted within this vision-focused context. Thucydides makes it clear that people on both sides of the conflict were able to *see* Brasidas sacrificing. This sacrifice is not an urgent pre-battle *sphagia*, a blood-offering before a major blood-letting.[42] This is a θυσία, a formal sacrifice from which meat may be taken. This might seem like a strange activity for a *strategos* close to engagement, but it recalls Xenophon's comments about the inspiring sight of the army worshipping and training at Ephesus (Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.18). For the Peloponnesians, seeing Brasidas carrying out religious as well as military functions would be a fine sight, perfect for maintaining good morale.[43] And those other recipients of this spectacle, the Athenians, would perhaps be as disconcerted by the sight of Brasidas sacrificing leisurely as they were by the sight of the feet beneath the gates. It seems likely that Brasidas chose the site of his sacrifice precisely because it was visible to the Athenians. Gomme suggests that Brasidas sacrificed 'in a conspicuous part of the city, so that he might be seen by Kleon from the hill to the east'.[44] Similarly, Woodhead talks of Brasidas 'sacrificing ostentatiously as if unconcerned'.[45] The Amphipolitans were now firmly committed to revolt from Athens; they had no need to feel threatened by Brasidas' use of their sacred space. For the Athenians, the sight of Brasidas sacrificing in Amphipolis was not just a revelation of his presence, confidence, and piety, but also of his secure position within Amphipolis. This was a provocative reminder that this once-Athenian colony was his to access now they were the outsiders. On multiple occasions Thucydides demonstrated Brasidas' ability to produce in others the responses he requires. The visibility of Brasidas' sacrifice is no accident but a carefully stage-managed demonstration eliciting different responses from different parties. Cleon, by contrast, is never depicted sacrificing. In reality he must have done so, but Thucydides never shows the Athenians experiencing the encouraging sight of *their strategos* propitiating the gods, and he inspires no confidence in them.

The impact of sacrifice upon its witnesses is central to the majority of the few other references to sacrifice that appear in the *History*. Amongst these few references to the act, sacrifice is used to confirm the special status of the Plataeans after the Persian Wars, encourage troops before they fight victoriously, validate the returns of an exiled king, constitute part of the Panhellenic peace, justify the

abandonment of a controversial campaign, and mark the beginning of Persian intervention.[46] As with Brasidas' sacrifice, the public nature of these sacrifices gives them a significance that goes beyond the primary meaning of the act. These sacrifices function as a means of communication between the parties that witness or enable them, and they provide Thucydides with a means of conveying those relationships too.

The use of sacrifice as a means to express its impact on those who witness it is in keeping with Thucydides' recurring exploration of religion as a force of social cohesion.[47] Brasidas does not win *because* he sacrifices, but his public sacrifice is a sign of his effectiveness as a leader and a diplomat. Thucydides' readership is not immune from this display either. Just as much as those within the narrative are affected by the performance, Thucydides' readers are exposed to this further characterisation of Brasidas as a man of religion shortly before his final battle.

After receiving news of his victory at Amphipolis, Brasidas died of his wounds. The people of the city conferred extraordinary honours upon him, Thucydides provides a detailed account:[48]

> The rest of the army returned from the pursuit with Clearidas, stripped the corpses and set up a trophy. After this, all the allied troops paraded with their weapons for the funeral of Brasidas, which took place at the public expense in front of what is now the agora. The Amphipolitans enclosed an area round his tomb, and still they cut the throats of victims (ἐντέμνουσι) to him as to a hero and have instituted games and yearly sacrifices in his honour. And they named him their *oikist* and dedicated their colony to him, demolishing Hagnon's cult buildings and obliterating any other solid reminders of his foundation, considering that it was Brasidas who had been their saviour, and because in the circumstances their fear of Athens made them flatter their Lacedaemonian allies. For Hagnon to have honours, when they were at war with the Athenians, seemed unprofitable and displeasing. They also returned the corpses to the Athenians. (Thuc. 5.10.12–5.11.2)

As Brasidas was not the actual *oikist* of Amphipolis, the honours he was awarded are remarkable.[49] The efforts to found the city made by the original *oikist*, Hagnon, had been described earlier (Thuc. 4.102); this was the man whom Brasidas replaced.[50] Brasidas had been entombed in public space as a hero; he would receive the honours – the contests and sacrifices – that had formerly been paid to Hagnon. He became the

city's 'sacred embodiment of its collective "personality"' and his memory was celebrated there for generations.[51] Few people ever received such recognition, especially without going through the normal endeavours associated with establishing a colony.

An *oikist* would normally provide a bridge between the mother-city and the colony. Following their death, the community would retain some connection with the mother-city, but there would also be a sense that the new city was 'on its own'. This process had been confused in Amphipolis by the overwhelming power of the mother-city, imperial Athens, and by the existence of a still-living, yet absent, *oikist*, Hagnon.[52] Irad Malkin suggests that the Amphipolitans, many of whom were non-Athenian, would have been offended by Hagnon's absence and assumption of cult honours. As a result, they 'turned against Hagnoneia in anger', once they had the opportunity.[53] With Hagnon alive, the Amphipolitans may have felt that they were still in a state of transition, free to choose whomever they wanted as their figure-head. Brasidas represented an ideal alternative. In death, the *oikist* fulfilled a symbolic and protective role, a function that was advertised by their prominent burial.[54] When the Athenians had returned, looking to capture Amphipolis by force, Brasidas provided leadership and protection, the very qualities expected of an *oikist*. The causal term explaining their decision to heroise Brasidas is 'νομίσαντες' – 'thinking that he was their saviour, 'σωτήρ'. The Amphipolitans' desire to honour Brasidas is represented as stemming from a genuine belief that he had saved them.[55] Brasidas had lost his life in the course of this action and this must also have validated his suitability. Brasidas had protected them and, being dead, he presented a more normal *oikist* than the living Hagnon. Amphipolis, as a community with a present though dead *oikist*, was now able to move on independently, free from the overbearing influence of either mother-city. All these factors made Brasidas an attractive alternative to Hagnon.

The extraordinary treatment that Brasidas received after death confirms the extent to which he won the community over, and its coverage by Thucydides is consistent with the attention paid throughout the *History* to the response he elicited from those with whom he interacted. Hornblower suggests that the unique characterisation of Brasidas is intended to establish him as genuinely superhuman.[56] If Brasidas had a heroic quality even before his death, this

would explain Thucydides' career-destroying defeat. But there is more than *apologia* at work. This is the extreme point of a contrast that has been established at length. The manner in which Brasidas encouraged confidence could not be more different from the Athenians' behaviour in Boeotia. The extensive treatment of Delium and its dovetailing with the northern expedition exposes the Athenians' waste of resources, which were expended an ignoble campaign in Boeotia instead of usefully deployed in Thrace.[57] And beyond mitigating Thucydides' failure in Amphipolis, the narrative arrangement invites a meaningful contrast between the nature of the Athenians' activities in Delium and Brasidas' in the north. While Thucydides employed the motifs of heralds, corpses, and the treatment of sacred space to express the extremity of the collapse in values that took place during the siege at Delium, the same themes and motifs appear in the Thracian campaign, creating an opposite effect and resulting in an actual heroisation.

We have seen that throughout the *History*, Thucydides developed his readers' awareness of the correlation between the perception of actions by the wars' major players and the responses of its minor ones. In that regard, the Athenians did a terrible job soliciting support in Boeotia. Their uncongenial behaviour, where they wanted to win over the local population, could not be more different to the behaviour Brasidas was exhibiting simultaneously in Thrace. The Athenians are shown to be anxious about the contrasting impression each side is making on the allies (Thuc. 4.108), and there is no more talk of democracy in Boeotia in the rest of the *History*. When Athens' defeat eventually ended the war, the Boeotians' hostility proved only too well how the Athenians had made potential friends into enemies (Xen. *Hell*. 2.2.19). In depicting Brasidas' campaign, meanwhile, Thucydides demonstrates that by treating others with moderation and justice, and by treating non-Lacedaemonian sacred sites with respect, Brasidas reinforced his reputation for good character and reliability, which enabled him to secure support and successfully pursue his goals, enhancing his military effectiveness. As a consequence of the contrast with Athens, Brasidas' characteristic virtue is shown to be by far the more effective and desirable approach to warfare.

But Thucydides never lets us have things too easy. Despite Brasidas' respectful treatment of sacred sites and his restrained behaviour towards defeated peoples, many have perceived in

Thucydides' narrative an implied criticism of his northern campaign.[58] There is certainly something chilling in the realisation of the terrible fate that awaited so many of the people who trusted him. Thucydides' use of prolepsis means that the whole Thracian campaign is read in the knowledge that while Brasidas earned people's trust, his success secured a number of cities that would be returned to the Athenians once peace negotiations started (Thuc. 4.81).[59] If the oaths guaranteeing autonomy ever were taken, they were broken when the Spartans sent forth governors (Thuc. 4.132). This was done against Spartan custom, '*paranomos*', a word conveying moral criticism, used on only two other occasions in the *History*.[60] Acanthus escaped destruction, but the other cities were devastated when the Spartans either gave or lost them to the Athenians, with Mende (Thuc. 4.130), Torone (5.3), and Scione (5.32) experiencing mass executions and enslavements.[61] While Brasidas' treatment of sacred space was more pious and diplomatically effective than that of the Athenians, the outcomes of Brasidas' career are open to the inference that even good qualities can be corrupted by war and misapplied with negative consequences.

AGESILAUS AND THE SANCTUARY OF ARTEMIS

In idealising passages about the campaign in Asia, Xenophon showed how adept Agesilaus could be in earning a good reputation through the piety of oath-keeping, and how important that was to his military success (Xen. *Ages*. 1.10–113; 2.2–5). Before leaving for Asia, however, a misjudged use of a Boeotian sanctuary had damaged his reputation and Sparta's diplomatic standing. This section will look at the dynamics of that encounter and its fall-out as presented by authors with different priorities, and at a follow-up event that damaged Sparta's reputation further, with monumental consequences.

In 396, Agesilaus was poised to embark for Asia Minor, with the bold intention of liberating the Ionian Greeks. He sacrificed before leaving and again at the border of Laconia, then went on to gather troops from the allies. Pre-campaign sacrifices were the norm, and the frontier sacrifice, τὰ διαβατήρια, was a standard feature of Spartan life (Xen. *Lac.Pol*. 13.2–5). But while his allies gathered, Agesilaus went further north into Boeotia to perform less routine sacrifice. Xenophon explains Agesilaus' motivation:

> [Agesilaus] wished to go and sacrifice in Aulis, the place where Agamemnon had sacrificed before he sailed to Troy. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3)

All accounts of agree that the sacrifice was motivated by a desire to imitate Agamemnon, leader of the ultimate Greek campaign against Asia. This grandiose intention signals the high hopes the Spartans held about the campaign, and perhaps about their growing hegemony in mainland Greece. But despite the grand vision, the sacrifice was spoiled:

> The Boeotarchs, learning that he was sacrificing, sent horsemen to tell him not to sacrifice, and the victims, already sacrificed, they swept from the altar. Furious and calling the gods to witness, Agesilaus embarked on his trireme and sailed away (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3)[62]

Typically, Xenophon offers no explicit appraisal of the episode, yet we can tell that he was critical of the Boeotians' actions because the episode is recalled later on in the *Hellenica* with Theban Pelopidas offering it as an example of Boeotia's loyalty to Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.34). From Xenophon, veteran of the Ten Thousand, this is hostile rhetoric.[63] Xenophon also has Pelopidas minimising the physical intervention in the sacrifice (the riders prevent the sacrifice rather than spoiling it). This indicates that this was also an aspect that Xenophon felt they should be ashamed of.

This is how the incident appears in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, but, much like the events at the sanctuary of Hera, it is absent from Xenophon's *Agesilaus* encomium. Encomium deals in conventional praise with supporting anecdotes, so it is not surprising that the full story is not depicted. But did Xenophon omit it because Agesilaus was shamed by the Boeotians' insult or because he regarded Agesilaus as being at fault?

Scholars have demonstrated that the *Hellenica* was written in a manner that expresses Xenophon's disappointment about the Asian campaign and about Spartan imperial policy in general.[64] The Aulis story appears to be included partly because the king's desecrated sacrifice was an ominous beginning to a disappointing campaign and partly because of its serious consequences later on. Such an ominous omen would be out of place in the encomium as the start of a campaign that is presented as a brilliant success.[65] However, this does not fully explain why Xenophon did not include an edited version, featuring the sacrifice but not the interruption. Furthermore, Frances

Pownall notes that Aulis is one of very few instances where conspicuous wrongdoing (the Boeotian treatment of the sacrifice) is not punished.[66] These factors suggest that while Xenophon regarded the Boeotians as having reacted badly, Agesilaus too was at fault.

Xenophon's suppression of Aulis in the encomium and his representation of it in the *Hellenica* indicate a disapproval of the king's behaviour as 'improperly ambitious'.[67] It was also extremely undiplomatic. Boeotian politics was in a state of flux.[68] Relations between Sparta and Boeotia were increasingly tense. They were ostensibly still allies, but Boeotia had begun demonstrating independence, most recently by refusing troops for the Asia campaign (Xen. *Hell*. 3.5.5; Paus. 3.9.3).[69] As some Boeotians favoured ties with Sparta and others were without specific political alignment, those keen to create distance from Sparta were obliged to move cautiously.[70] Fundamentally, Boeotia was not sufficiently decided upon war against Sparta. A hostile act from Sparta might unite anti-Laconian feeling, but until then, those urging conflict had to make do with provoking Sparta. Religious situations were an ideal opportunity for this, especially if 'the "official" version portrayed Sparta as the aggressor'.[71] This made it a dangerous time to be sacrificing in a Boeotian sanctuary without seeking approval from Thebes.

The Boeotians were not always so sensitive about the presence of non-Boeotians in their sanctuaries: 'Several Boeotian sanctuaries were regularly frequented by non-Boeotians: Amphiaraus at Oropus, Trophonius and Zeus at Lebadea, Apollo at the Ptoion, the Muses at the foot of Helicon.'[72] But non-Boeotians had no automatic right to sacrifice there and Agesilaus was not an everyday passing *xenos*. A probably apocryphal story demonstrates the correct procedure for political heavy-weights: Leonidas requested and obtained permission to sleep in the temple of Heracles while taking his army to Thermopylae (Plut. *De Herod*. 31; *Mor*. 865e). By contrast, we have seen that Dercylidas and Brasidas' sacrifices in cities outside Laconia represented a statement of political change, while the story of Cleomenes' sacrifice in the Heraeum expressed his despotic disregard for boundaries. Although he had no one whipped, Agesilaus' surprise appearance in the sanctuary could be interpreted as a disregard for Boeotian sovereignty that would not have been welcome amongst the increasingly anti-Spartan element of Boeotian society nor even amongst more ambivalent

Boeotians. His presumption was made more egregious by the nature of this particular sacrifice. The imitation of Agamemnon communicated a claim to an Agamemnon-like hegemony over the Greeks that will have been met with consternation by those who viewed Sparta's growing power apprehensively.[73] In this context, Agesilaus' assumed right to sacrifice was provocative in a volatile situation. A more cautious diplomat would have resisted pushing his wavering allies so far.

Xenophon's *Hellenica* indicates that the events at the sanctuary fuelled the tension between Boeotia and Sparta in the short-term and that the impact remained serious in the long-term. The visit gave the Boeotians an opportunity to slight Sparta. The *Hellenica* goes on to show that Agesilaus' anger towards Thebes festered, affecting his decision-making and foreign policy.[74] This emotional rather than reasoned response to the events incriminates Agesilaus just as much as his initial provocation did. The insult to Sparta is cited as part of Sparta's motive for going to war, and not as a pretext, but as an equally contributing factor (Xen. *Hell*. 3.5.5).[75] Rivalry with Thebes eventually lost Sparta its long-held supremacy. By presenting the events at Aulis and Agesilaus' response to them, Xenophon indicates Agesilaus' partial responsibility for the ultimate calamity that befell the Spartans. Xenophon does not depict Agesilaus doing anything wrong at Aulis in a ritual sense, but the seriousness of his errors of judgement in his use of another community's sacred space makes the incident unsuitable for the encomium and deeply compromising in the context of the *Hellenica*.

The episode need not have been focused on in such detail. Diodorus reports simply that '[Agesilaus] transported the force from Aulis' (Diod. Sic. 14.79.2).[76] Such brevity reveals by contrast how careful Xenophon was to explore the significance of the episode. Xenophon presents a largely Lacedaemonian perspective of events, critical of the Boeotians as well as the king. Through Plutarch, we can see matters from a more Boeotian-friendly perspective, almost certainly drawing on local traditions.[77] This account is more incriminating still, in terms of both Agesilaus' ritual irregularity and arrogance, and for the impact on his reputation and Sparta's standing.[78] The survival of this variant tradition is another example of how competing interpretations of events circulated. The episode unfolds as follows:

> He had a hind wreathed and ordered his own *mantis* to begin the sacrifice, instead of the one normally appointed by the Boeotians to do this. Hearing of this, the Boeotarchs were moved to anger and sent their assistants, forbidding Agesilaus to sacrifice contrary to the laws and ancestral customs of the Boeotians. Having delivered their message, they also swept the thigh-pieces from the altar. And so Agesilaus sailed away with great anger; he was enraged at the Thebans, and full of ill-boding on account of the omen. He was convinced that his undertakings would be incomplete and that his expedition would have no fitting outcome. (Plut. *Ages*. 6.5–6)[79]

While the gist of the accounts is the same, Plutarch does not state that the sacrifice was completed and he is explicit, where Xenophon only implied, that the desecration of the sacrifice posed an ill omen. Further differences appear in the degree of Agesilaus' culpability. Donald Shipley notes the central difference between the two accounts:

> Plutarch, a Boiotian and a priest of Delphi, would be sensitive about the violation of the territory and the sanctity of the shrine, and he stresses the Boiotarch's concern for local customs, omitted by Xenophon.[80]

Plutarch is explicit that Agesilaus had his own *mantis* carry out the sacrifice, not a local one. In this account, it is precisely the use of a non-Boeotian priest that causes the Boeotarchs' reaction.[81] In Xenophon they react to prevent Agesilaus sacrificing at all, but in Plutarch they react to the news that he is sacrificing in an irregular manner. The significance of the outsider *mantis* is reinforced by the additional reference to Agesilaus sacrificing 'contrary to the laws and customs of the Boeotians'. The Plutarchan version therefore 'puts him in the wrong and virtually justifies the Boeotarchs in spoiling his sacrifice'.[82] Those who have examined the situation from a political standpoint have given little weight to the Theban complaints of impiety, seeing it as a purely political resistance.[83] But the detail of rituals mattered. It is understandable that Agesilaus would have wanted his own man to perform the sacrifice, but as the sanctuary was not his, it was not his choice to make. Agesilaus' affront, both politically and religiously, lies in him treating the sanctuary as if it was Lacedaemonian. Perhaps the key point is that Plutarch chose to represent the Boeotians' complaint as legitimate. His reference to 'the one who is normally appointed by the Boeotians' (Plut. *Ages*. 6.5) emphasises the irregularity and stresses that alternatives were available. Had Agesilaus tried to be considerate, he would have

called on a *proxenos* or whoever else the sanctuary suggested.[84] We have seen that when sanctuaries changed hands, the new authority determined how they would be run and this change would not necessarily be regarded as impiety. But as Aulis was a Boeotian sanctuary, sacrificing without the right intermediary might indeed be 'contrary to the laws and ancestral customs'. While this might not be classed as a dreadful impiety, it was not the act of an ally. This provocation contributes to the theme of the danger of excessive self-assertion which Plutarch has already established.

For Plutarch, the incident at Aulis helped to characterise Agesilaus as an ambitious and contentious individual and his behaviour is shown to have grave consequences. Agesilaus develops, as Hillman puts it, 'a consuming, lifelong hatred that, as Plutarch repeatedly emphasises, brings out the worst, most excessive aspects of his φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία [his love of honour and love of victory]'.[85] Although the seriousness of the long-term outcome is not immediately apparent, Plutarch's Agesilaus, like Xenophon's, allows his anger against Thebes to fester and affect his judgement (esp. Plut. *Ages*. 22.1 and 26.3). By making Agesilaus more culpable for Aulis than Xenophon did, and by focusing on his hostility to Thebes, Plutarch gives Agesilaus greater responsibility for the subsequent wars and, ultimately, for Sparta's downfall. Plutarch did not blindly follow the traditions he worked with. In Plutarch's *Lysander*, Agesilaus plunges Greece into war, but some blame Lysander and others blame the Thebans for angering Agesilaus at Aulis (Plut. *Lys*. 27). Aulis remains important, but where Agesilaus' character is not the subject he is held less responsible for the aftermath. The *Agesilaus* used a hostile interpretation of the episode to demonstrate how an unchecked character-fault led to an intrusion into a sacred space and an over-reaction to being ejected, with serious consequences for the states involved. The different loyalties of Plutarch and Xenophon and the different genres in which they wrote led them to deal with the events at Aulis in different ways, but they both demonstrate how sensitive the issue of sacrifice by outsider *strategoi* was, with implications for society at large.

THE SEIZURE OF THE THEBAN ACROPOLIS

While Xenophon and Plutarch both imply criticism of Agesilaus for the damage caused to diplomatic relations with Thebes by his visit to

the sanctuary of Artemis, the incident that draws the most explicit condemnation from both of them is his support for the seizure of the Theban acropolis, the Cadmea.

The seizure took place in 382, after the King's Peace had determined that all Greek cities would be autonomous. The Spartan general Phoebidas took the city by subterfuge during the Thesmophoria. Despite calls for his execution, Agesilaus saw to it that Phoebidas was only fined. More controversially, Sparta refused to restore Theban independence, retaining control of the city until the revolt of 379. Agesilaus' acquiescence in this matter is the act for which he receives the most explicit criticism. The degree to which he is held personally responsible varies in a familiar pattern, but all who allude to the event do so with disapprobation that goes beyond that expressed regarding the other controversial episodes that he was involved in.

Xenophon's criticism of Sparta's actions is strikingly explicit. At the start of his account of the Theban revolt, he includes a narrator intervention which interprets the subsequent Spartan disaster at Leuctra:

> It is possible to talk of many other things, among both Greeks and barbarians, which prove that the gods do not fail to take notice of the irreligious or of those who do unholy things. But now I will talk of what is before me. For the Lacedaemonians, who had sworn to leave the *poleis* autonomous, after seizing the acropolis at Thebes were punished by those alone whom they had treated unjustly, when before that they had never been conquered by any people at all. (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1)[86]

The vehemence of this criticism is unparalleled in the *Hellenica*, and the set-back Sparta suffered is implied to be divinely orchestrated retribution carried out through the appropriate human agents.[87] The retention of the Cadmea expressed much that Xenophon had considered wrong with the Spartan approach to empire.[88] The encomium is typically silent on the seizure of Thebes and the trial of Phoebidas, but as the consequences of the occupation determined the rest of Agesilaus' life it would have been conspicuous to omit them entirely. As so little of the episode was praiseworthy, Xenophon focuses on the loyalty the king demonstrated towards his pro-Spartan Theban friends when he invaded Boeotia to restore them. Xenophon acknowledges that 'some may reproach' these expeditions, a phenomenal understatement, 'but', he adds, 'it is obvious that they

were prompted by comradeship' (Xen. *Ages*. 2.21–2). Even this qualified admission of censure is strikingly rare in encomium, and the episode can only be admitted with its most fundamental elements omitted.

Plutarch's criticism of the seizure is clear:

> For when Phoebidas committed the terrible (δεινὸν) act of seizing the Cadmea in a time of truce and peace, and all the Greeks were discontented and the Spartans angry, and especially when those who were at variance with Agesilaus were furiously asking Phoebidas who had ordered him to do this deed, thereby turning suspicion upon him, he did not scruple to help Phoebidas and to say openly that they must examine whether the act itself was profitable or not. For what was useful for Lacedaemonia might well be done independently, even if no one ordered it. In conversation he was always declaring that justice was the first of all virtues . . . But in his actions he no longer upheld this idea, but was often carried away by love of honour and love of victory (φιλοτιμίᾳ καὶ τῇ φιλονικίᾳ), and particularly towards the Thebans.
>
> (Plut. *Ages*. 23.3–6)

The *Pelopidas* cites Sparta's false show of good will and jealousy of Thebes as the cause of the seizure (Plut. *Pel*. 5), and provides a long and glowing narrative of the retake (*Pel*. 6–13). The reader is reminded of Agesilaus' role via a rebuke given by a Spartan that he had taught the Thebans to fight (*Pel*. 15), and a discussion of the Aulis episode (*Pel*. 21.1–2). But the 'real' reason for the victory at Leuctra is the young Thebans' shame at disgrace and their noble cause (*Pel*. 17). When Plutarch weighs up Agesilaus and Pompey's virtues and vices in the *syncrisis*, the controversies at the sanctuaries of Hera and Artemis go unmentioned; it is Agesilaus' immoral adoption of the crown and his support for Phoebidas who 'broke the peace with Thebes' that receive explicit criticism (Plut. *Ages.-Pomp*. *sync*. 1.2 and 1.4).

While the incident at Aulis, for example, was a one-off, temporary infraction of Boeotian authority, the seizure of the Theban acropolis was on a different scale. We have seen that in wars and conquests, territory and cities changed hands, including cults, *acropoleis*, and populations. The events at Thebes caused outrage because it was not a straightforward military conquest, nor even a normal seizure by subterfuge. The seizure was easy because Theban independence had been guaranteed by the oaths sworn to bind the King's Peace. This was a contract between the cities involved and the gods that

oversaw it.[89] As blatant oath-breaking it contravened a civic arrangement that was enshrined within a religious framework. This is the aspect that draws censure, from Xenophon and Plutarch. Diodorus, who expressed no interest in the morality of events at Peiraeum and Aulis, draws attention to the contravention of oaths in the taking of the Cadmea (Diod. Sic. bk.15 contents, 15.19.1).[90] Just, peaceful, and wise Agesipolis says Sparta should abide by its oaths and not enslave Greeks, but active, war-loving Agesilaus wants dominance (Diod. Sic. 15.19.4). In the *prooemia*, Diodorus explicitly promises to explain how the Spartans won their empire by acting 'properly and humanely' (ἐπιεικῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπος), and threw it away by acting 'roughly and harshly' (βιαίως καὶ χαλεπῶς) losing 500 years of supremacy and receiving the contempt of their allies (Diod. Sic. 15.1.3). In the course of the narrative, he adds that the Lacedaemonians were 'discredited in the eyes of the Greeks' for their actions at Thebes (Diod. Sic. 15.20.2).

The greater degree and breadth of criticism levelled at this episode is a clear indication that the oaths binding inter-state treaties, especially regarding the respect for another community's sovereignty, were more important than the rights and wrongs of particular episodes in sacred spaces. Those episodes might matter, they might invite criticism or divine vengeance, but their significance is limited compared to oath-breaking acts of wholesale conquest.

Like the *acropoleis* at Athens, Sparta, and elsewhere, the Cadmea blurred civic and religious functions as a centre for cult as well as other activities.[91] But this sacred aspect of the acropolis never features in discussions of the occupation. It is noticeable that the Spartans are never depicted sacrificing there. In the course of a three-year occupation, they must have sacrificed there, even if only through the medium of the Theban collaborators who would later be killed for trying to win the Theban gods over to the Spartan cause (Plut. *De Gen.* 31). Depictions of them sacrificing together would have lent them an air of legitimacy that Xenophon and others were not willing to give. We have seen that such an episode could be used to express resistance, such as the Athenian collaborators witnessing of a miracle on the acropolis (Chapter 1, 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'), but suppression of positive interaction with the divine is a more straightforward way to avoid the suggestion of piety or legitimacy. Sacred space does play a role in some traditions connected to the

occupation, however; not sacrifice on the acropolis, but the unauthorised opening of tomb in Boeotian Haliartus (Plut. *De Gen.* 4–7). In this (probably apocryphal) tradition, Agesilaus himself orders the plundering of the tomb. Spartan transgression is contrasted with Theban respect in an episode that explicitly anticipates disaster for Sparta (Plut. *De Gen.* 4–7; 8–16, Chapter 2, 'Moving Bones'). Throughout this dialogue, the Spartans and their collaborators are characterised as tyrants; there are few things more characteristic of the undesirability and self-destructiveness of tyranny in ancient Greek discourse than this sort of violation of a sacred space.[92]

The seizure of the acropolis took place during the Thesmophoria festival; the men's absence from the Cadmea during the festival was another reason that it was taken so easily (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.29).[93] The festival adds another religious element to the situation, with further implication of sacrilege on the Lacedaemonians' part. But again, the emphasis does not fall on this aspect and appears merely to exacerbate the main offence. The *Pelopidas* includes allusion to the Thesmophoria (Plut. *Pel.* 5.3), but the later-written *Agesilaus* does not. In the *Pelopidas*, like Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the occurrence of the Thesmophoria explains the ease of the seizure. The inclusion in the *Pelopidas* indicates that the timing did indeed deepen the Spartans' guilt, but its omission from the *Agesilaus* indicates that it was inessential to the narrative. Like Xenophon, Plutarch chiefly emphasises the breaking of the King's Peace oath. The seizure is 'terrible' because it takes place 'in a time of truce and peace', not because it took place during a festival, but this is not because the festival did not matter, but rather that the whole peace was itself a divinely endorsed arrangement.

There was plenty of precedent for attacking during festivals, and for inverting the temptation to do so. Solon was said to have captured Salamis by luring the Megarians to attack women celebrating the Eleusinian Mysteries (Plut. *Solon* 8.6; Polyaenus, 1.20.2). A similar story was told of Peisistratus (Aen.Tac. 4.8–11). These stories reflect the 'cultural hero' trope rather than being strictly historical.[94] Nonetheless, they suggest both the plausibility of armies taking this opportunity and reiterate the moral position that it is acceptable to lure an enemy into doing something wrong.

Condemnation of the Spartans' seizure seems fairly universal, but the event was not unique. The Thebans themselves had used a festival as a distraction to seize Plataea during a time of peace.

Thucydides' speaker calls this '*paranomos*', one of only three usages of this strong word in the *History* (Thuc. 3.65–6).[95] Isocrates' Plataeans also cite the Thebans' outrages in this respect, noting that they were attacked in violation of oaths during peacetime, and that whilst almost anything is permitted in war, oaths of peace are paramount (Isoc. 14.1; 14.52–6). They declare it extraordinary for Thebes to complain about the Cadmea when they been busy destroying other people (Isoc. 14.19); they add that the occupation is divine punishment for the Thebans' contravention of their oath to support Sparta during the Corinthian War (Isoc. 14.27–8). But as with the killing of suppliants after battles, the occasional contravention of norms does not change that fact that it was abnormal to seize a city in violation of oaths, and that this produced more virulent condemnation than many other transgressions.

Many of the sanctuary-based incidents that have been examined contain ambiguity about who was the guilty party. The Spartans will have argued that it was the Boeotians in the wrong at the sanctuary of Artemis, just as they presumably thought that they acted within their rights at the sanctuary of Hera Akraia. There was no way of arguing that the seizure of Thebes had not broken the oaths; there was no way of arguing that it was justified.[96] This, and the extent of Sparta's apparent punishment at Leuctra, helps to explain why the retention of the Cadmea was frequently represented as the worst offence of the Spartan hegemony, and why it is the only Spartan action that Xenophon explicitly condemned.[97] And yet for all the outrage, no sanctions were taken against Sparta until well after Leuctra. Although Athens temporarily supported Thebes, by the time of the Leuctra campaign, Thebes was isolated (explicit at Diod. Sic. 15.51.2; Plut. *Pel.* 14). People may have suspected that divine punishment was heading Sparta's way, but the schedule for divine punishment is unpredictable and faced with that uncertainty, they shrank from confrontation. The Delphic Amphictyony would later fine Sparta heavily for the occupation, but this reflected not Panhellenic chastisement, but an anti-Phocis-Sparta feeling on the Council and the desire to isolate these parties diplomatically via a fine they could not pay.[98]

Reputation was crucial in the making and breaking of alliances and treaties, and military leaders' interactions with sacred spaces influenced how states were perceived. Brasidas was able to convince cities to ally with Sparta partly through his demonstrations of piety.

The Athenians, by contrast, alienated support in Boeotia through their impiety at Delium, while the Syracusans judged the Athenians more harshly when they recalled their behaviour towards others. Agesilaus pushed Sparta's alliance with Thebes to breaking point by intruding into their sacred space at Aulis, and they in turn invited conflict and isolation through their overzealous response and by their harsh treatment of their Plataean neighbours. Ancient authors bring-out the connection between action and reputation as part of their explorations of morality in public life. Sometimes the accounts focus on individual military leaders, but the associated characteristics of arrogance and despotism, or humility and piety could also be associated with whole cities either directly, through the representation of group action or through those leaders. But while there is no doubt that these issues influenced those making decisions, this was a complex world and a great range of factors came into play. Brasidas reassured with his piety, but his military threat was important too; the Athenians' defeat at Delium spoke against them more loudly than their impiety. The confrontation at Aulis soured relations between Sparta and Thebes, but the relationship was already failing. And whilst many were disgusted by the Spartan outrage against the Cadmea, they stood by and waited for the gods to help the Thebans help themselves. Actions in sacred space influenced reputation, but cities followed their own convenience in how they responded, believing whichever versions of events they preferred and keeping their complaints until it suited them to air them.

CHAPTER 6

Fighting for Sacred Space: Sacred Wars, Prestige, and Plunder

The final group of interactions we will examine demonstrate the special temptation that the four great Panhellenic sanctuaries presented to states and their armies. To a greater or lesser degree, these sanctuaries ran on a model in which a small state ran the sanctuary, sometimes under the influence of a more powerful one. This degree of distance from the strongest powers is thought to have facilitated the use of these sites as meeting places; as Catherine Morgan puts it, 'the lack of constraints imposed by *single-state* control made *inter-state* sanctuaries ideal contexts for political activity of many kinds'.[1] And yet, as Morgan has demonstrated, political competition was so fundamental to the conception of these spaces that even the foundation of the major games reflects rivalry. The sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia in Elis is geographically remote. Elis was settled in the late eighth century (though dedications had been coming for a long time before that), and by *c*.600, Elis had made its neighbours subordinate allies and ran renowned contests.[2] With rivalry always in the air, the development of the Olympic Games prompted games to emerge at Delphi, Isthmia, and Nemea only a short time later. Delphi by this time was staffed by Delphians and run by an Amphictyony, under the influence of Corinth. The sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia was under even firmer Corinthian influence, while the sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea shows strong evidence of Argive links from its beginnings in the Iron Age. The nominal organisers were the citizens of the small *polis*,

Cleonae, but the introduction of Panhellenic games seems to have been a politically motivated response to the Corinthian initiation of games at Delphi and Isthmia, themselves an imitation of Olympia.[3]

The foundation of the Panhellenic festivals, then, contained rivalry as well as cooperation. The prestige of the sanctuaries was enormous and widely recognised across the Greek world. They were wealthy and influence over them included decisions about spending, primarily on festivals and building projects. Influence over the Delphic Amphictyony was particularly desirable as it was, as Simon Hornblower puts it, 'an international committee which could impose fines for religious offences, and generally assert a practical moral ascendancy of an enjoyable kind over the Greek community'.[4]

Not surprising then that this appeal sometimes led to conflict. This chapter will examine the evidence for these struggles. In some of these instances, it is difficult or impossible to analyse the characterisation of the states and leaders involved, as the relevant authors can be intriguingly coy about the details, mentioning them briefly or scarcely at all. Other episodes can be treated historiographically, having been rendered in narratives that include vivid details and real-time scenes.

DELPHI: THE FIRST SACRED WAR

The foundation stories of the sanctuary at Delphi are full of conflicts and struggles for control. Apollo fought Pytho there and struggled with Heracles over the tripod. These stories expressed the process of establishing the sanctuary over a long period, with conflict acting as an agent of change and confirmation.[5] The tradition of the first human conflict for the sanctuary expresses similar ideas, with the rights of the international Amphictyony being confirmed over those of locals. The tradition of the First Sacred War, as it is known, is vague enough that its occurrence has been denied, although on balance some conflict of this sort does seem to have taken place and was certainly understood in antiquity to have done so. The traditions indicate that the newly formed Amphictyony called its members to war against the nearby city of Crisa, resulting in Crisa's destruction and a direction from the

oracle that Crisa's land should be kept uncultivated, dedicated to the gods of Delphi.[6] Crisa was variously accused of over-taxing or robbing pilgrims coming to Delphi, or of committing sacrilege and theft at the sanctuary, and generally outraging the Amphictyons. The traditions around the war do not sit tidily together,[7] yet they agree in expressing the idea of the Panhellenic community co-operating to put down those who were hostile to the sanctuary's interests. Small wonder that it is represented as a source of credit to have fought for Delphi in this war. Although traditions are few and far between, Plutarch knew of one which celebrated Solon's involvement:

> But he was even more admired and celebrated among the Greeks for what he said on behalf of the temple at Delphi, namely, that the Greeks must come to its relief, and not suffer the people of Cirrha to outrage the oracle, but aid the Delphians in maintaining the honour of the god. For it was by his persuasion that the Amphictyons undertook the war, as Aristotle, among others, testifies, in his list of the victors at the Pythian Games, where he ascribes the measure to Solon. (Plut. *Solon*, 11)

The war is never said to be fought within the sanctuary; it is taken to the Cirrhans who are destroyed at their city. Solon is celebrated for orchestrating the relief of the sanctuary, not a war within it or a take-over of it. Later Sacred Wars would be more contentious.

NEMEA AND DELPHI (THE SECOND SACRED WAR)

Being in the Peloponnese, three of the Panhellenic sanctuaries were clear of the Persian War conflict-zone. Delphi was vulnerable, but escaped real damage. Herodotus has Persian troops attacking, but seen off by local heroes (Hdt. 8.35–9).[8] In the rivalry between the Greek states that followed these wars, control of the Panhellenic sanctuaries was a platform for prestige that could turn violent. Although some of the evidence for these struggles comes from the Greek historians, it has been demonstrated that they seriously under-report Delphi's significance in the wars of the fifth century, leaving historians to piece the picture together from all too little. This makes understanding the progress of events difficult, never mind the Greeks' assessment of them. But it is necessary to explore these episodes nonetheless, simply because they are so fundamental to the history of the classical period.

Swiftly following the Persian Wars, influence at Delphi was being tested. The Amphictyony decided together upon the political act of punishing the mediser, Ephialtes (Hdt. 7.213). However, in the 470s when Sparta suggested expelling medisers and neutrals from the Amphictyony, Athens prevented it (Plut. *Them.* 20).[9] Disputes were also arising at Nemea. The 460s witnessed the Argives' destruction of Mycenae and Tiryns (we have seen how this led to them moving the Tirynthians' statue to the Heraeum of the plain, Chapter 2, 'Moving Statues'). Diodorus gives us a glimpse into issues that sparked the war:

> The Mycenaeans, because of the ancient prestige of their country, would not be subservient to the Argives as the other cities of Argolis were, but they maintained an independent position and would take no orders from the Argives; and they kept disputing with them over the sanctuary of Hera and claiming that they had the right to administer the Nemean Games by themselves. (Diod. Sic. 11.64.2)

The Argives were intent on increasing their influence and the Mycenaeans' resistance came, in part, through the assertion of control over these sanctuaries. Unfortunately for the Mycenaeans, the Argives counted on the Lacedaemonians being too busy to intervene, and the Argives were proved right. The Mycenaeans were besieged, then enslaved (Diod. Sic. 11.64.3–4).[10] Cleonae had always run the Nemean Games (so Pind. *Nem.* 10.42; 4.17). It seems strange that the Mycenaeans staked a claim. Competing foundation stories gave them grounds.[11] That Cleonae joined Argos in the destruction of Mycenae seems to underlie the significance of the sanctuary in the struggle.[12] This was a period of region-wide turmoil leading towards the First Peloponnesian War. Corinth appears to have been leading a campaign of expansion, including an attack on Cleonae that must have been a bid to wrest the sanctuary from them – indirectly from rival Argos (Plut. *Cim.* 17.2). The Mycenaeans had been asserting their independence from Argos for some time; Corinth surely encouraged them to bid for the games as part of a process of diminishing the Argives' prestige. Corinth did not prevent the destruction of Mycenae, but fought Argos hard in the coming years of the First Peloponnesian War.[13]

Meanwhile, further north, struggles for influence at Delphi continued. Epigraphic evidence of an Athenian alliance with the Amphictyony shows Athens' ongoing interest. Influence at Delphi also underlies the Spartans' campaign of 458, protecting Doris from

Phocian expansion, as it was only through Doris that Sparta had influence on the Amphictyonic Council (Thuc. 1.107.2).[14] The Athenians lost to Sparta at Tanagra following the Doris campaign, though they rallied, seized Boeotia, and allied with Sparta's enemies, the Phocians (Thuc. 1.108; 111). Ten years later, the same concerns about influence at Delphi saw the outbreak of the Second Sacred War, with Sparta removing the Phocians from the administration of Delphi and the Athenians marching to put the Phocians back in. The Delphians were also Phocian, but their position at Delphi allowed them to act independently of the other Phocians. These other Phocians lived in the rest of the Phocis region and at the town of Phocis. They do not seem to have had a history of administering Delphi, but their recurrent claim to the role (made primarily on the basis that Delphi was in Phocian territory) was occasionally supported by other parties, destabilising the Amphictyony and the region.[15] Thucydides reports:

> After this the Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and becoming masters of the temple at Delphi, placed it in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately after their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, and placed it in the hands of the Phocians. (Thuc. 1.112.5)

This was a great result for Athens, with their allies retaining control of the sanctuary. This was a more contentious conflict than the First Sacred War, as members of the Amphictyony were acting against each other. Plutarch names Pericles as the Athenians' general:

> He considered it a great achievement to hold the Lacedaemonians in check, and set himself in opposition to these in every way, as he showed, above all other things, by what he did in the Sacred War. The Lacedaemonians made an expedition to Delphi while the Phocians had possession of the sanctuary there, and restored it to the Delphians; but no sooner had the Lacedaemonians departed than Pericles made a counter expedition and reinstated the Phocians. And whereas the Lacedaemonians had had the 'promanteia', or right of consulting the oracle ahead of others, which the Delphians had bestowed upon them, carved upon the forehead of the bronze wolf in the sanctuary, he secured from the Phocians this high privilege for the Athenians, and had it chiselled along the right side of the same wolf. (Plut. *Per.* 21)

Within the *Life*, this seems positive, although the observation that Pericles thought it good to counter the Spartans in everything meets

criticism in the *syncrisis*: 'the Peloponnesian War was a ground of great complaint against Pericles. For it is said to have been brought on by his contention that no concession should be made to Sparta' (Plut. *Per.-Fab. sync*.3.1).[16] Plutarch's account also frames the Spartans' actions in the war positively; they are restoring the Delphians, not simply turfing out the Phocians. A passing reference to Pericles campaigning at Nemea (Plut. *Per*. 19.2) does not specify what the Athenians were doing there, but, as David Lewis wondered, they 'might have been doing something to protect Cleonae's rights to Nemea'.[17]

The Second Sacred War shows the struggle for direct and indirect control of Delphi, but its details are elusive. We can understand that the Athenian alliances with the Amphictyony and with Phocis might have unsettled the Spartans, as would their gradual build-up of a 'religiously based land empire' through conquest and influence.[18] But, as Simon Hornblower observes, Thucydides' vague reference to Spartan action and silence regarding the Amphictyony does not reflect these factors' significance, 'even to a minimalist and political reconstruction of a Thucydidean type'.[19]

Various writers show that the Athenians had to abandon their plans for land empire following defeat at the battle of Coronea (447/6: Thuc. 1.113; Diod. Sic. 12.6; Plut. *Per*. 18, with *Ages*. 19) and the concluding of the Thirty Years Truce. Phocis now allied to Sparta, but the custodianship of Delphi must have passed from the Phocians around this time (they do not have it later) and yet of that there is no mention.[20] Amidst this half-light, it can still be seen that influence at Delphi was hotly contested, with the rivalry between the major powers reflected in the struggle between the Delphians and other Phocians. But as the competing parties wished to be recognised as legitimate, there is, at this time, no talk of sacking the sanctuary.

DELPHI, OLYMPIA, AND NEMEA IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

The Thirty Year Truce lasted half the intended time and the Panhellenic sanctuaries continued as objects of competition. Two are mentioned in rather a startling context on the eve of war, in a speech in which the Corinthians argue that they can borrow enough treasure (χρημάτων) from Olympia and Delphi to pay mercenary sailors (432: Thuc. 1.121.3).[21] They seem to be talking about their

own dedications at these sanctuaries. A key word in the Corinthian speech is 'borrow', for while temple-robbery was punishable by grievous means, borrowing and returning money could be approved.[22] This was normally practised at home, however, so it is novel to hear dedications at the Panhellenic sanctuaries being included in these decisions. A counter-speech from Pericles shows Athens contemplating this risk; for him this is not normal, acceptable borrowing, but something 'somewhat underhand (and therefore sacrilegious)' (Thuc. 1.143.1).[23] Thucydides' reticence about Delphi's role in the war continues; there is no reference to the Amphictyony's response to this interest in the treasure, although most of its members cannot have been keen.[24] Meanwhile the oracle promised Sparta that they would win if they tried their hardest and would have Apollo's backing whether they asked for it or not (Thuc. 1.118, with 1.123).

The Olympic Games held around the same time as the Corinthians' pro-war speech go unmentioned by Thucydides, though they must have been a curious affair with tensions rising so high. Those of 428 receive a thorough treatment. The games seem to have been open to all as usual, although Thucydides indicates a pronounced anti-Athenian atmosphere (Thuc. 3.8–15).[25] Two Olympiads later, in 420, the atmosphere had got so bad that the Eleans had more than 2,000 troops ready to defend the sanctuary. 1,000 Argives, 1,000 Mantineans, Elean hoplites, and Athenian cavalry all stood on stand-by for hostilities (Thuc. 5.50). The awkwardness this time was not Athens' treatment of its allies, but Sparta's fall-out with Elis.

The 420 games appear to have been the occasion at which the Eleans announced the arrival of Hippodamia's bones from Midea, asserting their own antiquity and, by implication, disparaging the Spartans as newcomers to the Peloponnese.[26] The use of religious authority to push political agendas is pronounced in this episode in further respects. As Jim Roy has shown, Elis seems to have 'used its domination of Olympia as a means of exercising control', manipulating arrangements with its *perioikic* communities and others.[27] For reasons which are unclear, Sparta backed one of these communities, Lepreum, to the chagrin of Elis (Thuc. 5.31). When the games came round soon after, Elis barred Sparta from participation, citing non-payment of an Olympic fine levied on what Thucydides presents as tenuous grounds – a direct response to the events at

Lepreum (Thuc. 5.49).[28] Thucydides cites the terms of two rounds of negotiation, bringing out the political nature of the dispute. When the terms were rejected, the ban was maintained. At least one Spartan famously flouted it. Lichas son of Arcesilaus ran a winning chariot and was beaten by the umpires when he went on to the track to crown his charioteer. This public beating and the ban are given as the reasons for the Eleans' military build-up, expecting the Spartans to 'sacrifice by force'.

The Eleans' preparations, as described by Thucydides, are extraordinary in that they indicate how seriously they took the threat of military action. That said, the fact that their hoplites had to be supplemented suggests that for all their ability to bully their subordinate allies, they were not a great military power expecting to need to defend the sanctuary very often. Their defensive aims are also limited; they imagine the Spartans forcing their way in to sacrifice, not to burn and plunder or occupy. As it was, the Spartans (and the Lepreates) chose to sacrifice at Sparta.

Thucydides' account of the fracas at Olympia is not extensive, but nonetheless appears positively cinematic by comparison with his account of the Second Sacred War.[29] This is a different sort of victor-after-the-victory scene. We get the detail that Lichas was beaten on the course (i.e. in front of everyone), we get information on what competition he entered, and the state (Boeotian) under whose banner it was announced, and then there is the picture of him bustling forward to crown the charioteer on the course, 'to show that the chariot was his'. These are the sort of details that make these episodes come alive, and they surely reflect the ways in which this incident would be replayed in discussion, be it to criticise Lichas' presumption or in indignation at the Eleans' response. And there is no doubt this episode was replayed. As we will see, the Spartans remained indignant about these events and their consequences were grave.

Thucydides seems to sympathise with the Spartans' position. As we have seen, he draws out the pretexts in the Eleans' negotiations with the Spartans. He then builds the tension by citing the fear and military preparations at the sanctuary, raises it further with detailed description of the Lichas affair and by adding that people were 'more afraid than ever following it'. The terse reference to the Spartans' restraint pops the bubble of suspense, drawing a feeling of relief from the reader. And by communicating this with the expression that the

Spartans 'let the festival continue', Thucydides, like the Spartans, places the emphasis piously on the festival rather than any other aspect of the dispute. Soon after, the Eleans marched home in a rage when their allies would not pursue another Lepreum campaign (Thuc. 5.62.1–2). As Roy notes, 'It is hard to avoid the impression that Thucydides relates this episode in such a way as to bring out the Eleans' blinkered focus on their own interests.'[30]

Why did the Spartans not take their army to Olympia? Several reasons have been suggested. It has been noted that Lichas was presumptuous in attending the games, a factor which may have dissuaded the Spartans from acting. The military preparations must have played a role; it would be prudent to avoid a pitched battle, even against a modest force. 'Religious unease' seems important here too.[31] Their ill-treatment gave them a moral high-ground that many in the Greek world would have been sympathetic to. Disrupting the festival would have evaporated that sympathy. However unfair or over-zealous the Eleans had been, they were the recognised administrators of the games. The Spartans would take steps to further their influence there, through diplomatic subterfuge and force, but the Olympic truce was judged an ill-time to pursue the course of force, a sacrilege too far for a pious people with a reputation to think about. But the consequences of this dispute were not over and could still have lost Elis the games. The memory of insults and plans for influence had a long life; it would be almost 20 years before the bad feeling erupted.

Meanwhile, the Spartans had not forgotten Delphi. Thucydides seems to underplay the religious motives behind a lot of action in the Peloponnesian War, but there are indications that many of the Spartans' and Athenians' plans perpetuated their earlier goals of achieving prestigious influence at major sacred sites.[32] The Spartans' attempt to found Heraclea in Trachis in the 420s (Thuc. 3.92, with Diod. Sic. 12.59) falls into this category, as it seems to have been motivated by the desire to secure further votes on the Amphictyonic Council. The Athenians' discontent at the extension of Spartan influence at Delphi was expressed in their reorganisation of the festival of Delian Apollo on Delos, which had pan-Ionian appeal and even attracted some Dorian islanders. Thucydides does not discuss the relevance that these moves had to each other, but as he mentions them only 12 chapters apart, it seems likely that readers were intended to join the information together themselves.[33]

The armistice of 423 agreed Panhellenic access to Delphi (Thuc. 4.118.1–2). There was also an intriguing agreement to identify and punish whoever had acted against 'the treasure of the god' (Thuc. 4.118.3). Who had taken what is unknown. There are obvious echoes of the Corinthians' designs on Delphic money despite them calling that 'borrowing'.[34] This theft (as whatever happened appears to have been regarded) presented a challenge to the Panhellenic sanctuaries' treasury system. Nonetheless, the agreement reflects a decision to try and keep that system afloat, and it did not alter the custom of sending Pythian Apollo his war tithe; he received his due from both sides following the campaign between Mantinea and Laodocium shortly afterwards (Thuc. 4.134). Amongst the clauses of the 421 Peace of Nicias, it was reiterated that all Greeks could consult the Panhellenic sanctuaries. This does not demonstrate that any state was banned before this point, but as Hornblower has argued, 'It does, however, suggest that there had been difficulties, and that Athenian pilgrims were not altogether welcome at the games.'[35] This was an attempt to confirm rights and keep the Panhellenic festival circuit alive despite an unusually long war. It was also determined that Delphi and Delphians would be essentially autonomous, and that the Athenians and Spartans must respect that (5.18.1–3). The agreement about Delphic autonomy attempted to prevent another Sacred War, and was probably meant as a curb on Sparta and the party most directly interested in taking the administration of Delphi, Phocis.[36]

Events at Nemea took a turn for the worse. Although Cleonae was the traditional organiser of the games, by the early fourth century, Argos appears in charge (e.g. Xen. *Hell*. 4.72). Excavation has unearthed 'evidence for activity of an unexpected type', namely of a violent conflict resulting in widespread destruction across the sanctuary, including the temple and the precinct around the altar. 'Unexpected' because no Greek historian tells us what happened, though the violence of it is clear. Bronze arrow heads and iron spear tips littered the sanctuary, walls were breached, while broken dedications and architectural material and burnt limestone blocks reveal the intensity of the destruction.[37] The destruction-layer indicates the late fifth century, so it occurred during the Peloponnesian War.[38] Thucydides reports campaigning in the Nemea area by Sparta and Argos (Thuc. 5.57–62), but says

nothing of the sanctuary or games, and that Agis was blamed at Sparta for doing nothing of note (Thuc. 5.60).

Argos and Athens were allies in this campaign, and Nemea excavator, Stephen Miller, notes that Euripides' *Hypsipyle*, from 408/7, establishes the Argives as the originators of the games, implying support for Argive administration of them. One possibility must be that, perhaps with Athens' approval, Argos destroyed the sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea.[39] Sparta had a history of making provocative use of other people's sanctuaries, but not of destroying them. Corinth attacked Cleonae in the 460s, although it seems more likely that they sought control of the sanctuary and games rather than their destruction. Argos gained most from the damage. The games moved to Argos and with them the organisers' prestige. Cleonae became an Argive *deme*, with privileges at the games.[40] The games could have been moved first with the destruction following separately. Once Cleonae was formally Argive, the Argives perhaps considered the transfer of the games a natural step, moving the cult as they had moved Tiryns' (see Chapter 2, 'Moving Statues'). The Argives could have fought Cleonae to force this move, destroying the sanctuary to ensure the switch; but this seems unlikely given the Cleoneans' privilege at the games and ongoing co-operation with Argos. Alternatively, it is possible that conflict with an old enemy (Corinth?) wrecked the sanctuary, inadvertently triggering an opportunistic transfer of the games. The destruction of the old temple shows that this was an extreme event; there was no activity at the site until the late fourth century.[41]

No ancient author gives an account of this destruction. Although historiography suggests some possibilities, without excavation no one would now know the fate that befell the sanctuary. This is a reminder of how selective Thucydides and other ancient historians were about what events they covered. Nonetheless, this seems an extreme example given the intensity of the destruction of a site of Panhellenic renown. If the destruction did take place during the Sparta-Argos campaign of 419/18, it was passed over only a few chapters after two had been devoted to the events of the 420 Olympics (5.49–50; Nemea-area campaign, Thuc. 5.57–62). It is possible that Thucydides did not wish to repeat a topic he had covered in depth with Delium (Chapter 1, 'The Sanctuary of Apollo at Delium'); but fundamentally it is unclear why this sanctuary was subject to such an unusual level of violence or why such blatant sacrilege escaped the histories.

OLYMPIA AND THE SPARTAN–ELEAN WAR

The events at Olympia before the 420 games were not forgotten at Sparta. A second account is offered by Xenophon, who provides it in the context of the Spartan–Elean War of *c*.400. This war makes an ambiguous impression in the *Hellenica*. As Christopher Tuplin has shown, it presents Spartan imperialism in the Peloponnese in an ugly light, contrasted unfavourably with their actions in Asia.[42] Nonetheless, there are several features which present the Spartans in a much more favourable light than their Elean enemies. Wanting better from Sparta did not equate to a favourable view of Elis. While the 420 incident was sparked by Sparta assisting a *perioikic* community that wanted independence from Elis, the Spartan–Elean War saw Sparta demanding the independence for *all* of Elis' *perioikoi*. Xenophon makes the case that the Spartans pushed for this war because they were angry about the Elean alliance with Athens, Argos, and Mantinea, because of what happened over the 420 Olympics, and because Agis was refused access to sacrifice there some years later (Xen. *Hell*. 3.2.21).[43]

Xenophon's account of the Lichas episode has affinity but deviations from Thucydides', demonstrating both familiarity and a decision to treat it differently.[44] Like Thucydides, Xenophon slows the narrative to include vivid details. Xenophon's reference to 'whipping' is stronger than Thucydides' 'beating', containing tyrannical overtones; Xenophon also includes the strong expression 'drove him out' to finish the account of Lichas' treatment. The escalation reflects badly on the Eleans; like the Boeotians throwing sacrificial items to the floor (Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.3–4), the presiding party lose some of their moral high-ground in their over-zealous response. This is reinforced by the sympathetic detail that Lichas was over 60. This is sympathetic because it is a hard way to treat a man of mature years, and because of the possibility it raises that he was a member of the *gerousia* council. Lichas was clearly wrong to participate in the games, but that issue is overshadowed by the attention on the Eleans' heavy-handed response.

The Spartans' anger was intensified by a follow-up incident with king Agis (probably in 414/13).[45] Xenophon directs our interpretation of this incident by mentioning that Agis wished to sacrifice in obedience to an oracle. The Eleans' obstruction becomes an act of impiety as they are preventing Agis from fulfilling a divine direction,

and this is made worse by the tenuous reason they offer.[46] This is really Agis' moment in the sun as far as the *Hellenica* goes. He had appeared in a positive light on previous occasions, yet it is here that we see his piety flower into results, in his final campaign before his death.[47] When the war begins, Agis piously obeys a divine sign (θεῖον ἡγησάμενος) to cease the campaign (an earthquake, *Hell*. 3.2.24). Obedience to omens is always a positive in Xenophon. Soon enough, Agis returns to campaign the following year, making sacrificing at Olympia one of his first objectives, 'and this time no one undertook to prevent him' (*Hell*. 3.2.26). This is another crucial interpretive detail; Xenophon ensures that the reader knows that Agis did not sacrifice after pushing past protesting priests. The formidable Spartan army may have persuaded the Eleans to keep quiet, but this is not the point Xenophon emphasises. This shows how the episode has been distinguished from, for example, Herodotus' account of Cleomenes at the sanctuary of Hera or Xenophon or Plutarch's accounts of Agis' brother, Agesilaus, at the sanctuary of Artemis at Aulis.[48] We also hear that Agis was joined by many of Elis' *perioikoi*, a sure sign of their disaffection. The campaign is then presented as a wondrous success, more like a 'foraging mission for the Peloponnese', than a normal campaign (*Hell.* 3.2.26). This conspicuous degree of success implies divine support. The scenario is repeated with more explicit positivity in Xenophon's rather brutal description (to a modern ear) of an easy massacre of impious enemies at Corinth: 'how could one help regarding this as a gift from heaven?... so many fell within a short time' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.12). The campaign ended with Sparta determining what alliances the Eleans' were permitted and the administration of Olympia:

> they did not, however, dispossess them of the presidency of the shrine of Olympian Zeus, even though it did not belong to the Eleans in ancient times, for they thought that the rival claimants were rustics and not competent to hold the presidency. When these things had been agreed upon, a peace and an alliance were concluded between the Eleans and the Lacedaemonians. And so the war between the Lacedaemonians and the Eleans ended. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.31)

The reasons behind this war are intriguing. We should not dismiss Xenophon's claim that it was pursued through revenge for the slights.[49] Revenge was a powerful motivator in Greek warfare, propelling numerous conflicts and regarded as ideologically legitimate.[50]

Reasons of politico-military authority have also been suggested, including influence within the Peloponnese and the chance to 'expedite [Sparta's] military and, possibly, commercial involvement with the west', by securing the Elean coastline.[51] Hugh Bowden has argued that religious concerns should be forefronted, suggesting that Sparta was primarily motivated by concern, 'that Olympia should be managed to their satisfaction… and that they should be able to sacrifice there without difficulties'.[52] Roy observes Sparta's hand in the coup at Elis that failed mid-war, noting that 'it seems extremely likely that the Spartans had from the outset encouraged the oligarchs' attempt to take control in Elis'. He notes that Pausanias mentions the friendship between Agis and the coup's leader, and that Diodorus had called revenge a pretext, implying more material goals.[53] A successful coup would have put the philolaconian faction in power. Although Roy resists linking this aim to influence over Olympia, Bowden's suggestion is consistent with Sparta's ongoing pre-occupation with secure access to the Panhellenic sanctuaries. It is not outrageous to think that the Spartans would have pursued a war and backed a coup with the aim of placing pro-Spartan Eleans in charge of Olympia, thereby securing future access and good standing at the sanctuary. Pausanias says that the coup's leader was none other than Sparta's *proxenos*, the perfect person to look favourably on Sparta's position at the sanctuary. Athens' earlier alliance with Elis (and presence guarding Olympia in 420) would have intensified the anxiety for control. Although Xenophon does not cite this as the reason, this echoes Thucydides' reticence about actions motived by the desire for influence at Delphi when those motives were surely there. Material intentions have their place in all this, but we should not overlook the prospect that the Spartan–Elean War was, at a very fundamental level, a war for influence at Olympia. The fact that the Eleans were eventually left in charge of the games does not reduce this possibility. The games were clearly a key issue in the peace negotiations, but the Spartans may have felt uneasy at the prospect of entirely removing the Eleans. The coup would have left Eleans in charge, just Eleans with different political leanings. The competing claimants, who must be the Pisatans, had a limited claim as well as the unsuitable manners Xenophon mentions.[54] Ousting Elis altogether would have been deeply controversial. If Sparta felt it had made its point clearly enough, there would be no need for further regime-change with the risk of divine displeasure and disapproval within the wider Greek

community. The negotiations certainly saw the end of Sparta's problems at the sanctuary.[55]

It is curious to see Sparta being represented as the virtuous party regarding the sanctuary, as Xenophon's account has it. The Spartans do, after all, behave rather forcefully in the matter of sacrificial rights. But then, this was a Panhellenic site, and Xenophon establishes a sense of the Eleans' wrongdoing. It should also be remembered that Sparta refrained from disrupting the festival in 420, and Agis' visit during the war was for sacrifice, not plunder. Comparison with Diodorus' account helps to confirm Xenophon's positivity and the points which determine the interpretation given to the leaders' actions. Like Xenophon, Diodorus cites the Spartans' complaints about exclusion from the 420 games and Agis' rejection. Unlike Xenophon (or Thucydides) however, there is no mention of the Eleans' extreme reaction to Lichas' victory, never mind his age. In this account, as we saw, the Spartans' complaints are pretexts; the Eleans ignore them as such and accuse the Spartans of enslaving the Greeks, a particularly extreme charge in the context of the freedom-conscious *Bibliotheke* (14.17.6). The Boeotians and Corinthians withdraw from Sparta's campaign in disgust, offering a third-party moral judgement (Diod. Sic. 14.17.7). The Lacedaemonians are terrified during a contact (a sure sign of anti-Spartan bias) (Diod. Sic. 14.17.10). The king is not depicted sacrificing at Olympia. There is no scene of him sacrificing in defiance of an outraged priest, but nonetheless the lack of any sacrifice seems to confirm the suggestion that the complaint about Olympia was a pretext. Then, most interestingly, it is noted that 'he traversed its territory, laying it waste and plundering it, even though it was sacred soil, and gathered great stores of booty' (Diod. Sic. 14.17.11).[56] This does not state that the Spartans laid waste to the sanctuary, but the description of Elean territory as 'sacred' is an intriguing development, reflecting the Syracusan argument that all of Sicily was sacred (Chapter 3, 'Nicias and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Syracuse'). There is no evidence of people applying this definition of Elean territory typically, but the claim must have had enough weight with some to make it meaningful. It is a far cry from Xenophon's depiction of it as a divinely endorsed foraging mission.

We then find that while plunder is taken, there is no reference to Agis dedicating it at Delphi on his dying mission. As well as avoiding reference to a pious act, the lack of sympathetic detail about the old

king stems from Diodorus' account having Pausanias as the campaign leader. This is a mistake. Xenophon would not have been wrong about this detail; he became close to the Spartan elite around this time and became friends with the king's brother, Agesilaus II.[57] Diodorus is thought to have been working from Ephorus at this point, who, with greater distance from Spartan sources, would have been more prone to this mistake.[58] The account, as we have just seen, is actively pro-Elean. We have in these two accounts competing traditions drawn from what was said, at Sparta and in Elis. The justice of the war, the conduct of the armies, and their leaders' interactions with sacred space all shift subtly to describe the same conflict in ways that communicate different moral messages. The behaviour of the *strategoi* reflects back on the justice of the campaigns: the ravaging of sacred land in Diodorus reflects and reinforces the narrative's suggestion that the war was unjust. The omen, miraculous plunder, uninterrupted sacrifice, and tithes all reinforce Xenophon's overall presentation of the war as a mission to restore Sparta's use of the sanctuary and curb Elean pride. Yet neither author offers the full range of reasons that must have underpinned the war, and neither goes so far as to state what was surely the case, that both sides fought to secure influence over the sanctuary, a topic perhaps too anti-Elean for Ephorus, in exposing the vulnerability of their position, too anti-Spartan for Xenophon, in suggesting more Spartan aggression than he wished.

ISTHMIA IN THE CORINTHIAN WAR

In between the controversy at Olympia in the Spartan–Elean War and one at Isthmia in the Corinthian War, there was another critical incident at one of the Panhellenic sanctuaries. Agis had died and been succeeded by Agesilaus. The early days of his reign saw his controversial visit to the sanctuary of Artemis at Aulis, and his celebrated visit to the sanctuary of Artemis in Ephesus (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.18). His return to Greece was interrupted by the battle of Coronea, but victory was followed by a visit to Delphi to dedicate the tithe from the Asian campaign.

Of the surviving narratives, only the Diodoran one eschewed mention of the troops being released from Athena Itonia, and this tone is perpetuated by the suggestion that Agesilaus went to

Delphi only because he was wounded (Diod. Sic. 14.84.2).[59] This is misleading. It must always have been the plan to dedicate the tithe, a usual custom and the best way to advertise the success of his campaign. Xenophon's accounts have a different feel:

> After the truce was made, and Agesilaus had arrived in Delphi, he dedicated a tithe of the spoil to the god, not less than a 100 talents.
> (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.21)[60]

The king's visit is not associated with his wounds, which are no longer mentioned. The Delphic passage marks a triumphant return and the king's achievements are proclaimed by reference to the extent of the booty. The positive tone is undermined by the loss of some his army plundering Locris, under the leadership of Gylis (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.22), but nonetheless, this is a far more active, positive representation of events. This detail also provides the insight that Agesilaus attended Delphi without his army.

Like Xenophon, Plutarch has Agesilaus visit Delphi to dedicate rather than recover, and the account is noticeably generous:

> he proceeded to Delphi where the Pythian Games were being held, and there he carried out the procession for the god and dedicated the tithe from the spoils of the Asian campaign – which came to a 100 talents.
> (Plut. *Ages*. 19.3)

As this episode proved uncontroversial, Plutarch takes the opportunity to feature a pleasant scene of Delphic life. This provides a positive example of the king acting, when unchallenged, as an inspiring, well-behaved leader, reminding us why he deserved a *Life* in the first place.

Many pilgrims would have congregated for the games. From a practical perspective, this may have prompted Agesilaus to attend without his army. Where would they stay at such a busy time? He may also have judged that an arrival with his army would be seen as over-bearing. By now, the sanctuary of Nemea had witnessed serious conflict, making armies an unsettling presence even at Panhellenic sites. Sparta had no wish to challenge the custodianship of Delphi at this time, so by keeping the army out of sight and joining in nicely at the games Agesilaus presented himself to a war-torn Greece as a successful leader returned from a Panhellenic crusade. In doing so, he helped maintain the moral high ground Sparta needed for the ongoing war. This was a military leader using

sacred space to advantage. When Agesilaus became more directly involved in the Corinthian War, however, controversy crept back in.

Tensions between Argos and Corinth never resolved themselves for more than short periods and competition for the Panhellenic sanctuaries remained part of their medium of conflict. In the fourth century, the struggle turned from Nemea to Isthmia. Isthmia had been a cult site since *c.*1050, and remained a local Corinthian site until the founding of the games *c.*580 made it a Panhellenic site under Corinth's custodianship.[61] The Corinthians probably felt comfortable opening up attendance due to its position clearly within Corinthian territory.[62] When *stasis* struck Corinth during the Corinthian War, conflict emerged over which Corinthians now ran the games. Was it the old guard, who had been ousted from the city but maintained their claim to authority and their ties with Sparta, or was it those who had thrown off the Spartan alliance in favour of radical union with Argos?

In contrast to the conflict at Nemea, the episode during which this question came to a head receives extensive treatment from the Greek historians. While there is always a lot more that could be known, there is a selection of accounts which outline the main events and exhibit distinctive differences that offer insight into the way the episode was interpreted by key commentators.

According to Xenophon's *Hellenica*, Agesilaus was marching north for the Peiraeum campaign when he encountered activity at Isthmia:

> The Argives chanced at the time to be there making the sacrifice to Poseidon, as though Argos were Corinth. But when they learned that Agesilaus was approaching, they left the sacrificed items and the breakfast, and in great fear retired to the city along the Cenchreae road. However, Agesilaus did not pursue them, despite seeing them, but encamping in the sanctuary he sacrificed to the god and waited until the Corinthian exiles had conducted the sacrifice and the games for Poseidon. (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1)[63]

Xenophon is explicit here that in forming a union with Corinth, the Argives had co-opted presidency of the games, even to the point of making the sacrifices. The Argives were using the opportunity to advertise their alliance with Corinth and the control of the Isthmus and prestigious sanctuary that came with it. 'As though Argos were Corinth' brings out the change from tradition, enabling Xenophon to

suggest that Agesilaus was rightly restoring normality by ensuring that the exiled pro-Spartan Corinthians could conduct the games as they had done traditionally. Other details are also specified: that there was no physical contact between the two groups, no actual fighting, that the sacrifice was already complete when Agesilaus arrived, and that the Argives fled as if guilty as well as fearful. These qualifications limit the extent of the conflict at the sanctuary. Agesilaus' military presence prompts the Argives' departure, but Xenophon frames this with emphasis on the king's restraint: he prioritises the god's rites, not pursuing the Argives.

Xenophon also limits the suggestion of Spartan aggression by implying that they happened upon the Isthmian Games by chance. This seems disingenuous; organisers would send out invitations to the games (e.g. Thuc. 8.10), and athletes, trainers, and calendar-keepers would know the time it was due even if no one else remembered. That the Corinthian exiles were with Agesilaus only reinforces the likelihood that they knew the games were on. Were the Spartans not invited that year? The question of invitation carries its own implications for legitimacy. The inviter expresses their legitimacy through their invitation. If (as seems unlikely) the Corinthian exiles did issue invites that year, they did not just happen upon the attendees. If the Spartan army did just happen upon them, the exiles were not the ones issuing invites. By having the Spartans and exiles surprise the games, Xenophon side-steps the awkward probability that the new Corinthian authorities had announced the games and that the Spartan army was inveighing upon those games in a way that Sparta had resisted during the Olympics of 420. The issue of Argive cooperation complicates the picture. Pro-Argive Corinthians must have been there too, but they are hazed out of Xenophon's picture, leaving only the illegitimate Argives.

The account in the *Hellenica* makes Agesilaus' intervention a restoration of tradition achieved through intimidation rather than force, and yet this incident, so vivid in the *Hellenica*, is absent from the encomium. It would not have supported the characterisation of Agesilaus the panhellenist, but it could have included as Agesilaus protecting a festival. In the corresponding spot, the encomium describes how Agesilaus 'returned home for the Hyacinthia and, in the position assigned to him by the choirmaster, he joined in singing the paean to the god' (Xen. *Ages*. 2.17). Xenophon appears

broadly supportive of the ousting of the Argives, but the quieter virtues demonstrated at the Hyacinthia are deemed more suitable for encomium. Both stories show Agesilaus supporting Spartan interests, but at the Hyacinthia he does so without conflict. The absence of this episode from the encomium does not offer detail of the extent or nature of Xenophon's reservations, but it does indicate that he did not consider the struggle for the games an edifying affair.[64]

Diodorus' account is brief, but still manages to emphasise that the competition was *for* the festival rather than *at* it.

> And since the Isthmian Games were now at hand, there as a quarrel over who should conduct them. After much contention, the Lacedaemonians had their way and saw to it that the exiles conducted the festival. (Diod. Sic. 14.86.5)

It is one of many Diodoran examples of the Lacedaemonians forcing their way against fellow Greeks. Perhaps primarily for this reason it does not focus on Agesilaus individually, but on the dynamics between the states.

Plutarch's narrative is biographical, so Agesilaus takes centre-stage. This account places greater emphasis on the use of force, which suggests that this issue may also have hung over Xenophon's assessment of the events:

> The Argives were then holding Corinth and conducting the Isthmian Games; he drove them out just as they had sacrificed to the god, making them abandon all their equipment. When a number of Corinthian exiles, who happened to be present, begged him to run the games, this he would not do, but he remained there while they ran the games and provided security until they were completed. (Plut. *Ages*. 21.1–2)[65]

Plutarch does not replicate Xenophon's indignant 'as though Argos were Corinth', but we see the same dynamic in which the Argives have claimed the games as a perk of controlling Corinth. As for Agesilaus, he removes the Argives more actively; they are driven out rather than retiring.[66] Plutarch also has the sacrifice interrupted at an earlier stage. In the *Hellenica*, it was so complete that the follow-up meal was being prepared. Plutarch's Argives have only just sacrificed, creating an image of them still gathered around the altar as the Spartan army appears. As well as accentuating Agesilaus' aggression, the freshness of the sacrifice and the gratuitous reference to the god

(who else would they sacrifice to?) introduces, in a way that Xenophon had not, the possibility of sacrilege. Agesilaus plays the same part here that the Boeotians had at Aulis, interrupting a sacrifice because he objected to the party sacrificing.

Both sides bear responsibility for the *fracas*, the Argives for their presumptuous assumption of the presidency, Agesilaus for his forcible reclamation of it. The Argives are also indicted by the suggestion that Agesilaus had to stay to prevent the games being interrupted a second time. Both sides are implicated and, as with Aulis, shared culpability is hardly the same as innocence. Plutarch's rendering of the events clarifies how mild Xenophon's version was and yet even this was not enough to make it acceptable for encomium.

Plutarch's follow-up to the ruined sacrifice adds complexity to this episode's use within this *Life*. Agesilaus demonstrates conspicuous moderation in refusing the invitation to preside (Plut. *Ages*. 21.2). He may have acted towards the Argives with his usual contentiousness, but his characteristic desire for prestige is laudably restrained. This combination contributes usefully to Plutarch's theme. The reader has been told that during Agesilaus' childhood, it was his 'decorum' (κόσμος) which won over Lysander and his 'mildness' (πραότης) and 'readiness to obey' (εὐπειθής) which made his 'love of victory' (φιλονικία) and 'high-spiritedness' (θυμοειδής) possible to bear (Plut. *Ages*. 2.1). This pattern is repeated at Isthmia, where Agesilaus' more fiery qualities draw him into conflict, while his self-discipline enables him to restrain himself to good effect. This pattern intensifies later on in the *Life*. Desire for conflict helps to bring about the invasion of the Peloponnese, but Agesilaus avoids complete disaster by resisting the urge to fight when it is not safe to do so (Plut. *Ages*. 31.3). As Plutarch puts it, 'all agree that the salvation of Sparta at this time was due to Agesilaus, because he renounced his innate passions of love of victory and love of honour, and adopted a policy of safety' (Plut. *Ages*. 33.1).[67] Agesilaus may have been combative at Isthmia, but his restraint redeemed the situation, prefiguring some positive acts to come. It is Agesilaus' misfortune that he cannot always restrain himself. The Isthmian Games are followed by the contrasting incident at Peiraeum, where Agesilaus acts without such caution, with disastrous results (Chapter 4, 'Agesilaus and the Sanctuary of Hera Akraia').

Xenophon does not refer to Agesilaus being offered the chance to preside over the games, which, combined with its suitability for Plutarch's didactic purpose leaves questions over its reliability. But if the offer was made and resisted, this must be regarded as careful diplomacy on Agesilaus' part, for just as criticism of the Argives is implied in the reference to them treating Isthmia as Argos, so a Spartan king presiding over the games would look a lot like Spartans treating Isthmia as Sparta. This would be a poor way to have the exiles restored to Corinth.

The anxiety felt about the use of force in sanctuaries is further illustrated by the account in Pausanias. Pausanias' generally positive representation of Agesilaus provides guidance for interpreting the detail of the episode. While Xenophon omitted these games from his encomium, Pausanias does include them, but devoid of actual conflict:

> The Corinthians in exile for pro-Spartan sympathies held the Isthmian Games. The Corinthians in the city kept quiet at that time, through fear of Agesilaus. Then when he marched to Sparta, they also celebrated the Isthmian Games along with the Argives. (Paus. 3.10.1)

The king's achievement is that the pro-Spartan Corinthians are able to hold the games because of Agesilaus' support and reputation. This reputation makes the pro-Argive Corinthians stay away altogether. There is no Argive sacrifice to interrupt, the Argives are not scared into leaving as they are in Xenophon, and certainly not driven from the sanctuary as they are in Plutarch. The narrative has become so sanitised that Agesilaus achieves his aims without conflict, while the Argives still show cowardice and hold the memorably absurd second games. The rivalry for the presidency of the games is won without recourse to any morally dubious show of force in the sanctuary. This is a clear indication that the level of force is key to the interpretive scheme of the accounts. Pausanias moves on from the events at Isthmia, mentions some victories, before finishing with Agesilaus' death in old age. In doing so he manages to finish an account of Agesilaus' life without reference to the battle of Leuctra or the Theban invasion of the Peloponnese.[68] This alone indicates that we are dealing with a sympathetic account of his life.[69] For Isthmia, that means no reference to fighting or disrupting a sacrifice.

The struggle for the Isthmian Games is another instance of states competing for influence at the Panhellenic sanctuaries. Unlike the

Sacred Wars at Delphi, the war was not fought just to control the sanctuary, yet the sanctuary did become a platform for the wider conflict. The Argives and pro-Argive Corinthians used the games to demonstrate their union and their control of Corinth's assets, religious and civic. Agesilaus countered this demonstration with his own, using the threat of his army to restore the exiled Corinthians to their prestigious presidency, demonstrating their legitimacy, their power, and Sparta's intention and ability to resist the Argives.[70] The ongoing conflict is acted out through access to the sanctuary. While Agesilaus may have ruined the Argive sacrifice, he presented himself as the protector of the games, not its destructor. This is another disputed narrative, in which the degree of force used and the attitude of the leader help to express the legitimacy or otherwise of the parties involved.

After the intervention at Isthmia, the night before his attack on Peiraeum, Agesilaus' troops were stationed on the heights of Mt. Lutraki. They became cold so he sent for fire to warm them and their food. That night, Xenophon tells us, the temple of Poseidon went up in flames (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.4).[71] The fire is visible in the archaeology: 'the fifth century temple was largely destroyed, with its remains showing indications of fire'.[72] It has been suggested that Xenophon intended it to be inferred that Agesilaus was responsible for the fire.[73] This seems unlikely, and others have argued the opposite, that Xenophon made this apparently casual reference to refute suspicions or allegations of his guilt:

> One suspects that Agesilaus had been criticised for his conduct of the battle [of Coronea], as perhaps, he had been blamed for the burning of the temple of Poseidon in 390 which was, so suspiciously for Spartan superstition, followed the next day by the Pathos in Lechaeum; Agesilaus, with admirable resource and solicitude for his men, provided fire for the cooking of their supper, but 'no one knew who was responsible for the burning of the temple.' (*Hell*. 4.5.4) and so Agesilaus was in no sense to be blamed for the Pathos.[74]

Nor was Agesilaus the last person seen at the site. Sources agree that games were held there again once the Spartans had left; they would hardly have done so after a conflagration. More pertinently, it must be asked what Agesilaus would have gained from such destruction. He had been presenting himself as the sanctuary's protector, keeping it safe for the pro-Spartan Corinthians. Burning a Panhellenic

sanctuary would have done nothing positive for his reputation or for Spartan authority in general. It seems unlikely he would have been so rash. Distancing Agesilaus from allegations of impiety would be more in keeping with the rest of Xenophon's work. So devastating a fire following so unseemly a row would doubtless have invited suspicion; and yet without deigning to address allegations directly, Xenophon does seem to distance Agesilaus from responsibility for the fire. To George Cawkwell (above), a refutation of arson at the sanctuary is a refutation of responsibility for the losses at Lechaeum. As we have seen, many scholars consider Xenophon's account of the events at the Heraeum to express causality between the king's behaviour *there* and the defeat of the troops at Lechaeum.[75] It is telling that Agesilaus was involved or suspected of being involved in so many dubious incidents that there could be a choice of candidates for the cause of divine retribution.

If it was not the Spartans, who was it? It seems unlikely that the Corinthians would willingly wreck their celebrated site. The most likely candidates are surely the Argives, who might have seen this as an opportunity to limit the chance of the site being used to advance the pro-Spartan Corinthians' prestige, and, after the passing of the sanctuary at Nemea, to make Argive sanctuaries the only real rivals to Olympia in the Peloponnese. But, as Xenophon notes, no one knows who did it. It could even have been an accident (akin to Thuc. 4.133). If it was arson, no one was claiming responsibility.

OLYMPIA AND THE ARCADIAN–ELEAN WAR

Xenophon's account of the events at Olympia during the Arcadian–Elean War of 364–362 makes it so clear that the events were sacrilegious that there is no need to look for details indicating his criticism or approval. Control of the sanctuary at Olympia was not the purpose of the war, but it became a fundamental part of its development, in both pragmatic and symbolic terms.

Much of the conflict centred on the communities surrounding Elis, and whether they would be Elean, Elean allies, or independent communities with Arcadian backing. The Pisatans lived in Elean territory by the sanctuary of Olympia. They had probably never run the sanctuary, but their emerging 'separatist tendencies' found expression in the desire to run the games.[76] This desire had been showing its head

since at least the end of the Spartan–Elean War, when the Pisatans were most likely the people who Sparta decided not to give the games to (Chapter 6, 'Olympia in the Spartan–Elean War'). Olympia had numerous foundation stories, so there was plenty of scope for the sort of disputes about administration that occurred between Mycenae and Cleonae for Nemea.[77] When conflict between Elis and the Arcadian league ignited, the Arcadians separated the Pisatans from Elis and gave them *polis*-like powers: to issue decrees, form alliances, and mint coins.[78] At first this did not affect Olympia, but as the conflict unfolded it would have profound consequences for the sanctuary.

Xenophon presents the Arcadians as pushy and boastful. He describes how, when the Spartans won a victory over them, everyone was so exasperated with the Arcadians that even the Eleans and Thebans were pleased (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.32). There is no lead personality amongst Xenophon's Arcadians, but they have one in their ally, Euphron of Sicyon, whom Xenophon characterises in detail. He is an oligarch who turned democrat to cling on to power; he betrays his friends to join the revolution, and the Arcadians accept him. He buys mercenaries, 'sparing neither the public nor the sacred funds', and was 'manifestly a tyrant' (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.44–6). Eventually he is murdered. Xenophon includes a lengthy speech defending the murder, which cites Euphron's injustices and theft of Sicyon's sacred property; the speech is accepted and the murderers escape punishment (Xen. *Hell*. 7.3.4–12). This sub-narrative tells its own tale about the war, but also prefigures the actions of the Arcadians, guiding our judgement of them.

Tyrants had a long association with sacrilege. We have seen how Herodotus developed a pre-existing discourse on the connection between despotism and sacrilege in his depictions of archaic and early classical figures. This remained pertinent in the face of fourth-century despotism. Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, is infamous for his appropriation of sacred funds. Diodorus describes how Dionysius paid for his mercenary army by leading a raid on an Etruscan temple at Agylle, taking 1,500 talents worth of plunder after overpowering a small number of guards (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3–4). There were raids against Croton and Epizephyrian Locris.[79] Most infamous was his alleged attempt to plunder Delphi (Diod. Sic. 15.13.1–3). More typical of Greek tyrants was the plundering of his own people's temples and wealth. Following the pattern laid down by Hiero (Xen. *Hiero*, 4.11, see Chapter 3, 'Nicias and the Sanctuary of Zeus at

Syracuse'), he took from the temples of Syracuse (Ps-Arist. *Oec*. 2.1349A–B; Ps-Arist. *Oec*. 2.1353B; Plut. *De Iside*. 71; Polyaenus, 5.2.19), as well as robbing orphans and issuing confiscations. It was these temple-robberies that had called forth the complaints of his army (Diod. Sic. 14.67–9, see Part I, 'How to Behave in an Army').

Precisely because Dionysius was a tyrant, many traditions about him are infused with embellishments and negative interpretations of his actions stemming from deeply hostile parties at Athens.[80] The allegation that he sent troops to raid Delphi, for example, is probably not literally true.[81] The plundering of the Italian temples is plausible; the use of wealth from Syracusan sanctuaries even more so. In a sense, what Dionysius was doing with the Syracusan dedications was not essentially different to the Athenians' use of theirs, or the Corinthians' similar actions. And yet his appropriations may have been perceived differently, even in Syracuse, because of the political difference that while the Athenians and Corinthians made group decisions, this was the decision of one man. A despot's actions could easily be perceived as lacking legitimacy. The other difference, of course, is that the Syracusan tyrants spent not only on war, but on maintaining a lavish lifestyle and shoring up their positions. But even the military aspect of Dionysius' spending must have had its impact on the behaviour of other states who witnessed his increased capacity to make war. In this sense, J.K. Davies is right to argue that Dionysius was the model for an increased use of sacred funds in the fourth century, even if this use was not entirely innovative and not as cavalier or impious as Dionysius' detractors claimed.[82] Euphron of Sicyon was not the only one to notice the potential that sacred funds represented, but like Dionysius, his reputation was largely defined by hostile responses to the rule-bending of the individual rather than the group.

The Arcadians' first move at Olympia was to stockade the hill of Cronus, becoming 'masters of the Olympian mountain' (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.14). The hill is directly beyond the sanctuary to the north, running along the edge with the treasuries and track. We do not yet hear of them using the sanctuary itself, but their presence must have created access problems for the Eleans, who were struggling to keep them out of Elis. The occupation seems to be as much about this access to Elis and its *perioikic* communities as it is to the sanctuary. Things escalated when their attention shifted back to Olympia after a campaign elsewhere:

> They occupied themselves again with the Eleans, and they not only kept Olympia more strongly garrisoned, but also, since an Olympic year was coming on, prepared to celebrate the Olympic Games in company with the Pisatans, who say that they were the first to have charge of the sanctuary. (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.28)

Xenophon's choice of details here reveals some of the dynamics at work. The Arcadians and Pisatans need each other: the Arcadians claiming legitimacy at the games through their partnership with the Pisatans, the Pisatans relying on the Arcadians' strength to gain rights they were refused by the Eleans.[83] Xenophon's expression '*who say* that they were the first' casts doubt on those claims, while the more sympathetic Diodorus relates that they 'revived the ancient fame of their land and using certain ancient mythical proofs declared that the right of conducting the Olympics was theirs' (Diod. Sic. 15.78.2).

The Eleans, with Achaean allies, marched on the games. Xenophon remarks that 'the Arcadians had never imagined that the Eleans would come against them' (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.29). This must be a reference to the Arcadians' military confidence, as the preparations to defend Olympia in 420, as well as Agis' visit during the Spartan–Elean War, meant it was no longer inconceivable that an army would march on Olympia. The account of the battle is unusually long. Xenophon details the Eleans' advance, drawing out the sacred nature of the site: the space between the racecourse and the altar… the sacred precinct… battle-line on the River Cladaus, which flows past the Altis… pushing the enemy towards the altar… pelted from the roofs of the porticoes, the council-house, and the great temple (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.29–31). Xenophon expresses his support for the Eleans by depicting only them sacrificing and by observing that while the Eleans had always been despised in war they fought magnificently on this day (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.30). This implies divine involvement, confirmed in a later reference that compliments the Eleans even in their withdrawal:

> As for the Eleans, when they returned on the next day and saw that the stockade was a strong one and that many men had climbed up on the temples, they withdrew to their city, having shown themselves such men in point of valour as a god no doubt could produce by his inspiration even in a day, but human creatures could not make even in a long time out of those who were not valiant. (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.32)

Only a god could have made the Eleans as brave as they were on this occasion. This is a ringing endorsement not only of their bravery, but also, by implication, of their right to pursue this conflict in the manner in which they did. For Xenophon, this appears to fall into the category of it being acceptable to act violently within a sanctuary as long as it is your own and the provocation is extreme. We have seen that he did not much credit the Pisatans' claims, and the Arcadians' position was tenuous. No doubt if the Arcadians had displaced the Eleans and conquered the territory fully, their administration of the games would have accrued legitimacy over time, but by ploughing ahead with the games at this early stage, they appeared invasive. Part of what is fascinating about this episode, however, is that plenty of people had turned up for the games. The events were already going ahead. The Arcadians were also joined by mainstream allies, 'about 2000 Argive hoplites and about 400 Athenian horsemen' (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.33). The Pisatans' legitimacy was more widely accepted than the narrative suggests.

As the narrative continues, however, it reveals further signs of the Arcadians' de-legitimising actions: 'the leaders of the Arcadians were using the sacred treasures' for pay. There is no talk of borrowing, and it seems clear that the league have been using other people's dedications, not dedications made by their own cities in former times. This makes the appropriation different from the (still-) controversial use of treasures suggested by the Corinthians during the Peloponnesian War. The leagues' own members turned against the culprits. The Mantineans voted against using sacred funds and found their portion from their own pocket (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.33). Xenophon adds further third-party judgement on the Arcadian leaders, saying that 'others were soon saying in the meeting of the Ten Thousand that they ought not to use the sacred treasures, or to leave to their children for all time such an offence in the eyes of the gods' (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.34). Xenophon does not need to criticise the Arcadians in his authorial voice when he can have the allies themselves condemn the actions and name their likely consequences. 'Such of the Arcadian leaders as had handled the sacred treasures' realise that they are likely to be executed and call on Thebes for help. Xenophon has slowed the pace of the narrative right down, and offers insights into the personal thoughts and motives of individuals he does not know. Through this presentation of the

negotiations, Xenophon has the Arcadians self-accusing and taints the Thebans for good measure.

When a truce is agreed, Xenophon flips the approach used to describe the end of the Spartan–Elean War and refers only to religious reasoning:

> [The assembly] reasoned that they had no desire for war. For they held that they had no desire for the presidency of the shrine of Zeus, but that they would be acting more justly as well as more righteously if they gave it back, and that in this way, as they supposed, they would please the god better. Now since the Eleans also were desirous of this course, both parties resolved to make peace; and a truce was concluded. (Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.35)

The war that began as a dispute over territory and alliances is ended as a confirmation of Elean presidency, with no reference to political arrangements. This reinforces the idea that religious reasons were not mentioned regarding the earlier war because they have shown would too clearly that the Spartans were on dangerous ground.

The Arcadians' looting had demonstrated that it was they, not the Pisatans who were in charge of events at Olympia. That the Arcadians, not the Pisatans, negotiated the truce and management of the sanctuary also demonstrates that the Pisatans had essentially been puppets.[84] As Jim Roy notes, the Pisatans are at times dropped from the narrative. While Xenophon, Diodorus, and Pausanias refer to the Arcadians and Pisatans running the games of 364, Pausanias could also refer to them as the games the Arcadians ran (Paus. 6.8.3, 6.22.3). The Eleans declared the games invalid and issued coins joining their name with Olympia.[85] While normality was restored at Olympia, the events of this war contribute to the building sense of chaos that characterises the dispirited end of the *Hellenica*.

DELPHI: THE THIRD SACRED WAR

To treat all the players in this war in detail would require another volume and take us beyond the chronological scope of this book, yet it would not do to avoid this seismic conflict in a study of conflict and sacred space.[86] We have seen that competition for control of the Panhellenic sanctuaries drew strong responses from the Greek states, and that Delphi was particularly motivating in this respect. The Third Sacred War, knowledge of which comes primarily from Diodorus,

repeated and escalated some of the common tropes of wars fought to control Panhellenic shrines. The Phocians' designs on Delphi had probably never entirely subsided. Feeling vulnerable, the Delphians allied with Thebes. Through the Amphictyony they isolated their rivals by issuing massive fines: against Phocis for cultivating sacred land, and against the Phocians' potential back-up, Sparta, for occupying the Cadmea (see Chapter 5, 'The Seizure of the Theban Acropolis') (Diod. Sic. 16.23ff).[87] There was concern for the safety of Delphi around this time, with a declaration reasserting the Delphians' rights to administer the sacred treasure and forbidding armies from coming to the sanctuary.[88] The Delphians were right to be nervous; the fines were rejected, and Phocis went further, seizing the sanctuary and adding a defensive wall, allegedly with the backing of the Spartan king, Archidamus (Diod. Sic. 16.24.1–2; 16.28.2).[89] Slowing the narrative to include this incriminating detail, Diodorus depicts the Phocian leader, Philomelus, outlining his plan to take Delphi in a secret conversation with the king, ensuring that Archidamus and Sparta are implicated in all that follows. The Amphictyonic Council declared war. There was no battle in the sanctuary itself, but when the Phocians suffered setbacks, they looted Delphi's treasuries to pay for mercenaries (Diod. Sic. 16.30ff). The scale of the plunder was certainly great, estimated at 10,000 talents (Diod. Sic. 16.56.6), with the more likely 5,000 'still a gigantic sum'.[90]

Because of these events, the Phocians are known to history as 'the impious Phocians'. The scale of the plunder made the situation unusual, but there are a number of factors that suggest that it was an almost inevitable development of previous trends. We have seen that several states had been using their own sacred wealth for war for some years, while Dionysius' votive-fuelled spending on mercenaries had re-enforced the perceived potential of both. Typically, however, these conversions had the legitimacy of being an internal matter, a civic decision made by the original dedicators. Even when the Corinthians suggested using funds at Delphi and Olympia, they seem to have been referring to their own treasuries. The Arcadian and Pisatans had stretched the limits of this definition, and their plundering of Panhellenic votives at Olympia must have shown Delphians and Phocians alike what was possible at Delphi.[91] The Phocians were following in the Arcadians' footsteps, which placed them on dubious ground, but it should be noted that they were not passing marauders

stopping by to raid Delphi, this was spending by a state that had assumed the right to administer the site permanently. They had worked on legitimising their claim, citing Homer as evidence (Diod. Sic. 16.23.5–6; *Il.* 2.517–19), and sending out multiple ambassadors declaring their ancient rights to guardianship. But they had also supported their claim by declaring that they had no designs on Delphi's assets (Diod. Sic. 16.24.5; 16.27.3–4). The Athenians, Spartans and others accepted the Phocians' legitimacy, but Thebes and others did not (16.27.4–5). Their claim therefore remained highly controversial even before it was undermined by the melting down of treasures.[92] Both major allies had backed Phocis before the plundering had begun, and although they maintained their alliances afterwards, and even accepted payment, the Phocians were increasingly isolated. The Athenians and Spartans appear to have hung on only because the war had escalated so far, making the risk of divine punishment preferable to domination from Thebes or their new backers, Macedon (Diod. Sic. 16.57.1–4).[93]

The political situation in Phocis also replicated some of the factors that facilitated the use of votives for finance elsewhere. In the build-up to the war, Phocis was ruled by a very narrow oligarchy, not by the *koinon* of the region. Philomelus, 'a man of unusual audacity and lawlessness', was in charge when the sanctuary was seized, having had himself named general with supreme power (Diod. Sic. 23.1; 16.23.6–24.1). Onomarchus replaced him. When he faced opposition in relation to the treasure, his opponents were executed and he too declared himself *strategos autocratos* (Diod. Sic. 16.32.2–33.3). Ancient sources discussing the occupation refer to the 'tyrants of the Phocians'.[94] This continues the popular association of tyranny and sacrilege, but it also seems to have been a political arrangement that genuinely facilitated the use of the votives as capital. As despots, the *strategoi* had no need to obtain consensus, while the mercenaries who joined Onomarchus were not invested in his decision as fellow citizens, they simply accepted payment. Although they were represented as men of ill repute (Diod. Sic. 16.30) and eventually held responsible for accepting sacred money (Diod. Sic. 16.35.6), it is easy to see how the mercenary system loosened their sense of responsibility for where the money came from.[95]

With his explicit criticism of the *strategoi* and mercenaries' characters, Diodorus guided the reader through a hostile interpretation

of events. Several further familiar tropes contribute to a negative view of the participants. It is noticeable, for example, that there are no scenes describing the *strategoi* sacrificing at Delphi, although they must have done so. As with Lysander at Athens and the Spartans at Thebes, the absence of sacrifice-scenes ensures that the legitimacy implied by that ritual is not expressed. By contrast, there is reference to the massacre of Delphi's priestly family, the Thracidae (Diod. Sic. 16.24.3). Delphi maintained the archaic practice of appointing from within a *gene*. The destruction of that *gene* removed them as rivals, but also evidenced the Phocians' illegitimacy. The Pythia was kept alive, but her vulnerability is alluded to by a story of historical rape. Philomelus forces her onto the tripod and wilfully misinterprets her words in a manner that demonstrates his over-confidence (Diod. Sic. 16.25.3–16.27.2).[96] Past examples have shown what a difference priest-narratives make: the mythical Ajax rapes a priestess, Miltiades imprisons one, Cleomenes has a priest whipped, and Agesilaus ignores one, all within narratives shaped to express their wrongdoing more broadly and to anticipate future troubles.[97] With the murder of this family-group and the rough treatment of the Pythia, Diodorus expresses how hasty and illegitimate the take-over of the sanctuary was, as well as its viciousness.

Previous on-site attempts to loot Delphi were reportedly stopped by divine intervention (e.g. Hdt. 8.36–9; *FGrHist*. 688F. 13.28–9, Chapter 6, 'Nemea and Delphi'). This war forced a compromise. It was too clear that the sanctuary had been plundered to pretend otherwise; however, stories were told which showed that the god was not completely indifferent or powerless. According to these traditions, the initial plundering went ahead unchecked, but when the Phocians tried to dig up the temple for more, an earthquake scared them away (Diod. Sic. 16. 56.7–8; Strabo, 9.3.8). More was to follow and, overall, book 16 of the *Bibliotheke* has a disproportionate number of references to the divine, all contributing to the anticipation and then realisation of divine vengeance.[98] The perpetrators were said to suffer eventually in a number of appropriate and gruesome ways that evoke the nemesis inflicted on Herodotean wrong-doers (e.g. Diod. Sic. 16.31.4; 16.56.4–5; 16.58.4–6; 16.61–64.3; 16.78.3–79.2; Plut. *Timo*. 30.7–10).[99] The ultimate proof of their illegitimacy, and the guarantor of their bad reputation, was their defeat in the war, which was followed by massive fines and the destruction of Phocis-city (Diod. Sic. 16.57.1, 16.60.1–2;

Tod, 2.172). Further factors embedded their reputation. This war was a turning-point in Greek history and affected more states than the Arcadian–Elean War, circumstances which helped to confirm the significance of the plundering of Delphi in the public imagination. The plundering also received more literary coverage.[100] At the same time, the release of precious metals from the sanctuary coincided with its release from other sources; the sudden increase in the presence of gold and silver must have exaggerated the impression of how much was taken.[101] This combination of factors meant that, although their actions were not fundamentally different, the Phocians became known as the 'impious Phocians' in a way that the Arcadians avoided.

Athens and Sparta were disgraced by their involvement, Diodorus says (16.57.4).[102] When Archidamus later died, it is said that while he was praised for his conduct generally, he was criticised for the alliance with Phocis and blamed for the seizure of Delphi (16.63.1). He had not approved the plundering, but his involvement was incriminating and continued his father's tradition of controversial interventions into sanctuary affairs. Although the use of Delphi's wealth only extended a pre-existing phenomenon, in their wrangling for Delphi, Athens, Sparta, Phocis, and Thebes drew Macedon into their contest. A further Sacred War followed, but even by the end of the Third, the Greek political and religious landscape had changed forever.

FIGHTING FOR SANCTUARIES

In this torrent of examples we have seen wars fought explicitly to control Delphi, with further evidence that a number of wars ostensibly about other matters were, at a fundamental level, about influence at the Panhellenic sanctuaries. The Spartans, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, and Thebans can all be seen conducting wars of this sort, suggesting that the Panhellenic sanctuaries were a perpetual source of conflict. Although the case is less clear, it seems likely that competition for less prestigious sanctuaries may also have sparked a number of wars, with the sanctuaries as the sought-after prizes. The continuing struggle for influence at the Panhellenic sites demonstrates the force of the cultural imperative that was driving this behaviour. These wars largely conform to the pattern evidenced in a number of other conflicts, in which what is sought is the right to

honour and organise, not plunder and destroy, however the violent events at Olympia and particularly at Nemea, show that these priorities could shift, if only in extreme circumstances. The destruction at Nemea remains an intriguing exception to usual practice and it would be valuable for more to be uncovered about it. The plundering of Olympia and Delphi emerged from an imbalance in the growing practice of states using their own dedications as funds. Neither the Pisatans nor the Phocians seem to have taken the sanctuaries for their wealth, but for their prestige; however once their positon was threatened, they turned what was becoming normal elsewhere into an attack on the Panhellenic system. Their actions were virulently condemned (even by some members of their own groups), but nonetheless, they irreparably changed the Greeks' relationship with the wealth of sanctuaries.

Conclusions

Above all, the examples examined above have demonstrated the fundamental importance of ownership and legitimacy in the interpretation of actions in sacred spaces. The side confident of its ownership could act in a sanctuary in a way that would be unacceptable for an outsider. This refers not only to the issue of whether or not someone was entitled to sacrifice, but to more clearly military actions such as fortifying and garrisoning, in which the sanctuary might be used to muster, sally forth and retreat, and, in desperation, as a place in which to fight. Some sanctuaries might never be used in this manner, but a state had no need for qualms if the situation seemed to require it. The short-term use of one's own or one's allies' sanctuaries for military camping seems to have been entirely normal. The use of a hostile party's sanctuary for these same purposes seems to have been viewed differently, and there are relatively few examples of people doing so, which should be taken as indicative of the historical reality. When it did occur, it was a recognised ground for complaint that could damage the aggressor's social standing, even if other states did not respond directly to those complaints. Blocking a community's access to their sanctuaries was an effective way of damaging their morale. The indirect use of sanctuary borders as protective cover by either side seems to have been tolerated. Some found the presence of sanctuaries beside the battlefield encouraging, others found it less significant. As the deity's role could not be reliably predicted it was essentially determined after the event.

In most cases, sanctuaries remained in the care of the communities that had always run them. Determining which communities ran the

Panhellenic sanctuaries was a perpetual concern for the major states, prompting numerous wars to enforce the rights of a preferred party, and even motivating wars only tangentially connected to the sanctuaries as an indirect form of influence. The battles fought within the sanctuaries at Olympia and Nemea were extreme and unusual, but nonetheless indicative of the intensity of feeling attached to the right to administer Panhellenic sites. Other sanctuaries could become an extra prize in a war of conquest and, as a public announcement of the control of the territory in which they lay and a prestigious prize in their own right, they could even be a goal for war. But this was not a prize that could be grasped too eagerly. Unless a change of territory-ownership was clear, it was unwise to become involved with enemy sanctuaries. Over-hasty attempts to take control could lead rapidly to diplomatic ignominy and embarrassing climb-downs. This was particularly the case if the existing personnel were still present. Far better to wait until circumstances were clear. The aim would then be to demonstrate conspicuous devotion; this is conquest by acts of worship, not by sacking. For this reason, the role of collaborators recurs as an important issue, from the Ionians and Athenians helping Xerxes, to Toroneans helping Brasidas, and the Thebans killed for assisting Sparta through ritual means. Collaborators offered a bridge between insiders and outsiders that provided religious as well as political legitimacy. While some acts of sacrilege (such as Cleomenes' possibly ahistorical burning of suppliants) were driven by ruthless opportunism, or by desperation, many were a question of perception, approved by some and resented by others. At the extreme end of warfare, when a city fell to total destruction, the major sanctuary was likely to be maintained by the victors, another act with a mixture of religious and political meanings. But only the major cults appear to have been maintained in these circumstances, and the duration of that maintenance depended on individual circumstances, from permanent arrangements to much briefer ones.

Small-scale sanctuary plundering in land not intended for conquest must have happened from time to time, but there is remarkably little evidence of its occurrence. The risk of divine punishment and social disgrace do seem to have prevented it from becoming a frequent feature of Greek warfare. Cities' decisions to begin using their own dedications (rather than money only stored in sanctuaries) as emergency capital did eventually have an effect on

this custom, however, particularly the use of dedications at Delphi during the Peloponnesian War. The acceleration of using domestic and looted dedications by the fourth-century tyrants was another significant step, blurring the lines further. This normalisation of dedication-spending suggested the possibility and offered an apparent legitimisation of the use of wealth by those seizing control of the Panhellenic shrines. Nonetheless, it must be noted that those who did so still did not enjoy actual legitimisation of their actions. They had acted too fast, without waiting for their position to be widely recognised, their actions stemmed from a narrow rule, and they extended the right to spend too far, taking things dedicated by others, not only by themselves. But although their actions shook the ideal of inviolability, they were still not those of plundering raiders, so much as the product of an over-interpretation of existing practice and their own legitimacy.

Accounts of military interactions with sacred sites were fundamental to the way that views on particular wars, states, and individuals were articulated. The story of Cleomenes at the Heraeum expresses everything of the Argives' hostility to Sparta; Brasidas dedicating at Lecythus and heroised at Amphipolis offers a microcosm of his diplomatic success in the north; Agesilaus' fight with the Boeotarchs' riders at Aulis summarises the breakdown in Spartan–Theban relations and anticipates the trouble that would bring. The reason that it is hard to be definite about exactly when access rights to a sanctuary changed is that there was no definite answer to that question even at the time. This gave stories about military conduct a powerful charge, with disputed narratives competing between cities and even within them. These memories and stories lasted a long time; Plutarch depicts the Thebans talking about Aulis some 20 years after the event, while the written traditions of it never disappeared. The subtleties of these accounts were profoundly meaningful. Striking details such as Pausanias' tears at Plataea or Philomelus manhandling the Pythia helped to make stories memorable and guided interpretation. What was said; who touched what; was the sacrifice complete? Did Agesilaus put the Corinthians off coming to Isthmia, or did he interrupt them there? Did Miltiades leave Paros because of a missile from a sanctuary, or did he flee a sanctuary? References to the treatment of sacrificial items or priests and priestesses are particularly powerful motifs in these narratives,

and it is fair to say that priests and priestesses only appear in them in order for us to observe how they are treated. The deportment of the leader involved is crucial. Far from the act of sacrifice itself being the only important matter, the manner in which the sacrifice is conducted is hugely significant as an expression of the legitimacy or otherwise of the whole campaign. Laughing, pushing, ignoring instructions, or otherwise being haughty or obnoxious could all be cited as evidence of the illegitimacy of the leader which reflected upon the legitimacy of their whole campaign. Whenever a military leader is depicted sacrificing, it is worth asking why that scene has been included; it is never simply because it happened.

The examples of hostile representations of interactions with sacred space demonstrate how strong the association between religious impropriety and despotism was. The connection between sacrilege and tyranny has been identified for many years, particularly in the more egregious examples of Herodotean tyrants. However, it is apparent that this association is also present in the less explicit examples, such as the hostile view of the Athenian invasion of Paros, the Spartan occupation of Thebes and their hegemony more broadly. Despotism and injustice are almost always the subtext of hostile traditions about sanctuaries and it is this aspect as much as the related suggestion of offence to the divine that enables these stories to express a perception of illegitimacy. Some of these traditions relate to groups, such as 'the Athenians' at Delium, however, it is noticeable that, as with the Trojan War examples from early literature, behaving controversially in sanctuaries is largely depicted as an elite activity. This manifests in the conspicuous number of colourful episodes in which the Spartan kings personally step over the boundaries. A common soldier's minor act of temple-robbery is of far less interest to a Greek historian than, say, Archidamus secretly approving the occupation of Delphi, or Cleomenes' exchange with the priestess of Athena. The actions of a Miltiades or an Agesilaus have both a Homeric quality and the ability to summarise the despotic quality of foreign policies.

The desire to articulate these narratives pushed cultural expression as parties worked to make their own versions compelling to themselves and other communities. People faced (and face) choices about what stories they tell about their wars, about the values they felt had been upheld or flouted, and the consequences they

regarded as having happened or being due. Stories about sacred space expressed moral judgements more effectively than many other forms of story, as the values they worked with were shared Panhellenically and they had clear political implications. If a person (or state) would act against those above them in the social hierarchy (i.e. against the gods and their values), they would not scruple to be unjust to their equals or inferiors. Historians altered the dynamic of this mode of storytelling and complaint through their ability to prefer one version over another, or to place competing versions alongside one another. And while the detail of these stories had always mattered, historians learned to capture these details minutely, emphasising subtleties of action and expression, and echoing previous stories and scenarios. Hindsight had always been important to the interpretation of omens and the identification of divine vengeance and rewards, and historians were able to take this further, weaving together incident and outcome in a way that connected the unfolding of history with a sense of overarching justice. They expressed the idea that war is more tolerable when it is fought with respect for the things that matter in peace and they warned against disregard for common values and humanity as being ultimately self-defeating.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. E.g. Y. Garlan, *War in the Ancient World: A Social History* (London, 1975), pp. 57–60; R. Lonis, *Guerre et Religion en Grèce à l'époque Classique: Recherches sur les Rites, les Dieux, l'idéologie de la Victoire* (Paris, 1979); M.D. Goodman and A.J. Holladay, 'Religious scruples in ancient warfare', *Classical Quarterly* 36.1 (1986), pp. 151–71; W.K. Pritchett, *Greek State at War, Part 5* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1991) esp. pp. 160–8; J. Ober, 'Classical Greek times', in M. Howard, G. J. Andreopoulos, and M.R. Shulman (eds), *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven and London, 1994), pp. 12–26; P. Krentz, 'Fighting by the rules: the invention of the hoplite *agon*', *Hesperia* 71.1 (2002), pp. 23–39; H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), pp. 119–21.
2. Esp. J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford, 1963); H.P. Stahl, *Thucydides: Man's Place in History* (Swansea, 2003); N. Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion* (Konigstein, 1981); M. Cogan, *The Human Thing: The Speeches and Principles of Thucydides' History* (Chicago, 1981b); C. Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton, 1994); J. Price, *Thucydides and Internal War* (Cambridge, 2001).
3. Esp. H.R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Ohio, 1966); D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1989); T. Harrison, *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus* (Oxford, 2000b).
4. Esp. V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London, 1989); C.J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon's Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart, 1993); J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London and New York, 1995).
5. See A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1993), p. 113, while Aristotelian ethics may have formalised this view, it 'reflected general attitudes of Greek morality'. Also C. Gill,

'The question of character-development: Plutarch and Tacitus', *Classical Quarterly* 33.2 (1983), pp. 469–87; C. Gill, 'The character-personality distinction', in C. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 1–31; C. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue* (Oxford, 1996); T. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 72–98. With Arist. *Nic.Eth.* esp. 1103A 24 –1103B 25; Plato esp. *Rep*. 497B; Plut. *De virtute morali. Mor.* 443C.

6. The distinction between history and biography will be respected with regard to the *Lives*, on which see Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography*, pp. 1–7, 23–64; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives,* pp. 14–30; B. Gentili and G. Cerri, *History and Biography in Ancient Thought* (Amsterdam, 1988).

PART I BOUNDARIES OF CULTURE AND SPACE

1. For further detail on types of divine figures, see e.g. W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 125–214. For chthonic deities, J.W. Hewitt, 'The major restrictions on access to Greek temples', *TAPA* 40 (1909), pp. 83–91.
2. D. Birge, 'Trees in the landscape of Pausanias' *Periegesis*', in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods*, 231–45; M. Dillon, 'The ecology of the Greek sanctuary', *ZPE* 118 (1997), pp. 113–27.
3. See esp. E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica* (London, 1989); with E. Kearns, 'Between god and man: status and function of heroes and their sanctuaries', in A. Schachter (ed.), *Le Sanctuaire Grec* (Geneva, 1992), pp. 65–108. For founder cults, see esp. I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1987), esp. pp. 200–3.
4. Cult activity at these sites was more likely to take the form of one-off visits rather than regular civic festivals, C.M. Antonaccio, 'Placing the past: The Bronze Age in the cultic topography of early Greece', in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods*, pp. 79–104, at p. 90.
5. See R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 160–70; A. Schachter (ed.), *Le Sanctuaire grec* (Geneva, 1992); N. Marinatos and R. Hägg, *Greek Sanctuaries: New Approaches* (London and New York, 1993). For an introductory overview, see J. Pedley, *Sanctuaries and the Sacred in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 2005).
6. Pedley, *Sanctuaries*, pp. 57–8. Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 161–3; Boundary stones, see examples from Megara Hyblaia (*LSCG* 32), in de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), pp. 254–6; with R. Parker, *Athenian Religion*: *A History* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 144–5; S. Price, *Religions of the Ancient Greeks* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 65.
7. Nemea, see D.E. Birge, 'The sacred square', in D.E. Birge *et al.* (eds), *Excavations at Nemea: Topographical and Architectural Studies: The Sacred Square, the Xenon, and the Bath* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1992),

pp. 1–98; with S.G. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1978', *Hesperia* 48.1 (1979), pp. 73–103, 81–3.

8. *IG* I^3 84 (*LSCG* 14), discussed in Parker, *Miasma*, p. 161.
9. Schachter, *Le Sanctuaire Grec*; Burkert, *Greek Religion*, pp. 87–8; Pedley, *Sanctuaries*, pp. 7–8, 16.
10. The term 'adyton' ('not to be entered') is sometimes used for these rooms, although the more generic 'opisthodomos' ('place behind') is frequently more appropriate. 'Abaton' ('not to be stepped on') is also used, although again, this is not appropriate to every temple's inner room. M.B. Hollinshead, '"Adyton", "opisthodomos", and the inner room of the Greek temple', *Hesperia* 68.3 (1999), pp. 189–218, discusses the terminology and uses of these spaces, concluding that while 'the defining characteristic of any *adyton* is restricted access' (p. 194), not every inner-temple room is an *adyton*, and even those that were frequently restricted access to protect property rather than for ritual reasons. Also see Parker, *Miasma*, p. 167, on the taboos around this form of space. D. Harris, *The Treasures of the Parthenon and Erechtheion* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 64–5, notes that the Parthenon seems to have been designed with a large interior, all the better for housing numerous items; it also had a lockable door.
11. Some were available for this sort of use, others were not. Birge, 'Trees', pp. 238–45, regulations and shelter, p. 243; with Dillon, 'The ecology of the Greek sanctuary', esp. 115–20, for extensive examples of sacred laws governing the protection of trees. At Nemea, the sacred grove was close to the altar and temple, see Birge, 'The sacred square', pp. 85–96.
12. Birge, 'Trees', pp. 234–5.
13. For examples of *xoana*, see Burkert *Greek Religion*, p. 91, n. 90, with pp. 88–92 on cult statues more broadly. With I.B. Romano, 'Early Greek cult images and cult practices', in R. Hägg *et al*. (eds), *Early Greek Cult Practice* (Stockholm, 1988), pp. 127–34, and K. Lapatin, 'New statues for old gods', in J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine (eds), *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations* (Edinburgh, 2010), pp. 126–51, on the simultaneous importance of new and old statues.
14. I.C. Rutherford, '*Theoria* and *darsan*: pilgrimage and vision in Greece and India', *Classical Quarterly* 50.1 (2000), pp. 133–46, esp. pp. 144–6.
15. Practice in Early Iron Age, see C. Morgan, 'The evolution of a "sacral" landscape: Isthmia, Perachora, and the early Corinthian state', pp. 105–42, at 115, in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods*: *Sanctuaries and Sacred Space in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994). Later restrictions on the use of sanctuary utensils, see Parker, *Miasma*, p. 170, n. 149 for examples, e.g.: *LSCG* 116.22–5; *LSC Supp*. 24, 27, 117; *LSA* 74.
16. See Harris, *Treasures*, esp. pp. 20–39 on Athenian inventories. Votives, see e.g. H. Kyrieleis, 'Offerings of "the common man" in the Heraion at Samos', in R. Hägg *et al*. (eds), *Early Greek Cult Practice* (Stockholm, 1988), pp. 215–21; Excavation of the Halieis sanctuary of Apollo revealed spits, goat horns, animal bones, knives, swords, spearheads, and cups in and around the temple, see A.J. Mazarakis Ainian, 'Early Greek temples. Their

origin and function', in *Early Greek Cult Practice*, pp. 105–19 at p. 118, n. 47; C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles. The Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century BC* (Cambridge, 1990), esp. pp. 30–9, 43–7, 137–46; A.H. Jackson, 'Hoplites and the gods: the dedication of captured arms and armour', in V.D. Hanson (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London, 1991), pp. 228–49, with Harris, *Treasures*, pp. 107–10; F.T. van Straten, 'Votives and votaries in Greek sanctuaries', in A. Schachter (ed.), *Le Sanctuaire Grec* (Geneva, 1992), pp. 247–84. Overviews in Pedley, *Sanctuaries*, pp. 100–16; Burkert, *Greek Religion*, pp. 68–70; Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 170–5; J. Whitley, *The Archaeology of Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 140–6; 311–13. On the re-use of sanctuary wealth, see below, n. 27.

17. J. Shaya, 'The Greek temple as museum: the case of the legendary treasure of Athena from Lindos', *American Journal of Archaeology* 109.3 (2005), pp. 423–42, at 424; with C. Higbie, 'Homeric Athena in the Chronicle of Lindos', in S. Deacy and A. Villing (eds), *Athena in the Classical World* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2001), pp. 105–26.
18. On pollution, μίασμα, in contrast to what is sacred, ἁγνός, ἱερός, ὅσιος, see esp. Parker, *Miasma*; W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, pp. 75–87, 269–71.
19. In the archaic period, most priesthoods were appointed from within particular *gene*; in the classical period, most were opened up to the whole *demos*. See Parker, *Athenian Religion*, pp. 56–66 and 125–9; L.B. Zaidman and P.S. Pantel, *Religion in the Ancient Greek City* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 46–54. For civic determination of priestly offices, see e.g. *IG* i^3 35, 36 (424/3); appointment of council-members as *hieropoioi*, *IG* I^3 82 (421/0). Also see R.S.J. Garland, 'Religious authority in archaic and classical Greece', *The Annual of the British School at Athens* 79 (1984), pp. 75–123; M. Beard and J. North (eds), *Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the Ancient World* (1990); R. Osborne, 'Archaeology, the Salaminioi, and the politics of sacred space', in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods: Sanctuaries and Sacred Space in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 143–60; W. Burkert, 'Greek *poleis* and civic cults: some further thoughts', in M.H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub (eds), *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart, 1995), pp. 201–10.
20. Hans von Prott and Ludwig Ziehen were ground-breakers in the field, with *LGS I* and *II*; followed by Franciszek Sokolowski, with *LSA*; *LSC Supp.; LSCG*; and Georges Rougemont's *CID*; and more recently E. Lupu's *Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents* (Leiden, 2005).
21. R. Parker, 'What are sacred laws?', in E.M. Harris and L. Rubinstein (eds), *The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece* (2004b), pp. 57–70, esp. 65.
22. See J.K. Davies, 'Temples, credit, and the circulation of money', in A.R. Meadows and K. Shipton, *Money and its uses in the Ancient World* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 117–28, With J.K Davies, 'The Phokian hierosylia at Delphi: quantities and consequences', in N. Sekunda (ed.), *Corolla Cosmo Rodewald* (Gdansk, 2007), pp. 75–96, at pp. 85–6. Decisions might also be referred to an oracle, as testified by a lead roll from Dodona in which a Thessalian community asks Zeus Naios and Dione if it is acceptable to

cultivate a certain portion of sacred land. Davies, 'Temples, credit', p. 122, with n. 31, on *SGDI* 1557.

23. Davies, 'Temples, credit', p. 122, for sacred land disputes including resource grievances. On the administration of sacred land, see Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 160–6; N. Papazarkadas, *Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 2011); A. Williams, 'Leasing of sacred land in 4th century Athens. A reassessment of six inscribed fragments', *Hesperia* 80 (2011), pp. 261–86. Also see T. Howe, 'Pastoralism, the Delphic amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: the creation of Apollo's sacred pastures', *Historia* 52 (2003), pp. 129–46, on the requirements of pasture and their implications. Howe cites *Syll*.^{3} 145, pp. 15–25, which details camping and pasturing arrangements at Delphi, likewise *IG* v^{2}, 3.1–21, pasturing arrangements for citizens and *xenoi* at the festival of Athena Alea, and Xen. *Ana*. 5.3.11–12, in which Xenophon lays out his plans for festival pasturing at his new sanctuary.
24. Parker, *Miasma*, p. 173; Davies, 'Temples, credit', pp. 117–28, Calapodhi: pp. 123–4 with *SEG* xxxvii 422; Hollinshead, '"Adyton", "opisthodomos", p. 209; P. Millet, *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 172, notes that loans were only made from temples at *deme* level, not from the funds on the acropolis, where money only went out 'into empty state coffers'.
25. Davies, 'Temples, credit', pp. 123–6, with *IG* I^{3} 78.
26. Sanctuary costs: Davies, 'Temples, credit', esp. 120; Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', p. 85, n. 49, cites *SEG XXVIII* 103 lines 36–9, an Eleusinian *deme* decree 332/1 determining that income from a quarry on land sacred to Heracles must only be spent on Heracles' festivals.
27. On the re-use of votives, see e.g. Thuc. 2.13.4–5 and *IG* I^{3} 292–316, vessels melted at the end of the Peloponnesian War, with Harris, *Treasures*, esp. pp. 29–38, 61, 114; L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.24* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1993), pp. 103, 196–7; Parker, *Athenian Religion*, p. 244, notes, 'It was, of course, always hoped that the last resort [re-appropriating votives] would not be reached; it is anachronistic to see dedications, which were meant to be seen and admired, simply as public funds in a deposit account. But, psychologically, rich gods symbolized a rich state.'
28. Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 173–5; Davies, 'Temples, credit', p. 125.
29. Davies, 'Temples, credit'; Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 173–4; J.K. Davies, 'The impious Phokians as economic facilitators', The Oxford Princeton Partnership Lectures (Oxford, 2003): 'Functionally and ideologically, the two accumulations [Athens and Delphi] represent very different sets of ideas.'
30. Inscriptions such as *IG* I^{3} 45, a fifth-century Athenian inscription ordering the repairs of the acropolis wall to keep out asylum-seeking slaves and thieves show that theft was a real enough concern; Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', p. 85. With Garland, 'Religious authority', p. 79; Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 170–5; R. Parker, 'Law and religion', in M. Gagarin and D. Cohen (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law* (Cambridge, 2005b), pp. 61–81, at 63–8.

31. E.g. *LSC* 69: the priest should fine minor offenders; serious offences should be referred to the courts.
32. E.g. LSC 69, early fourth century, refers to citizens and *xenoi*, and seems to indicate different courts for the two groups, A. Petropoulou, 'The eparche documents and the early oracle at Oropus', *GRBS*, 22.1 (1981), pp. 39–64, at 52.
33. Parker, 'What are sacred laws?', esp. pp. 61–6.
34. Parker, 'Law and religion', p. 63. Also see A.M. Bowie, 'Greek sacrifice. Forms and functions', in A. Powell (ed.), *The Greek World* (London and New York, 1995), pp. 463–82, for an overview of Greek sacrifice.
35. See esp. Hewitt, 'Major restrictions', pp. 83ff; P.A. Butz, 'Prohibitionary inscriptions, *xenoi*, and the influence of the early Greek *polis*', in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Role of Religion in the Early Greek Polis* (Stockholm, 1996), pp. 75–95; with Bowie, 'Greek sacrifice', pp. 467–8; Lupu, 'The sacred law', pp. 19–24.
36. E.g. *SEG* 46.1157; *IG* I^3 4, see G. Nemeth, 'Μεδ' ὄνθον ἐγβαλεν. Regulations concerning everyday life in a Greek *temenos*', in R. Hägg (ed.), *Ancient Greek Cult Practice from the Epigraphic Evidence* (Stockholm, 1994), pp. 59–64.
37. The range and roles of these figures varied between sanctuaries. See esp. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, pp. 95–8; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Further aspects of *polis* religion', in R. Buxton, *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion* (Oxford, 2000a), pp. 38–55; Zaidman and Pantel, *Religion*, pp. 46–53; Parker, 'What are sacred laws?'. With Arist. *Pol*. 1322B.18–29, and Soph. *OC* lines 111–43.
38. M.B. Wallace, 'Early Greek "proxenoi"', *Phoenix* 24.3 (1970), pp. 189–208, on functions and evidence for early *proxeny*; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'What is *polis* religion?', in R. Buxton, *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion* (Oxford, 2000b), pp. 13–37, at 13–14; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Further aspects', pp. 48–9; Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz and R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, 'The *proxenoi* of western Greece', *ZPE* 147 (2004), pp. 93–106.
39. Morgan, 'Evolution of a "sacral" landscape', p. 107; Antonaccio, 'Placing the past', p. 85, n. 30; with R. Parker, *Cleomenes on the Acropolis* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 4–6, 10–23, and 27–33, on ethnicity and religion more broadly.
40. Wallace, 'Early Greek "proxenoi"', p. 194: *proxenoi* system possibly developed 'by the Eleans to facilitate the operation of an international sanctuary'; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'What is *polis* religion?', pp. 15–17.
41. Zelnick-Abramovitz and Zelnick-Abramovitz, 'The *proxenoi* of western Greece', pp. 93–106, esp. 103 for inscriptions relating to *proxeny* and sacrifice at Delphi and Olympia: 'Two mutilated inscriptions from Olympia [6th and 5th century] … mention *proxenoi* who, together with the priests, are entrusted with the duty of receiving or rejecting foreigners visiting the temple.'
42. This amphictyony was focused on the sanctuary of Demeter of Anthela, but Delphi was its prestigious site. F. Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie Pyléo-Delphique: Histoire et institutions* (Paris, 1998), pp. 21–139; Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, pp. 18, 135–6; P. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 125, with 93, 117–18.

43. See esp. M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1986), esp. pp. 100–1, on the concepts of *nomos* (custom; law; principle, or maxim); *nomimos* (customary, lawful, honest, righteous), as well as *pátrios* and *patrikós* (of one's father or forefathers; customary, hereditary). For overviews of military conduct, see E.g. M.D. Goodman and A.J. Holladay, 'Religious scruples in ancient warfare', *Classical Quarterly* 36.1 (1986), pp. 151–71; W.K. Pritchett, *Greek State at War, Pt.5* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1991), esp. pp. 160–8; J. Ober, 'Classical Greek times', in M. Howard, G.J. Andreopoulos, and M.R. Shulman (eds), *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven and London, 1994), pp. 12–26; A. Jacquemin, *Guerre et Religion dans la Monde Grec* (*490–322 av J.-C*) (Liege, 2000), pp. 129–35; P. Krentz, 'Fighting by the rules: the invention of the hoplite *agon*', *Hesperia* 71.1 (2002), pp. 23–39; H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), pp. 119–21.
44. See Low, *Interstate Relations*, esp. 85 on the terms s*ummachiai* and *spondai*, which are distinct from the terminology of domestic law, and *sunthekai*, a term for an interstate agreement that is also used in domestic contracts. Oaths: Low, *Interstate Relations*, pp. 119–23, 218–19, with F. Adcock and D.J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London, 1975).
45. On sacred histories, see J. Dillery, 'Greek sacred history', *American Journal of Philology* 126.4 (2005), pp. 505–26. Oral history: R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and the Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989).
46. Tribunals: D. Hamel, *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998), pp. 118–60, with refs; concern about prosecution influencing decision-making, pp. 61–2, 120; W.K. Pritchett, *Greek State at War, Pt.2* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1974), pp. 4–33. Soldiers as jurors, Lys. 14.5, with Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, pp. 59–62. Nepos reports that Lysander was tried for attempting to bribe the oracle of Jupiter-Ammon (Nepos, *Lys*. 3.1–4), but this was not on campaign but part of an alleged plot to bring down the state. For trials at Athens and Sparta, see Chapter 2, 'The Sanctuary of Demeter and a Despot's Crime'; Chapter 3, 'Nicias and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Syracuse'; Chapter 4, 'Cleomenes and the Grove of Argos'.
47. The Carthaginians are also guilty of plundering Sicily's sanctuaries; Diodorus includes divine vengeance amongst the causes of the plague their army suffered, alongside over-crowding, marshy environment, and unhealthy weather conditions, but sacrilege is not connected with discontent amongst the troops (Diod. Sic. 14.70.4–6). [Following their defeat]: 'Of these [spectators to the battle] some raised their hands to heaven and returned thanks to the gods, and others declared that the barbarians had suffered the punishment of heaven for their plundering of the temples. For from a distance the sight resembled a battle with the gods' (Diod. Sic. 14.74.3–4). See Chapter 6, 'Olympia and the Arcadian–Elean War', for more on Dionysius.
48. The impression of overwhelming positivity in this passage is reinforced by the realisation that it comes virtually unchanged from the exclusively

positive *Agesilaus* (Xen. *Ages*. 1.27). J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London and New York, 1995), p. 30, describes this scene as Xenophon's 'ideal aims and occupations of man': hard physical training, careful material preparation, religious observance – all activities which Xenophon values highly and which turn up elsewhere in his corpus in association with ideal communities.' J. Crowley, *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 105–7, 122–3, examines the system of discipline in Athenian armies, concluding that the power to punish existed but was hard to enforce, and that more positive factors had to 'propel the compliance relationship'.

49. V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London, 1989), p. 35; Dillery, *Xenophon*, pp. 103–4, also argues for Xenophon as the speaker, highly critical of Thibron for involving the Ten Thousand in inglorious activities.
50. For these cases of misconduct, see Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, p. 61, with further refs; on discipline, also see van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, pp. 108–13; Pritchett, *GSW2*, pp. 232–45.
51. Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, pp. 40–4; Pritchett, *GSW2*, pp. 55–6.
52. Private plundering: Pritchett, *GSW5*, p. 388. On plunder generally, Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, pp. 44–50; van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, pp. 2–28; Pritchett, *GSW5*, pp. 68–541.
53. See R. Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism and religious life', in P. Funke and N. Luraghi (eds), *The Politics of Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League* (Washington, DC, and Cambridge, MA, 2009), for a discussion of trends in the changing life of cults. For the priesthoods at Oropus, see Petropoulou, 'The eparche documents', p. 51; D. Knoepfler, 'Un document attique à reconsidérer: le décret de Pandios sur l'Amphiaraion d'Oropos', *Chiron* 16 (1986), pp. 71–98; with Parker, *Athenian Religion*, p. 149.
54. D.A. Campbell, *The Golden Lyre: The Themes of the Greek Lyric Poets* (London, 1983), p. 106. More on collective guilt: e.g. Solon 4 (West, *Greek Lyric*, pp. 74–5). For gods' vengeance as inevitable, but sometimes slow: e.g. Hesiod, *Theog*. 217–22; 226–32; Solon 13, 'Such is the punishment of Zeus. He does not flare at every insult, like a mortal man, / but all the time he is aware whose heart is marked / with sin, and in the end it shows for sure' (West, *Greek Lyric*, p. 77). Inherited guilt unfair: e.g. anon. theog. lines 731–52 (West, *Greek Lyric*, p. 139).
55. e.g. Locrian Ajax: Apollod. *Epit*. 5.23, Calchas told the Greeks their return was delayed because of Athena's anger at Ajax's impiety. They were going to stone him but he took refuge at an altar and they left him alone; Polygnotus' painting of the fall of Troy: 'Ajax, the son of Oileus, holding a shield, stands by an altar, taking an oath about the outrage on Cassandra. Cassandra is sitting on the ground, and holds the image of Athena, for she had knocked over the wooden image from its stand when Ajax was dragging her away from sanctuary' (Paus. 10.26.3), Odysseus advises the stoning (Paus. 10.31.2). Priam's death at the hands of Neoptolemus was another much revisited story. The *Little Iliad*

(12) had him killed at the palace doors after being dragged from the altar of Zeus, while classical vase painters had him murdered at the altar (e.g. the Kleophrades Painter 'Sack of Troy' hydria, Naples, Museo Nazionale Archeologico), which was visually clearer. Apollodorus followed this tradition (*Epit.* 5.21).

56. On the fall of Troy in Greek art, see esp. J. Boardman, 'The Kleophrades painter at Troy', *Antike Kunst* 19 (1976), pp. 3–18; M.J. Anderson, *The Fall of Troy in Early Greek Poetry and Art* (Oxford, 1997); S. Ebbinghaus 'Protector of the city, or the art of storage in early Greece', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 125 (2005), pp. 51–72.

CHAPTER 1 THE TEMPLE AS FORTRESS

1. In *Hom.Hymn.*11. *Ath.*, Athena is protectress of cities as well as sacker of cities. On the relationship between virginity and military inviolability, W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford, 1985), p. 140. Other city-guardians include Aphrodite at Corinth and Artemis at Ephesus.
2. See e.g. R. Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 71–2; J. M. Hurwit, *The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from the Neolithic Era to the Present* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 70–98. N.b. this longstanding use does not necessarily equate to continuity of cult: C. M. Antonaccio, 'Placing the past: The Bronze Age in the cultic topography of early Greece', in S.E. Adcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods*, pp. 79–104, esp. p. 89, disputes the suggestion in Burkert, *Greek Religion*, pp. 49–50, and F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek City-State* (Chicago and London, 1995), pp. 85–92, of a continuous line of authority. Palace cult existed on the Bronze Age acropolis and ended with the passing of that era; votives begin appearing on the acropolis in the eighth century, monumentalisation in the sixth.
3. Euripides' play, *Erechtheus*, explored this myth, and offers an example of a change city ownership expressed through a change of cult-emphasis. Asked to sacrifice her daughter to prevent the fall of the city, Praxithea replies: 'Above all, no one shall without my heart's consent cast out the ancient ordinances of our forefathers, nor shall Eumolpus or his Thracian folk replace the olive and the golden Gorgon by planting a trident upright in the city's foundations and crowning it with garlands, leaving Pallas dishonoured' (Eur. *Erechtheus*, Loeb frag. 360, 43–52).
4. For details of the archaic Athenian acropolis, see Parker, *Athenian Religion*, pp. 67–72 with 84; Hurwit, *Athenian Acropolis*, pp. 67–136.
5. In M.L. West, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford, 1993a), p. 140, anonymous theognidea lines 773–9.
6. J. Rosivach, 'Why seize the acropolis?', *Historia* 57.2 (2008), pp. 125–33, 127.
7. Cyrus is also said to have returned the Jews and their sacred items to Jerusalem, L.L. Grabbe, *Judaism from Cyrus to Hadrian*, Vol. 1: *The Persian and Greek Periods* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 126. On religious tolerance as

imperial policy, see also J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London, 1983), pp. 148–9. Noting the mild treatment of Babylon following the conquest of 556, the Nabonidas Chronicle relates: 'There was no interruption [of rites] in Esagil or the [other] temples and no date [for a performance] was missed. On the third day of the month Marchesvan Cyrus [II] entered Babylon … were filled before him. There was peace in the city while Cyrus [II] spoke his greeting', A.K. Grayson, *Assyrian and Greek Chronicles* (New York, 1975), Chronicle 7, col.iii, 17–20; The Cyrus Cylinder records Cyrus' boast that he worshipped the local god, Marduk, maintained his cults and returned statues that had been brought to Babylon prior to the invasion, in A. Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East, c.3000–330*, Vol. 2 (London, 1995), pp. 601–2.

8. The Akitu festival: Nabonidas Chronicle, col.iii, 24–8, in A.L. Oppenheim, 'The Babylonian evidence of Achaemenian rule in Mesopotamia', in H. Bailey *et al.* (eds), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 2: *The Median and Achaemenian Periods* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 529–88, 554, with A. Kuhrt and S. Sherwin White, 'Xerxes' destruction of Babylonian temples', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt (eds), *Achaemenid History 2* (Leiden, 1987), pp. 69–78. The ritual involved the king being slapped, see B.D. Sommer, 'The Babylonian Akitu festival: rectifying the king or renewing the cosmos?', *Journal of the Ancient Near Eastern Society* 27 (2001), pp. 81–95.
9. See Udjahorresnet sect.17–21 and 24–7, in A.B. Lloyd, 'The inscription of Udjahorresnet: a collaborators' testament', *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 68 (1982), pp. 166–80. Udjahorresnet uses the verb '*dr*', which expressed the concept of a pharaoh acting in his cosmic role, driving out chaos. This and other expressions communicate the idea that Cambyses was 'not simply assuming the forms of the Pharaonic office but the Pharaonic office in the fullest possible sense, Lloyd, 'Udjahorresnet', pp. 171–3.
10. Temple building: Udjahorresnet sect.43–4, in Lloyd, 'Udjahorresnet', 173, with Polyaenus, 7.11.7, and K.M.T. Atkinson, 'The legitimacy of Cambyses and Darius as kings of Egypt', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 76.3 (1956), pp. 167–77. Babylon: A. Kuhrt and S. Sherwin White, 'Xerxes' destruction of Babylonian temples', pp. 71–6.
11. Characterising Miletus as 'the planner of evil deeds', indicates the personal responsibility that was associated with this disaster. The Ionian Revolt is the 'evil deed'. See M. Piérart, 'The common oracle of the Milesians and the Argives (Hdt. 6.19 and 77)', in P. Derow and R. Parker (eds), *Herodotus and his World* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 275–96.
12. Hdt. 6.100–2. C. Krause, *Das Westtor: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen 1964–68*, *Eretria: Ausgrabungen und Forschungen* 4 (Berne, 1972), pp. 48–50.
13. R.M. Berthold, 'The Athenian embassies to Sardis and Cleomenes' invasion of Attica', *Historia* 51.3 (2002), pp. 259–67, explores the Athenian submission (Hdt. 5.70–4), and notes that, from a Persian perspective, rescinding from this arrangement was revolt; J. Finn, 'Gods, kings, men. Trilingual inscriptions and symbolic visualizations in the Achaemenid empire', *Ars Orientalis* 41(2011), pp. 219–75, demonstrates

the conceptual link, in Achaemenid ideology, between rule and cosmic order.

14. Excavation has 'shown the domestic quarters of the city to be somewhat different from the way Herodotus described them'. A. Ramage, *Lydian Houses and Architectural Terracottas* (Cambridge MA, 1978), pp. 8–9.
15. The concept of boundaries is outlined as early as the prologue where Herodotus states that Asia and Europe are separate (Hdt. 1.4). The flouting of boundaries as a characteristic of despotism is laid out in Otanes' speech at Hdt. 3.80. On the recurrence of this motif in the *Histories*, see H.R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Ohio, 1966), p. 84, which identified the 'river-boundary' motif; J.G. Gammie, 'Herodotus on kings and tyrants: objective historiography or conventional portraiture?', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45.3 (1986), pp. 171–95; K.A. Raaflaub, 'Herodotus, political thought, and the meaning of history', *Arethusa* 20 (1987), pp. 221–48, 243; F. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1988), p. 331; D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1989), pp. 126–44; D. Boedeker, 'Protesilaos and the end of Herodotus' *Histories*', *Classical Antiquity* 7.1 (1988), pp. 30–48, at 41–8; N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece* (Warminster, 1992), pp. 352–4, 378, 374–7 and 383, and R. Thomas, *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 75–101; K.A. Raaflaub, 'Philosophy, science, politics: Herodotus and the intellectual trends of his time', in E.J. Bakker *et al.* (eds), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2007), pp. 149–86, at 172–3; S. Flory, 'Laughter, tears and wisdom in Herodotus', *American Journal of Philology* 99.2 (1978), pp. 145–53, explores the hubris of Xerxes' desire for world domination (Hdt. 7.8a–c), a plan which is executed alongside numerous acts of sacrilege and gruesome murders.
16. Hdt. 7.138f. Apparently a controversial view: 'an opinion which I know most people will object to' (trans. Marincola, with n. 38).
17. Their persistence at Delphi is not disobedience; like the debate, it is part of the process of arriving at a satisfactory interpretation of the oracle, T. Harrison, *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus* (Oxford, 2000b), pp. 151–2.
18. R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), esp. pp. 224–34.
19. The major example of this in the *Histories* is the false oracle delivered to Aristodicus and the Cymaeans. Aristodicus is told to commit an offence (the expulsion of a suppliant). He eventually receives the explanation that this was ordered 'so that by committing an impiety you will more quickly come to your end' (Hdt. 1.158–9, with Harrison, *Divinity and History*, pp. 147–8). Long before, Semonides had observed that, 'Gods easily give men the wrong idea' (Semonides, frag. 42. West, *Greek Lyric*, p. 20).
20. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC* (Oxford, 1988), p. 23: 'The city shall be entrusted to

Athena, Athens' [protectress; and to the] other gods, all of them, for protections and [defence against the] Barbarian on behalf of the country … [The treasurers and] the Priestesses are [to remain] on the Acropolis [and guard the possessions of the] gods … the triremes 'shall be manned by [order of] the Boule and the generals, after they have sacrificed an appeasement offering to Zeus the All-powerful and Athena Nike and Poseidon the Securer'. As Ctesias tells it, the people on the acropolis escaped at night, but it is hard to credit this as a literal truth (*FGrHist.* 688 F13 30).

21. E.g. *IG* I^3 474.1 refers to 'the ancient statue' (τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἄγαλμα). G. Ferrari, 'The ancient temple on the acropolis at Athens', *American Journal of Archaeology* 106.1 (2002), pp. 11–35, discusses the aftermath of the sack with the assumption that the statue survived; K. Lapatin, 'New statues for old gods', in J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine (eds), *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations* (Edinburgh, 2010), pp. 126–51, 130: the Athenians took the statue with them when they evacuated.
22. M.H. Jameson, 'A decree of Themistokles from Troizen', *Hesperia* 29 (1960), pp. 198–223, at 218–19. Herodotus' report (8.56) that the Greeks were distressed to hear that the acropolis had fallen has led to suggestions that the Athenians did leave a garrison there (E.g. R. Sealey, 'A note on the supposed Themistocles decree', *Hermes* 91 (1963), pp. 376–7). This has been dismissed as unnecessary by those noting that the Greeks had many reasons to be dismayed without the defeat of a garrison: for the Athenians it would be a blow even if it was expected, and many Greeks (Athenian and otherwise) may well have hoped that their resistance would not depend on naval success and Athenian persistence, C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 449–51; A.R. Hands, 'On strategy and oracles, 480/79', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 85 (1965), pp. 156–61.
23. On the Persian use of temples and sacred precincts, M. Shenkar, 'Temple architecture in the Iranian world before the Macedonian conquest', *Iran and the Caucasus* 11.2 (2007), pp. 169–94. Nb. This contradicts Herodotus' assertion that the Persians had no temples or altars (Hdt. 1.131–2).
24. On which see O. Broneer, 'Excavations on the north slope of the acropolis in Athens, 1933–4', *Hesperia* 4 (1935), pp. 104–88; T.L. Shear Jr, 'The Persian destruction of Athens. Evidence from agora deposits', *Hesperia* 62.4 (1993), pp. 383–482; A. Lindenlauf, 'Der Perserschutt der Athener akropolis', in W. Höpfner (ed.), *Kult und Kultbauten auf der Akropolis* (1997), pp. 46–115; Ferrari, 'The ancient temple', 11–35, although she stresses that the temple was damaged rather than destroyed; Hurwit, *Athenian Acropolis*, pp. 135–6; R. Kousser, 'Destruction and memory on the Athenian acropolis', *The Art Bulletin* 91.3 (2009), pp. 263–82; H.A. Thompson, 'Athens faces adversity', *Hesperia* 50 (1981), pp. 343–55, at 344–6, 344 describes the fate of the agora shrines, 'the Altar of the Twelve Gods … sanctuary of Zeus and a

small temple of Apollo … At least one other Archaic temple … All these shrines were destroyed'.

25. Kousser, 'Destruction and memory', p. 265.
26. P. Kaplan, 'Dedications to Greek sanctuaries by foreign kings in the eighth through sixth centuries BCE', *Historia* 55.2 (2006), pp. 129–52, quotation at 137. Similar occurrences are mentioned. At Halos, Xerxes' guides told him a dark local tale of murder and the gods' intervention; in response he ordered his army to avoid the sacred precincts in the area (Hdt. 7.197). Mardonius consults oracles, including the recently plundered (Hdt. 8.32–3) temple of Apollo at Abae and the sanctuary of Amphiaraus at Oropus, where Mardonius' man made sure to pay a non-Theban to incubate on his behalf as Thebans were prohibited from entering (Hdt. 8.134). These stories vary the list of destruction and, by providing examples of divine power which even the Persians are said to recognise, they anticipate Xerxes' destruction in the midst of his triumphal march.
27. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, p. 69, discusses this form of tale in Herodotus, including this example. Ferrari, 'The ancient temple', 30–1, discusses this story as part of the Athenians' recovery and as an expression of traditional metaphors of the *polis* as tree. With Paus. 1.27.2 and Dion. Hal. *Ant Rom.* 14.4–5.
28. W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War, Pt.3* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1979b), pp. 22–3; J. Dillery, 'Greek sacred history', *American Journal of Philology* 126.4 (2005), pp. 505–26, esp. 517. With C. Higbie, 'Homeric Athena in the Chronicle of Lindos', in S. Deacy and A. Villing (eds), *Athena in the Classical World* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2001), pp. 105–26, on the context of the chronicle's creation; it was very much part of the Lindians' attempt to improve the popularity of the sanctuary in the late second century, but nonetheless drew on earlier ideas about Athena.
29. K.S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton, 1990) pp. 42–54.
30. Ferrari, 'The ancient temple' esp. p. 27, with Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 81; Kousser, 'Destruction and memory', p. 272.
31. D. Castriota, *Myth, Ethos, and Actuality: Official Art in Fifth-Century B.C. Athens* (London, 1992); G. Ferrari, 'The Ilioupersis in Athens', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 100 (2000), pp. 119–50; Kousser, 'Destruction and memory', pp. 269–77.
32. Euripides *Erechtheus* Fr.65 lines 77–89 (Austin, 1968), discussed in Ekroth, *Sacrificial Rituals*, p. 258.
33. C.W. Clairmont, 'Euripides' Erechtheus and the Erechtheion', *GRBS* 12.4 (1971), pp. 485–96, at 490.
34. Hdt. 5.70–2, with Thuc. 1.126–7 and Plut. *Sol.* 12. Hdt. 1.61 indicates that it remained a tarnish on the family within Athens as well; Peisistratus does not want sons with his Alcmaeonid wife partly because he has sons already and partly because the Alcmaeonids are cursed. See H. Bowden, *Classical Athens and the Delphic Oracle: Divination and Democracy* (Cambridge, 2005a), pp. 145–7, on the role that this played in

the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, with H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), p. 20; R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and the Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 130–1, 145, 149–53, on hostile traditions. A scholiast reports a tradition that Cylon was attempting to plunder the acropolis treasures (schol. Ar. *Knights* 445).

35. J.D. Mikalson, *Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars* (Chapel Hill, 2003), pp. 18 and 146, notes Hdt.s' suggestion of injustice.
36. See above, n. 15.
37. R. Parker, *Cleomenes on the acropolis* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 4–6 and 10, discusses the ethnic aspect of this exchange, and cites an anti-Dorian proscription from Paros, *LSCG* 110. This episode was remembered in Athenian comedy: in Ar. *Lys*. 273–84, the chorus recall besieging Cleomenes and evicting him from the city in disarray, see Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, pp. 245–7. Cleomenes was said to have violated another taboo by sleeping with Isagoras' wife (Hdt. 5.70).
38. On which J. Kindt, 'Delphic oracle stories and the beginning of historiography: Herodotus' Croesus *logos*', *Classical Philology* 101 (2006), pp. 34–51.
39. Rosivach, 'Why seize the acropolis?'.
40. L.I. Hau, 'The victor after the victory: a narrative set-piece in Greek historiography from Herodotus to Diodorus of Sicily', in E. Bragg *et al.* (eds), *Beyond the Battlefields: New Perspectives on Warfare and Society in the Graeco-Roman World* (Newcastle, 2008), pp. 121–44.
41. Parker, *Cleomenes*, p. 24.
42. V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London, 1989), pp. 29–32, demonstrates how carefully Xenophon set up this narrative to express the ruler's virtue and Meidias' contrasting vice. The over-arching narrative of Dercylidas and Meidias tells 'a story of Dercylidas' remarkable justice and generosity of spirit': Gray, *Xenophon's Hellenica*, pp. 29–35, quotation at 33. C.J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon's Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 49–50, notes that Meidias is a 'doubly distasteful individual, being not only a tyrant but also a murderous usurper'. Dercylidas had just replaced Thibron, who Xenophon – a participant in these events – clearly disapproved of.
43. H. Bowden, 'Religion and politics. Xenophon and the scientific study of religion', in C.J. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His World* (Stuttgart, 2004), p. 233, discusses the combination of the practical and the ritual in Dercylidas' actions.
44. Parker, *Cleomenes*, pp. 24–5, notes the dedication, details of which are available in *IG* II^2 1386, 1388, 1393, 1400, 1407 (401–385 BCE), and D. Harris, *The Treasures of the Parthenon and Erechtheion* (Oxford, 1995), p. 192.
45. Plutarch does not mention the dedication in his *Lysander* either (14–16). He presents this as a harsh episode; Lysander organises the flute-girls himself and leaves a garrison on the acropolis to back up the Spartan governor.

46. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory*, esp. ch.2.
47. See esp. chapters in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods: Sanctuaries and Sacred Space in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994). E.g. Antonaccio, 'Placing the past', pp. 79–104, demonstrated the significance of Bronze Age remains in the formation of sanctuaries; C. Morgan, 'The evolution of a "sacral" landscape: Isthmia, Perachora, and the early Corinthian state', pp. 105–42, while acknowledging the usefulness of de Polignac's ideas demonstrates that a number of sacred sites developed considerably earlier than de Polignac realised, removing the possibility that they were developed with the *polis*; S.G. Cole, 'Demeter in the ancient Greek city and its countryside', pp. 199–216, demonstrates that Demeter's sanctuaries occur in a much wider variety of locations than de Polignac's theory had allowed for; M. Jost, 'The distribution of sanctuaries in civic space in Arkadia', pp. 217–30, also identified a wide range of explanations for the disparate locations of sanctuaries; I. Malkin, 'Territorial domination and the Greek sanctuary', in P. Hellström and B. Alroth (eds), *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World* (Uppsala, 1996), pp. 75–81, explores the limitations and advantages of de Polignac's approach.
48. Antonaccio, 'Placing the past', p. 97.
49. S. Price, *Religions of the Ancient Greeks* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 53, with Paus. 8.10–12.
50. Antonaccio, 'Placing the past', p. 96.
51. S.G. Cole, *Landscapes, Gender, and Ritual Space: The Ancient Greek Experience* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2004), p. 187, with examples from Attica, Euboea, Salamis, and Laconia.
52. On which see U. Sinn, 'The influence of Greek sanctuaries on the consolidation of economic power', in P. Hellström and B. Alroth (eds), *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World* (Uppsala, 1996), pp. 67–74.
53. See Osborne, 'The politics of sacred space', p. 153.
54. Ibid., pp. 152–3.
55. Ibid., p. 154.
56. C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles. The Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century BC* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 13–14, with further refs.
57. S. Hornblower, 'The religious dimension to the Peloponnesian War, or, what Thucydides does not tell us', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 94 (1992), pp. 169–97, at 186.
58. T.L. Shear Jr, 'The demolished temple at Eleusis', *Hesperia Supp.* 20 (1982), pp. 128–212.
59. Athens cut off from Eleusis, see Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20–1; Plut. *Alc.* 34, with Chapter 3, 'Nicias and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Syracuse'; Fortifications: G.E. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton, 1961) pp. 124–5; 132–3. *Syll.*^{3} 957, refers to the defence of fourth-century Eleusis being under the control of ephebes.
60. L.A. Tritle, 'Kleomenes at Eleusis', *Historia* 37.4 (1988), pp. 457–60, recognised the significance of the scholiast's reference to Eleusis.
61. Under-reporting, see esp. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension'. Religion and moral themes, see e.g. S.I. Oost, 'Thucydides and the irrational:

sundry passages', *Classical Philology* 70.3 (1975), pp. 186–96; N. Marinatos *Thucydides and Religion* (Konigstein, 1981); B. Jordan, 'Religion in Thucydides', *TAPA* 116 (1986) pp. 119–47; D. Lateiner, 'Heralds and corpses in Thucydides', *The Classical World* 71 (1977a), pp. 97–106 at 97–8; J. Price, *Thucydides and Internal War* (Cambridge, 2001), esp. pp. 217–26, with 224 n. 41: 'his personal beliefs are irrelevant, for he is most definitely interested in the use and abuse of religious and social norms during the war'.

62. Its exact location is unknown. For the evidence, see W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Topography, Pt.2* (Berkeley and London, 1969), 24–36; *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Pt.3* (Berkeley and London, 1980), pp. 295–7, argues that the seizure of Delium was a necessity for any would-be conquerors of Boeotia. With A. Schachter, C*ults of Boiotia*, Vol. 1 (London, 1981), p. 45.
63. See A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. 3: *Books IV–V.24*, p. 137, with p. 579 and pp. 584–8: Thucydides' arrangement of the narrative, while exposing the Athenians' mistake, was 'not in self-excuse'; D. Babut, 'Interpretation historique et structure littéraire chez Thucydides: remarques sur la composition du livre IV', *Bulletin de l'association Guillaume Bude* 40 (1981), pp. 417–39, at pp. 434–6; S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. 2: *Books IV–V.24* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 256–8. S. Nevin, 'Military ethics in the writing of history: Thucydides and Diodorus on Delium', in E. Bragg *et al.* (eds), *Beyond the Battlefields: New Perspectives on Warfare and Society in the Graeco-Roman World* (Newcastle, 2008), pp. 99–120, 111–17; H.D. Westlake, 'Thucydides and the fall of Amphipolis', *Hermes* 90.3 (1962), pp. 276–87; and J.R. Ellis, 'Thucydides at Amphipolis', *Antichthon* 12 (1978), pp. 28–35, argue for a greater degree of apologia.
64. L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.24* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1993), p. 171, notes the ominous significance of this detail.
65. Pritchett, *Topography 2*, p. 24, he must have been travelling to Thasos at the time.
66. While few now concur with F.M. Cornford's extreme stance, that Thucydides introduces Fortune as a character (*Thucydides Mythistoricus*, London, 1907, pp. 82–109), it remains apparent that chance/fortune, plays a conspicuous role in the Athenians' success. See J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford, 1963) p. 174; J.G. Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas: Thucydides' presentation of events at Pylos and Amphipolis', *Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar* 12 (2005), pp. 207–84, at 217–18. As Stahl, *Thucydides*, pp. 138–53, outlines it: a chance storm forces the Athenians to beach though they had rejected Demosthenes' suggestion to do so (Thuc. 4.3.1), the troops spontaneously decide to fortify the area, the Spartans just chance to be distracted by a festival (Thuc. 4.5.1), Messenians chance by to help (Thuc. 4.9.1), a strange change of fortune leads to Athenians defending on land and Spartans

attacking by sea (Thuc. 4.12.3), and by chance the Spartans fail to blockade the harbour (Thuc. 4.13.4).

67. H.D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 106–11. Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', pp. 217–18: to the detriment of Cleon. H.D. Westlake, 'The naval battle at Pylos and its consequences', *Classical Quarterly* 24.2 (1974), pp. 211–26, at 213, attributes the lack of strategic precision in the narrative to a deficiency of sources.
68. Cornford, *Mythistoricus*, pp. 119–21; de Romilly, *Thucydides*, pp. 172–9; Stahl, *Thucydides*, pp. 142–4: also demonstrating the link between this representation of *tyche* and that in the speeches preceding the war (at Thuc. 1.120–4). This explains the unusual nature of the speeches, which Westlake, 'The naval battle', pp. 221–2, considered 'among the most puzzling'.
69. As P.A. Brunt, 'Spartan policy and strategy in the Archidamian War', *Phoenix* 19.4 (1965), pp. 255–80, 269 notes, the Athenians had a sound record of defeating the Thebans and could hardly have foreseen the new Boeotian tactics.
70. Stahl, *Thucydides*, 143–53; H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), pp. 140–2; M. Cogan, *The Human Thing: The Speeches and Principles of Thucydides' History* (Chicago, 1981b), pp. 272–3, n. 31, with 73–7; I.G. Spence, 'Thucydides, Woodhead, and Kleon', *Mnemosyne* 48.4 (1995), pp. 411–37, 421–2; Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', pp. 217–30, esp. 220.
71. τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἔσκαπτον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τὸν χοῦν, καὶ σταυροὺς παρακαταπηγνύντες ἄμπελον κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λίθους ἅμα καὶ πλίνθον ἐκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἐγγὺς καθαιροῦντες, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριζον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ᾗ καιρὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπῆρχεν. ἤπερ γὰρ ἦν στοὰ κατεπεπτώκει. (Thuc. 4.90.2)
72. See Nevin, 'Military ethics', pp. 99–120.
73. M. Dillon, 'The ecology of the Greek sanctuary', *ZPE* 118 (1997), pp. 113–27, 115–20, for examples of sacred laws governing the use and protection of trees and other plants.
74. This is Thucydides' only use of 'εὐσέβεια', and it occurs in this negative context as a quality which is not possessed.
75. Price, *Thucydides*.
76. Lateiner, 'Heralds and corpses', p. 97.
77. Ibid., pp. 100–5. The dead also provide a marker of moral decency. At Delium, in Ambracia, on Sicily (Thuc. 7.75; 7.87), and during the Athenian Plague (Thuc. 2.50; 2.52), society is shown to be in such collapse that the dead are left 'ἀταφος', signifying that normal moral order has been abandoned. Through its reference to heralds and corpses, the Delium debate is associated with three other devastating events in the *History*: the siege of Plataea (Thuc. 2.2; 3.24; 3.52), the Ambraciot campaign (Thuc. 3.105–15), and the collapse of the Sicilian expedition (esp. Thuc. 7.72–87).

78. E.g. Gomme, *Commentary 3*, pp. 570–1; W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Topography, Pt.5* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1985), pp. 191–2; J.D. Mikalson, *Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy* (Chapel Hill and London, 1991), p. 125. The retention of the bodies is unusual: C. Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton, 1994), p. 90, notes that their unwillingness to return them is the only such refusal in the whole of Thucydides and is rare elsewhere. See P. Vaughn, 'The identification and retrieval of the hoplite battle-dead', in V.D. Hanson (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London and New York, 1991), pp. 38–62, on ancient anxieties about burial. On the Athenians: Jordan, *Religion in Thucydides*, p. 130: 'pure sophistry and special pleading mixed with evasions, falsehoods, and irrelevant legalisms'. With Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, pp. 314–15.
79. Stahl, *Thucydides*, pp. 57ff with 143; Cogan, *The Human Thing*, p. 7.
80. Orwin, *Humanity of Thucydides*, pp. 44–56.
81. Ibid., p. 91.
82. ὅτι οὐ δικαίως δράσειαν παραβαίνοντες τὰ νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων. πᾶσι γὰρ εἶναι καθεστηκὸς ἱόντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἱερῶν τῶν ἐνόντων ἀπέχεσθαι, Ἀθηναίους δὲ Δήλιον τειχίσαντας ἐνοικεῖν, καὶ ὅσα ἄνθρωποι ἐν βεβήλῳ δρῶσι πάντα γίγνεσθαι αὐτόθι, ὕδωρ τε ὃ ἦν ἄψαυστον σφίσι πλὴν πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι, ἀνασπάσαντας ὑδρεύεσθαι. ὥστε ὑπέρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῶν Βοιωτούς, ἐπικαλουμένους τοὺς ὁμωχέτας δαίμονας καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, προαγορεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀπιόντας ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν. (Thuc. 4.97.2–4).
83. Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 150–1 and 226–8; S.G. Cole, 'The uses of water in Greek sanctuaries', in R. Hägg, N. Marinatos, and G.C. Nordquist (eds), *Early Greek Cult Practice* (Stockholm, 1988), pp. 161–5, particularly Apollo, at 161.
84. Orwin, *Humanity of Thucydides*, p. 94. This is also the weakness in their representation of themselves as suppliants.
85. Ibid., p. 94, 'nothing could have been more intentional than the seizure of Delium'.
86. Orwin, *Humanity of Thucydides*, p. 93; and see Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, pp. 312–14.
87. Bowden, *Classical Athens*, p. 74, contra Price, *Thucydides*, p. 227.
88. See T. Howe, 'Pastoralism, the Delphic amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: the creation of Apollo's sacred pastures', *Historia* 52 (2003), pp. 129–46, 140–1.
89. For the everyday use as pollution, see e.g. Jordan, *Religion in Thucydides*, 129 n. 18; Hornblower, *Commentary* 2, p. 310; with Parker *Miasma*, p. 162.
90. R. Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism and religious life', in P. Funke and N. Luraghi (eds), *The Politics of Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League* (Washington DC, and Cambridge MA, 2009); R. Parker, 'Athenian religion abroad', in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (eds), *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 139–46, at 142–6, with similar examples from Samos and Lemnos. I. Polinskaya, 'Fifth-Century Horol

on Aigina: A Reevaluation', *Hesperia* 78.2 (2009), pp. 231–67, at 250–64, and I. Polinskaya, *A Local History of Greek Polytheism: Gods, People and the Land of Aigina, 800–400BCE* (Leiden and Boston, 2013): Temene dedicated to the Athenians' favourite deities were established while Aeginetan cults were also continued. And C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'What is *polis* religion?', in R. Buxton (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion* (Oxford, 2000b), pp. 13–37, 18–19.

91. D. Knoepfler, 'Un document attique à reconsidérer: le décret de Pandios sur l'Amphiaraion d'Oropos', *Chiron* 16 (1986), pp. 71–98; A. Petropoulou, 'The eparche documents and the early oracle at Oropus', *GRBS* 22.1 (1981), pp. 39–64, at 51; Parker, *Athenian Religion*, pp. 148–51 and 247, and Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism', with Schachter, C*ults of Boiotia 1*, p. 22.
92. Schachter, C*ults of Boiotia 1*, p. 46, astutely notes the reference to Theban control in Hdt. 6.118, and argues for its accuracy.
93. Petropoulou, 'The eparche documents', pp. 338–335, demonstrates that when the sanctuary was founded in the late fifth century, consultation was free, under Theban influence the Oropeans introduced an entrance fee, under Athenian control, the entrance fee increased. A new four-yearly festival was also introduced at this time, see Parker, *Athenian Religion*, pp. 25 and 151. Also see J.D. Mikalson, *Religion in Hellenistic Athens* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1998), pp. 208–41, on how the Athenians atticised cult practice on Delos in the Hellenistic era.
94. The Boeotians respond grimly that if this is Athenian land, they should be able to remove their own dead without permission (Thuc. 4.99.1).
95. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', esp. pp. 182–4, 193–7, on the importance on Delos in light of issues with Delphi, and religion, 'used by the Athenians as a propaganda device inside their empire and even as an instrument of oppression and expropriation' (p. 182). Concerns about the Athenian plague also seems to have prompted the purification: Diodorus states this explicitly (12.58) and several minor shrines across Athens were restored at this time in what has been described as a 'wave of religiosity', H.A. Thompson, 'Athens faces adversity', *Hesperia* 50.4 (1981), pp. 343–55, at 347–8, with Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 17, 73, 163, 218, 276–7.
96. Military set-backs and a Delphic oracle led to the Athenians arranging the restoration of the Delians (5.32), although a lot of them had been murdered in the meantime (8.108).
97. Location, see above, n. 62. The Athenians relished opportunities for spectacular processions to their new festival (e.g. Plut. *Nic*. 3). Possession of Delium would expand these opportunities.
98. There were sanctuaries of Apollo Delios (sometimes with Artemis Delia) at Amorgos, Calymnos, Cos, Naxos, Nisyros, Paros, Prepesinthos and Syme, among other islands. See C. Constantakopoulou, *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World* (Oxford, 2007).
99. Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion*, p. 39.

100. On which see more below, Chapter 5, 'The Religious Activity of Brasidas'.
101. Nevin, '*Military ethics*', p. 105, Socrates recalled his participation in this campaign during his defence speech (Pl. *Ap*. 17E); Alcibiades discusses it at symposium (Pl. *Symp*. 221A–C). There is no suggestion that they participated in the siege.

CHAPTER 2 TALISMANS

1. 'Ἐς μὲν δὴ τοσοῦτο τοῦ λόγου οἱ πάντες Ἕλληνες λέγουσι, τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ αὐτοὶ Πάριοι γενέσθαι ὧδε λέγουσι. Μιλτιάδῃ ἀπορέοντι ἐλθεῖν ἐς λόγους αἰχμάλωτον γυναῖκα, ἐοῦσαν μὲν Παρίην γένος, οὔνομα δέ οἱ εἶναι Τιμοῦν, εἶναι δὲ ὑποζάκορον τῶν χθονίων θεῶν. ταύτην ἐλθοῦσαν ἐς ὄψιν Μιλτιάδεω συμβουλεῦσαι, εἰ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιέεται Πάρον ἑλεῖν, τὰ ἂν αὐτὴ ὑποθῆται, ταῦτα ποιέειν. μετὰ δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑποθέσθαι, τὸν δὲ διερχόμενον ἐπὶ τὸν κολωνὸν τὸν πρὸ τῆς πόλιος ἐόντα ἕρκος θεσμοφόρου Δήμητρος ὑπερθορεῖν, οὐ δυνάμενον τὰς θύρας ἀνοῖξαι, ὑπερθορόντα δὲ ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ μέγαρον ὅ τι δὴ ποιήσοντα ἐντός, εἴτε κινήσοντά τι τῶν ἀκινήτων εἴτε ὅ τι δή κοτε πρήξοντα. πρὸς τῇσι θύρῃσί τε γενέσθαι καὶ πρόκατε φρίκης αὐτὸν ὑπελθούσης ὀπίσω τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἴεσθαι, καταθρώσκοντα δὲ τὴν αἰμασιὴν τὸν μηρὸν σπασθῆναι. οἵ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸ γόνυ προσπταῖσαι λέγουσι. Μιλτιάδης μέν νυν φλαύρως ἔχων ἀπέπλεε ὀπίσω, οὔτε χρήματα Ἀθηναίοισι ἄγων οὔτε Πάρον προσκτησάμενος' (Hdt. 6.134–5).
2. See e.g. *Hymn Hom*. 2, *Dem*. 477–9; Ar. *Thesm*. 1150. With W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford, 1985), p. 161: 'The secrecy of what is peculiarly sacred and pure, *hagnon*, surrounds this goddess'; R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 177–9, 'Superficially, secrecy divides profane knowledge from guarded sacred knowledge; it is probably more important, however, that a division is thereby created between those who have access to this knowledge and those denied it. The secrecy of the Thesmophoria emphasized the separation of the sexes …'; H.S. Versnel, 'The festival for Bona Dea and the Thesmophoria', *Greece and Rome* 39.1 (1992), pp. 31–55, esp. 41–2.
3. L. Scott, *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6* (Leiden and Boston, 2005), pp. 634–5, 639–40 and 642.
4. J.D. Mikalson, *Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars* (Chapel Hill, 2003), pp. 36–7.
5. A. Griffiths, 'Was Kleomenes mad?', in A. Powell (ed.), *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* (London, 1989), pp. 51–78, at 59.
6. Plut. *Sol*. 9.1. U. Kron, 'Patriotic heroes', in R. Hägg (ed.), *Ancient Greek Hero Cult* (Stockholm, 1999), pp. 61–83, at 69–71, suggests that vase Boston Museum Fine Arts 95.28 may even depict this episode. For the other instances mentioned, see Chapter 1, 'The Athenian Acropolis in the Persian Wars' and 'The Sanctuary of Apollo at Delium'.
7. W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, Vol. 2: *Books 5–9* (Oxford, 1912), p. 121, and D. Hamel, *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998), pp. 168–9,

suggest ritually motivated theft. Most satisfactory is B. Goff, *Citizen Bacchae: Women's Ritual Practice in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2004), p. 208: Miltiades went, 'to perform some unknown symbolic act that would lead to his capture of the island'. Parker, *Miasma*, p. 179, refers to 'nefarious purposes', citing this as an instance of 'the popular sub-literary genre of "impiety instantly punished"'.

8. M. Detienne, 'The violence of well-born ladies', in M. Detienne and J-P. Vernant (eds), *The Cuisine of Sacrifice Among the Greeks* (Chicago and London, 1989), pp. 129ff; Goff, *Citizen Bacchae*, pp. 203–11.
9. D. Boedeker, 'The view from Eleusis. Demeter in the Persian Wars', in E. Bridges *et al*. (eds), *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 65–82, at 76–80.
10. D. Viviers 'Historiographie et propagande politique au vème siècle avant notre ere: les Philaides et la Chersonese de Thrace', *Rivista di Filologia e D'Instituzione Classica* 115 (1987), pp. 288–313, 290–300: the competing traditions available to Herodotus, and 306: Herodotus' independence.
11. The tendencies are outlined in Otanes' speech at Hdt. 3.80. On the recurrent characteristics of Herodotean despots, see Chapter 1, n. 15 on the flouting of boundaries, with H.R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Ohio, 1966), esp. pp. 86–7 and 148–237; A. Ferrill, 'Herodotus on tyranny', *Historia* 27.3 (1978), pp. 385–98; F. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1988), pp. 322–39; N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece* (Warminster, 1992), pp. 343–85; V. Gray, 'Herodotus and images of tyranny: the tyrants of Corinth', *The American Journal of Philology* 117.3 (1996), pp. 361–89; S. Forsdyke, 'Athenian democratic ideology and Herodotus' *Histories*', *The American Journal of Philology* 122.3 (2001), pp. 329–58; C. Dewald, 'Form and content: the question of tyranny in Herodotus', in K.A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece* (Austin, 2003), pp. 25–58, esp. 26–35. Contra K.H. Waters, *Herodotos on Tyrants and Despots: A Study in Objectivity* (Wiesbaden, 1971), who perceives no pattern; J. Hart, *Herodotus and Greek History* (London, 1982), pp. 76–95, who argues unconvincingly that Herodotus' tyrant portraits are positive, and J.F. McGlew, *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca and London, 1993), pp. 183–212, whose idea of the tyrant as role-model is directly refuted by Forsdyke 'Athenian democratic ideology', p. 345, n. 41. Also see K.A. Raaflaub, 'Stick and glue: the function of tyranny in fifth-century Athenian democracy', in K.A. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny*, pp. 59–93, demonstrating that tyranny was generally perceived negatively in Athens throughout the fifth century.
12. In Hartog's memorable phrase, 'The personality of a tyrant is all-craving', *Mirror*, p. 330. On tyrant motifs, see Chapter 1, n. 15 and Chapter 2, n. 11.
13. Thus Croesus succumbs to Cyrus (1.86), Cyrus to the Massagetae (1.214), Apries falls after an expedition against Cyrene, wealthy Polycrates loses his life pursuing still more gold (3.125), Cambyses loses his mind campaigning through Africa despite success in Egypt, the Ionian Revolt is

said to take place only because Aristogoras wants to possess Naxos (5.30), despite conquering Lesbos and Chios Histaeus is killed when he plunders the mainland (6.28), Darius, although a more effective despot than most, dies without subduing Greece and Egypt (7.4), and Xerxes, finally, is shamed by his failure in Greece, an unnecessary campaign as articulated by Pausanias' observation that the Persians came to rob Greece of its poverty (9.82). See C. Fornara, *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 76–7 and 87–8: the 'cancerous nature of imperialism' in Herodotus; Raaflaub, 'Herodotus, political thought', esp. pp. 227–9 and 243–5; 'Philosophy, science, politics', pp. 175–6; Hartog, *Mirror*, p. 330; Dewald, 'Form and content', 33–5; J. Kindt, 'Delphic oracle stories and the beginning of historiography: Herodotus' Croesus logos', *Classical Philology* 101 (2006), pp. 34–51, at 46–9; Fisher, *Hybris*, pp. 217–24.

14. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 154, talks of, 'Individual uniqueness within a fixed pattern'. Gammie, 'Herodotus on kings', refers to, 'individualized, yet withal highly conventional, compositions'; Fisher, *Hybris*, pp. 343–85; Gray, 'Images of tyranny', pp. 361ff; Dewald, 'Form and content', pp. 25–58, although this chapter will challenge Dewald's view (pp. 40–7) that the portraits of the Greek tyrants are so nuanced that they do not really reflect the 'despotic template' of the Asian despots. Tyrants are not monarchs as such (though in Herodotus, as in Aristotle, monarchs and other legitimate rulers can be considered tyrants because of their unchecked power), both are despots; see 'Herodotus on tyranny', on the value-judgements conveyed by Herodotus' careful choice of terminology.
15. Dewald, 'Form and content', pp. 38–40.
16. 'As free men they are dreadful and they stand out as the most unmanly of all peoples; but if they are to be considered slaves, no people would love their masters more and be less likely to run-away' (Hdt. 4.142).
17. R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Books, II* (London, 1895), pp. 45–7; A.R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks: The Defence of the West, c.546–478BC* (London, 1984), pp. 133–4 with n. 14; M.M. Austin, 'Greek tyrants and the Persians, 546–479 BC', *Classical Quarterly* 40.2 (1990), pp. 289–306, 299 and 303. J. Wells, *Studies in Herodotus* (Oxford, 1923), pp. 116–20, provides a rare defence of the tradition.
18. Perhaps put forward by them on the occasion of Miltiades' first trial. See W.W. How, 'Cornelius Nepos on Marathon and Paros', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 39 (1919), pp. 48–61, at 56; Waters, *Herodotos on Tyrants*, pp. 31, 37, 90, and below, 'Miltiades: Hero and Despot' and 'The Sanctuary of Demeter and a Despot's Crime'.
19. This approach was taken in the pro-Cimonid family history by Marcellinus, which includes a favourable representation of the establishment of their colony, with no service to Darius, and no expedition to Paros (Marcellin. *Thuc.* 13–24). A similar effect is achieved by Ctesias, who seems to have been represented Miltiades only as the victor of Marathon, without any of the more compromising details of his early life. *FGrHist* 688 F13 21, with J.M. Bigwood, 'Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars', *Phoenix*, 32.1 (1978), pp. 19–41.

20. How, 'Cornelius Nepos', 56 (supported by Fornara, *Herodotus*, p. 54, n. 33): Herodotus 'clearly made use of a source favourable to Miltiades as well as of the hostile Alcmaeonid tradition'. R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and the Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 98, n. 9, observes that the identification of a famous tomb need not have been made by the family, although (p. 107) Olympic victories are very characteristic of family tradition; Waters, *Herodotos on Tyrants*, 10 n. 23, Herodotus' attitude towards Miltiades is 'complex'; Hart, *Herodotus*, p. 41, the apologetic account of the Danube incident stems from Miltiades' defence at the trial of 493, and Herodotus has included 'discreditable' details by referring to service under Darius – i.e. that Herodotus uses a positive tradition in an ambiguous if not hostile manner.
21. J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300BC* (Oxford, 1971), p. 299, after E. Bradeen 'The fifth-century archon list', *Hesperia* 32.2 (1963), pp. 193–4. Technically the Cimonid branch of this family was not truly Philaid, but they are often referred to in scholarship as Philaids, largely because this is how Herodotus identifies them (6.35.1).
22. Davies, *APF*, pp. 299–300. Miltiades III is so termed in relation to two men of that name who preceded him, Miltiades I and II, who served as archons in 664/3 and 659/8 (Paus. 4.23.10 and 8.39.3). Contra N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Philaids and the Chersonese', *Classical Quarterly* 6 (1956), pp. 113ff, who attempted to make Miltiades III into two men. Also see Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, pp. 161–73, on the genealogy, preferring Herodotus' to Pherecydes' (*FGrHist* 3. F2).
23. The historicity of this invitation has been doubted, in reality he was probably a more typical, self-assertive colonist, supported by Peisistratus. Diog. L. 1.2, cites a tradition that Solon initiated the project; this may have been unknown to Herodotus, but even if it was not, it would not have been compatible with Herodotus' characterisation of Solon as a wise advisor. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 76, the invitation is possible, but it is more likely that 'the initiative came from Athens'. Also Wells, 'Miltiades', pp. 113–14: Miltiades was sent by Athens because of his trading connections in the area, with R. Parker, 'Greek states and Greek oracles', in P. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey (eds), *Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday* (London, 1985), pp. 298–326, at 306 (essentially following Nepos 1.1–4) argues that Miltiades III was probably a normal *oikist*, approved by Delphi, rather than one invited by locals. Contra H.W. Parke, *A History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1939), p. 164: the story was only 'slightly touched up' and the 'invitation' was essentially genuine, and Hart, *Herodotus*, p. 37 and 58, the oracle was matching suitable partners. Viviers, 'Historiographie', pp. 291, 294, and 310, suggests that the sympathetic 'invitation' *logos* was invented to defend Miltiades against charges of tyranny during his 493 trial. Viviers bases this plausible argument, in part, on the existence of a pro-Philaid tradition in Marcellinus' *Life of Thucydides* 13–24. This view supported by T.J. Figueira, *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization* (Baltimore and London, 1991),

pp. 134–8, G. Cawkwell, 'Early Greek tyranny and the people', *Classical Quarterly* 45.1 (1995), pp. 73–86, 79; and Scott, *Commentary*, p. 509. The transformation of a family history connected with tyranny into one of democratic principles is not at all uncommon in Athens (and the story of Miltiades III is not unlike the claims made by the Alcmaeonids, Isoc. 17. 25f), Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, pp. 132–54. Nonetheless, Herodotus' inclusion of Miltiades III's invitation forms discreet contrast with is account of Miltiades IV's appointment, on which see Chapter 2, 'Miltiades: Hero and Despot'.

24. Contra Waters, *Herodotos on Tyrants*, p. 37, who sees no negative connotation to the act. Whereas Macan *Herodotus I* (1895), p. 296: 'The oracle given to the Knidians would seem to condemn the work of Miltiades.' On the Cnidians see Lateiner, *Historical Method*, p. 129; T. Harrison, *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus* (Oxford, 2000b), p. 239; Kindt, 'Delphic oracle stories', pp. 47–8. Also consider Xerxes' work on the Athos canal (Hdt. 7.23–4) on which Fisher, *Hybris*, pp. 376–7.
25. Xerxes' actions recall earlier trans-continent transgressions (Hdt. 7.20), reflecting what Boedeker, 'Protesilaos', p. 42, calls 'an enduring pattern of hostility'; she also cites (at p. 44) Benveniste's view that the 'pontus' in 'Hellespont' should be interpreted as 'dangerous crossing', indicating a place of 'dangerous transition'. Arrogance is not necessarily hubristic, but in violating natural boundaries humans demonstrate hubris towards divine designs.
26. Death without an heir reoccurs in the *Histories* as a most undesirable fate and, although it occurs in many differing contexts, it is frequently associated with aggressive despotism, see Lateiner, *Historical Method*, p. 142; Gray, 'Images of tyranny', pp. 370–1; with Harrison, *Divinity and History*, pp. 31–63, on children as a blessing and their death or non-generation as a grave misfortune.
27. Here I have followed Aubrey de Selincourt, whose translation of ὡς as 'just as if' brings out the sense that they are generous to Miltiades *despite* their wrongs to his father. A.D. Godley in the Loeb prefers to say that the sons of Peisistratus were 'feigning' innocence, which implies (in a way that the text does not) that Miltiades might have been deceived. Hammond, 'The Philaids', pp. 117 and 119, argues that the Peisistratid involvement in the murder was initially a secret, which only became known much later on. Although possible, this is not what Herodotus describes.
28. H.T. Wade-Gery, 'Miltiades', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 71 (1951), pp. 212–21, 214. On helping friends, see K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 180–4, 273–8. With e.g. Pl. *Rep*. 332–6.
29. The archonship is attested by the archon list Agora I, 4120, on which see B. Meritt, 'Greek inscriptions (14–27)', *Hesperia* 8.1 (1939), pp. 59–65; Bradeen, 'The fifth-century archon list'. Scholars have often suspected that Miltiades IV's commission to the Chersonese was what Hart, *Herodotus*, p. 25, usefully calls, 'exile-by-employment', although Herodotus presents a chummier scenario.

30. Esp. Lateiner, *Historical Method*, pp. 135–40.
31. Darius at Hdt. 3.85–7, on which Dewald, 'Form and content', p. 30. Deioces at Hdt. 1.96–103, Peisistratus at Hdt. 1.60, on the connection between them see Gray, 'Images of tyranny', pp. 365–6; V. Gray, 'Reading the rise of Pisistratus. Herodotus 1.56–68', *Histos* 1 (1997), pp. 128–53. Fisher, *Hybris*, p. 366, however, finds the moral 'far from clear', but does argue that the arrests 'indicate a capacity for ruthless action', and that they were raised in accusation during the trial for tyranny held on Miltiades' return to Athens. V. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World: Essays and Reviews* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 121–8 esp. 122, working on a historical perspective, saw this incident as strong evidence that the political unity of the peninsula was established through force.
32. Also recall Deioces: the account of his rise to power appears 'almost as a recipe for how to found an autocratic government' (Dewald, 'Form and content', p. 27), and among his first acts as king is the adoption of a bodyguard (Hdt. 1.98). Similarly Peisistratus (Hdt. 1.64). Wade-Gery, 'Miltiades', p. 218, considered the passage to be drawn from Miltiades' trial for tyranny, commenting, 'all of 6.39 was meant (not by Herodotos, but by the parties whom he echoes) to be damaging: the treacherous arrests, the foreign wife, the bodyguards, not least the help from Hippias, all have the smell of tyranny'. The 'smell of tyranny' is right, and we might dispense with the reticence about Herodotus' use of it; this is no accidental 'echo'.
33. The need to arrest the local aristocracy suggests opposition to Miltiades. Moreover, it is noticeable that Hippias sent Miltiades out in a trireme, a technically advanced warship complete with some 200 fighting men (Hdt. 6.39.1). As Hammond, 'The Philaids', p. 123, observes, 'If Miltiades … was simply going out to succeed his brother peaceably, there was no need for the Peisistratidae to send him on one of their best warships or to give him official support.' Triremes were still rare at this time and a striking display of power: H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), pp. 206–7.
34. The lion metaphor is used in an oracle to describe the tyrant, Cypselus (Hdt. 5.92b). As an infant, Cypselus appears harmless, like a cub, but he grows into an uncontrollable predator (Hdt. 5.92c–e). See Gray, 'Images of tyranny', pp. 367–8 and 373–4. Hipparchus and Pericles are also likened to lions, and the metaphor could be extended to the city of Athens, and to tyranny itself: Gray, 'Images of tyranny', pp. 384–7. Aeschylus used the image to refer to an apparently innocuous danger that gets out of control (*Ag.* 718–36). Aristophanes applied it to Alcibiades (*Frogs* 1425 and 1431–2). The repetition of the motif in which a community does not realise until too late the danger it has brought upon itself explains Herodotus' adoption of the favourable version of the origin of the Cimonid's rule (that Miltiades III was *invited* to rule, see above, n. 23), as it emphasises the manner in which the Dolonci Thracians underestimated the risk of despotism and brought about their own domination.

35. Around 514, Miltiades may have been driven temporarily from the Chersonese by the Scythians, but the historicity of this has been doubted. Viviers, 'Historiographie', at pp. 294 and 310, suggests compellingly that the flight was invented to emphasise Miltiades' subjects inviting him back.
36. Although he does not explore it in detail, Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 192, observed that 'the history of Miltiades and his family follows a particular pattern of fortune and impiety'.
37. The Persians also took the island around this time, apparently massacring much of the population. Whether Miltiades' conquest came before or after that of the Persians is uncertain, but after seems more likely as a new Athenian settlement is unlikely to have survived a Persian occupation. Things must have got more difficult for Miltiades once Hippias formed a marriage-alliance with Lampsacus (Thuc. 6.59), enemy of the Chersonese, relinquishing interest in that resource rich area to Persia's gain and at Miltiades' expense; Davies, *APF*, p. 302, this 'cannot have been anything but a deliberate slap in the face of Miltiades IV'.
38. When the Peisistratids' murder of Miltiades' father is reiterated at this point, there is no 'sour' reference to Miltiades accepting their favours. Furthermore, although Miltiades' rule in the Chersonese is not forgotten, its presentation is less negative at this later stage; an incident that appeared earlier (Miltiades' flight from the Chersonese, Hdt. 6.41) is even retold as a life-threatening story in which Darius is Miltiades' enemy, in contrast to the initial report in which Herodotus stated that people were *mistaken* in their belief that Darius resented Miltiades.
39. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 250: 'his account favors Miltiades as the planner and executor of the battle, but without slighting the patriotism and heroism of Callimachus'. How, 'Cornelius Nepos', 57; Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*; J.A.S. Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon', *Historia*, 42.3 (1993), pp. 279–307, at pp. 284–6; Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, pp. 81 and 165 n. 7; Scott, *Commentary*, pp. 378–86, all prefer that Callimachus was a proper commander-in-chief and that Philaid-Cimonid sources lie behind the role ascribed to Miltiades. P. Bicknell, 'The command structure and generals of the Marathon campaign', *L'Antiquité Classique* 39 (1970), pp. 427–42, 431, adds that despite being in a subordinate role Miltiades may genuinely have surpassed the *polemarch* and other *strategoi* as a result of his greater experience. Bicknell maintains that the account comes from a favourable, probably Philaid source.
40. P. Derow, 'Herodotus readings', *Classics Ireland* 2 (1995), pp. 29–51, at 46–51.
41. 'if our city survives, it could become first among the cities of Greece' (Hdt. 6.109). See Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 192; Raaflaub, 'Herodotus, political thought', p. 238.
42. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, 236; P. de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 25–6; V. Gabrielsen, 'Warfare and the state', in P. Sabin, *et al.* (eds), *The Cambridge History of*

Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 248–72, at 250–6; Figueira, *Athens and Aigina*, pp. 158–9.

43. A.W. Gomme, 'Review: Miltiades and his age, by Helmut Berve', *The Classical Review* 51.6 (1937), pp. 235–6, Miltiades goes to establish a refuge, 'as Pisistratus had acquired Sigeum'; R. Develin, 'Miltiades and the Parian expedition', *L'Antiquité Classique* 46 (1977), pp. 571–7, 576: As the *demos* might scorn his plan to prevent future Persian use of the island, Miltiades heads out with a tyrant's individualism; Figueira, *Athens and Aigina*, p. 159: Miltiades intended Peisistratids and Philaid-style colonisation, with 'aristocratic highhandedness that had missed its day'. The insistence on secrecy echoes the (probably ahistorical) secrecy of Cleomenes' campaign (Hdt. 5.74).
44. Develin, 'Miltiades', pp. 574–5, dismisses the 'grudge', suggesting a plan to dominate the Cyclades and prevent future use by the Persians, with N. G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322* (Oxford, 1959), p. 219, who follows Nepos (*Milt.* 7.1) in believing that vengeance for medising was the genuine reason; H. van Wees, 'Herodotus and the past', in E.J. Bakker *et al.* (eds), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002), pp. 321–49, 347, considers booty to be the motive, stressing Herodotus' insistence that punishment was a pretext; Scott, *Commentary*, p. 633, accepts the booty-motive, although he is unusual in adding that the 'personal grudge' reported in Herodotus may have been relevant too, p. 434; de Souza, *Piracy*, pp. 25–6, is surely closest in noting that the campaign, 'seems to have combined a political motive (or excuse), to punish the Parians for their alleged medising, with a less noble motive, namely to obtain money for the Athenians'.
45. Austin, 'Greek tyrants', p. 304, calls this 'a tantalizing hint of competition between individual Greeks for favours and influence with the Persians'.
46. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 120, suggest Lysagoras was the Persian commander of the Phoenician fleet referred to at Hdt. 7.135, which seems likely. J.A.S. Evans, 'Note on Miltiades' capture of Lemnos', *Classical Philology* 58.3 (1963), pp. 168–70, at 169, made the same identification and suggests that Lysagoras had reminded Hydarnes of Miltiades' disloyalty in Scythia.
47. Just as it will be presented as hubristic that Xerxes wishes to dishonour all the Greeks just because of his grudge against the Athenians (Hdt. 7.157) it is wrong of Miltiades to harm all Parians because of his anger against one man, see Raaflaub, 'Herodotus, political thought', p. 242; with Fisher, *Hybris*, p. 372, who notes, pp. 376 and 385, that harming those who have done you no harm is the very essence of hubris. There is ominous further precedent in Croesus' attack upon innocent Syrians (Hdt. 1.73–6) and the Scythians' opinion of Darius' campaign against them (Hdt. 4.118). Derow, 'Herodotus readings', pp. 40–1, notes the verbal connections that Herodotus used to establish the connection between this campaign and others: the similarity of the promise of easy gains that Miltiades makes to the Athenians and that of Aristagoras to the

Athenians before the ill-fated Ionian Revolt (Hdt. 5.97 and 6.132, 'εὐπετέες' and 'εὐπετέως' respectively); the Athenians' desire for more property and Croesus' similar lust (Hdt. 1.73 and 6.135, 'προσκτήσασθαι' and 'προσκτησάμενος').

48. The opinion that Miltiades encouraged the Athenians' hubris is shared by Plato's Socrates, who links the fall of great politicians (including Miltiades) to their tendency to encourage the worst traits of the *demos*: enriching the city without regard for justice or the despotism they encourage (Pl. *Gor.* esp. 515–22). Aelius Aristides' contradicted this view in *On the Four* and in *Defence of Oratory: Bk.2*. 113D, claiming that it was inconsistent to admire the victories at Marathon and Salamis and condemn the leaders who brought them about. Plato was not criticising Marathon; in the case of Miltiades he must have been objecting to his behaviour after the victory, i.e. against Paros. We should re-appraise Hartog's suggestion, *Mirror*, pp. 335–6, that Miltiades' despotism is located only outside the *polis*. For further criticism of Hartog's somewhat over-schematised view, see Fisher, *Hybris*, pp. 364–5. Similar claims were made by Waters, *Herodotos on Tyrants*, pp. 10 and 37–8, who argues that Miltiades' tyranny is 'forgotten' after his return to Athens, and in P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Oedipus in Athens', J-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet (eds), *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece* (New York, 1988), pp. 301–27, at 309: Miltiades appears 'in two different, even opposed, guises'. Miltiades is never as 'perfectly integrated' in democratic Athens as Vidal-Naquet suggests.
49. See Chapter 2, 'Miltiades: Hero and Despot'. C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'What is *polis* religion?', in R. Buxton, *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion* (Oxford, 2000b), pp. 13–37, 15, emphasises Miltiades' gender transgression. There is some indication (Apollodorus of Athens, *FGrHist*. 244 F89) that the Parians viewed their sanctuary of Demeter as the principle sanctuary of Demeter, as the Athenians viewed Eleusis (*Hom. Hymn.2, Dem.*) and the Sicels Sicily (Diod. Sic. 5.2.3–5.5.1). Miltiades may not have shared this particular belief, but this was still Demeter.
50. On dismemberment, see Detienne, 'The violence of well-born ladies'. Regarding Alcibiades, Thucydides says that while the Athenians were concerned that this was a bad omen for the expedition, they were also concerned that it was a sign of an anti-democracy coup (Thuc. 6.27–8); what is tyrannical in Miltiades' behaviour has tyrannical, or at least anti-democratic connotations in Alcibiades'. See Chapter 3, 'Nicias and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Syracuse', with Raaflaub, 'Stick and glue', pp. 66–7. Others only suspected of violating Demeter's rites are killed, e.g. the Chians after the battle of Lade, Hdt. 6.16.
51. The Herodotean Cambyses offends his own religion by burning Amasis' corpse (Hdt. 3.16), offends Greek religion by attacking the oracle of Zeus (3.25–260), and offends Egyptian religion by killing the Apis bull (3.29). As well as offending Greek religion through his destruction of Greek sanctuaries, Xerxes offends Persian religion by assaulting the Hellespont (7.35), when Persian religion is said to hold all rivers sacred (1.138) and is said to offend Babylonian religion by stealing their statue (1.183).

Similarly, Pherus' spear-cast into the Nile (2.111). For the alternative perspective, see above, Chapter 1, 'The Athenian Acropolis in the Persian Wars'.

52. D. Lateiner, 'A note on the perils of prosperity in Herodotus', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 125 (1982), pp. 97–101, at 98.
53. J. Dillery, 'Darius and the tomb of Nitocris (Hdt. 1.187)', *Classical Philology* 87.1 (1992), pp. 30–8.
54. E.g. Godley refers to her as 'a Parian slave woman', obscuring her recent transition to prisoner-of-war.
55. On the mistreatment of women by despots: C. Dewald, 'Women and culture in Herodotus', *Women's Studies* 8 (1981), pp. 93–127, at 93–7 and 107–13; Gammie, 'Herodotus on kings', esp. pp. 177, 181, 184, and 186–7; and Lateiner, *Historical Method*, pp. 135–40. Other mistreatment of priests and priestesses is carried out by Xerxes (1.183), Cambyses (3.29), and Cleomenes (5.72). Otanes lists violence towards women, 'βιᾶται γυναῖκας', as typical monarchical behaviour (3.80); this does not exclusively mean rape.
56. The quote, from D. Gillis, *Collaboration with the Persians* (Wiesbaden, 1979), p. 44, is representative of most views. Goff, *Citizen Bacchae*, p. 208, is closer in stressing the ambiguity surrounding Timo, who, 'exemplifies the potential mobility of women's allegiances'.
57. Herodotean characters frequently misunderstand what they are told, from Croesus' failure to understand Delphi, the Amphiaraum, or Solon (1.30–1.33; 1.53; 1.71 and 1.86) at the start of the work, through to Xerxes' accidental prophecy towards the end (8.114). On Croesus' misunderstanding: Kindt, 'Delphic oracle stories', esp. 39–40. On Xerxes': L. Solmsen, 'Speeches in Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea', *Classical Philology* 39.4 (1944), pp. 241–53, p. 243, and D. Lateiner, 'A note on DIKAS DIDONAI in Herodotus', *Classical Quarterly* 30.1 (1980), pp. 30–2. With J.A.S. Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer of the Past: Three Essays* (Princeton, 1991), pp. 15 and 40 on Xerxes' dream.
58. The inscription as oracular, Dillery, 'Darius and the tomb', pp. 32–3.
59. Aristodicus chastised (1.158–9); Sabacus resists advice to do wrong (2.139); Glaucus punished (6.86a–d). Miltiades' own predecessor, Miltiades III, is said to have checked the Dolonci claims (6.35), see Harrison, *Divinity and History*, p. 152 n. 109. On the significance this check would have for his 'religious authority', see I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1987), pp. 27, 77–8, 191–3.
60. As always, the oracles proved accurate; the Athenians brought trouble by backing the Ionian Revolt (5.97). Evans, 'Herodotus', 280, notes that the Homeric phrasing Herodotus employs (5.97.3: *Il*.5.62) implies blame of the Athenians for inviting trouble.
61. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, p. 229, with H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), p. 161, on responsibility. Given Herodotus' abhorrence of extreme punishments, it is appropriate that in Timo's case, as in Euenius' (Hdt. 9.93–93), Delphi acts, as Parke, *Delphic Oracle*, pp. 367–9, notes, as a 'moderating influence which

prevents the application of extreme measures'. Gods may exact what revenge they will, but humans should be moderate.

62. Croesus' impudence: Kindt, 'Delphic oracle stories', pp. 37–8; contra Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer*, p. 49, 'diligence'.
63. Hart, *Herodotus*, pp. 59–60, compares Timo to the wolves that attacked Euenius' sacred flock (Hdt. 9.93–5). But Timo's temptation is no random heavenly affliction, but the means through which Miltiades' own character destroys him. Hart, *Herodotus*, p. 61, does not recognise the connection with Delphi's words to Croesus, because he wrongly dismisses that *logos* as 'puerile'. The Euenius *logos* is more about scale of punishment: the Apollonians are punished by the gods because their punishment of Euenius is disproportionate to his fault. This is an appropriate story to include before Mycale (which follows at 9.96–107), where the Greeks punish the Persians thoroughly, but not hideously, unlike the Athenians who go on to punish Artayctes excessively (9.114–21).
64. See A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford, 1960), p. 124; Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer*, pp. 35–8; with T. Harrison, '"Prophecy in reverse"? Herodotus and the origins of history', in P. Derow and R. Parker (eds), *Herodotus and his World* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 237–55, esp. 248–51, on the mixed layers of causation in Herodotus.
65. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 192.
66. L.W. Daly, 'Miltiades, Aratus, and compound fractures', *The American Journal of Philology* 101.1 (1980), pp. 59–60, notes that 'τὸν μηρὸν σπασθῆναι' should be translated as a breaking of the leg, in this case a compound fracture, rather than the more common translation 'sprain' or 'twist'. Scott, *Commentary*, pp. 439; 640–2, discusses the terminology of the wound, although it is unclear why he argues that Miltiades did not consider the injury serious.
67. Fehling, *Herodotus*, pp. 108–9.
68. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 192, and Gammie, 'Herodotus on kings', p. 191, note the connection between Miltiades' and Cambyses' injuries. Hartog, *Mirror*, p. 336, regards Miltiades' wound as a connection with Cambyses, and its cause as demonstration of 'despotism and *hubris*'. Also see Fisher, *Hybris*, p. 364: 'the sacrilege and leg-wound alike recall Cambyses (and Cleomenes)'.
69. In a curious coincidence, it was this Aspathines who invited Hydarnes into the conspiracy against the Magi (Hdt. 3.70), probably the same Hydarnes who prompted Miltiades' Parian expedition. If Hydarnes was a young man during the coup of *c.*521, he need not have been too old to command the fleet in the Chersonese when Miltiades fled, or for that matter to be Xerxes' commander *c.*480 (Hdt. 7.135). How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 120, regard the Hydarnes of the Parian expedition as the same as the same person who commanded the Immortals and the fleet, i.e. the son of Darius' co-conspirator, but Herodotus distinguishes between these persons: during the coup there is a simply named

'Hydarnes', just as the man to whom Miltiades was maligned and the man who commands the fleet is simply 'Hydarnes the Persian' (Hdt. 6.133; 7.135); only the commander of the Immortals is 'Hydarnes son of Hydarnes', suggesting that this Hydarnes of the Immortals was the son of the elder Hydarnes of the fleet. Therefore the elder Hydarnes is a linking figure between the rise of Darius and the origin of the Parian expedition.

70. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, p. 229, n. 18, notes how Histaeus' wound links him with Cambyses and Miltiades.
71. The identification of the thigh wound motif is not a suggestion that thigh-wounds are a necessary fatality for all despots. Herodotus balanced patterning and motifs with individualisation and variety. So while thigh wounds are not inflicted upon every despot, it is patterning that they should be so consistently connected with despotism. No other body part is reported injured in such a systematic manner. When Miltiades sustains his injury, his offence leads to death by a despots' disease.
72. Hamel, *Athenian Generals*, p. 169, n. 3, with Scott, *Commentary*, p. 439.
73. Raaflaub 'Herodotus, political thought', p. 239; 'Philosophy, science, politics', p. 172.
74. Raaflaub 'Herodotus, political thought', p. 245, n. 63. Themistocles' exchange with the Andrians is also reminiscent of Zeus' despotic manner in *Prometheus Bound*; for the resonance of this play with the *Histories*, see Forsdyke, 'Athenian democratic ideology', p. 351, with n. 54.
75. For Miltiades and Themistocles in particular: Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 200, n. 29; Raaflaub 'Herodotus, political thought', p. 239. For the more general relevance of imperialism in Herodotus to his contemporary audience: Fornara, *Herodotus*, esp. pp. 40–58 and pp. 75–91; Derow, 'Herodotus readings', pp. 29ff; Dewald, 'Form and content', p. 31; Raaflaub, 'Philosophy, science, politics', pp. 164–86. With Gray, 'Images of tyranny', p. 387; R. Fowler, 'Herodotus and Athens', in P. Derow and R. Parker (eds), *Herodotus and his World* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 305–18.
76. The *Histories* famously closes with Miltiades' enemy, Xanthippus, taking control of *both* sides of the Hellespont and the Athenians' implication in a disturbing act of violence that attaches their city to the Herodotean cycle of hubris, Hdt. 9.114–22, on which Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 146, with n. 46; Boedeker, 'Protesilaos', pp. 30ff; Raaflaub, 'Philosophy, science, politics', p. 173.
77. Miltiades IV did have an heir, Cimon, but Cimon's conspicuously low-profile in the *Histories* should be noted. Despite being one of Athens' most successful *strategoi*, Cimon appears only twice, both times very briefly. His first appearance follows Miltiades' death, when he pays the fine (Hdt. 6.136). In the second, Herodotus is praising Cimon's Persian opponent (Hdt. 7.107). Cimon's campaign was fundamentally successful, but Herodotus presents it as a failure. Other stories, such as the charming one in which Cimon dedicates his bridle on the acropolis before Salamis, come not from Herodotus but from Plutarch

(*Cim.* 5.2–3). Herodotus did not do such violence to the facts as to pretend that Miltiades had no heir, but by mentioning Cimon only on two dismal occasions, Herodotus implies the failure of the family's advancement.

78. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 121, claim that Herodotus intended the fall of Miltiades to represent 'general nemesis of too great success and fame'. Similarly, Hart, *Herodotus*, p. 44: the story is one of the 'mutability of fortune;' Evans, *Herodotus, Explorer*, p. 74, Miltiades 'exhausted his good fortune'. While it is true that the changeability of fortune is fundamental to the *Histories*, Miltiades and his family play an active role in their downfall. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 121, suggest that a late tradition (Paus. 3.12.7) which held Miltiades responsible for the death of Darius' heralds was developed in order to provide a deserving crime to warrant the punishment that his death in disgrace seemed to represent. Wells, 'Miltiades', p. 123, adds that while this tradition may not be true at all, if it *is* reliable, Miltiades may have been motivated to commit a strikingly anti-Persian act to counter-act his previous medising. Nonetheless, the context of the story argues against this. It is told at the shrine of Talthybius, the heroised herald said to have exacted vengeance from the Spartans. An unspecified vengeance exacted from the Athenians (as at Hdt. 7.133) would have made a weak story by comparison to vengeance upon a famous Athenian. If anything, the story would have been believed *because* of the circulation of stories of his sacrilege on Paros, not because there was no crime to connect to his fate. See R. Sealey, 'The pit and the well: the Persian heralds of 491BC', *The Classical Journal* 72.1 (1976a), pp. 13–20, for a historical treatment of the heralds.
79. Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, p. 238.
80. The Parian Chronicle, brief as always, offers no additional information. Marathon is the victory of the 'Athenians' as a whole, there is no mention of the attack on Paros, and the only named Athenians are archons (e.g. Phainippides, Aristides, Xanthipus) and poets (Aeschylus, Simonides, Euripides), *FGrHist.* 239, 48–52.
81. Prestige: Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, p. 97. Hostile motives: *Oral Tradition*, p. 125, with C. Higbie, 'The bones of a hero, the ashes of a politician: Athens, Salamis, and the usable past', *Classical Antiquity* 16.2 (1997) pp. 278–307, at 280–1. Scandal that ran counter to family-owned traditions might also survive as popular gossip, *Oral Tradition*, pp. 109–10.
82. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 121. A scholiast who records that Miltiades was accused by the Alcmaeonids of failing to capture the island when he could have, with no explanation for the end of the expedition, W. Dindorf, *Aelius Aristides: Ex Recensione*, Vol. 3 (Hildersheim, 1964), pp. 531–2.
83. Cimon's trial in 463 may well have seen a reiteration of these rival versions of history, Viviers, 'Historiographie', p. 299. Speeches for and against Miltiades might also have been composed as rhetorical exercises

over the years; as a famous yet controversial figure he was a prime candidate for treatments of this sort.

84. The scholia derive from the fourth century CE professor of rhetoric, Sopater, 'a zealous advocate of the educational value of Aristides' orations' (F.W. Lenz, *The Aristeides Prolegomena* (Leiden, 1959), p. 106). For the texts see Dindorf, *Aelius Aristides 3*, with corrections and discussion in Lenz, *Aristeides*, and see Scott, *Commentary*, pp. 630–1, for a usefully condensed discussion the scholia's origins. For a vote of confidence on the scholiasts' sources, see W.R. Connor, 'Two notes on Cimon', *TAPA* 98 (1967), pp. 67–75, at 68, they are, 'often well informed and not lightly to be rejected'.
85. In a further scholia, Miltiades' offence is accidental: 'He was passing (παρελθὼν) the temple polluted by the blood of the enemy. Some say he was struck by a missile, others that he fell off the wall. And so he broke the thigh and returned without finishing' (Dindorf, *Aelius Aristides 3*, p. 678). Use of the definite article at 'τοῦ τείχους' indicates that Miltiades fell from the wall of the sanctuary, but while this begs the question of what Miltiades was doing there, the scholiast does not take the opportunity to further accuse or exonerate. In Libanius (*Dec.* 11.25) 'the gods' as a whole humble Miltiades to demonstrate their power.
86. Dindorf, *Aelius Aristides 3*, pp. 572 and 691.
87. The leg injury, incurred in combat, is incidental. The accusation of bribery is a pretext covering concern about aspiration to tyranny (*Milt.* 8). Nepos' narrative has been called 'little more than a translation of Ephorus' (How, 'Cornelius Nepos', p. 48). The origin can be seen through comparison with Stephanos of Byzantium's Ephoran excerpt: *FGrHist.* 70 F63. How, 'Cornelius Nepos', argues that the Ephoran version is a rationalised version of Herodotus, but it could equally be a rationalisation of alternative traditions, especially as there are slips that are unlikely to come from misreading Herodotus. It is note-worthy that even Nepos' positive *Life* contains concerns about tyranny.
88. See L. Pearson, 'Historical allusions in the Attic orators', *Classical Philology* 36 (1941), pp. 209–29; W.C. West III, 'Saviors of Greece', *GRBS* 11.4 (1970), pp. 271–83; K.R. Walters, '"We Fought Alone at Marathon": historical falsification in the Attic funeral oration', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 124 (1981), pp. 204–11; N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1986), esp. pp. 155–71; Thomas, *Oral Tradition*, pp. 221–7; J. Marincola, 'The Persian Wars in fourth-century oratory and historiography', in E. Bridges *et al.* (eds), *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 105–25.
89. On protective items, see esp. C.A. Faraone, *Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardian Statues in Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 18–35, 54–73.
90. On heroes, esp. E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica* (London, 1989). On their protective role, see also Kron, 'Patriotic heroes', pp. 61–83. Their special relation to place meant that they were often made guardians of

city-gates: E. Kearns, 'Between god and man: status and function of heroes and their sanctuaries', in A. Schachter (ed.), *Le Sanctuaire Grec* (Geneva, 1992), pp. 65–108, at 73–4; Faraone, *Talismans*, pp. 18–35.

91. Heroons did not always contain relics: Kearns, 'Between god', pp. 65–108. Attempts to obtain relics show that it was preferable to have them, although B. McCauley, 'Heroes and power: the politics of bone transferral', in R. Hägg (ed.), *Ancient Greek Hero Cult* (Stockholm, 1999), pp. 85–98, 93–5, has demonstrated that proclaiming the presence of relics as tangible evidence of the hero's presence was more important than their magical properties.
92. B. McCauley, 'The transfer of Hippodameia's bones: a historical context', *The Classical Journal* 93.3 (1998), pp. 225–39, esp. 233. C.M. Antonaccio, 'Placing the past: The Bronze Age in the cultic topography of early Greece', in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods: Sanctuaries and Sacred Space in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 79–104, 103: struggle over relics in classical period, 'embodies this mutual awareness [of heroes' significance] and the importance of such figures for relations between communities'. A. Foley, *The Argolid 800–600BC: An Archaeological Survey* (Göteborg, 1988), pp. 151–3, describes the rise in offerings at Bronze Age tombs.
93. Plut. *Cim*. 8, king Lycomedes of Scyros killed Theseus treacherously ('δόλῳ' in Plutarch) after Theseus was exiled from Athens.
94. M. Zaccarini, 'The return of Theseus to Athens: a case study in layered tradition and reception', *Histos* 9 (2015), pp. 174–98.
95. A.J. Podlecki, 'Cimon, Skyros and 'Theseus' Bones'', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 91 (1971), pp. 141–3, suggested Scyros was already a target and Delphi willing to support Athenian action. A. Blamire, *Putarch: Life of Kimon* (London, 1989), pp. 118–20, prefers the *Cimon*'s tradition that the bones were, 'an additional bonus, conceived and executed after the primary object of taking Skyros had been achieved'. Zaccarini, 'Return of Theseus', indicates that the bone stories significantly post-date the conquest.
96. Zaccarini, 'Return of Theseus', p. 191.
97. This factor is still more pronounced in Pausanias' version, in which the Athenians had to find the bones in order to take Scyros at all (Paus. 3.3.7). Elsewhere Pausanias says that Cimon took the island in revenge for the killing of Theseus (Paus. 1.17.6). McCauley, 'Heroes and power', p. 95, called the demand of the bones 'tantamount to demanding their submission'; this link between relic ownership and territorial claim remains valid despite the need to revise the chronology.
98. See above, n. 91.
99. For analysis of the decoration, see D. Castriota, *Myth, Ethos, and Actuality: Official Art in Fifth-Century B.C. Athens* (London, 1992) pp. 33–63, although the chronology needs revisiting in light of Zaccarini, 'Return of Theseus'.
100. Zaccarini, 'Return of Theseus', p. 180.

101. McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones', p. 236. Higbie, 'Bones of a hero', at 296, suggests that the Herodotean story is evidence that the Tegeans, 'tried hard to keep [the relics'] whereabouts hidden'. McCauley, 'Heroes and power', pp. 85–98, accepts the suggestion in D. Boedeker, 'Hero cult and politics in Herodotus: the bones of Orestes', in C. Dougherty and L. Kurke (eds), *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics* (1993), pp. 164–77, that the bones may have been intended to have an internally consolidating effect, as a higher power than the royal families, but nonetheless rightly reasserts the case for the bone-removal as territorial claim, suggesting that the bones offered a medium through which to approach compromise without loss of face.
102. McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones', p. 237. The transfer of Aristomenes was also done as a gesture of united enmity towards Sparta (see McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones', p. 232). Delphi approved: Paus. 6.32.3.
103. Midea: Strabo 8.6.11. Mycenae: Diod. Sic. 11.65.1–5; Strabo 8.6.19; Paus. 7.25.5–6. Tiryns: Hdt. 7.137; Strabo 8.6.11; Paus. 2.17.5; 2.25.8; 8.46.3. See J.M. Hall, 'How Argive was the "Argive" Heraion? The political and cultic geography of the Argive plain, 900–400 B. C.', *American Journal of Archaeology* 99.4 (1995), pp. 577–613, and McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones'. The passage of Strabo relating to Midea is damaged, but the identification of Midea has been widely accepted due to its citation in the accompanying discussion, see McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones', pp. 234, n. 38. It was still uninhabited in Pausanias' day: 2.25.9.
104. McCauley, 'Heroes and power', p. 95, makes this point: 'We may conclude from the is story that divine approval is vital for the success of a bone transfer.'
105. A statue seems to be what is meant (Strabo 261; Diod. Sic. 8.32; Justin, *Epit*. 20.2.9–20.4.1), so S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323BC* (London, 2002), p. 42; McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones', p. 230, n. 20. There are other examples of friendly temporary transfers. When the Spartans sent statues of the Dioscouri to Epizephyrian *Locris* in Italy, it was a gesture of collaboration (Diod. Sic. 8.32); see Hornblower, *Greek World*, p. 42; W.K. Pritchett, *Greek State at War, Pt.3* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1979b) pp. 16–17, notes that this involved an 800-mile round trip, not undertaken lightly.
106. The Aeacids as statues, so e.g. How and Wells, *Commentary* 2, p. 256, 'The idea clearly is that the coming of the image would ensure also the spiritual presence and aid of the heroes'. The same Aeacids are sought and delivered before the battle of Salamis (8.83), see Chapter 3, 'Artemisium and Salamis'. Also see I. Polinskaya, *A Local History of Greek Polytheism: Gods, People and the Land of Aigina, 800–400BCE* (Leiden and Boston, 2013), pp. 269–84, for more on Damia and Auxesia.
107. They were almost certainly kneeling in a birthing posture, in relation to their role supporting fertility; see Polinskaya, *Local History*, pp. 278–9.
108. On which see Chapter 1, 'The Temple of Apollo at Delium', with S. Nevin, 'Military Ethics in the Writing of History: Thucydides and Diodorus on

Delium', in E. Bragg *et al.* (eds), *Beyond the Battlefields: New Perspectives on Warfare and Society in the Graeco-Roman World* (Newcastle, 2008), pp. 99–120, at 111–14.

109. Figueira, *Athens and Aigina*, p. 104; Higbie, 'Bones of a hero', pp. 292–8, 297 with Paus. 1.35.3 for the altar to Eurysaces. The Corinthians seem to have done something similar in founding a cult of Hera Akraia in Corinth at the point when they assimilated Perachora and its sanctuary of Hera Akraia into the Corinthian state, although this appears to have been a less hostile transition; see R.A. Tomlinson, 'Perachora', in A. Schachter (ed.), *Le Sanctuaire grec* (Geneva, 1992), pp. 321–246, at 325–6; Kearns, *Heroes*, p. 47, with Kron, 'Patriotic heroes', p. 72, suggests the Athenians may have tried to remove relics of Aeacus. This is possible, but the other examples indicate that the relics would be claimed after conquest rather than before. M.B. Hollinshead, '"Adyton", "opisthodomos", and the inner room of the Greek temple', *Hesperia* 68.3 (1999), pp. 189–218, 208, discusses this as 'political plundering' by Aeginetans and Athenians.
110. On the Argive usurpation of mythic traditions, see Hall, 'How Argive', esp. p. 612, 'Certainly, after the destruction of Mycenae and Tiryns, Argos emphasized her control over the region by usurping her former neighbors' mythology'. With K. Dowden, *Death and the Maiden: Girls' Initiation Rites in Greek Mythology* (London and New York, 1989), pp. 71–95, quotation in full, p. 73: 'Argos' cultural imperialism is the handmaiden of her military imperialism.'
111. Foley, *The Argolid*, pp. 145–7; C. Morgan and T. Whitelaw, 'Pots and politics: ceramic evidence for the rise of the Argive state', *American Journal of Archaeology* 95 (1991), pp. 87–8.
112. I.B. Romano, 'Early Greek cult images and practices', in R. Hägg *et al.* (eds), *Early Greek Cult Practice* (Stockholm, 1988), pp. 127–33, 128 n. 6: wooden construction indicates age as wooden statues were the norm before stone superseded wood in the late sixth century. Festival link: W. Burkert, *Homo Necans*: *The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983) p. 169, n. 1, citing Plut. *Q.Gr.*303A–B.
113. See Acusilaus of Argos, *FGrHist.* 2 F 28. The girls were made to believe themselves to be cows. Burkert, *Homo Necans*, p. 169; H.J Rose and J.N. Bremmer, 'Proteus', *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 2003), p. 1253: 'The myth with its "mooing" girls, a stay outside the city, a chase by youths and concluding marriage strongly suggests a background in initiation.' With Dowden, *Death and the Maiden*, pp. 71–95, who traces the complex threads of this myth. Romano, 'Cult images', pp. 127–33, discusses some of the many rites that statues were included in.
114. See McCauley, 'Hippodameia's bones', pp. 234–5; Dowden, *Death and the Maiden*, pp. 71–95.
115. Hall, 'How Argive', p. 611.
116. Ibid., p. 600.
117. Finance: Morgan and Whitelaw, 'Pots and politics', p. 85. Polycleitus: Paus. 2.17.4. The definition of 'cult statue' was not rigid, plural statues could co-exist with importance in cult, see Romano, 'Cult images', p. 132,

for a discussion of the plural Hera statues on Samos, with K. Lapatin, 'New statues for old gods', in J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine (eds), *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations* (Edinburgh, 2010), pp. 126–51.

118. See Paus. 2.36.4–5; 3.7.4; 4.14.3, with Morgan and Whitelaw, 'Pots and politics', p. 83; Hall, 'How Argive', pp. 581–3; Foley, *The Argolid*, pp. 142–3, notes that other towns near Asine seem to have shared the Asineans' ethnicity and may have shared the sanctuary with them before the Asineans' destruction: 'The Argives may have wanted to appease these towns by showing respect for the cult, thus they may have used this to gain some political advantage; they were, in effect, now in control of this cult in the area and so were expanding their power beyond the immediate plain.' The cult was continued there for centuries; this seems to be the cult at the heart of a dispute over sacred rents between Argos and Epidaurus (Thuc. 5.53). The cult statue was apparently not moved, it is thought to be the small figurine found in what is identified as the temple of Apollo.
119. Morgan and Whitelaw, 'Pots and politics', p. 88, citing U. Jantzen, *Führer durch Tiryns* (Athens, 1975), pp. 102–5.
120. Menodotos of Samos, *FGrHist*. 541 F 1 = Ath. *Deipnosophistai* 15.12. There are discussions of this episode in Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 134, Romano, 'Cult images', p. 129, Hollinshead, '"Adyton," "Opisthodomos"', p. 208; J. Dillery, 'Greek sacred history', *American Journal of Philology* 126.4 (2005b), pp. 505–26, 511–14.
121. Dillery, 'Greek sacred history', p. 511.
122. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 140 and 91 with n. 84.
123. Apollodorus, *Epitome*, 5.8–13. Aeneas took the real one: Dion.Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.68ff; 2.66.5ff. The Athenians claim it: Paus. 1.28.9; the Argives claim it, but must be wrong as it is in Italy: Paus 2.23.5.
124. **Beazley Vase Number:** 275163, Stockholm, Medelhausmuseet, 1963.001, Tyszkiewicz Painter: Athena's tolerance is indicated by the removal of her helmet, her calm expression and posture, her resting spear and unruffled aegis. The position of her feet suggests that she is accompanying Odysseus and Diomedes. Other depictions include: **Beazley** 204694, Campana Collection, St. Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum, 1543. 500–450BCE, Diomedes holds the one arm, sword drawn in the other; **Beazley** 220519, Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, 81401. 450–400BCE, Diomedes holds the Palladium, with Odysseus and Helen; Naples, 3235 *ARV* 2 1316.1, *LIMC* 3 pl.286, Diomedes I 27. And, earliest: Makron, Leningrad B 649, *ARV* 2 460,13, *LIMC* 1 pl.337.

CHAPTER 3 ON THE BATTLEFIELD

1. M.H. Jameson, 'The hero Echetlaeus', *TAPA* 82 (1951), pp. 49–61, 50: gods 'with a local attachment were more likely to be of service'. Hermes appears

as an *ephebe* during Tanagra v Eretria, Paus. 9.22.2. See W.K. Pritchett, *Greek State at War, Pt.3* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1979b), pp. 11–46, for a list of battlefield epiphanies and, pp. 91–153, military portents. E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica* (London, 1989), p. 44, 'The simplest type of [hero-saviour] phenomenon and perhaps the earliest – of itself it does not even imply any form of cult – is the appearance of the hero fighting on the battlefield'; U. Kron, 'Patriotic heroes', in R. Hägg (ed.), *Ancient Greek Hero Cult* (Stockholm, 1999), pp. 61–83, 62, stresses the importance of proximity for participation; G. Ekroth, *The Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Heroes* (Liège, 2002), p. 257, notes that heroes who received blood sacrifice were disproportionately associated with warfare, with an implication that they would offer practical support in local conflict.

2. Half-gods, ἡμιθέων. Ceramicus monument inscription, *c.*447BCE, cited in, Pritchett, *GSW3*, p. 26.
3. E. Vandiver, *Heroes in Herodotus: The Interaction of Myth and History* (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York, Paris, 1991), pp. 81–2, discusses this question and notes the uncertainty of whether 'these references to heroes' shrines near the fields of battle … serve a symbolic as well as a topographical function', and argues that the frequent references demonstrate, 'the importance accorded to the heroes in the traditional Greek world view'.
4. The worship of Athena Hellotis is attested for the locality (Schol. Pi. *Ol.* xiii 56) and even epic notes Athena's presence in the area, landing at Marathon en route to Athens (*Od.* 7.80). See N.G.L. Hammond, 'The campaign and battle of Marathon', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 88 (1968), pp. 13–57, at 24–5.
5. Hammond, 'Campaign and battle', p. 25, puts the Heracleum on the lower slope of Mt Kotroni; a tomb cult for Eurystheus may have been nearby, although the evidence is slim, Lucian *Deor. Conc.* 7. Also see J.A. G. van der Veer, 'The battle of Marathon: A topographical survey', *Mnemosyne* 34 (1982), pp. 294–7.
6. See e.g. Hammond, 'Campaign and battle', 44; J.F. Lazenby, *The Defence of Greece: 490–479 BC* (Warminster, 1993), pp. 45–80.
7. Hammond, 'Campaign and battle, p. 32; J.A.S. Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon', *Historia*, 42.3 (1993), pp. 279–307, 283.
8. Eg. Kearns, *Heroes*, pp. 117–23; J. Boardman, esp. 'Herakles, Peisistratos and sons', *Revue archéologique* (1972), pp. 57–72.
9. Other authors include the detail that the Athenians defended their *temenos*-camp with stakes cut from the nearby slopes (Nepos, *Milt.*5, Hammond, 'Campaign and battle', pp. 38–40; Evans, 'Herodotus', p. 294). This adds a normalising detail to the Athenians' defences at Delium, with the exception that the Delium stakes were cut from the sanctuary itself.
10. Coincidence is taken elsewhere as evidence of divine action (Hdt. 9.100–1). See Chapter 3, 'Pre-Battle Sacrifices at Plataea'. H. Bowden, 'Herakles, Herodotos and the Persian Wars', in L. Rawlings and H. Bowden (eds), *Herakles and Hercules: Exploring a Graeco-Roman Divinity* (Swansea, 2005b),

pp. 1–14, at 6–7, argues that Herodotus mentions the coincidence, 'in order to suggest that [Heracles] did indeed have a role to play'. With below, n. 20. Bowden (pp. 7–9) also argues for an implied role for Heracles at Thermopylae; C.A. Faraone, *Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardian Statues in Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 58–61 and 66, notes that like many heroes, Heracles has a destructive aspect that can plague local communities, though he still defends them from invasion.

11. Kearns, *Heroes*, p. 45. See D. Castriota, *Myth, Ethos, and Actuality: Official Art in Fifth-Century B.C. Athens* (London, 1992), pp. 28–32, 76–89, on the ethos of the paintings.
12. Kearns, *Heroes*, p. 45.
13. 'Many of the men who fought the Mede at Marathon believed that they saw the apparition of Theseus, clad in full armour and charging ahead of them against the barbarian' (Plut. *Thes*. 35). Kearns, *Heroes*, p. 46, notes Theseus' popularity in the era of the battle, which may have prompted sightings, with G. Herman, 'Greek epiphanies and the sensed presence', *Histos* 60.2 (2011), pp. 127–57.
14. Paus. 1.32.5, has him heroised after the battle, which Kearns, *Heroes*, p. 45, notes is a common pattern of heroisation; Jameson, 'The hero Echetlaeus', pp. 49–61, at 50, considers him a pre-existing agricultural hero. Epizelos was also in the painting (so Aelian, *AH*, 7.38), but not the *daimon*. E. Harrison, 'The south frieze of the Nike temple and the Marathon painting in the painted stoa', *American Journal of Archaeology* 76.4 (1972), pp. 353–78, at 367–8, argues that the *daimon* was not thought of as fighting for the enemy, but was an embodiment of fear, the painting showing Pan prompting the Persians' flight and the Athenians (represented by Epizelos) resisting their fear. H.R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Ohio, 1966), p. 253, stresses Pan's importance in the Athenians' bravery.
15. So Polemon (1.35; 2.41; 2.62), see Harrison, 'The south frieze', pp. 376–7, with *IG* II^2 1358, and D. Boedeker, 'The view from Eleusis. Demeter in the Persian Wars', in E. Bridges *et al*. (eds), *Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 65–82, esp. pp. 72–3, who argues compellingly for a strong tradition of Demeter's role in all the major conflicts of the Persian Wars.
16. Harrison, 'The south frieze', p. 368.
17. E. Vanderpool, 'A monument to the battle of Marathon', *Hesperia* 35 (1966), pp. 93–106; Evans, 'Herodotus', 305 with n. 111.
18. On the importance placed on the moon, see Hammond, 'Campaign and battle', p. 40, citing Ar. *Knights*, 660, with Xen. *Ana*. 3.2.11–12, for the sacrifice to Artemis; the way that the moon complicated the Persians' movements may also account for this special notice and for the moon that appears behind Athena's owl on the coins struck after 490, visible in C.T. Seltman, *Greek Coins*, p. 91. Also see R. Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* (Oxford, 1996), p. 155, n. 10.
19. M.N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions 2* (Oxford, 1948), p. 14.

20. Pan: Parker, *Athenian Religion*, p. 164 with n. 38; Athena: K. Lapatin, 'New statues for old gods', in J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine (eds), *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations* (Edinburgh, 2010), pp. 126–51, 143, statues as competition between Athens and Aegina; Heracles: E. Vanderpool, 'An archaic inscribed stele from Marathon', *Hesperia* 11 (1942), pp. 329–37; with Parker, *Athenian Religion*, p. 153; Bowden, 'Herakles, Herodotos', p. 7.
21. Kron, 'Patriotic heroes', pp. 65–8, discuses Oxford Ashmolean Museum 1911.615 and fragments of New York Metropolitan Museum of Art 1973.175.2, here proximity is important, as the heroes appear to be emerging from a shrine.
22. Evans, 'Herodotus', esp. p. 280.
23. Hdt. 7.175–95, for the campaign narrative.
24. Herodotus' insistence on Delphi's unprompted help and the Greeks' gratitude challenges the idea that Delphi lost prestige during the Persian Wars.
25. P. Kaplan, 'Dedications to Greek sanctuaries by foreign kings in the eighth through sixth centuries BCE', *Historia* 55.2 (2006), pp. 129–52, at 135–6, suggests that the Persians sacrificed to Persian deities, not local ones. The reality of this is uncertain, but it has its own significance that Herodotus presented the religious features of the conflict as he did, and the use of collaborators for religious insight is a recurring trope.
26. S.G. Cole, *Landscapes, Gender, and Ritual Space: The Ancient Greek Experience* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2004), p. 187.
27. Most, e.g. W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, Vol. 2, *Books 5–9* (Oxford, 1912), p. 256, consider that statues were brought from Aegina. W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford, 1985), p. 207, is unusual in imaging that the ship brought 'invisible heroes'. As the Aeginetans apparently went to the trouble of sailing home and back, it seems likely that they brought something to offer tangible reassurance of the heroes' presence.
28. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, pp. 83–4, with Boedeker, 'View from Eleusis', p. 69, with n. 10. Reference to the divine shout predates Herodotus, see Aeschylus' *Persians*, 401–5. J.L. Myres, *Herodotus, Father of History* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 280–2, suggests that the Greek leaders persuaded a human woman to shout the orders to begin. This seems an unnecessary rationalisation.
29. This has its parallel in Hippias' prediction at Marathon (Hdt. 6.107).
30. Pritchett, *GSW3*, p. 25, with n. 59 cites this epiphany. For the coin, see J. P. Shear, 'Athenian imperial coinage', *Hesperia* 5.3 (1936), pp. 285–332, 299, with Paus. 1.36.1 and Hesiod cited by Strabo, 9.393, on Cychreus. Boedeker, 'View from Eleusis', p. 65, comments that while Themistocles' motives are ambiguous, his words were 'meant to ring true for the internal audience of Greek allies'. Kron, 'Patriotic heroes' pp. 68–9, notes that several vase-fragments from *c.*480–450 depict figures holding ship ornaments; most likely Ajax or other divine figures thought to have

helped at Salamis and Artemisium, e.g. Athens National Museum, Acr.516.

31. Herodotus says of Aristides, 'I am convinced, from learning of his way of life, that he was the best man ever to come from Athens and the most just. (Hdt. 8.79). In the earliest surviving reference to Aristides (*c*.479–477) he is already known as a good man, and already contrasted with the morally ambiguous Themistocles (Timocreon 727.1–5). This reputation persisted. Plato has Socrates refer to him as 'a good man' (Pl. *Men*. 93D), who 'with great means of committing injustice always lived a just life' (Pl. *Gorg*. 526A–B). He is referred to in the *Ath.Pol*. as 'outstanding in justice' (23.3). By Plutarch's day, Aristides was a popular example for teachers expounding on virtue (Plut. *Mor*. 76A–B). The practice of drawing a contrast between Themistocles and Aristides lasted up to the Suda (*Lex*. *A*, 3903).
32. The oracle: 'Not genuine', concludes J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1978), p. 319, as did H.W. Parke, *A History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1939), p. 189. See D. Lateiner, 'A note on DIKAS DIDONAI in Herodotus', *Classical Quarterly* 30.1 (1980), pp. 30–2, at 32, on how Xerxes' response to the Spartan's fits into the moral framework of the *Histories*; with J. Dillery, 'Reconfiguring the past: Thyrea, Thermopylae and narrative patterns in Herodotus', *The American Journal of Philology* 117.2 (1996), pp. 217–54, at 242–5.
33. See Harrison, *Divinity and History*, pp. 97 and 114.
34. A similar sentiment is expressed in an Athenian speech to reassure the Spartans. J.D. Mikalson, *Herodotus and Religion in the Persian Wars* (Chapel Hill, 2003), p. 89, stresses the religious aspect of these statements; with R. Parker, *Cleomenes on the Acropolis* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 10–23, on religious unity and division. The group-voice technique communicates group values, as in Aeschylus' *Persians*, see T. Harrison *The Emptiness of Asia: Aeschylus' 'Persians' and the History of the 5th Century BC* (London, 2000a), p. 96, with extensive refs at p. 157, n. 2. Plutarch's attribution of this speech to Aristides is appropriate for biography. He may not have invented the identification, see D. Sansone *Plutarch: The Lives of Aristeides and Cato* (Warminster, 1989), p. 188.
35. [_–_–_|_-] ρατὸν πεδιον. *P.Oxy*. 3965, line 40, restored, M.L. West (ed.), *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* (Oxford, 1992), as 'ικον Ἐλευσινος γης ἐ] ρατὸν πεδιον', '[and soon they reached Eleusis'] lovely plain'. Also see M.L. West, 'Simonides redivivus', *ZPE* 98 (1993b), pp. 1–14, at 7. The restoration is endorsed by D. Boedeker, 'Heroic historiography: Simonides and Herodotus on Plataea', in D. Boedeker and D. Sider (eds), *The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 120–34, at 128–9; and I.C. Rutherford, 'The new Simonides: towards a commentary', in *New Simonides*, pp. 33–54, at 47.
36. T.L. Shear Jr, 'The demolished temple at Eleusis', *Hesperia Supp. 20, Studies in Athenian Architecture, Sculpture and Topography* (1982), pp. 128–212: Excavation suggests that the sanctuary was relatively fortunate in that officials were in the process of deconstructing the archaic temple at the

time of the invasion; the *anaktoron* (inner chamber of the mysteries) that was destroyed was the one part of the archaic temple that was still in place. Damage to the rest of the sanctuary was extensive. Also see Boedeker, 'View from Eleusis', pp. 66–72.

37. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 296, with 391–2: this explanation is inadequate, it is more likely that they moved to 'provoke a battle'.
38. Παυσανίᾳ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι κοινῇ Τισαμενὸς ὁ Ἠλεῖος ἐμαντεύσατο, καὶ προεῖπε νίκην ἀμυνομένοις καὶ μὴ προεπιχειροῦσιν. Ἀριστείδου δὲ πέμψαντος εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς Ἀθηναίους καθυπερτέρους ἔσεσθαι τῶν ἐναντίων εὐχομένους τῷ Διΐ καὶ τῇ Ἥρᾳ τῇ Κιθαιρωνίᾳ καὶ Πανὶ καὶ νύμφαις Σφραγίτισι καὶ θύοντας ἥρωσιν Ἀνδροκράτει, Λεύκωνι, Πεισάνδρῳ, Δαμοκράτει, Ὑψίωνι, Ἀκταίωνι, Πολυΐδῳ, καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον ἐν γᾷ ἰδίᾳ ποιουμένους ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τᾶς Δάματρος τᾶς Ἐλευσινίας καὶ τᾶς Κόρας (Plut. *Arist.* 11.3).
39. Dryden, revised by Clough (1864) 'But Aristides…', Perrin (1914) 'But Aristides…'; Scott-Kilvert (1960) 'Aristides, however…'; Calabi-Limentani, *Vita Aristidis*, 'ma siccome Aristide…'; Sansone, *Plutarch*, 'But as for Aristeides…'; Stewart (1888) is a rare exception, avoiding a direct comparison and starting the sentence simply with 'Aristeides sent to Delphi…'.
40. The only other known reference to it comes from Clement of Alexandria (*Exhortion to the Greeks*, 2.35), but that does not mean that its origins were not much older. H.W. Parke, *Delphic Oracle*, pp. 189–91, believes it to be genuine, received when the Thriasian plain was still the likely location for the encounter and reinterpreted when Mardonius' movement made the oracle redundant. Parke suggests that the vulnerable Plataeans would gladly have ceded land to Athens (as they do at Plut. *Arist.* 11.8) thus fulfilling the new interpretation of the oracle. Aristides and Arimnestus might well have shared an understanding about what would be expedient. They probably knew each other already. Arimnestus had fought and probably led the Plataeans at Marathon (Paus. 9.4.2). A.R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks: The Defence of the West, c.546–478BC* (London, 1984), p. 509, n. 2, 515–16 with n. 13, with H. Bowden, *Classical Athens and the Delphic Oracle: Divination and Democracy* (Cambridge, 2005a), pp. 115–16, suspects that the oracle 'if genuine' was a combination of different oracles, amalgamated to link the clause about fighting on one's own land with that about the Plataean heroes once hindsight made the Plataean aspect more relevant. L. Prandi's view is similar, 'Plutarcho, 'Aristide' 11.3–9 e la cessione del territorio di Platea', in G. Argoud and P. Roesch (eds), *La Béotie Antique* (Paris, 1985), pp. 211–17: the oracle was solicited for the embassy to Sparta, and reinterpreted through the dream when circumstances changed. The clause about the Plataean heroes was, Prandi suggests, added much later after the Peace of Nicias, when the fall of Plataea was in people's mind and the reassessment of tribute made Aristides – the original assessor – a current *topos*. Fontenrose, *Delphic Oracle*, pp. 319–20, considers the opposite aspect to be the false addition: 'The direction to worship the named gods and heroes is probably genuine', but the clause

about the plain of Demeter was, 'a *post eventum* addition'. C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 419–21, dismisses the oracle as fiction, as do F.E. Brenk, *In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch's 'Moralia' and 'Lives'* (Leiden, 1977), p. 248, n. 7 and Lazenby, *Defence*, p. 223, n. 22. A. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia*, Vol. 2 (London, 1981), p. 7, n. 2, is 'not entirely convinced' of the oracle's historicity; p. 56, 'anybody's guess' if these heroes were really invoked.

41. Mardonius gives a characteristically boastful speech before advancing, which also anticipates his doom and expresses its moral justice, see Lateiner, 'DIKAS DIDONAI', pp. 30–2, esp. 31, with L. Solmsen, 'Speeches in Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea', *Classical Philology* 39.4 (1944), pp. 241–53, at 252. For boundaries, see Chapter 1, 'The Athenian Acropolis in the Persian Wars' and 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'. T. Harrison, 'The Persian invasions', in E.J. Bakker *et al.* (eds), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002), pp. 551–78, at 570–1, stresses the distinction constructed between Greek obedience and Persian disobedience to divine guidance.
42. Brenk, *Mist*, p. 248: 'in Plutarch's version Tisamenos is barely mentioned'.
43. Cooperation: See J. Marincola, 'The fairest victor. Plutarch, Aristides, and the Persian Wars', *Histos* 6 (2009), pp. 91–113, on the centrality of this theme. This is not to suggest that Plutarch invented traditions of this sort, but where they existed, and where they complimented his themes, such traditions would be preferred. This tradition also reflects well on Delphi, which Plutarch cherished (e.g. *Mor.* 792F), often promoting Delphi's glories and veiling its indiscretions, on which see Brenk, *Mist*, pp. 236–55, esp. 248, with J. Hershbell, 'Plutarch and Herodotus: the beetle in the rose', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 136 (1993), pp. 143–63, at 160–1.
44. See A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London, 1974), pp. 29–32 and 120, on cooperation and pp. 57–63, on the importance of harmony. With T. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 77–8; 89–90, and Marincola, 'Fairest victor', pp. 107–10, for its contemporary purpose.
45. Sansone, *Plutarch*, p. 182, Aristides a 'paragon of cooperation'. See Marincola, 'Fairest victor', pp. 91–102, for emphasis on co-operation and examples in which Plut. makes Aristides the author of co-operative acts Hdt. ascribes to 'Athenians'. One of the few ways in which Aristides is judged greater than Cato is his willingness to cooperate, compared with Cato's bitter struggle with Scipio (*sync.* 5.1–4). On this last point, Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, p. 120; C.B.R. Pelling, 'Plutarch and Roman politics', in *Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies* (London, 2002), pp. 207–36, 219; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, pp. 261–2.
46. That Arimnestus seeks advice about his dream is a positive sign. His cooperative approach resembles that of Pelopidas, who consults seers and fellow commanders (Plut. *Pel.* 21–2). It stands in contrast to Agesilaus II who announces what he dreamed, but then acts unilaterally, Plut. *Ages.* 6.5, with S. Nevin, 'Negative comparison: Agamemnon and Alexander in Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompey*', *GRBS* 54 (2014), pp. 45–68, esp. 55.

47. Plataea was a very Spartan victory. The Herodotean religious narrative of Plataea is also dominated by Peloponnesians: Tisamenus the *mantis* (an Elean, subsequently a Spartan citizen, Hdt. 9.33–6), and Pausanias, the Spartan Regent. The Delphic/dream narrative shifts the emphasis from a Spartan/Olympian orientation, to an Athenian-Plataean/Delphic one – a far more suitable dynamic for a biography of an Athenian. Pausanias was unpopular; few would have objected to a narrative that preferred Aristides to him (Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, p. 59, comments on Plutarch's avoidance of writing Pausanias' biography; C. Fornara, 'Some aspects of the career of Pausanias of Sparta', *Historia* 15.3 (1966), pp. 257–71, 266: 'To few has a position so unenviable been granted as to Pausanias. The Athenians had no cause to love him … the Spartans put him to death.') The tradition also offers a chance for Aristides to match the oracle-reading skill of his now absent rival, Themistocles.
48. W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Pt.5* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1985), pp. 93–4 stresses this point, with Vandiver, above n. 3.
49. C. Waldstein and H.S. Washington, 'Excavations by the American School at Plataia in 1891. Discovery of a temple of archaic plan', *American Journal of Archaeology* 7.4 (1891), pp. 390–405. Although Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia 1*, p. 244, argues that it is not absolutely certain that the sanctuary had been fully monumentalised by this point.
50. *IG* VII, 1670 and 1671. G.B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries* (New York, 1901), pp. 494–8, sited the temple on the slopes of Mt. Cithaeron, where the church of St. Demetrios now stands, based on his 1892–3 survey; W.K. Pritchett, 'New light on Plataea', *The American Journal of Archaeology* 61(1957), pp. 9–28, sites the temple by a well just east of modern day Kriekouki, south of Grundy's position; with W.K. Pritchett, 'Plataiai', *The American Journal of Philology* 100.1 (1979a), pp. 145–52; *Topography 5*, pp. 105–17, this identification is endorsed by Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia 1*, pp. 152–4, 158–9; P.W. Wallace, 'The final battle at Plataea', *Hesperia Supp. 19* (1982), pp. 183–92, 187–9, also placed the site near Kriekouki, but lower, in a more western position than Pritchett's; Kirsten, 'Plataia', *RE*, 20.2 (1950) p. 2271, claims Demeter sanctuaries were not built on slopes, however S.G. Cole, 'Demeter sanctuaries in the ancient Greek city and its countryside', in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods: Sanctuaries and Sacred Space in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994) pp. 199–216, observes that they were frequently on hillsides. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, pp. 433–4, rejects Kirsten, and considers Grundy's position unlikely; he places the temple further north-west than the others. Flower and Marincola, *Herodotus*, p. 207, provide useful discussion of the debate.
51. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, pp. 418–21; Lazenby, *Defence*, p. 223, n. 22, 'so muddled as to be practically worthless'. Contra W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Topography, Pt.1* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1965), p. 110, n. 37, who sees some merit.

52. As noted above (n. 47), Pausanias did not enjoy a good reputation. The *Histories*, however, is without most of the negative traditions available about him and presents him very positively in the victor-after-the-victory scene (9.76–82). 5.32 and 8.3 demonstrate that Hdt. knew stories of Pausanias' arrogance, but they are not exploited.
53. Among scholars who consider the move deliberate: R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Books* II (London, 1908), pp. 371–2, 382, 396; How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 310; Myres, *Herodotus*, p. 291; Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*, p. 531; Wallace, 'Final battle', pp. 190–1. Whereas Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 490 and Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, p. 327, prefer the view that the Greek centre did not end up where it was supposed to, but that this happened by accident rather than through cowardice. Lazenby, *Defence*, p. 235, also rejects the suggestion that the troops moved to their appointed position, but differs by accepting the possibility of panic as a cause; similarly Flower and Marincola, *Herodotus*, p. 200, 'after a long day of continual harassment without food and water, the flight of the centre, albeit irresponsible and cowardly, is not at all surprising or unnatural'.
54. How and Wells, *Commentary 2*, p. 310.
55. Waldstein and Washington, 'Excavations', p. 402.
56. Contra e.g. Sansone, *Plutarch*, p. 192, who claims that, 'Plutarch repeats a statement from Herodotus of which he elsewhere strongly disapproves'.
57. See Pritchett, *Topography 5*, pp. 132–7, contra Wallace, 'Final battle'.
58. Only Waldstein and Washington, 'Excavations', p. 402, suggest that, 'the sanctity of the spot would appeal to them as a protection'.
59. 'ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν Παυσανίην πρὸς τὸ Ἥραιον τὸ Πλαταιέων ἐπικαλέσασθαι τὴν θεόν, χρηίζοντα μηδαμῶς σφέας ψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος…' (Hdt. 9.61). 'ἐπικαλέσασθαι' is a humble term, used by Croesus on the pyre (Hdt. 1.87). See Chapter 1, 'Military Leaders on the Acropolis'. Pritchett, *GSW3*, pp. 78–81, observes that modern commentators have been too quick to insist on purely cynical manipulation of omens; A.S. Bradford, 'Plataea and the soothsayer', *Ancient History* 23.1 (1992), pp. 27–33, 32, comments, 'The explanation for the actions of the soothsayer is rather to be found in the natures of soothsaying itself … his judgement (we know and the seers would not have denied) could not be independent of his knowledge of the situation, though it need not consciously depend upon that knowledge.' *Sphagia* divination was done by interpreting blood flow, which lent itself readily straightforward 'charge now or don't charge now' inquiries, M.H. Jameson, 'Sacrifice before battle', in V.D. Hanson (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London, 1991), pp. 197–227, at 204–5 and 207–8; R. Parker, 'Spartan religion', in A. Powell (ed.), *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* (London, 1989), pp. 142–72, at 158, observes that the Greeks expected the gods 'to show good strategic sense'; with R. Parker, 'Sacrifice and battle', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London, 2000), pp. 299–314, 305; J.N. Bremmer, 'The status and symbolic capital of the seer', in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Role of Religion in the Early Greek Polis*, pp. 97–109, discusses the close ties between seers and

aristocrats. Bremmer observes that, typically, the weaker the king, the stronger the seer – as Pausanias was a young regent from a royal house in a kind of free-fall (n.b. the disgrace of Pausanias' uncle, Cleomenes, and the untimely deaths of Leonidas and Cleombrotus), it would not be surprising to see considerable recourse to the authority of the famous seer, Tisamenus.

60. Wallace, 'Final battle', p. 191; Lazenby, *Defence*, p. 241.
61. Pritchett, *Topography 5*, p. 136.
62. Quotation: Parker, 'Spartan religion', pp. 150–1. For her role as a defender of territory, see Boedeker, 'View from Eleusis', pp. 74–80, and above Chapter 2, 'Miltiades: Hero and Despot'.
63. Jameson, 'Sacrifice before battle', p. 224, n. 22.
64. Lazenby, *Defence*, p. 12.
65. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, p. 180, n. 89, and 77, 'that they were not disappointed in their wider hope might also then be due (in some part) to Hera'.
66. θῶμα δέ μοι ὅκως παρὰ τῆς Δήμητρος τὸ ἄλσος μαχομένων οὐδὲ εἷς ἐφάνη τῶν Περσέων οὔτε ἐσελθὼν ἐς τὸ τέμενος οὔτε ἐναποθανών, περί τε τὸ ἱρὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐν τῷ βεβήλῳ ἔπεσον. δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι περὶ τῶν θείων πρηγμάτων δοκέειν δεῖ, ἡ θεὸς αὐτή σφεας οὐκ ἐδέκετο ἐμπρήσαντας τὸ ἱρὸν τὸ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι ἀνάκτορον (Hdt. 9.65).
67. For locations, see above, n. 50. Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 503, concluded that there really were no Persians in the sanctuary, because the topography meant that they had never wanted to go in there. Myres, *Herodotus*, p. 295, concurred, 'it was too obvious a death-trap.' Whichever location one accepts, the topography discourages flight to the sanctuary. Some Persian troops did make it back to their fortified position near Thebes, but this did not protect them (Hdt. 9.65–70); going north was still the best option however, but in the manner of Artabazus who headed to the Hellespont via Phocis (Hdt. 9.66). For a discussion of the manuscript, see D. Gilula, 'Who was actually buried in the first of the three Spartan tombs (Hdt. 9.85.1)? Textual and historical problems', in P. Derow and R. Parker (eds), *Herodotus and his World* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 73–87.
68. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, pp. 65–6, and at 73, 'divine retribution', p. 105, 'divine vengeance'.
69. Flower and Marincola, *Herodotus*, p. 221. Harrison, *Divinity and History*, p. 91, notes the force of this unusually clear reference to divine involvement, with Boedeker, 'View from Eleusis', pp. 67–80. Contra D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1989), p. 67, who suggests, rather untenably, that, 'under pressure [Herodotus] threw out a merely divine explanation', being reluctant to attribute the events to divine agency.
70. δῆλα δὴ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοισι ἐστὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων, εἰ καὶ τότε, τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπιπτούσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῇσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκάλῃ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι τρώματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ ἐσαπίκετο, ὥστε θαρσῆσαί τε τὴν στρατιὴν πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν.

Καὶ τόδε ἕτερον συνέπεσε γενόμενον, Δήμητρος τεμένεα Ἐλευσινίης παρὰ ἀμφοτέρας τας συμβολὰς εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῇ Πλαταιίδι παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ Δημήτριον ἐγίνετο, ὡς καὶ πρότερόν μοι εἴρηται, ἡ μάχη, καὶ ἐν Μυκάλῃ ἔμελλε ὡσαύτως ἔσεσθαι. (Hdt. 9.100–1). Diodorus saw evidence of the divine in the apparent coincidence of Thermopylae and Gelon's victory over the Carthaginians at Himera (Diod. Sic. 24.1).

71. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 299: 'when he refers to the sanctuary of Demeter at Plataea he speaks as if he believed in the goddess, and this belief must be accepted'. Similarly Harrison, *Divinity and History*, pp. 66–7, with n. 12, 235. More cautiously, Thomas, *Herodotus in Context*, 192, on Hdt.'s use of the 'language of proof'. For further discussion of divine causation see J. Gould, 'Herodotus and religion', in S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 91–106, 91–8.
72. Flower and Marincola, *Herodotus*, p. 278: 'The emphatic narrator intervention strongly suggests that H. believed that the gods somehow conveyed the truth to the Greeks at Mycale.'
73. Calabi-Limentani, *Vita Aristidis*, oral tradition: p. 73; noting Plutarch's access to Spartan sources: p. xxxiv.
74. Sansone, *Plutarch*, p. 193. Parker, 'Spartan religion', p. 148, notes that the rites of Artemis Ortheia belonged to Sparta's 'elaborate initiatory system', rather than being commemorative. As with more mythical figures such as Theseus or Lycurgus (on whom *Thes*. 1; *Lyc*.1.1), the educational value of the tradition was more important than its reliability.
75. C. Carey, *A Commentary on Five Odes of Pindar* (New York, 1981), p. 184.
76. Δημητ-' *POxy* 3965 fr.19, line 1. Line 7 includes 'ῥύσιον', which commentators have interpreted as referring to Demeter taking vengeance, see Rutherford, 'New Simonides', p. 49; Boedeker, 'Heroic historiography', p. 130. Whether or not Herodotus was familiar with Simonides' Plataea elegy is uncertain. Boedeker, 'Heroic historiography', pp. 120ff, argues for a Simonidean influence on Herodotus, contra A. Aloni, 'The proem of Simonides' Plataea elegy and the circumstances of its performance', in D. Boedeker and D. Sider (eds), *The New Simonides: Contexts of Praise and Desire* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 86–105, at 101. Plutarch was familiar with the elegy, citing it at *Mal.Hdt.* 872D, but not picking up its vengeance theme. See J. Marincola, 'Defending the divine: Plutarch on the gods of Herodotus', *Histos Supp*. 4 (2015) pp. 41–83, on the philosophical basis of Plutarch's alternative depiction of the gods' role.
77. Boedeker, 'View from Eleusis'. Other historians also interpreted the Persian Wars in a religious context. Ctesias' account includes the story that Mardonius escaped from the battle of Plataea only to be killed in a hail-storm while attempting to plunder Delphi (*FGrHist*. 688F. 13.28–9). Although apocryphal, this tradition is indicative of the religious and moral framework in which the Persian Wars continued to be regarded. On Ctesias, see J.M. Bigwood, 'Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars', *Phoenix* 32.1 (1978), pp. 19–41.
78. Castriota, *Myth, Ethos*, pp. 63–76. The Parthenon also commemorated the wars, see Chapter 1, 'The Athenian Acropolis in the Persian Wars'.

79. In even later years, Libanius would claim that the battle was won not by the 10,000 Athenians, but by Heracles and Pan (*Oration* 30. 31). He made statement in a polemic defence of the Hellenic gods against Christianity, but nonetheless, it indicates the extreme religious position that could be taken.
80. Esp. 3.54.3–4; 56.4–6; 57.1–4; 58.1; 58.4–5; 59.2. Speech pairs as an indicator of social significance, see M. Cogan, 'Mytilene, Plataea, and Corcyra Ideology and Policy in Thucydides, Book Three', *Phoenix* 35.1 (1981a), pp. 1–21. 6–7, with 14–17. T. Rood, *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 287–8, notes: 'Thucydides' exploration of how war crushes morality might have culminated in a debate on the fate of Athens: the Spartans had destroyed Plataia to gratify the Thebans, they save Athens because they distrust them, and the appeal to a noble past that was useless for Plataia is effective for Athens, but only because it chimes with the Spartans' self-interest.' The Plataean heroes oracle may stem from the defensive rhetoric of this period, see above, n. 40.
81. Waldstein and Washington, 'Excavations', p. 403.
82. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia 1*, p. 245.
83. As citizens, they would have participated fully in Athenian rites. Had they remained *metics*, their participation would have been limited, but they would have been able to practice rituals outside the main civic cults and festivals. See D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 86–9.
84. L. Kallet, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and its Aftermath* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2001), esp. pp. 87–97; Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 200–1, notes its 'tragic pattern'.
85. See Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 159–67, with J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 54–7 and 200–13. Athenian despotism is suggested at e.g. Thuc. 6.18, Alcibiades suggests that Athens may conquer Greece with the wealth gained in Sicily.
86. On which see e.g. R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 168–70; S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. 3: *Books V.25–VIII.169* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 367–81, with refs; Rood, *Thucydides*, 180–2: it its fear of tyranny, the *demos* is tyrannically harsh.
87. Pritchett, *GSW3*, p. 331. Also see e.g. A.W.H. Adkins, 'The *Arete* of Nikias: Thucydides 7.86', *GRBS* 16 (1975), pp. 379–92, with Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 183–201, esp. 198 n. 72, stressing how Nicias' virtues are worthy of pity by Aristotelian standards; cf. Hornblower, *Commentary 3*, pp. 741–3, with further refs, suggesting that Thucydides may be deliberately ambiguous in his phrasing. Another indicator of a generally positive depiction of Nicias' character is his solicitation for his troops following his capture (Thuc. 7.85). Diodorus (13.27.3–4) reveals that Nicias was the *proxenos* of the Syracusans. J.C. Trevett, 'Nikias and Syracuse', *ZPE* 106 (1995), pp. 246–8, suggests that Thucydides omitted this detail sympathetically, wishing to avoid the impression that Nicias opposed the mission for personal reasons. H.D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 169–211,

offers an overview of Nicias' characterisation as an upright and dutiful person whose excessive caution made him a poor leader.

88. While this has often been regarded as a contrast between the two sides, Hornblower, *Commentary 3*, pp. 477–81, argues that it is the Athenians under discussion, and they who are divided between experienced and inexperienced.
89. The context is a description of Polygnotus' paintings in the Cnidian Lesche, depicting the punishment in Hades of those guilty of sacrilege and other serious crimes.
90. Kallet, *Money and Corrosion*, pp. 92–3, 105, with 147–82. Hornblower, *Commentary 3*, p. 481, notes that the reference to not taking the temple may not be criticism, but 'polemical, directed against a discrepant tradition'.
91. The Athenians had thought the Egestans' intention to use valuables in their own temples towards the war perfectly normal, although in this case they were deceived (Thuc. 6.46). On states releasing temple-funds for war-costs, see Part I, 'How to Behave in a Sanctuary'. The Syracusans appear not to have used the Olympieium as a war-chest.
92. The significance of the Athenians' growing 'religious pessimism' is explored in C.A. Powell, 'Religion and the Sicilian Expedition', *Historia* 8.1 (1979), pp. 15–31; for this storm, see Powell 30, and Hornblower, *Commentary 3*, pp. 724–5, discussing Thucydides' contrasting of the responses to the two storms.
93. Rood, *Thucydides*, p. 289.
94. Hornblower, *Commentary 3*, p. 481, notes that Diodorus may be making a vague reference to seizing the area around the sanctuary rather than deliberately specifying the seizure of the sanctuary itself; another instance of sanctuary as landmark.
95. Gylippus seems to suggest that the sacrifices of conquerors are less pleasing to gods than those of the traditional inhabitants of a place, arguing that there is no mercy for the Athenians after their massacres at Mytilene, Scione, and Melos, he asks, 'Where is it worth their while to flee to safety? To gods, whom they have chosen to rob of their traditional honours? To men, whom they have visited only to enslave. . .?' (Diod. Sic. 13.31.1).
96. C.B.R. Pelling, 'Plutarch and Thucydides', in P.A. Stadter (ed.), *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition* (London and New York, 1992), pp. 10–40.
97. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, 26; timidity criticised in the *syncrisis*, see pp. 269–75; p. 56, n. 16, offers examples of negative features in the *Nikias-Crassus* at 2.4–6, 4.3, 4.8, 8.2, 10.8, 22.2.
98. Rood, *Thucydides*, p. 288.
99. Oracles before the expedition: Thuc. 8.1; Plut. *Nic*. 13.6; Paus. 8.11.12. The eclipse: Thuc. 7.50; Plut. *Nic*. 23. See esp. Powell, 'Religion and the Sicilian', pp. 15–31; Hornblower, *Commentary 3*, pp. 750–1, 639, 642–5. For imperialism, see above, n. 85.
100. See Hornblower, above, n. 90.
101. At 5.70, he denies a religious motive for Spartan flute-playing. See S. Hornblower, 'The religious dimension to the Peloponnesian War, or,

what Thucydides does not tell us', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 94 (1992), pp. 169–97, at 173, on the vocabulary and emphasis.

102. Pritchett, *GSW3*, p. 18.

CHAPTER 4 TAKING ASYLUM

1. F.S. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 301–38.
2. Discussion in K. Crotty, *The Poetics of Supplication: Homer's Iliad and Odyssey* (Ithaca and London, 1994); J. Gould, 'HIKETEIA', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 93 (1973), pp. 74–103, 75–81.
3. U. Sinn, 'Greek sanctuaries as a place of refuge', in N. Marinatos and R. Hägg (eds), *Greek Sanctuaries: New Approaches* (London, 1993), pp. 90–1; A. Chaniotis, 'Conflicting authorities. Asylia between secular and divine law in the classical and hellenistic *poleis*', *Kernos* 9 (1996), pp. 65–86, esp. 65–70.
4. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication*, p. 11.
5. Ibid., pp. 105–62.
6. Ibid., pp. 146–7 and 149, although Chaniotis, 'Conflicting authorities', perceives a broader application of the principle in the archaic-early classical periods.
7. Suggested by R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Books* I.2 (London, 1908), p. 735.
8. A. Hollmann, *The Master of Signs: Signs and the Interpretation of Signs in Herodotus' Histories* (Washington DC and Cambridge MA, 2011), notes: 'If he were meant to, he argues in self-justification, the flame would have appeared from the statue's *head*, showing he would take the city completely. This ingenious interpretation depends on the phrase κατ' ἄκρης (6.82.2), which has a literal ("from the topmost part") as well as figurative meaning ("utterly"), both of which need to be taken into consideration. It is an interpretation and thus a *teras* wholly specific to the Greek language.'
9. On Aristodicus, see T. Harrison, *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus* (Oxford, 2000b), pp. 142 and 147–8. The Thucydidean episode is the infamous death of Pausanias, starved in the temple of Athena Chalkioikos. Nepos includes the gruesome detail that Pausanias' own mother was one of the first to bring a stone to wall him in (Nepos. *Paus*. 5.3).
10. A.H. Jackson, 'Argos' Victory over Corinth. ΑΡΓΕΙΟΙ ΑΝΕΘΕΝ ΤΟΙ ΔΙΓΙ ΤΟΝ ΦΟΡΙΝΘΟΘΕΝ', *ZPE* 132 (2000), pp. 295–311, at 306, contra A. Griffiths, 'Was Kleomenes mad?' in A. Powell (ed.), *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* (London, 1989), pp. 51–78; M. Piérart, 'The common oracle of the Milesians and the Argives (Hdt. 6.19 and 77)', in P. Derow and R. Parker (eds), *Herodotus and his World* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 275–96, notes (at p. 284) 'its origin in a tradition hostile to Cleomenes. Everything points to Argos itself as the place of origin.'

11. E.g. Parker, *Cleomenes on the acropolis* (Oxford, 1998), p. 25, n. 56; Griffiths, 'Was Kleomenes mad?', p. 59; L. Scott, *Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6* (Leiden and Boston, 2005), p. 640, n. 25.
12. Griffiths, 'Was Kleomenes mad?', p. 59, rightly argues that Cleomenes was attempting to win over the deity to further his military aims, but he is wrong to suggest that Miltiades was attempting the same thing.
13. F. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1988), p. 332: whips as instruments of despotism. The violence exhibited is also in keeping with a Spartan tendency towards excessive inter-personal violence – treating non-Spartiates as if they were helots – a tendency which was causing Sparta plenty of problems in Herodotus' own day, see S. Hornblower, 'Sticks and stones and Spartans: the sociology of Spartan violence', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London, 2000a), pp. 57–82.
14. F. de Polignac, *Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek City-State* (Chicago and London, 1995), p. 87.
15. J.M. Hall, 'How Argive was the "Argive" Heraion?' *American Journal of Archaeology* 99.4 (1995), pp. 577–613, quotation at p. 588; F. de Polignac, 'Mediation, competition, and sovereignty: the evolution of rural sanctuaries in Geometric Greece', in S.E. Alcock and R. Osborne (eds), *Placing the Gods: Sanctuaries and Sacred Space in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 3–18, 4–5; A. Foley, *The Argolid 800–600BC: An Archaeological Survey* (Göteborg, 1988), pp. 135–9, 154, represents the development of the Heraeum as a multi-state effort, albeit one that the Argives took a lead in. Its votives come from the Argolid, but the use of Cleonae's script on some of them shows that visitors did attend from outside, although Spartan offerings do not seem to be represented.
16. C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'What is *polis* religion?' in R. Buxton (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion* (Oxford, 2000b), pp. 13–37, at 14 with n. 3.
17. Hall quotation, 'How Argive', p. 588, n. 76. Plut. *Mor.* 245C–F (*On the Bravery of Women*, 4). Paus. 2.27.7–8, with 2.20.8 for Telesilla's monument. The situation here is tricky, Telesilla's story reflects initiation rites (so F. Graf, 'Women, war, and warlike divinities', *ZPE* 55 (1984), pp. 245–54), but could still be a pseudo-historical amalgamation of myth and history (sceptically, Piérart, 'The common oracle', p. 278). Piérart regards the tradition as stemming from an oracle concerning Miletus and the Ionian Revolt. Fundamentally, it is as plausible that Cleomenes went to Argos and was repulsed as it was that he went to the Heraeum; both stories contain strengths and weaknesses. In the context of this study, it worth noting that the account of Telesilla's defence contains an incidental reference to Demaratus occupying and being driven from the Argive Pamphyliacum, a heroon.
18. D.R. Stuart, *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography* (New York, 1928), pp. 60–90; E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la Vie de Xénophon* (Paris, 1957), pp. 462–70; A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge MA and London, 1993), p. 50: 'The very fact that he wrote

twice on Agesilaus shows he made a distinction between the historical account of the *Hellenica* and the encomiastic (I do not say biographical) account of the pamphlet'; J. Geiger, *Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography* (Stuttgart, 1985), p. 16; B. Gentili and G. Cerri, *History and Biography in Ancient Thought* (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 65–6; 81–5; N. Humble, 'True history: Xenophon's 'Agesilaos' and the encomiastic genre', in N. Richer and A. Powell (eds), *Xenophon and Sparta: New Perspectives* (London, 2010).

19. Humble, 'True history'. See Arist. *Rhet.* 1366B 1–4; *Rhet.Alex*. 1440B 19–20. Eros is not credited with piety as this would be inappropriate in a deity (K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1994, p. 66), whereas Evagoras and Agesilaus both are. Xenophon stresses Agesilaus' piety far more than Isocrates did Evagoras'. See also Stuart, *Epochs*, p. 65: 'The four cardinal virtues, valor, wisdom, temperance, and justness … The encomiast would seek to show that his hero lived up to this standard of all that did become a man.'
20. R. Waterfield, *Xenophon's Retreat: Greece, Persia, and the End of the Golden Era* (London, 2006), pp. 178–9, provides a recent example the 'hero-worship' school. See Humble, 'True history', on the problems with using encomium as history.
21. H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), p. 133; J. Dillery, *Xenophon and The History of His Times* (London and New York, 1995), esp. pp. 179–237; H. Bowden, 'Religion and politics. Xenophon and the scientific study of religion', in C.J. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His World* (Stuttgart, 2004), pp. 229–46; and esp. R. Parker, 'One man's piety: the religious dimension of the *Anabasis*' in R. Lane Fox (ed.), *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (New Haven and London, 2004a), pp. 131–53.
22. Humble, 'True history', citing *Rhet.Alex*. 1425B 36–40; Pl. *Symp*. 198 D3–E2; Isoc. *Bus*. 4. Similarly, while Plutarch attests Agesilaus' *arete*, he never refers to him as being pious, and frequently provides examples of the opposite.
23. V. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London, 1989).
24. See C.D. Hamilton, 'Plutarch's *Life of Agesilaus*', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4201–21, at 4208; D.R. Shipley, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos: Response to Sources in the Presentation of Character* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 46–55. For use of sources in the *Pompey*, see B.X. de Wet, 'Aspects of Plutarch's portrayal of Pompey', *Acta Classica: Proceedings of the Classical Association of South Africa*, 24 (1981), pp. 128–32, although see the valid criticism at T.P. Hillman, 'Authorial statements, narrative, and character in Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompeius*', *GRBS* 35 (1994), pp. 255–80, at 259, n. 9. On Plutarch's selection and adaptation of source material see, esp. P.A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the 'Mulierum Virtutes'* (Cambridge MA, 1965), pp. 125–40; C.B.R. Pelling, 'Plutarch's method of work in the Roman *Lives*', in *Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies* (London, 2002), pp. 1–44; C.B.R. Pelling, 'Plutarch's adaptation of his

source-material', in *Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies* (London, 2002), pp. 91–116; T.W. Hillard, 'Plutarch's Late-Republican *Lives*: between the lines', *Antichthon* 21 (1987), pp. 19–48; T.E. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 6–9, 101–2; A. Georgiadou, 'Bias and character-portrayal in Plutarch's *Lives of Pelopidas and Marcellus*', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4222–57, esp. 4254; D.H.J. Larmour, 'Making parallels: *synkrisis* and Plutarch's *Themistocles and Camillus*', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4154–1499, esp. 4162–74.

25. H.D. Westlake, 'The sources of Plutarch's *Pelopidas*', *Classical Quarterly* 33.1 (1939), pp. 11–22, at 20, asserts that Plutarch, 'presents an inconsistent picture of his central character, mixing eulogy and censure somewhat haphazardly', owing to the use of 'two conflicting traditions, the one favourable to Agesilaus and Sparta, the other hostile'. P.J. Stylianou, *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus: Bk. 15* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 119, n. 314, rightly criticises this assessment for underestimating the extent to which Plutarch was able to select and adapt his sources to contribute to his own vision. It is also wrong to suggest that the mixture of censure and praise is haphazard, however Westlake's central conclusion, that the *Agesilaus* is neither entirely positive nor entirely negative, bears much closer scrutiny and has generally met with agreement. Hamilton, 'Plutarch's *Life of Agesilaus*', pp. 4205–7, refers to the number of 'virtues and character faults' which Plutarch's Agesilaus exhibits; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, pp. 275–6, suggests that Plutarch treats both Agesilaus and Pompey 'fairly positively'.
26. φιλονικότατος γὰρ ὢν καὶ θυμοειδέστατος ἐν τοῖς νέοις καὶ πάντα πρωτεύειν βουλόμενος, καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἔχων καὶ ῥαγδαῖον ἄμαχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον (Plut. *Ages*. 2.1).
27. C.B.R. Pelling, 'Childhood and personality in Greek biography', in *Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies* (London, 2002), pp. 301–38; Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, pp. 73–8, 151, 157, n. 87, 230–1.
28. Hillman, 'Authorial statements'. Early in the *Agesilaus* (5.3–4) Plutarch discusses and dismisses the notion that love of victory 'φιλονικία' is good for the health of a community, contradicting the claims of 'natural philosophers', 'φυσικοί'. Authorial statements throughout the two *Lives* then encourage the audience to interpret the careers of Agesilaus and Pompey with regard to this notion, culminating in a lengthy authorial statement about the battle of Pharsalus. The gist of this is that Caesar and Pompey together might have had the whole world had they not thrown away their strength in competing with one another (Plut. *Pomp*. 70.1–4). On the concept of φιλονικία and φιλονεικία in Plutarch more broadly, see Duff, *Plutarch's Lives*, pp. 83–9, and P.A. Stadter, 'Competition and its costs: φιλονικία in Plutarch's society and heroes', in G. Roskam and L. Van der Stockt (eds), *Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics* (Leuven, 2011), pp. 237–55.
29. Hillman, 'Authorial statements', esp. pp. 278–9.
30. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia 1*, pp. 117–27.

31. This is certainly not a 'convincing' victory in which the Thebans are 'easily overwhelmed', as suggested by J. Kane, 'Greek Values in Xenophon's *Hellenica*', in A. Loizou and H. Lesser (eds), *Polis and Politics: Essays in Greek Moral and Political Philosophy* (Aldershot, 1990), pp. 1–12. See J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, 1985), pp. 143–8; C.D. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (Ithaca and London, 1991), pp. 106–9, on this unusual battle, with J. Buckler and H. Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 67–70, who consider it a Spartan defeat and demonstrate that the Spartans failed in this opportunity to end the Corinthian War.
32. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν νίκη Ἀγησιλάου ἐγεγένητο, τετρωμένος δ' αὐτός προσενήνεκτο πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα, προσελάσαντές τινες τῶν ἱππέων λέγουσιν αὐτῷ ὅτι τῶν πολεμίων ὡς ὀγδοήκοντα σὺν ὅπλοις ὑπο τῷ νεῷ εἰσι, καὶ ἠρώτων τί χρὴ ποιεῖν. ὁ δέ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων, ὅμως οὐκ ἐπελάθετο τοῦ θείου, ἀλλ' ἐᾶν τε ἀπιέναι ᾗ βούλοιντο ἐκέλευε καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐκ εἴα. (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.20).
33. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ μὲν νίκη σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἐγένετο, τετρωμένος δ' αὐτός προσηνέχθη πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα, προσελάσαντές τινες τῶν ἱππέων λέγουσιν αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῶν πολεμίων ὀγδοήκοντα σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ὑπὸ τῷ ναῷ εἰσι, καὶ ἠρώτων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν. ὁ δέ καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων πάντοσε καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις ὅμως οὐκ ἐπελάθετο τοῦ θείου, ἀλλ' ἐᾶν τε ἀπιέναι ὅποι βούλοιντο ἐκέλευε καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐκ εἴα καὶ προπέμψαι ἐπέταξε τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἱππεῖς, ἕστε ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ἐγένοντο. (Xen. *Ages*. 2.13).
34. Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, p. 68, assume it would have been fine to ransom or enslave them, but this is debatable. See Chapter 4 for things that might justify their rejection.
35. Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, pp. 66–7, note the manuscript variations for Polyaenus 2.1.5, with 'Athenians' the more likely, given that the Boeotians fled elsewhere.
36. L.I. Hau, 'The victor after the victory: a narrative set-piece in Greek historiography from Herodotus to Diodorus of Sicily', in E. Bragg *et al.* (eds), *Beyond the Battlefields: New Perspectives on Warfare and Society in the Graeco-Roman World* (Newcastle, 2008), pp. 121–44, at 130.
37. Cornelius Nepos, so positive about Agesilaus generally, went so far as to refer to the battle of Coronea as 'an undisputed victory' for Sparta (Nepos, *Ages*. 4.5), with the release of the enemy troops, 'the most glorious feature' of the battle. He too emphasises the contrast of Agesilaus' wounds and his mercy: 'Of that victory, the most glorious feature was this: many of the fugitives had rushed into the temple of Minerva, and when Agesilaus was asked what he wished to be done with them, although he had received several wounds in the battle and was obviously incensed with all those who had borne arms against Sparta, yet he subordinated his anger to respect for religion and forbade their being injured' (Nepos, *Ages*. 4.6–7).
38. Shipley, *Commentary*, pp. 234–6, at 236: '[Plutarch] Ignores Xenophon's statement giving victory to Agesilaus. He does not link that report to

Agesilaos' retirement, and reserves the release of refugees for the next episode.'

39. 'Ἀγησίλαος δέ, καίπερ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων πολλῶν κακῶς τὸ σῶμα διακείμενος, οὐ πρότερον ἐπὶ σκηνὴν ἀπῆλθεν ἢ φοράδην ἐνεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἰδεῖν ἐντὸς τῶν ὅπλων συγκεκομισμένους. ὅσοι μέντοι τῶν πολεμίων εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν κατέφυγον, πάντας ἐκέλευσεν ἀφεθῆναι. πλησίον γὰρ ὁ νεὼς ἐστιν ὁ τῆς Ἰτωνίας Ἀθηνᾶς, καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τρόπαιον ἔστηκεν, ὅ πάλαι Βοιωτοὶ Σπάρτωνος στρατηγοῦντος ἐνταῦθα νικήσαντες Ἀθηναίους καὶ Τολμίδην ἀποκτείναντες ἔστησαν (Plut. *Ages*. 19.1–2).
40. J. Buckler, 'Plutarch and autopsy', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4788–830, 4805.
41. J.B. Campbell, 'Polyaenus (2)', *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 2003), p. 1209.
42. See above n. 35.
43. Buckler and Brenk, *Central Greece*, p. 68, take this view; that Agesilaus' army were too tired to pursue the matter.
44. This deception is itself quite controversial. Gray, *Xenophon's Hellenica*, p. 151: emotional control saves a precarious situation. Contra C.J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon's Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart, 1993), p. 68: At *Mem.* 4.2.17, Xenophon says it is permissible to lie to one's troops, 'but there is, one might think, a difference between misleading promises of reinforcements (which is what is involved in *Mem.*) and false interpretations of omens. … We seem to have here an attitude to τὸ θεῖον on Agesilaus' part less comendable than, for example, the one highlighted shortly afterwards in 4.3.20.'
45. Buckler and Brenk, *Central Greece*, p. 68, suggest that this was a 'small gesture' of non-hostility to Athens, and perhaps an indication to Boeotia that he planned nothing further there.
46. It has often been assumed that the Corinthian revolutionaries were democrats, but J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 354–7, has illustrated the problems with that assumption, suggesting that we can only go as far as to say that the revolutionaries were those who wished to oppose Sparta's influence on Corinth.
47. R.A. Tomlinson and K. Demakopoulou, 'Excavations at the circular building, Perachora', *Annual of the British School at Athens* 80 (1985), pp. 261–79; R.A. Tomlinson, 'Water supplies and ritual at the Heraion Perachora', in R. Hägg, N. Marinatos, and G.C. Nordquist (eds), *Early Greek Cult Practice* (Stockholm, 1988), pp. 167–72.
48. Gould, 'HIKETEIA', pp. 82–5; A. Chaniotis, 'Conflicting authorities. Asylia between secular and divine law in the classical and hellenistic *poleis*', *Kernos* 9 (1996), pp. 65–86, at 71.
49. Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, p. 223; this relates to the quantity of prisoners and their property, which does indeed seem to have pleased Agesilaus. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication*, pp. 137–8.
50. Naiden, ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 152.
52. Ibid., p. 147.
53. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication*, pp. 137–8, claims that the massacre took place in the temple of Hera Akraia in Corinth where Medea put her children for safety (according to Apollod. 1.9.28). Xenophon only says more vaguely that the killings took place at the altars and statues of the gods in the agora and in the theatre (Xen. *Hell*. 4.4.3–4). Naiden suggests that the correspondence of the cult (Hera Akraia for the massacre and the enslavement) accentuates the sense of divine justice. But there is a reason that one must go to Apollodorus to identify a temple of Hera Akraia in Corinth – Xenophon makes nothing of the correlation, suggesting that he did not see it or at least did not wish to suggest that it was a sign of divine endorsement.
54. 'θειον ἠγήσαιτο'. *This* is the righteous revenge on those responsible for the massacre; see Gray, *Xenophon's Hellenica*, pp. 154–7.
55. R.A. Tomlinson, 'Perachora', in A. Schachter (ed.), *Le Sanctuaire grec* (Geneva, 1992), pp. 321–46, esp. 325, has argued convincingly that the Heraeum was the local sanctuary of an independent peninsular before being assimilated into the wider Corinthian community. Contra e.g. J.B. Salmon, 'The Heraeum at Perachora, and the early history of Corinth and Megara', *The Annual of the British School at Athens* 67 (1972), pp. 159–204, who assumed that it was Megarian before passing to Corinth, with de Polignac, *Cults, Territory*, pp. 51–2.
56. Danger to ambassadors: F. Adcock and D.J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London, 1975), p. 154. Use of *proxenoi*: Adcock and Mosley, *Diplomacy*, p. 161, with P. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 96–7, on ambassadors. R.J. Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League, 423–371BC* (Edmonton, 1994), p. 55, claims the Boeotian ambassadors had taken refuge in the temple along with the others. This seems logistically unlikely and, if it was the case, neither Xenophon nor Plutarch make it clear.
57. Adcock and Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, p. 164.
58. C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca and London, 1979), p. 286, n. 27, notes the disparity between the scale of the losses and tragic tone.
59. Hamilton, *Failure of Spartan Hegemony*, pp. 114–16: Agesilaus' mishandling of the ambassadors caused anger in Sparta and perhaps compromised his political authority. See also R.E. Smith, 'The opposition to Agesilaus' foreign policy 394–371BC', *Historia* 2 (1953–4), pp. 274–88.
60. W.E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (Albany, 1977), pp. 111–12; Gray, *Xenophon's Hellenica*, pp. 157–63; Tuplin, *Failings*, p. 71; Shipley, *Commentary*, pp. 267–70; Hau, 'victor after the victory', pp. 128–9. F.S. Pownall, 'Condemnation of the impious in Xenophon's *Hellenica*', *Harvard Theological Review* 91.3 (1998), pp. 251–77, at 261, regards the fault as lying entirely in the treatment of the sanctuary, saying only that the hubristic behaviour

towards the ambassadors 'should perhaps be noted'. The treatment of the sanctuary could arguably be considered the more serious aspect, but nonetheless Pownall has surely underappreciated the importance of Agesilaus' gloating in a philosophical examination of his character.

61. Gray, *Xenophon's Hellenica*, p. 160.
62. The encomium praises Agesilaus for his ability to enslave barbarians and for selling them naked to inspire contempt (Xen. *Ages*. 1.28). This occurs during the Asian campaign and it is probable that the captives' non-Greek ethnicity makes their sale a more acceptable topic (see V.J. Rosivach, 'Enslaving *barbaroi* and the Athenian ideology of slavery', *Historia* 48 (1999), pp. 129–57). Xenophon praises Agesilaus for always making sure that those children and elderly people who were not sold should be taken off somewhere so they would not be eaten by dogs or wolves (Xen. *Ages*. 1.21–2). If the vision of selling children and prowling wolves was acceptable in an encomium, clearly Xenophon expected that his readers would be comfortable with the origins of their slave labour force in some circumstances.
63. Shipley, *Commentary*, p. 265.
64. Ibid., p. 267.
65. Gray, *Xenophon's Hellenica*, p. 160.

CHAPTER 5 REPUTATION AND DIPLOMACY

1. See Chapter 3, 'Plataea: Sanctuaries of Demeter and Hera'.
2. See esp. T. Rood, *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 61–82.
3. H.D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 144: 'This minor incident is perhaps included in order to show that he had two failings often associated with Spartan leadership, namely a tendency to senseless brutality and an inability to foresee what repercussion his actions would produce from other Greeks.'
4. C. Forster-Smith, 'Character-drawing in Thucydides', *The American Journal of Philology* 24.4 (1903), pp. 369–87, 373.
5. A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. 3: *Books IV–V.24* (Oxford, 1954), p. 131.
6. J.G. Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas: Thucydides' presentation of events at Pylos and Amphipolis', *Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar* 12 (2005), pp. 207–84 (developing J.G. Howie, 'The major *aristeia* in Homer and Xenophon', *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 9 (1996), pp. 197–217). Brasidas is compared to Achilles in Plato's *Symposium*, set only six years after Brasidas' death (Pl. *Symp.* 221C).
7. For Thucydides' Peloponnesian sources, see Thuc. 5.26, with J. Roisman, 'Alkidas in Thucydides', *Historia* 36.4 (1987), pp. 385–421, 414; H.D. Westlake, 'Thucydides, Brasidas, and Clearidas', *GRBS* 21.4 (1980), pp. 333–40, argues for contact with Brasidas' friends, but doubts contact

with Brasidas himself. With M.L. Lang, 'Participally expressed motivation in Thucydides', *Mnemosyne* 48 (1995), pp. 48–65, 50; E. Badian, 'The road to Acanthus', in R. Mellor and L. Tritle (eds), *Text and Tradition: Studies in Greek History and Historiography in Honor of Mortimer Chambers* (Claremont, CA, 1999), pp. 3–35, 4.

8. Gomme, *Commentary 3*, 127; H.P. Stahl, *Thucydides: Man's Place in History* (Swansea, 2003), pp. 129–57; D. Babut, 'Interpretation historique et structure littéraire chez Thucydides: remarques sur la composition du livre IV', *Bulletin de l'association Guillaume Bude* 40 (1981), pp. 417–39; W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), pp. 108–40; Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', treats the two campaigns as the first and second phase of Brasidas' *aristeia*.
9. Gomme, *Commentary 3*, p. 149, stresses the distinction.
10. Stahl, *Thucydides*, p. 136.
11. Wilamowitz, cited by Gomme, *Commentary 3*, p. 134. Similarly A. Andrewes in Gomme *et al.*, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, Vol. 5: *Bk. 8* (Oxford, 1981), p. 366.
12. Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 63–9.
13. Ibid., p. 66.
14. H.R. Rawlings III, *The Structure of Thucydides' History* (Princeton, 1981), p. 235; Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 71–6.
15. The mission is urgent because he must reach Acanthus before their harvest, the harvest Thucydides soon draws attention to. Thucydides thereby demonstrates the practical benefit of Brasidas' moderation. Contra Badian, 'Road to Acanthus', p. 15: Thucydides has no strategic understanding of the situation.
16. H.D. Westlake, 'Thucydides and the fall of Amphipolis', *Hermes* 90.3 (1962), pp. 276–87, has demonstrated the apologia within this account of the Amphipolitans' reaction to Brasidas: 'there is more than a hint that the citizens were lacking in fortitude'. Even more strongly: J.R. Ellis, 'Thucydides at Amphipolis', *Antichthon* 12 (1978), pp. 28–35.
17. P. Krentz, 'War', in P. Sabin *et al.* (eds), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, Vol. 1: *Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 147–85, 168.
18. Westlake, *Individuals*, pp. 148–9. Brasidas will not hold the Toronians accountable for their Athenian alliance (Thuc. 4.114), a contrast to Spartan policy at Plataea (Thuc. 3.52 and 68) and to Alcidas' behaviour in Ionia (Thuc. 3.32.2). Later on, after the death of Brasidas, the people of Melos will use 'allies Brasidas has not got to' as an expression meaning 'allies which have not revolted from Athens'' (Thuc. 5.110.2). Placed, as this is, within the Melian Dialogue, this reference brings forth the spectre of Brasidas to provide a contrast between approaches to inducing alliance, between the mixture of enticements and threats made by Sparta through Brasidas and the purely threatening offers of the Athenians. And see Rawlings, *Structure*, pp. 234–43 on the contrast between Brasidas and Lysander; with S. Hornblower, 'Sticks and stones and Spartans: the sociology of Spartan violence', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in*

Ancient Greece (London, 2000a), p. 72, on the contrast between Brasidas and Polydamidas, who lost control of Mende by treating a citizen with unwarranted violence (Thuc. 4.130).

19. Opinion is divided over the extent to which 'ἀρετή' constitiutes a moral term in this context. J.L. Creed, 'Moral values in the age of Thucydides', *Classical Quarterly* 23.2 (1973), pp. 213–31, 222–23 regards it as a moral appraisal, relating to 'δίκαιος καὶ μέτριος', while J. Price, *Thucydides and Internal War* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 254, interprets it as a reference to Brasidas' martial ability. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, pp. 56 and 271–3, offers a convincing compromise: that Thucydides expresses a mixture of the martial and moral excellence that Brasidas displays.
20. J. de Romilly, 'Fairness and kindness in Thucydides', *Phoenix* 28.1 (1974), pp. 95–100, at 99–100.
21. See e.g. K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1994), pp. 248–52; P.J. Rhodes, 'Making and breaking treaties in the Greek world', in P. de Souza and J. France (eds), *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 6–27, at 11, for oaths as a religious act. Badian, 'Road to Acanthus', pp. 24–33, doubts the reality of the oaths, or that Brasidas secured them, and notes that Thucydides himself probably had no way of knowing whether they had really been taken or not. This is a valid observation, although it does not affect the fact that Brasidas is shown offering them as a proof of his sincerity.
22. μάτυρας μὲν θεοὺς καὶ ἥρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ἥκων οὐ πείθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δῃῶν πειράσομαι βιάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἔτι νομιῶ. (Thuc. 4.87.2–3).
23. On this last point, F.M. Wassermann, 'The voice of Sparta in Thucydides', *Classical Journal* 59.7 (1964), pp. 289–97, 294.
24. J.M. Sanders, 'The early Lakonian Dioskouroi reliefs', in J.M. Sanders (ed.), *ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ: Lakonian Studies in Honour of Hector Catling* (London, 1992), pp. 205–10.
25. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 350: it would be 'strange' if Brasidas did not sacrifice there. Thucydides does not specify that Brasidas did sacrifice, but Thucydidean references to sacrifice are so rare that the absence on this occasion is not unusual.
26. Babut, 'Interpretation historique', p. 432: the truce is another example of Brasidas' moderation.
27. The Boeotians' 'μηχανή', 4.100.1; the Peloponnesians' 'μηχανή', 4.115.2. R.B. Rutherford, 'Learning from history: categories and case-histories', in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (eds), *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts presented to David Lewis* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 53–68, at 55, notes that, 'Thucydides' concern is not only with the practical details [of new technologies] but also with the pressures which these changes bring about.' The Boeotians use their new technological power to force a hole in their own sanctuary, while the Peloponnesians are never mentioned actually using theirs.

28. ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ληκύθῳ Ἀθηναίας ἱερόν, καὶ ἔτυχε κηρύξας, ὅτε ἔμελλε προσβάλλειν, τῷ ἐπιβάντι πρώτῳ τοῦ τείχους τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἀργυρίου δώσειν) νομίσας ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπείῳ τὴν ἅλωσιν γενέσθαι, τάς τε τριάκοντα μνᾶς τῇ θεῷ ἀπέδωκεν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν Λήκυθον καθελὼν καὶ ἀνασκευάσας τέμενος ἀνῆκεν ἅπαν. (Thuc. 4.116).
29. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 356.
30. Ibid., p. 356: 'This incident is, in fact, a sort of epiphany, or divine manifestation.' The fact that the god is not visible is not compromising: W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*: *Archaic and Classical* (Oxford, 1985), p. 186: 'the epiphany of anthropomorphic gods could never be spoken of in anything but a very vestigial sense'.
31. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 355, after W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War, Pt.2* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1974), pp. 289, n. 55.
32. B. Jordan, 'Religion in Thucydides', *TAPA* 116 (1986), pp. 119–47, 136; Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', p. 271.
33. For its position, see B.D. Meritt, 'Scione, Mende, and Torone', *American Journal of Archaeology* 27.4 (1923), pp. 447–60, 458, with photos: pp. 456 and 458, and map: p. 452.
34. J.D. Mikalson, *Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy* (Chapel Hill and London, 1991), p. 104; A.S. Bradford, 'Plataea and the soothsayer', *Ancient History* 23.1 (1992), pp. 27–33, 31–3; J.N. Bremmer, 'The status and symbolic capital of the seer', in R. Hägg (ed.), *The Role of Religion in the Early Greek Polis* (Stockholm, 1996), pp. 97–109, 98; R. Parker, 'Sacrifice and battle', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London, 2000), pp. 299–314, 305–7; R. Parker, 'One man's piety: the religious dimension of the *Anabasis*' in R. Lane Fox (ed.), *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (New Haven and London, 2004a), pp. 131–53, esp. pp. 131–46.
35. Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', p. 218.
36. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 356; P. Huart, *Le Vocabulaire de L'Analyse Psychologique dans L'Oeuvre de Thucydides* (Paris, 1968), p. 268: in some instances of '*νομί-*', terms 'la realité ne confirme pas la justesse de la pensée'. It is no guarantee that what *Brasidas* thought Thucydides *also* considered correct.
37. Lang, 'Participially expressed motivation', p. 53.
38. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 356: 'Note that Th. might perfectly well have used the noun κήρυγμα here (cp. 105.2).'
39. The translation is Hornblower's, *Commentary 2*, p. 50. At pp. 380–5, Hornblower argues convincingly against translating '*προσήρχοντο*' as 'giving first-fruits to', preferring 'going up to'; the star athlete treatment still has, as Hornblower puts it, 'a religious tinge'.
40. The implicit and explicit comparisons of Brasidas and Cleon are entirely in Brasidas' favour. A.G. Woodhead, 'Thucydides' portrait of Cleon', *Mnemosyne* 13.4 (1960), pp. 289–317, 306–9, suggests Thucydides maligns what was essentially good strategy from Cleon, contra W.K. Pritchett, 'The Woodheadean interpretation of Kleon's Amphipolitan campaign', *Mnemosyne* 26.4 (1973), pp. 376–86, who concurs that

Thucydides represents Cleon negatively but disputes Cleon's strategic ability, as does I.G. Spence, 'Thucydides, Woodhead, and Kleon', *Mnemosyne* 48.4 (1995), pp. 411–37, esp. 426–37. See also A.W. Gomme, 'Thucydides and Kleon: The second battle of Amphipolis', in D.A. Campbell (ed.), *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 112–21; Westlake, *Individuals*, pp. 78 and 162–3; Westlake, 'Thucydides, Brasidas', p. 335; and E.D. Francis, 'Brachylogia Laconia: Spartan speeches in Thucydides', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 38 (1991–3), pp. 198–212, 212: while Cleon 'has vilified Pericles' trust in the value of intelligent debate', Brasidas 'transcends the more restrictive aspects of Spartan temperament and seems, at least in the field, to assimilate some of the qualities of Periclean leadership'; Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', pp. 231–60. Also see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality*, pp. 31–2 and 36: Thucydides' negative portrayal of Cleon.

41. For example, Cleon has gone forward to *see* the area, the Athenians retreat (disastrously) once they have *seen* the many feet (thinking that an attack is imminent), and Brasidas attacks successfully once he *sees* 'ὁρᾳ' (not 'realises' or 'recognises') the opportunity their retreat represents. While Brasidas is in control of what is seen, Cleon repeatedly fails to see or fails to interpret what he sees correctly. Howie, 'The *aristeia* of Brasidas', p. 246; E. Greenwood, *Thucydides and the Shaping of History* (London, 2006), pp. 26–31. The emphasis on visibility is all the more apparent when it is considered that some of it is probably exaggeration: Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 445, notes, 'it is rather surprising that feet could be seen at all, without binoculars or telescope; more than a small gap would be a security risk'. A. Powell, 'Mendacity and Sparta's use of the visual', in A. Powell (ed.), *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* (London, 1989), pp. 173–92, 173, notes that the Spartans were masters at conveying ideas through visual demonstration.
42. W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War, Pt.3* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1979b), p. 88, with n. 157. And see M.H. Jameson, 'Sacrifice before battle', in V.D. Hanson (ed.), *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London, 1991), pp. 197–227; A.M. Bowie, 'Greek sacrifice. Forms and functions' in A. Powell (ed.), *The Greek World* (London and New York, 1995), pp. 463–82, at 472–3; M.A. Flower, *The Seer in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2008), pp. 159–65, on the difference between the types.
43. On sacrifice and divination as troop encouragement, also see Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 6.6. With Parker, 'Sacrifice and battle', pp. 303 and 307; R. Parker, 'One man's piety: the religious dimension of the *Anabasis*' in R. Lane Fox (ed.), *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (New Haven and London, 2004a), pp. 140–6. There is something of a controversy regarding 'καὶ ταυτα πράσσοντος'. To Gomme, *Commentary 3*, p. 646, it means 'i.e. making his preparations and plans with Klearidas'; with P.J. Rhodes, *Thucydides: History IV.1–V.24* (Warminster, 1998); Howie 'The aristeia of Brasidas', pp. 245–6. The other interpretation is that these 'matters' are matters to do with the sacrifice. The latter case (represented

by C.F. Smith in the Loeb and Kruger (1972) bk.ε, 9) is the more convincing, but the ambiguity reflects the fact that Brasidas is occupied with the sacrifice in the midst of making military arrangements (but not carrying out the two tasks simultaneously, as the former interpretation suggests).

44. Gomme, *Commentary 3*, p. 646.
45. Woodhead, 'Thucydides' portrait', p. 307; Rhodes, *Thucydides*, p. 321, goes further: 'sacrificing as if he were not planning to go out and fight'. 'As if' suggests deception, and yet Brasidas had not yet had his opportunity to pounce on Cleon's exposed side, which as Rhodes himself observes, was an opportunity 'Brasidas could not have predicted'.
46. Thuc. 2.71; 4.92; 5.16.3; 5.18; 5.54 and 5.55; 8.109. The three other references to sacrifice have no clear significance for inter-personal communication: 1.126; 6.3; 7.73, although the last invites a contrast between the joyful unity of the sacrificing Syracusans and the defeated Athenians.
47. On which see N. Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion* (Konigstein, 1981).
48. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, pp. 449–50, notes the extraordinary treatment.
49. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 452.
50. I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1987), p. 231; Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 455.
51. M. Giangiulio, 'Constructing the past: colonial traditions and the writing of history. The case of Cyrene', in N. Luraghi (ed.), *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus* (Oxford, 2001), 116–37, at 118. That it was Brasidas who was remembered provides an example of Giangiulio's observation, at 119, colonial history is 'intentional history', that is, socially and collectively determined. See Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1134B 23, for the persistence of this cult.
52. A slightly disputed point. Gomme, *Commentary 3*, p. 656; Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, pp. 84 and 230–2; and Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, pp. 452–5, argue that Hagnon was alive. Contra Classen/Steup and A. Griffiths, 'Was Kleomenes mad?' in A. Powell (ed.), *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind Her Success* (London, 1989), pp. 51–78, at 76, n. 42: he was not.
53. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, pp. 84 and 230. It appears that the hero-cult of Rhesus, founded by Hagnon when he settled Amphipolis, was abandoned along with that of Hagnon himself, see Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, p. 82; with Polyaenus, 6.53.
54. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization*, pp. 200–3. For more on hero-cult, see Part I, 'What is Sacred Space?' and Chapter 2, 'Moving Bones'.
55. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 452, suggests that this expresses the same sense as 'believing in a god'. It is the same term that described Brasidas' perception of his epiphany.
56. Ibid., pp. 49–50.
57. See Chapter 1, 'The Sanctuary of Apollo at Delium'.

58. To some, the praise of Brasidas is Thucydides' own assessment, e.g. Forster-Smith, 'Character-drawing', pp. 374–5: Thucydides characterised Brasidas favourably through the 'mask' of the Chalcideans' perception; P.A. Brunt, 'Spartan policy and strategy in the Archidamian War', *Phoenix* 19.4 (1965), pp. 255–80, 276, calls this a eulogy on Brasidas' justice; Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, pp. 54–6 and 270, discusses the issue, favouring the view that, 'Th. thought Brasidas *really had these qualities*' (p. 270). Others stress the focus on other people's perception, and find Thucydides unwilling to endorse the praises he ascribes to others. Connor, *Thucydides*, p. 130–2, finds Thucydides 'noncommittal'; Powell, 'Mendacity and Sparta', p. 177, stresses how Thucydides' description of Brasidas' words as 'enticing but untrue' intensifies the attention upon Brasidas as a manipulator; C. Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton, 1994), p. 79, suggests that the praise of Brasidas' moderation is, 'qualified by the emphasis in each case on the impression that Brasidas made and its usefulness to Sparta'; Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 69–74, also notes the 'strong focus on [Brasidas'] awareness of public reception and on that reception itself' (quotation p. 73). Price, *Thucydides*, goes as far as to say that wherever religion is mentioned in Thucydides it is done so to signal a decline in traditional Greek values brought about by the war or to emphasise disunity between the Greek people as a whole.
59. Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 74–6. A second prolepsis strikes an ominous note, saying that the cities made a 'great mistake' in underestimating the Athenians' ability to retaliate (Thuc. 4.108).
60. Used when the Thebans cite the Plataean accusation that the seizure of their city during a peacetime festival was unlawful and when they counter that the Plataean execution of helpless prisoners was unlawful, Thuc. 3.65–6, Rawlings, *Structure*, p. 241.
61. Hornblower, *Commentary 2*, p. 281, notes, 'whether or not these oaths were sworn at Sparta (and the evidence indicates that they were), the autonomy of the places was soon violated'. Badian, 'Road to Acanthus', pp. 24–33, doubts the existence of any such oaths, noting Thucydides' ambiguous presentation of them, as well as the ambiguity of the term 'autonomy'; A.B. Bosworth, 'The humanitarian aspect of the Melian Dialogue', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 113 (1993), pp. 30–44, 36: 'Thucydides also stresses the attractive and mendacious nature of Sparta's oratory', noting (at p. 37) that, 'The fine promises of Brasidas had brought utter ruin in two short years.' With Rood, *Thucydides*, pp. 76–7, 80–2; Price, *Thucydides*, p. 253.
62. ὡς δ' ἐκεῖ ἐγένετο, πυθόμενοι οἱ Βοιώταρχοι ὅτι θύοι, πέμψαντες ἱππέας τοῦ τε λοιποῦ εἶπαν μὴ θύειν καὶ οἷς ἐνέτυχον ἱεροῖς τεθυμένοις διέρριψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ. ὁ δ' ἐπιμαρτυράμενος τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ὀργιζόμενος, ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὴν τριήρη ἀπέπλει. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3).
63. In the encomium, readiness to fight Persia is cited as a virtue (Xen. *Ages.* 7.5–7). The Pelopidas story is Xenophon's account of the negotiation of the King's Peace in 367. S. Hornblower, *The Greek World, 479–323 BC* (London and New York, 2002), p. 258, notes: 'medism is a theme well to

the front of Xenophon's treatment of Pelopidas at Susa'. This is reinforced by reference to Troy. When the incident first appears in the *Hellenica*, it is described as occurring, 'At Aulis, the place where Agamemnon had sacrificed before he sailed to Troy' (Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.3). When it is recalled at Susa, it becomes, 'Aulis, the place where Agamemnon – when he was sailing to Asia – had sacrificed *before he took Troy*' (Xen. *Hell*. 7.1.34). The additional reference to the capture of Troy creates a stronger implication that the Boeotians helped to cheat Greece out of triumph in a modern-day Trojan War. Other authors represent the conference differently. Plutarch's *Pelopidas* has no list of services to Persia, the King admires Pelopidas because of his reputation (Plut. *Pel*. 30.3–4, with *Artax*. 21.4–22.6), see A. Georgiadou, 'Bias and character-portrayal in Plutarch's *Lives of Pelopidas and Marcellus*', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4222–57. Nepos has Pelopidas at Susa as an envoy, but without further detail (Nepos. *Pel*. 4.3). The brief eulogistic account in Diodorus is similar; Pelopidas acts as envoy, but there is no reference to Aulis or Thebes' services to Persia (Diod. Sic. 15.81.3).

64. J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London and New York, 1995). The Oxyrhynchus historian's account is more positive than Xenophon's *Hellenica* (V. Gray, 'Two different approaches to the Battle of Sardis in 395BC. Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.4.20–4 and *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 11(6) 4–6', *Californian Studies in Classical Antiquity* 12 (1979), pp. 183–200, discusses the differences, preferring the reliability of Xenophon's account). Ephorus appears to have followed the Oxyrhynchus historian (P) and this tradition passed to Diodorus (I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 150–1; Gray 'Two different approaches', p. 183; V. Gray, 'The value of Diodorus Siculus for the years 411–386BC', *Hermes* 115 (1987), pp. 72–89, at 72–3, 77; Dillery, *Xenophon*, p. 109), with the unexpected result that Xenophon's account in the *Hellenica* is the least positive: C.J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon's Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 56–60, at 60: 'Anyone concerned to write favourably about the Spartan hegemony could unquestionably have done better than this.'
65. Dillery, *Xenophon*, p. 116. This also explains why the reference to Troy's capture was delayed until Susa. If the Aulis narrative was intended to provide an ominous tone in order to anticipate disappointing results, this would have made it an incongruous moment to refer to the capture of Troy. By the time of the Susa conference, the campaign was long over and Thebes was in the assent. This makes the negotiations at Susa a more powerful place to stress Theban offences against Greece (*Hell*. 7.1.34).
66. Pownall, 'Condemnation of the impious', p. 269: the *Hellenica* implies that the Boeotians will be punished, but this is left vague and open-ended to an extent that is unusual in the work.

67. Tuplin, *Failings*, p. 57, and S. Nevin, 'Negative comparison: Agamemnon and Alexander in Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompey*', *GRBS* 54 (2014), pp. 45–68.
68. M. Cook, 'Ancient political factions: Boiotia 404–395', *TAPA* 118 (1988), pp. 57–85, 79: 'many citizens, including those who were politically active … were not associated with any continuing and cohesive political group.'
69. Athens and Corinth at least offered excuses for their unwillingness to provide troops (Paus. 3.9.2). The Corinthians' explanation, that they were prevented by the omen of their temple of Olympian Zeus burning down, seems to refer to a genuine event although they may have been glad of the convenient excuse, see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, pp. 228 and 342–3.
70. Cook, 'Ancient political factions', p. 84. Even when Thebes was more ready to make war, they were still obliged to draw Sparta into making the first move, which is why Phocis and Locris were drawn into conflict. See Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3–4; *Oxy.*18.2; Paus. 3.9.8.
71. Cook, 'Ancient political factions', 84. Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, pp. 157–8, also notes the propaganda value for Thebes of a hostile interpretation of Agesilaus' actions.
72. S. Price and E. Kearns, *Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion* (Oxford, 2003), p. 87.
73. See Nevin, 'Negative comparison', pp. 49–52; S. Perlman, 'The causes and the outbreak of the Corinthian War', *Classical Quarterly* 14 (1964), pp. 64–81, 78: 'no wonder that the cities of the Greek mainland viewed with apprehension Sparta's campaign in Asia Minor'. With Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, pp. 342–50; Cook, 'Ancient political factions', p. 64; R.J. Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League, 423–371BC* (Edmonton, 1994), p. 29.
74. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3–4; 5.1.33; 5.2.32.
75. H. Bowden, *Classical Athens and the Delphic Oracle: Divination and Democracy* (Cambridge, 2005a), pp. 142–3, notes the distinction. E.J. Lendon, 'Homeric vengeance and the outbreak of Greek wars', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London, 2000), pp. 1–30, 21, cites this when discussing the role of old slights in the outbreak of wars.
76. Pausanias' account of Aulis is more complex, combining a damning representation of the Thebans with a compromising depiction of Agesilaus: 'Agesilaus claimed to be king of a more prosperous city than Agamemnon, and to rule all Greece as he did, and that it would be more illustrious to have success conquering the King Artaxerxes and to acquire the fortune of Persia than to destroy the empire of Priam. But while he was sacrificing Thebans with weapons came upon him, threw from the altar the still-burning thighs of the victims and drove him from the sanctuary. Agesilaus, although annoyed that the sacrifice was not completed, nevertheless crossed into Asia' (Paus. 3.9.4–5). The king's behaviour is arrogant and his failure to respond to the omen appears as an error, but there is no Lacedaemonian *mantis* displacing local priests and the Thebans are much more forceful. Pausanias provides a short but glowing version of

the campaign, in which Agesilaus defeats the biggest Persian army since Darius and Xerxes (Paus. 3.9.6). But despite this success, 'The malevolence of some gods meant he did not bring his plans to completion' (Paus. 3.9.7). The mission remains unfulfilled as a result of divine displeasure, which was anticipated in, and perhaps explained by, the failed sacrifice.

77. A suggestion also put forward by Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, pp. 156–8; C. D. Hamilton, 'Plutarch's *Life of Agesilaus*', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4201–21, at 4214–15. A Boeotian perspective accessed by through Callisthenes or Callisthenes through Ephorus is a possibility (see G. Shrimpton, 'The Theban supremacy in fourth-century literature', *Phoenix* 25 (1971), pp. 310–18). Wherever Plutarch ultimately derived his material from, it shows a pronounced sympathy for the Boeotian perspective. Throughout his corpus Plutarch shows a considerable favour towards Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Agesilaus' rivals, see H.D. Westlake, 'The sources of Plutarch's *Pelopidas*', *Classical Quarterly* 33.1 (1939), pp. 11–22, 15–16; J. Geiger, 'Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*: The choice of heroes', *Hermes* 109 (1981), pp. 85–104, 87; Georgiadou, 'Bias and character-portrayal'. Plutarch's defence of his home state can also be seen in *Mal.Hdt.* 854E–874C. Shrimpton, 'Theban supremacy', pp. 310ff: the general perception of Thebes improved after 335 and with it the reputation of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.
78. For the impression of arrogance and failure created by the imitation of Agamemnon, see Nevin, 'Negative comparison'.
79. Καὶ κατασστέψας ἔλαφον ἐκέλευσεν ἀπάρξασθαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ μάντιν, οὐχ ὥσπερ εἰώθει τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν τεταγμένος. ἀκούσαντες οὖν οἱ Βοιωτάρχαι πρὸς ὀργὴν κινηθέντες ἔπεμψαν ὑπηρέτας, ἀπαγορεύοντες τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ μὴ θύειν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ πάτρια Βοιωτῶν. οἱ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀπήγγειλαν καὶ τὰ μηρία διέρριψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ. χαλεπῶς οὖν ἔχων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀπέπλει, τοῖς τε Θηβαίοις διωργισμένος καὶ γεγονὼς δύσελπις διὰ τὸν οἰωνόν, ὡς ἀτελῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων γενησομένων καὶ τῆς στρατείας ἐπὶ τὸ προσῆκον οὐκ ἀφιζομένης. (Plut. *Ages.* 6.5–6)

    Plutarch knew a tradition (probably created by confusion with a story about Agesipolis (Babbitt on *Mor.* 191) that Agesilaus went to Delphi and either Olympia or Dodona before sailing to Asia, but for the *Life* he prefers the Aulis tradition.
80. D.R. Shipley, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos: Response to Sources in the Presentation of Character* (Oxford, 1997), p. 127.
81. By placing 'ἀκούσαντες' at the start of the sentence, Plutarch stresses the connection between the provocation and the Boeotarchs' response. Xenophon's, 'When he arrived, however, the Boeotarchs, on learning that he was sacrificing…' 'ὡς δ' ἐκεῖ ἐγένετο, πυθόμενοι οἱ Βοιώταρχοι ὅτι θύοι…' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3) has a less prominent sense of cause and effect, and exactly what they react to is different. The use of the Spartan *mantis* is also an example of Agesilaus favouring his friends unduly, another key theme in this *Life*, on which see T.P. Hillman, 'Authorial statements, narrative, and character in Plutarch's *Agesilaus-Pompeius*', *GRBS* 35 (1994), pp. 255–80.

82. Hamilton, *Failure of Spartan Hegemony*, p. 32; C.D. Hamilton, 'Plutarch's *Life of Agesilaus*', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.33.6 (1992), pp. 4201–21, 4215. '*Virtually* justifies' is right – the Boeotians' behaviour is still excessive.
83. Cook, 'Ancient political factions', p. 64: 'The Boiotarchs, claiming some ritual irregularity, insulted Agesilaus'; Similarly Buck, *Boiotia and the Boiotian League*, p. 29: 'The ostensible reason was…'; even J-F. Bommelaer, 'Le songe d'Agesilas: un mythe ou le rêve d'un mythe?', *Ktema* 8 (1983), pp. 19–26, at 21: the ostensible motive not likely to be genuine given the circumstances.
84. A. Gerolymatos, 'Fourth century Boiotian use of the *proxenia* in international relations', in G. Argoud and P. Roesch (eds), *La Béotie Antique* (Paris, 1985), pp. 307–11: the Boeotians developed the *proxenoi* system later than Athens, but did have it by this time. With Shipley, *Commentary*, p. 127, and above, Part I, 'How to Behave in a Sanctuary'.
85. Hillman, 'Authorial statements', p. 275.
86. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ ἄλλα λέγειν καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικά, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι. νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν τὰς πόλεις τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνων τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρότερον οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. (Xen. *Hell*. 5.4.1)
87. H. Bowden, 'Religion and politics. Xenophon and the scientific study of religion', in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His World* (Stuttgart, 2004), pp. 229–46, at 243–4, notes that divine causation is strongly inferred though not actually stated outright. Xenophon criticises the Spartans, but in a manner that was possibly current in Sparta as self-criticism. The criticism of Spartan wrongdoing seems sincere, but the open acknowledgement of guilt and divine retribution nonetheless maintains Sparta's military image. Impiety can be apologised for and restitution made, without compromising one's apparently intrinsic military superiority; a defeat without divine intervention smacks uncomfortably of weakness. Cf. Athenians at Hdt. 5.86, Chapter 2, 'Moving Statues'. Among historians, Xenophon may have been unique in attributing Sparta's disasters to the gods, see Dillery, *Xenophon*, p. 224.
88. Dillery, *Xenophon*, pp. 195–237; Tuplin, *Failings*, pp. 87–100.
89. See Tuplin, *Failings*, pp. 96–100, esp. 99–100; Dillery, *Xenophon*, pp. 207–27. With P. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 94–5, 119–21, 218–19; R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 186–8; Burkert, *Greek Religion*, pp. 50–254; H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare. Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), pp. 12–18.
90. K. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton, 1990), pp. 9–22, esp. 20, demonstrates that Diodorus, not his sources, is the source of the *prooemia*. Other refs to the seizure include: Nep. *Pel*.1.2–4; Isoc. 4.126; 8.95; 14.9.28; Polyb. 4.27.4; Paus. 9.1.4.

91. See S. Symeonoglou, 'The oracles of Thebes', in G. Argoud and P. Roesch (eds), *La Béotie Antique* (Paris, 1985), pp. 155–8.
92. Xenophon too had characterised the revolt as a tyrant-slaying, though he did not include (probably did not know) the tomb-robbing story. Dillery, *Xenophon*, p. 229, 'the [*Hellenica*'s] account of the liberation is told very much as a story of just vengeance against tyrants – inescapable, brutal but nevertheless just'.
93. P.J. Stylianou, *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus: Bk. 15* (Oxford, 1998), p. 222, notes that the collaborators inform Phoebidas that this is an effective time to strike.
94. C. Higbie, 'The bones of a hero, the ashes of a politician: Athens, Salamis, and the usable past', *Classical Antiquity* 16.2 (1997), pp. 278–307, 282, n. 14. Parker, *Miasma*, pp. 159–60, notes the frequent theme of civic uprisings at festivals and the surprising level of religious toleration of this practice; although while the Athenians celebrated Harmodius and Aristogeiton, 'If political developments had been different, of course, more might have been heard of how the accursed pair "polluted the hieromania"'. See Parker, *Miasma*, p. 156, and M.D. Goodman and A.J. Holladay, 'Religious scruples in ancient warfare', *Classical Quarterly* 36.1 (1986), pp. 151–71, for more on festivals, truces, and attacks.
95. Rawlings, *Structure*, p. 241, above, n. 60.
96. Contra Rhodes, 'Making and breaking treaties', 20 and 22, arguing that the Theban refusal to march against Olynthus placed them in breach of the King's Peace and subject to occupation. No ancient authority cites this view.
97. Tuplin, *Failures*, p. 100, stresses this point, Xenophon's condemnation is so explicit because, 'the liberation initiated a *peripeteia* and was, for Xenophon, a great turning point'.
98. The Council traditionally dealt only in matters concerning the sanctuary, not international arbitration.

    The fine came *c.*20 years after the Theban revolt. J. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis* (Austin, 1999), p. 207: 'The Thebans' intentions were to isolate their ancient enemies from the rest of the Greek community, not to punish recent wrongdoing'; J. Buckler and H. Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 214–23, the Delphians brought the fines to weaken Phocis. See Chapter 6, 'Delphi: The Third Sacred War', for the consequences.

CHAPTER 6 FIGHTING FOR SACRED SPACE: SACRED WARS, PRESTIGE, AND PLUNDER

1. C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles: The Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century BC* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 137.
2. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, Zeus sanctuaries remote: p. 26, petty chieftains and location: pp. 29 and 35, history of pp. 26–105; J. Roy, 'Elis', in P. Funke and N. Luraghi (eds), *The Politics of Ethnicity and the*

Crisis of the Peloponnesian League (Washington, DC, and Cambridge, MA, 2009).

3. Argive influence on Nemea: S.G. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1976', *Hesperia* 46.1 (1977), pp. 1–26, 8; imitation pattern: Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, pp. 215–16; development at Delphi: Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, pp. 106–85.
4. S. Hornblower, *The Greek World, 479–323 BC* (London and New York, 2002), 97, with 29.
5. See Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, pp. 113–26, on development of Delphi's sanctuary at the expense of the local communities; at p. 135: 'If the war did not take place, it was necessary to invent it in order to cover the disjunction between the demands of regional and sanctuary activity'; pp. 144–9, Delphic myths. Also see J. McInerney, *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis* (Austin, 1999), esp. pp. 86–115, 154–65, on Phocis and Delphi's early settlement; J.K. Davies, 'The traditions about the First Sacred War', in S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 193–212, at 202–3. On Delphic myths, see esp. J. Fontenrose, *Python: A Study of Delphic Myth and its Origins* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), on Pytho, see pp. 1–27, 46–69. With e.g. *Hom. Hymn. 3, Apollo*, 182–387, Strabo, 9.3.12; Heracles, depicted first on a tripod at Olympia, later on vases, *c.*560–540, referenced in Hesiod, *Aspis* 477–80, Pindar, *Ol.* 9.32; Apollod. 2.6.2. Also, *Hom. Hymn. 4, Hermes*, 178–81, features Hermes' threat to sack Delphi.
6. Alternatively, the land was already sacred to Apollo, and more of it was dedicated to him after the war, so T. Howe, 'Pastoralism, the Delphic amphiktyony and the First Sacred War: the creation of Apollo's sacred pastures', *Historia* 52 (2003), pp. 129–46. The names 'Crisa' and 'Cirrha' were used quite interchangeably, referring to small cities near the Corinthian Gulf, controlling major routes to the sanctuary. The major source for the war is Aeschines 3.107–13. The earliest clear reference to the reduction of the Cirrhan plain comes in Isocrates' *Plataecus* (14.31), in which the Plataeans remind the Athenians that the Thebans planned to reduce Attica in the same way. *Hom. Hymn. 3, Apollo*, 540–4, may be a reference to the war. Diodorus (9.16), has the Cirrhans attempting to plunder Delphi; Pausanias (10.37.4–8) has them disrespecting Apollo and using his land. See Davies, 'Traditions', pp. 193–212, and Howe, 'Pastoralism', for a discussion of the sources and how they should be approached. Also see McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, pp. 165–72; P. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 123; H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London, 2004), p. 20.
7. Davies, 'Traditions', stresses that the early traditions are not suitable for blending together, but also notes (p. 202) that, 'the very untidiness of the Delphian stories suggest that they pre-dated the partial systemization which was carried through as the canonical story developed'.

8. Warning against attacking: Hdt. 9.42, attack: 8.36–9. On this episode, T. Harrison, *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus* (Oxford, 2000b), p. 150, with n. 104, pp. 71–2, 84, with n. 55, 94–5, 98, 138, 162.
9. See S. Hornblower, 'The religious dimension to the Peloponnesian War, or, what Thucydides does not tell us', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 94 (1992), pp. 169–97, 175.
10. The question of troop provision, often controversial, is cited as another flash point; the Argives were still smarting that the Mycenaeans had provided troops to fight at Thermopylae when Argos stayed neutral. Diodorus was probably drawing on Ephorus here, as Jonathan Hall notes, Diodorus writes that Mycenae was still 'uninhabited in my time'; it was resettled by the first century, Diodorus' time, but not in Ephorus' fourth century: J. Hall, 'How Argive was the "Argive" Heraion? The political and cultic geography of the Argive plain, 900–400B.C.', *American Journal of Archaeology* 99.4 (1995), pp. 577–613, at 608.
11. The Amphiaraus-Adrastus founder tradition gave an Argive spin to the games, while a competing Heracles foundation myth (founding the games after killing the lion) associated it rather more with Mycenae and Tiryns, Hall, 'How Argive', pp. 608–9. Argos, Cleonae, Corinth, and Mycenae were all Dorian. Argos, Tiryns, and Mycenae shared one alphabet group, while Cleonae belonged to another, and Corinth to a third, Hall, 'How Argive', p. 587 with refs.
12. For Cleonae joining Argos against Mycenae, see Strabo (8.6.19). See D.M. Lewis, 'The origins of the First Peloponnesian War', in P.J. Rhodes (ed.), *Selected papers in Greek and Near Eastern History* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 9–21, at 13–15; Hornblower, *Greek World*, p. 81, and 'The religious dimension of the Peloponnesian War or, what Thucydides does not tell us', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 94 (1992), pp. 169–97, at 179. The Plutarchan passage contains a wonderful exchange on the protocol of borders: Cimon is bringing his army to Athens from Sparta after the embarrassing earthquake rescue mission; a Corinthian complains that they have entered Corinthian territory without asking. Cimon replies that the Corinthians observed no such niceties at Cleonae, and passes through without further problems (*Cim.* 17.4).
13. This reading is based on Lewis, 'Origins', which recognised the importance Corinthian expansion had in initiating the First Peloponnesian War and that conflict for the sanctuary was implicit in a number of campaigns; with Hornblower, 'Religious dimension'.
14. Athenian alliance: *IG* I^3 9, see Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', p. 178. Tanagra campaign's significance: Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', p. 181; *Greek World*, pp. 29, 33–4. The desire for influence on the Council also explains Sparta's ongoing interest in Thessaly, which held presidency over the Council (*Syll.*^{3} 175), as indicated by Cleomenes' and Leotychides' adventures in Thessaly in the early fifth century, the foundation of Heracleia in Trachis in the 420s (Thuc. 3.92, with Diod. Sic. 12.59), and Lysander's in the 390s. See Hornblower, 'Religious dimension',

esp. pp. 182 and 186–90; *Greek World*, pp. 29 and 97, with McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, pp. 186–93.

15. Phocians: F. Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie pyléo-delphique. Histoire et institutions* (Paris, 1998), pp. 30–3; J. Buckler and H. Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 214, 280.
16. T. Duff, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 64, with 265–7, notes that this is not an exclusively positive *Life*, even if it is largely so.
17. Lewis, 'Origins', p. 20.
18. Hornblower, *Greek World*, p. 36.
19. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', pp. 176–9.
20. Ibid., p. 177.
21. ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων: δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ᾽ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. (Thuc. 1.121.3). With L. Kallet-Marx, *Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.24* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1993), pp. 177–8.
22. On using dedications as funds, see Part I, 'How to Behave in a Sanctuary'. Money was usually returned, although what was borrowed was not necessarily being consistently returned during the Peloponnesian War, see Kallet-Marx, *Money*, pp. 194–7; J.K. Davies, 'The Phokian hierosylia at Delphi: quantities and consequences', in N. Sekunda (ed.), *Corolla Cosmo Rodewald* (Gdansk, 2007), pp. 75–96, 86.
23. Kallet-Marx, *Money*, p. 95, referring to the use of the verb κινέω.
24. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', p. 177. There is more on this issue below, 'Delphi, Olympia and Nemea in the Peloponnesian War'.
25. Ibid., pp. 170 and 191–3. The Spartans actually tell the Mytilenians to attend so they can put their grievances against Athens to the allies. A Mytilenian speech is given (Thuc. 3.9–14), in which they represent themselves as supplicants of Olympian Zeus.
26. B. McCauley, 'The transfer of Hippodameia's bones: a historical context', *The Classical Journal* 93.3 (1998), pp. 225–39, and Chapter 2, 'Moving Bones'.
27. Roy, 'Elis', provides examples. Political deals were frequently made in which disputes were to be referred to officials at Olympia; as those officials were the Eleans, this gave Elis uneven advantage. The ability to demand religious fines in political cases also put Elis at an advantage. R. Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism and religious life', in P. Funke and N. Luraghi (eds), *The Politics of Ethnicity and the Crisis of the Peloponnesian League* (Washington, DC, and Cambridge, MA, 2009): 'though Elis made use of the sanctuary's prestige in its dealings with its *perioikoi*, it failed to create around it a community of hearts and minds; when the option of secession became available, it was taken'.
28. Roy, 'Elis'; Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', pp. 179 and 193.
29. T. Rood, *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation* (Oxford, 1998), p. 106; S. Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon, and Lichas: were the Spartans

excluded from the Olympic Games from 420 to 400 B C?', *Phoenix* 54 (2000b), pp. 212–25, 212.

30. Roy, 'Elis'.
31. Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', p. 222, with n. 24; J. Roy, 'Thucydides 5.49.1–50.4: The quarrel between Elis and Sparta in 420 B. C., and Elis' exploitation of Olympia', *Klio* 80 (1998), pp. 360–8, 366, for military prudence.
32. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', with H. Bowden, *Classical Athens and the Delphic Oracle: Divination and Democracy* (Cambridge, 2005a), pp. 134–9.
33. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', esp. p. 196; *Greek World*, pp. 29 and 158.
34. Kallet-Marx, *Money*, pp. 177–8, notes an earlier suggestion that the Spartans might have used it for Arcadian mercenaries (nb. Thuc. 3.101); as talk of using the money began in the Peloponnese, she suggests that the Athenians may have initiated the investigation at Delphi; J.K. Davies, 'Temples, credit, and the circulation of money', in A.R. Meadows and K. Shipton, *Money and its uses in the Ancient World* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 117–28, 125, inclines towards this as Corinthian spending, and suggests that the truce agreement hints at, 'Sparta's ostensible disapproval' of using dedications.
35. Hornblower, 'Religious dimension', pp. 192–4.
36. McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, p. 193, 'Since the Athenians had been in no position to dominate Delphi recently, it is safe to conclude that the clause was directed primarily at Sparta and the ally that had repeatedly asserted the right to administer the sanctuary, Phokis.'
37. S.G. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1978', *Hesperia* 48.1 (1979), pp. 73–103, 82: broken blocks and arrow heads in the sacred square, late fifth century, associated with destruction evident across the sanctuary; Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1976', pp. 8–10; S.G. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1979', *Hesperia* 49.2 (1980), pp. 178–205, at 179–80 and 186, 193: 'The violence of the destruction is attested not only by the debris and the heavy traces of fire within it, but also by an iron spear point (IL 342) and two bronze arrowheads (BR 766, BR 770). We are thus once again confronted by the evidence of a violent episode in the Sanctuary of Zeus during the last quarter of the 5th century B.C. … the battle obviously claimed as one of its victims a large and important building. This building must inevitably be identified as the Early Temple of Zeus'; D.E. Birge, 'The sacred square', in D.E. Birge *et al*. (eds), *Excavations at Nemea: Topographical and Architectural Studies: The Sacred Square, the Xenon, and the Bath* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1992), pp. 1–98, esp. 71.
38. Initial excavations indicated late fifth/early fourth, but the 1980 excavation revealed enough ceramic evidence to date it to, 'no earlier than ca.430, and probably well into the last quarter of the 5th century B. C', S.G. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1980', *Hesperia* 50.1 (1981), pp. 50–1.

39. Miller, 'Excavations at Nemea, 1976', pp. 8–10, Thucydides: n. 17; Euripides: p. 10.
40. Ibid., p. 10, n. 15, notes that by 388 the Argives were the ones declaring the (disputed) Nemean truce (Xen. *Hell*. 4.7.2); Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism', notes the Cleoneans' new position.
41. S.G. Miller, 'Kleonai, the Nemean Games, and the Lamian War', Hesperia Supp. 20 (1982), pp. 100–8.
42. C.J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 52–6.
43. The Spartans had probably had access to the sanctuary in the meantime, presumably paying the fine and perhaps by conceding Lepreum, see Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', pp. 422–3. See Tuplin, *Failings*, pp. 201–5, for a chronology of this war.
44. Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', pp. 216–17.
45. P. Cartledge, *Agesilaus*, p. 249; Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', pp. 215–16, P. Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenika II.3.11–IV.2.8* (Warminster, 1995), pp. 173–6.
46. F.A. Pownall, *Lessons from the Past: The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose* (Ann Arbor, 2004), pp. 95–6.
47. Agis demonstrates humility and restraint in refusing to direct the events of Athens' surrender (Xen. *Hell*. 2.2.12) (perhaps a response to the Spartans anger when he independently negotiated a truce during the campaigns around Nemea, Thuc. 5.59–60); he appears less keen than Lysander on Athens' destruction. Agis shows tremendous foresight in troubling about the Athenians' grain supply (Xen. *Hell*. 1.1.35–6). Agis dies in old age after returning from personally dedicating the tithe of the Spartan–Elean War at Delphi and is honoured by an extraordinary burial (Xen. *Hell*. 3.1). The foresight, moderation, and high esteem of his compatriots, are all signs of Xenophon's positive characterisation of Agis.
48. Hdt. 6.81; Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.3; Plut. *Ages*. 6.5–6, see Chapter 4, 'Cleomenes and the Grove of Argos' and Chapter 5, 'Agesilaus and the Sanctuary of Artemis'. Paus. 5.27.11, offers a hint of an alternative tradition, a skeleton found, 'lying in his armour when the roof of the Heraeum was being repaired in my time', is associated with this war. Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', p. 219, notes the 'implausible precision' of this, yet it is intriguing that this was the go-to war to explain the discovery of a skeleton even after so long.
49. As Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', p. 223, puts it, Sparta had been 'nursing their grievance' all the while. C. Falkner, 'Sparta and the Elean War, *ca* 401/400 B.C.: revenge or imperialism?', *Phoenix* 50 (1996), pp. 17–25, at 17 has revenge as some part of it.
50. See esp. E.J. Lendon, 'Homeric vengeance and the outbreak of Greek wars', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London, 2000), pp. 1–30, esp. 1, 3, 21.
51. Peloponnese, see esp. Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 80–5; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 285; plus coastline, Falkner, 'Sparta and the Elean War', pp. 17–25.
52. Bowden, *Classical Athens*, pp. 141–2.

53. J. Roy, 'Spartan aims in the Spartan–Elean war of *c.*400: further thoughts', *Electronic Antiquity* 3.6 (1997): Friendship: Paus 3.8.4. Coup: 'certainly Pausanias (5.4.8; 7.10.2) explicitly calls Xenias a traitor to Elis, implying that his actions were in Sparta's interest'. Coup fails: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.27–30. Revenge as pretext: Diod. Sic. 14.17.6.
54. Roy, 'Elis'. Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', p. 222, n. 24, notes the religious problem in regime change and Xenophon's coy handling: 'The single motive given by Xenophon is purely practical (the incompetence or unworthiness of the Pisatan "peasants"), but some Spartans would surely have felt religious unease at treating the Eleans in this way, despite the argument that the Eleans had not enjoyed their rights for all previous time. The pious Xenophon for once treats a religious episode in thoroughly Thucydidean manner, by suppressing the religious motive in favour of the more worldly one.'
55. Bowden, *Classical Athens*, p. 142, citing Agesipolis' sacrifice as an example (Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.2).
56. ἐπήει πορθῶν καὶ φθείρων τὴν χώραν ἱερὰν οὖσαν, καὶ παμπληθεῖς ὠφελείας ἤθροισεν (Diod. Sic. 14.17.11). Pausanias says that the Spartan–Elean War in the time of Agis involved 'a battle inside the Altis' (Paus. 6.2.3), but this seems like a confusion with the war of the 360s and it seems unlikely that this detail would be missing from Diodorus as well as Xenophon if this is what happened. Overall Pausanias' diverse references to this conflict are hard to gauge for moral themes; see Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', pp. 219–20.
57. Bowden, *Classical Athens*, p. 141.
58. Pausanias not Agis: Hornblower, 'Thucydides, Xenophon', p. 215, n. 10. Pausanias does not have a great reputation in the *Bibliotheke*; he refrains from backing the 30 tyrants at Athens as much to spite Lysander as to restore Sparta's reputation (14.34.1). On the use of Ephorus for this war, Hornblower, pp. 218–19, with Roy, 'Elis', who notes that the Elis produced number of pro-Elean victor-lists and histories and that Ephorus wrote a pro-Elean account of this war. G.L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 84–101, at 88: Ephorus, 'strongly biased in favour of Athens and against Sparta', and in Diod. Sic. for 411–341BCE, 'a strong anti-Spartan feeling is deeply interwoven in its texture' (p. 100). With H.D. Westlake, 'The sources of Plutarch's *Pelopidas*', *Classical Quarterly* 33.1 (1939), pp. 11–22; G. Shrimpton, 'The Theban supremacy in fourth-century literature', *Phoenix* 25 (1971), pp. 310–18; P.J. Stylianou, *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus: Bk. 15* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 112–20. K. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton, 1990) has refined this, noting that while Ephorus was a major source for bk. 14, Diodorus wrote much of it himself and interpreted his source material in accordance with his own themes (particularly the problems of empire), esp. p. 19, with 42–54.
59. The hostility of this account reflects the anti-Spartan-empire theme that exists in Diodorus, on which see previous note, n. lviii.

60. So pervasive is the effect of genre that even Xenophon's treatment of the tithes is slightly different in the encomium, where it appears out of chronological sequence to compare the king favourably with others (Xen. *Ages*. 1.34): The same dedication is 'not less than a 100 talents' (Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.21) and 'more than a 100 talents' (Xen. *Ages*. 1.34).
61. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, p. 39.
62. Ibid., pp. 213–14.
63. οἱ Ἀργεῖοι αὐτοῦ ἐτύγχανον τότε ποιοῦντες τὴν θυσίαν τῷ Ποσειδῶνι, ὡς Ἄργους Κορίνθου ὄντος. ὡς δ' ἤσθοντο προσιόντα τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, καταλιπόντες καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα καὶ τὰ ἀριστοποιούμενα μάλα σὺν πολλῷ φόβῳ ἀπεχώρουν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Κεγχρειὰς ὁδόν. ὁ μέντοι Ἀγησίλαος ἐκείνους μὲν καίπερ ὁρῶν οὐκ ἐδίωκε, κατασκηνήσας δὲ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ αὐτός τε τῷ θεῷ ἔθυε καὶ περιέμενεν, ἕως οἱ φυγάδες τῶν Κορινθίων ἐποίησαν τῷ Ποσειδῶνι τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα. (Xen. *Hell*. 4.5.1). For a discussion of the dates of this episode, see C. Tuplin, 'The date of the union of Corinth and Argos', *Classical Quarterly* 32.1 (1982), pp. 75–83, expressing confidence in Xenophon's account.
64. The eulogistic *Agesilaus* biography by Nepos also avoids this incident and Aulis.
65. Ἀργείων δὲ τὴν Κόρινθον ἐχόντων τότε καὶ τὰ Ἴσθμια συντελούντων, ἐπιφανεὶς ἐκείνους μὲν ἐξήλασεν ἄρτι τῷ θεῷ τεθυκότας, τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν ἀπολιπόντας. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων ὅσοι φυγάδες ἔτυχον παρόντες ἐδεήθησαν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀγῶνα διαθεῖναι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησεν, αὐτῶν δὲ ἐκείνων διατιθέντων καὶ συντελούντων παρέμεινε καὶ παρέσχεν ἀσφάλειαν. (Plut. *Ages*. 21.1–2).
66. The term 'retire' can encompass 'retire after battle', but this does not seem to be how Xenophon uses the term in this case, while 'to drive someone out', Plutarch's term, contains no such ambiguity.
67. It is of note that in Plutarch's depiction of Agesilaus' defence of Sparta, the king not only rejects conflict with Epaminondas when it is unsafe, he also avoids strife with his own citizens and refuses to attack rebellious soldiers who are at 'the Issorium, where the temple of Artemis stands' (Plut. *Ages*. 32.3–5). When Agesilaus is conciliatory he does not attack sanctuaries, as he might in a less agreeable mood.
68. Pausanias makes several references to Leuctra but not in connection to Agesilaus, E.g.: 1.3.4; 1.13.4; 1.29.8; 3.6.1; 7.6.5; 9.1.3; 9.6.1; 9.13.2–4; 9.16.3. The brevity of the account post-Asia and the limited discussion of Leuctra even in the section on Cleombrotus, support the idea of Pausanias' use of Theopompus, who finished his *Hellenica* with the battle of Cnidus, so A.R. Meadows, 'Pausanias and the historiography of classical Sparta', *Classical Quarterly* 45.1 (1995), pp. 92–113, at 110–11. Polybius criticised Theopompus for ending before Leuctra (Polyb. 8.11.3).
69. It could be argued that Leuctra is not mentioned because the royal houses are discussed separately (Paus. 3.1.9) and it was Cleombrotus who fought there (Paus. 3.6.1). But while Cleombrotus was at Leuctra, it was still a defining moment in Agesilaus' reign, and, moreover, some incidents are treated in the lives of both kings (the murder of King

Teleclus by the Messenians in the temple of Artemis is first mentioned at 3.2.7, but also appears in the account of his co-king, Nicander, 3.7.4). That Pausanias did not associate Agesilaus with Leuctra indicates a consciously positive rendering of his life. The question of his sources is vexed, see Meadows, 'Pausanias', with C.J. Tuplin, 'Pausanias and Plutarch's Epaminondas', *Classical Quarterly* 34.2 (1984), pp. 346–58.

70. J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 357–60, discusses some of the political implications of the Argive-Corinthian celebration of the games.
71. It is now widely accepted that this refers to the temple of Poseidon at Isthmia, not to an unknown temple of Poseidon on Mt. Lutraki. For the discussion, see J. Pollard, 'Mystery site on Mount Lutraki', *Greece and Rome* 15.1 (1968), pp. 78–81.
72. O. Broneer, 'Excavations at Isthmia. The third campaign, 1955–56', *Hesperia* 27.1 (1958), pp. 1–37, 2–3.
73. 'Pownall, 'Condemnation of the impious', at p. 267.
74. G. Cawkwell, 'Agesilaus and Sparta', *Classical Quarterly* 26.1 (1976), pp. 62–84, 64.
75. See Chapter 4, 'Agesilaus and the Sanctuary of Hera Akraia'.
76. Roy, 'Elis'.
77. Ibid., notes the significance of myth in this dispute.
78. Ibid., with refs.
79. Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', pp. 86–7.
80. L.J. Sanders, *Dionysius I of Syracuse and Greek Tyranny* (London, New York, Sydney, 1987), pp. 1–9, offers a fascinating account of Dionysius' attempts to present himself as a philosopher-ruler, and (pp. 9ff) the more enduring hostile image of him that emerged at Athens (nb. Ar. *Plutus*; Pl. *Rep*. 8.565F; Lysias, *Orat*. 33.5; Arist. *Pol*. 1305A) and was embraced and perpetuated by Timaeus. He demonstrates (pp. 110–57, esp. 154) that Diodorus presents a nuanced image of Dionysius, including hostile traditions in the Sicilian material, but also many positives, influenced by the use of Philistus; B. Cavan, *Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily* (New Haven and London, 1990), pp. 221–33, considers the negative traditions malicious slander.
81. Sanders, *Dionysius I*, at p. 121 argues convincingly that the Delphi story probably stems from the hostile Theopompus and, at p. 144, notes the general unreliability of the whole of the section in which the Delphi story appears; Cavan, *Dionysius I*, pp. 164, 191, 235, notes Dionysius' courting of Delphi and Olympia (15.13; 16.57) as evidence of his piety, but wonders, at p. 259, n. 34 if Dodona was the real target of this raid; Stylianou, *Commentary*, pp. 191–2, dismisses the Delphi story as 'nonsense', and also dismisses the possibility that this is a mistake for Dodona. 'Ephorus [sic] is likely to have presented the story as a rumour (φασίν or λέγεται), very much as Xenophon does that of Jason and Delphi (Xen. *Hell*. 6.4.30). Not surprisingly, there is a tradition (which reaches absurd lengths with Cic. *De nat. deorum* 3.34 [a raid on Olympia]) that Dionysius was not very respectful of gods and their temples, but there is no good evidence that he

robbed Greek (as opposed to barbarian: 15.14.3) temples. On the contrary, it is perfectly clear that Dionysius went to considerable lengths to establish and maintain good relations with the major Greek sanctuaries (cf. 14. 109; 16.57.2; Tod. 133 lines 9ff)'. Dionysius' overtures to the Panhellenic sanctuaries do not preclude the possibility of hostile intentions against them, but it is unconvincing that these differing attitudes would manifest so close together, and the textual difficulties outlined by Sanders make it almost entirely certain that the mission is a fiction. Nonetheless, Dionysius' friendly gestures to Delphi and Olympia should not determine our sense of how he treated his own sanctuaries (or Agylle's). Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', p. 87, notes the unconvincing nature of the Delphi story, but stresses the impact of the other raids.

82. Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', p. 87. Cavan, *Dionysius I*, pp. 160–6, rightly stresses that Dionysius' use of temple-funds was not entirely different from that by other states, but perhaps underestimates the significance of scale and communal legitimacy; Stylianou, *Commentary*, pp. 197–8, despite agreeing that Diodorus drew on hostile traditions, does not doubt the plundering of the temple at Agylle and notes that it was not surprising that Dionysius needed money, given his 'extravagant' lifestyle ('as befitted a Sicilian tyrant') and the cost of the war against Carthage. Sanders, *Dionysius I*, p. 175, observes that while many hostile traditions are embellishments, 'temples were very probably plundered'.
83. Roy, 'Elis'; Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism'.
84. Roy, 'Elis'; Parker, 'Subjection, synoecism': 'in the eyes not just of posterity but even of contemporaries Arcadia, not Pisa, could be said to have the presidency of the shrine' (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.35).
85. Roy, 'Elis': games invalid, Diodorus 15.78.3; Joint games, Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–9, Diod. Sic. 15.82.1, Paus. 6.4.2.
86. For more, see esp. J. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War* (Leiden, 1989); R. Sealey, *A History of Greek City States 700–358* (Berkeley, 1976b), pp. 463–8; McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*; Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, pp. 213–53.
87. Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, pp. 213–23, with Buckler, *Philip II*, pp. 15–16, see the Delphians behind the fines; contra McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, pp. 205–7, who prefers a greater role for Thebes. In 363, 11 Delphians had been exiled by the Amphictyony (*IG* II^2 19), probably pro-Phocians who offered (or were suspected of offering, Buckler, *Philip II*, pp. 9–13) to put Delphi in Phocian hands. Athens' support for the exiles stoked tensions, see Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, pp. 213–14.
88. *CID* IV.2, on which see Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, pp. 214–15; McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, p. 228, n. 66; Lefèvre, *L'Amphictionie*, pp. 48–9.
89. Above note, with Howe, 'Pastoralism', p. 143.
90. For the calculations, see Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', pp. 75–9.
91. McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, p. 205.
92. R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 173–4, the Phocians' rights were 'fiercely disputed', and the

indignation against them was not for use *per se*, but for using something 'other states had piously renounced'; J.K. Davies, 'The impious Phokians as economic facilitators', The Oxford Princeton Partnership Lectures (Oxford, 2003): 'Functionally and ideologically, the two accumulations [Athens and Delphi] represent very different sets of ideas'; McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, p. 210.

93. Parker, *Miasma*, p. 175; Buckler, *Philip II*, pp. 158–76, on the political allegiances; McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, pp. 209–11: Athens and Sparta backed Phocis to trouble Thebes, pp. 219–26, they continued despite Phocian wrongdoing out of concern about Macedon. See Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, pp. 223–53, on Macedon's involvement.
94. McInerney, *Folds of Parnassos*, pp. 203–4, 208–10, citing Aeschines, who, 'attributes the occupation of Delphi to "the tyrants of the Phokians" and twice calls Phalaikos "tyrant of the Phokians"', Aeschin. 2.130, 131, 135; Theopompus, *FGrHist.* 115.243; Polybius (9.33.6) has an ambassador refer to the destruction of the tyrants; Polyaenus (5.45) refers to Philomelus 'transforming his hegemony into a tyranny', following Diod. Sic. 16.23.6–24.1; Plutarch uses similar expressions, *Pyth. Orac*. 397ff; *Mul. Virt*. 13 (*Mor*. 249E). Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, p. 222, suggest that the *stasis* at Phocis, as well as the cultivation of sacred land, may have prompted the Delphians to call for the fines.
95. Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', p. 88, notes the intense financial hardship of the areas from which most mercenaries came.
96. Referring to his physical power, she tells him he can do what he wants; he takes this as an oracle authorising him to act as he pleases, a misinterpretation that echoes those of the Herodotean Croesus and Miltiades.
97. Ajax, see Part I, 'Examples from Troy'; Miltiades (Hdt. 6.134, Chapter 2, 'The Sanctuary of Demeter and a Despot's Crime'); Cleomenes (Hdt. 6.81, Chapter 4, 'Cleomenes and the Grove of Argos'); Agesilaus (Plut. *Ages*. 6, Chapter 5, 'Agesilaus and the Sanctuary of Artemis'). By contrast, Alcibiades is represented showing self-control in releasing priests and priestesses without ransom at the same time that he shows self-control in not causing Athenian civil war (Plut. A*lc*. 29).
98. Sacks, *Diodorus*, pp. 36–7, with n. 53.
99. Parker, *Miasma*, p. 172, notes the gloating tone of these stories. In one instance, many soldiers fled to the temple of Apollo at Abae and were killed in a miraculous fire; 'it became apparent that the gods do not extend to temple-robbers the protection generally accorded to suppliants' (Diod. Sic. 16.58.6). Pausanias attributes the fire to the Thebans, coupling them disapprovingly with the Persians who had first burnt the temple (Paus. 10.35.3).
100. Coverage included Theopompus' *On the Treasures Plundered from Delphi* (*FGrHist*. 115 F 247–9); Anaxandridas' work of the same name (*FGrHist*. 404 F2), as well as works by Polemon, Hagesandros, Alcetas, and the Ephorus-Demophilus used by Diod. Sic.
101. Davies, 'Phokian hierosylia', pp. 80–4.

102. Diodorus links this to an episode in which the Athenian general, Iphicrates, captured statues which were being sent by Dionysius to Delphi, and asked what he should do with them; they advise him to spend the money on his army (Diod. Sic. 16.57.2–3). Debra Hamel's observation (*Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period* (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998), p. 45) that 'The religious significance of the prizes taken by Iphicrates may have prompted him to seek instruction when he would otherwise not have done so' is surely correct, as is Robert Parker's (*Miasma*, p. 171), observation that the statues would not have been taken if they had actually arrived at Delphi and been dedicated. Nonetheless, Diodorus chides the Athenians by mentioning the story at this point, and by including Dionysius' angry letter of complaint to the Athenians chiding them for the seizure (Diod. Sic. 16.57.1–4). It is a sure sign of disgrace when Dionysius could take the moral high-ground with Athens.

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